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In exercising income tax jurisdiction, the state can choose to have a link with the 
personality of the income earner who resides within its territory whether or not the 
income was derived from a source within its territory (residence-based taxation). No 
universal rules for determining the tax residence of a person (either natural or juristic) 
for tax purposes apply in all circumstances. Thus, the states have different definitional 
rules of residence as contained in their respective income tax legislation and as 
interpreted by their courts. The global economic integration makes taxpayers move 
freely and exploit ambiguity created by the divergence of definition of tax jurisdiction 
between the States. The research explores the possibility of achieving cooperation 
amongst the States in delimiting the scope of their substantive and enforcement tax 
jurisdiction without losing their sovereignty. The cooperation envisioned by this 
research is a departure from the traditional approach, where the focal point of 
achieving cooperation is either bilateral or multilateral tax treaties. that focus on 
protecting the tax base of the party-state, ignoring the taxpayers who face conflicting 
claims due to inconsistencies in the definitional rules. The research argues that the 
cooperation could be achieved through comparative analysis of the definitional rules 
in order to ascertain the level of convergence and divergence and how they could 
extend mutual respect for each other’s tax sovereignty and balance their interests 
against that of the taxpayers in defining the tax residence. For the purpose of in-depth 
analysis, the research is restricted to Nigeria and South Africa. Nigeria has adopted 
the residence-based system at the inception of its income tax system, while South 
Africa initially adopted sourced-based system but later switched to the residence-
based system. Thus, the two states operate residence-based tax system. They are also 
parities to Bilateral Treaties in order to resolve the double taxation inherent in the 
system. However, the conflict remained unresolved. 
 
The thesis found that the definitional rule of tax residence is not universal. 
Traditionally, the States adopted the bilateral tax treaty regime to resolve the potential 
jurisdictional caused by the diversity. However, the reality of the economic 
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integration foists a challenge on that regime. Hence, the current move towards a 
multilateral tax treaty, which also runs against the tenet of the states’ tax sovereignty. 
Therefore, there is a conflicting interface between the need for the States’ cooperation 
in designing their tax residence rules and the states’ tax sovereignty. The research 
revealed that a comparative analysis of the diverse definitional rules balances the two 
conflicting interests. The comparison of the Nigerian and South African regimes 
bring home the significance of the comparative analysis.  It is found that the two 
regimes operate different and irreconcilable rules on the definition of tax residence. 
While, the South African regime is closer to the global trend, the Nigerian rules are 
complex and inconsistent, which could have impacted the existing double taxation 
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The power to impose tax is a dimension – and a crucial dimension – of state 
sovereignty.1 The state must have a jurisdictional basis for exercising this 
power. Thus, the necessary precondition for the exercise of fiscal jurisdiction 
by a state is the existence of the requisite link between that person (or the 
potentially taxable amount, where the source of income is in issue) and the 
state. It is relatively rate for taxpayers to question the State’s jurisdictional 
power to tax them, but they may fear that the divergence of the definitional 
rules in this regard may expose them to being regarded as tax residents of more 
than one state. Taxpayers may legitimately expect that states should cooperate 
with each other in defining who are ‘residents’ for tax purposes. On the other 
hand, States balance two conflicting interests when designing their domestic 
fiscal laws. That is to say they want to design their definitional rules in this 
regard in such a way as to protect their tax base and prevent manipulation by 
the taxpayers. But, at the same time, they need to accept the reality of 
                                                 
1 Martha, RSJ ‘The Jurisdiction to Tax in International Law’ (1989) Kluwer, Deventer at 12–18; Avi-
Yonah, RS ‘International Tax as International Law’ (2004) 57 Tax Law Rev 483 at 484–91Qureshi, 
AH ‘The Public International Law of Taxation: Texts, Cases and Materials’ (1994) Graham & 
Trotman, London at 1–9  Knechtle, AA ‘Basic Problems in International Fiscal Law’ (1979)  
Kluwer, The Netherlands 37, 41; Qureshi, AH ‘The Freedom of a State to Legislate in Fiscal Matters 
under General International Law’ (1987) 41 BIFD 14; Rosenbloom, HD ‘International Tax 
Arbitrage and the “International Tax System”’ (2000) 53 Tax Law Rev 137.   
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globalisation, by taking into account the jurisdictional rules applied by other 
states. 
 
Thus, the state may take account of the link to the income and impose tax on 
the basis that the source of that income is located within the state, whether or 
not the income was derived by a resident.2 Alternatively, the state can take 
account of its linkage to the persona of an income earner who resides3 within 
its territory. It can then tax that person on a residence basis, whether or not the 
income was derived from a source within its territory. The distinction between 
residence and source-based systems is irrelevant to a person who earns and 
invests his earnings in the state where he resides. The distinction between 
residence and sourced-based systems becomes relevant where the person 
derives his income in a state other than where he resides. There are no 
universal rules for determining the tax residence of either natural or juristic 
persons.4 Thus, each jurisdiction has its definitional rules in respect of 
‘residence’ as contained in their respective domestic income tax legislation 
and as interpreted by its own courts. 
 
The absence of a globally accepted criterion for fiscal ‘residence’ test has led 
to diversity and inconsistencies in defining both individual and corporate 
residence. Thus, there are situations where an overlapping taxing power 
occurs between two or more states that have both adopted a residence-based 
system. In resolving such conflicts, States usually adopt both unilateral and 
bilateral mechanisms in the form of double taxation relief provisions in their 
                                                 
2 Williams RC ‘Income Tax in South Africa: Law and Practice (2006) 4thed LexisNexis, Durban  
3 Or in the case of United States of America, if the person is a citizen even if he is not a resident. See 
Blum, C and Singer, PN ‘A Coherent Policy Proposal for U.S. Residence-Based Taxation of 
Individuals’ (2008) 41 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 708 
4 The determination of the residence status of the taxpayers is crucial because as it affects all other 
aspects of the tax system. It determines the scope of the taxable income, the rate of the tax, the level 
of allowable deductions, the availability of exemptions and the obligation to withhold tax. See 
Williams, RC (2006) at 32 
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domestic laws and an international bilateral Double Taxation Agreement 
(DTA) to resolve the conflicting jurisdictional claims and to enhance fiscal 
cooperation.5 A DTA is a bilateral treaty entered into by the two states 
involved. Thus, it binds only the two contracting parties. However, as a result 
of current global economic integration, a network of bilateral tax treaties may 
not achieve the desired result in this regard. This is why many commentators6 
have called for a shift from a bilateral treaty regime to a multilateral one in 
order to address the divergence of tax laws in this regard. However, a proposed 
Multilateral Tax Treaty regime may be vulnerable to constitutional challenge 
on the basis of its dilution of a State’s sovereignty in tax matters.7 
 
The interface between state fiscal sovereignty and global economic integration 
raises questions as to the effectiveness of bilateral treaties in resolving 
jurisdictional conflicts, inter alia in regard to the definition of fiscal residence. 
That is to say, globalisation brings States economically closer to each other 
but a bilateral treaty regime cannot resolve potential jurisdictional conflicts. 
Thus, fiscal sovereignty hinders the impetus toward a multilateral tax treaty 
regime. Nonetheless, States need to cooperate with each other. This thesis 
argues that the requisite cooperation can be achieved outside the tax treaty 
                                                 
5 For the purpose of this thesis, references to a bilateral or multilateral tax treaty regime are limited to 
the definitional rule of ‘resident’ for the purposes of the treaty, not the detailed content of the treaty. 
6 Cockfield, AJ ‘International Tax Competition: The Last Battleground of Globalization’ (2011) 63 
(12) Tax Notes International 867; from the empirical research conducted there are more than 2600 
DTA around the globe. See Braun, J and Zagler, M ‘An economic perspective on double tax treaties 
with(in) developing countries’ (2014) 6 (1) World Tax Journal 1.  
7 XU, M ‘Road forward to a multilateral tax treaty regime? ‘(2014) Global Tax News available at 
hhtp://www.dlapiper.com/en/global/insights/publication/2014/10 assessed on 10/5/2015 (He 
observes that the proposed multilateral tax treaty would require significant changes to the domestic 
tax laws. Therefore. the states that are highly protective of their sovereignty such as US, China 
Russia and the UK are not likely to endorse the proposal which may consequently remain at regional 
level.) see also Yonah, RS ‘Hanging Together: A Multilateral Approach to Taxing Multinationals’ 
(2016) 5 Mich. Bus. & Entrepreneurial L. Rev. 137; Cockfield, A J ‘The rise of the OECD as 
informal 'world tax organization' through national responses to e-commerce tax challenges’ (2006) 
8 (1) Yale Journal of Law and Technology; Brauner, Y ‘An International Tax Regime in 




regime and suggests that a comparative analysis of the rules adopted by states 
in defining the concept of ‘residence’ reveals that that States can preserve their 
fiscal sovereignty whilst achieving mutual cooperation through a better 
understanding of their respective definitional rules, after making any 
necessary reforms in this regard.  
 
1.2 Scope of the Thesis 
 
Research for this study was conducted within the framework of a residence-
based tax system, including the issue of double taxation8 and tax avoidance,9 
and including an analysis of the concept of residence either as a tiebreaker rule 
or as an anti-avoidance mechanism. However, this research will be limited to 
the definitional aspects of residence as expressed in domestic legislation.10 A 
residence-based system connotes that States should impose a tax on both the 
domestic and foreign income of their residents. The residence status of a 
person is thus crucial in determining his tax liability as the ascertainment of 
tax liability is the condition precedent that person’s becoming subject to tax. 
A liability to tax is distinct from being subject to tax. Under a residence-based 
                                                 
8 Gutuza, T ‘An analysis of the methods used in the South African domestic legislation and in double 
taxation treaties entered into by South Africa for the elimination of international double taxation’ 
Unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Law University of Cape Town, South Africa, 
2013. 
9 Oguttu, AW ‘Curbing offshore tax avoidance: the case of South African companies and trusts’ 
Unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Law, University of South Africa 2007. 
10 The establishment of a jurisdictional link is a condition precedent for asserting tax jurisdiction. It 
is the primary connecting factor. The tiebreaker rule, as well as the rules for determining the 
eligibility for tax reliefs or exemptions, are secondary connecting factors. Because, the nexus 
between the taxing state and the potential taxpayer must first be established before the issue of 
enjoying certain relief or exemptions or even benefiting from any DTA come up. A point worth 
noting is that before a tiebreaker rule applies to any situation, the resident status of the taxpayer in 
one of the parties must have been established. Thus, its application is grounded on the establishment 
of the jurisdictional link. Therefore, while dealing with the jurisdictional nexus under the domestic 
laws, the role of residence in the DTA should be a secondary consideration. Conversely, in analysing 
the role of residence under the DTA, the question of jurisdictional nexus under the domestic law is 
of equal importance. In the same vein, the issue of eligibility for reliefs or exemption is also 
grounded an established jurisdictional link. 
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regime, a person becomes both ‘liable to tax’ and ‘subject to tax'11 once he 
falls within the definition of “resident” provided by the tax system. He remains 
liable to tax even if, the regime exempts him from paying the tax, or if it 
granted him certain tax relief thereby making that person not subject to tax. 
Thus, all persons subject to tax are liable to tax, but not all persons liable to 
tax are subject to tax.12 ‘Residence’ can be used to determine whether or not a 
person is liable or is subject to tax. The crux of this thesis is the notion of 
residence as a determinant of establishing ‘liability to tax’ not of being 
‘subject to tax.' 
 
Nigeria has adopted a residence-based system from the inception of its income 
tax system and it has been in operation ever since. The Republic of South 
Africa initially adopted a source-based system, but in 2001, it switched to 
residence-based regime. Thus, the two countries currently impose income tax 
on both corporate and individuals on the same basis. Furthermore, the two 
nations are trading partners with an existing Double Taxation Agreement.  
  
The comparison undertaken in this thesis centres on the concept of residence 
as a means of establishing fiscal jurisdiction, but not for determining eligibility 
to tax exemption or relief.  Thus, this thesis does not merely deal with the 
relationship between Nigeria’s and South Africa’s respective residence-based 
regimes. It also undertakes an in-depth analysis of the definitional rule of both 
corporate and individuals’ residence in these two countries to ascertain the 
intricacies involved in the respective laws of the two states.13 Reference will 
                                                 
11 Wheeler, J ‘Persons qualifying for treaty benefits’ in Trepelkov, A et al (ed) ‘United Nations 
Handbook on Selected Issues in Administration of Double Tax Treaties for Developing Countries’ 
(2013) UN Publication, New York 60 at 63. 
12 A person is said to be liable to tax once he falls within the category of taxable persons provided by 
the taxing statute. However, the statute may exempt the taxable person from paying the tax or the 
class of income earned by the taxable person, 
13 United Kingdom, United States of America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and some civil law 
jurisdictions notably, France, Germany, Netherland, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria and Spain. 
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be made to other jurisdictions for purposes of an extended comparison. The 
comparative analysis explores the diversity of the rules adopted by the two 
states in determining the residence status of both corporate and individual. It 
also shows the weakness of the current DTA regime. Given the importance of 
the comparison, this thesis argues that it is possible to achieve cooperation 





For the purposes of this study, both the doctrinal and comparative methods of 
research will be adopted. By the doctrinal method, data will be collated from 
primary sources and from secondary sources. The primary sources include 
domestic statutes and the law reports of the jurisdictions covered. The 
secondary sources comprise journal articles, textbooks, legal encyclopaedias, 
and periodicals as well as previous relevant research. The statutes and case 
law will be used to derive relevant statute law and judicial pronouncements. 
Secondary sources will be used to access reflections of some other writers and 
to gain further insights into relevant issues at stake. In combination, these 
sources will reveal the juridical nature of the States’ fiscal sovereignty, the 
diversity of the definitional rules of tax residence and the need for co-
operation between states in defining fiscal residence in the context of 
increasing global economic integration. 
 
The comparative method will be used as a means of revealing the detailed 
domestic rules of the various states in determining fiscal residence, and the 
potential for co-operation between states. The detailed rules for determining 
fiscal residence in both Nigeria and South Africa will be compared and 
analysed to highlight the areas of strength and weakness in these two regimes 
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as well as the weaknesses of the DTA regime currently in force between these 
two states, and the lessons that each of these states may learn from the other. 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
 
Chapter one, as a general introduction, will serve as the background to the 
thesis as a whole. It will outline the nature and scope of the research, its 
objectives, justification, and the methodology applied in conducting the 
research.  
 
Chapter two gives a general overview of the legal framework for taxation in 
both Nigeria and South Africa, tracing the historical development of the tax 
regime in the two States. It will show that the States are both former British 
Colonies, and that the British Parliament introduced the income tax system in 
both colonies.14 Thus, these two States share a common antecedent in the 
development of their respective tax systems.  However, despite the British 
policy of imposing source-based income tax in its colonies, the British 
government introduced a residence-based tax regime in Nigeria and a source-
based system in South Africa. Nigeria has continued to operate a residence-
based system to the present day, whereas, in 2001, South Africa switched from 
a source-based to a residence-based regime. This Chapter also gives highlights 
of the current legal and regulatory framework for the operation of the 
residence-based system in Nigeria and its earlier operation in South Africa. 
 
Chapter three analyses the residence-basis as an aspect of tax jurisdiction 
through the lens of state sovereignty. It discusses the limitations that global 
economic integration foists on states’ tax sovereignty, and the significance of 
                                                 
14 See the Native Revenue Proclamation No. 2 of 1906 and the Cape of Good Hope Additional 




co-operation between states. The chapter also analyses the underlying 
principles and tax policy considerations in designing residence-based system.  
 
Chapter four discusses the nature of the current mechanisms for tax 
cooperation (namely, the treaty regimes) and role being played by the OECD. 
It also shows the impact of globalisation on the regime as well as the nature 
and scope of the OECD-BEPS initiatives. The chapter also highlights the 
weakness of the traditional method of achieving co-operation in this regard 
such as Double Tax Agreements. It also explores the possibility of achieving 
the desired cooperation between the states in defining the scope of their tax 
jurisdiction outside the traditional methods. The chapter makes a case for a 
comparative analysis of the different definitional rule for determining tax 
residence. 
 
Chapter five sets the stage for a comparative analysis by comparing and 
analysing the various rules for the determination of ‘residence’ as a connecting 
factor for imposing income tax on both individuals and corporations. It 
highlights the diverse nature of the rules defining the tax residence. The 
chapter analyses diversity in this regard through the lens of the tests applicable 
in common law jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, the United States 
of America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and some civil law jurisdictions 
notably, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria 
and Spain.15 These jurisdictions were chosen because aspects of their legal 
regimes are relevant to that of Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa. 
 
                                                 
15, Thuronyi proposes Germany, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom as natural choices 
for tax comparison. These countries can be regarded as leaders in influencing the tax laws of other 
countries. See Thuronyi, V ‘Comparative tax law’ (2003) Kluwer Law International, London See 
also Thuronyi, V ‘Tax law design and drafting’ (1996) 1 International Monetary Fund, xxiii-xxxv 
(Thuronyi, V. ed.). 
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Chapter Six provides detailed comparative analyses of the tests being used 
by Nigeria and South Africa for the determination of tax residence as a 
jurisdictional link for the imposition of income tax on individuals,16 that is to 
say, natural persons.17 It critically examines the existing DTA between Nigeria 
and South Africa through the lens of the respective rules for determining tax 
residence. Finally, it narrows down the lessons that both states can learn from 
each other in this regard and how such lessons could foster co-operation in 
defining tax residence. 
  
Chapter Seven as with Chapter six, this chapter compares and analyses the 
fiscal residence of corporations. Both chapters six and seven attempt an 
analysis of fiscal residence as a jurisdictional link, as distinct from being a 
mechanism for determining the eligibility of the person concerned to certain 
reliefs or exemption from tax or, alternatively, as a tiebreaker rule in a Double 
Taxation Agreement. 
  
Chapter Eight contains the conclusions derived from the research and makes 
certain recommendations in respect of problems revealed by the research.
                                                 
16In Nigeria, individual income tax applies to all recognised entities other than incorporated 
companies; such as partnership, Trustees, Estates, family and communities. 
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2.0  Introduction 
 
A tax system embraces tax policy, tax law (in the sense of the charging 
provisions of the relevant legislation) and tax administration. Fiscal policy is a 
governmental initiative that provides a set of guidelines, rules, and methods that 
regulate the tax system as a whole. It usually serves as the platform for both tax 
law and tax administration. Tax law thus deals with the imposition of tax while 
tax administration deals inter alia with the enforcement of tax law, and with the 
collection of tax. The determination of tax jurisdiction is crucial in the tax 
system. World-wide, residence and source are the two most commonly adopted 
connecting factors in determination of the tax jurisdiction. The theme of this 
thesis is the comparative analysis of the Nigerian and South African legal 
regime on residence-based taxation. The two regimes operate under the legal 
framework set out by their respective tax systems and the differences between 
the structural aspects of their legal systems must be recognised. This chapter 
concisely highlights the legal framework on which the residence-based tax 
system of Nigeria and South Africa operate. A detailed analysis of the 
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provisions of their respective Constitutions relevant to issues of tax is however 
outside the scope of this chapter.  
 
2.1 Overview of the Nigerian Fiscal system 
 
Nigeria became a political entity in the year 1914 when the Southern and 
Northern Protectorates and the British colony of Lagos were amalgamated to 
form ‘Nigeria’. The amalgamation coincided with the beginning of the modern 
Nigerian tax system.1 Before the merger, many forms of taxation were practised 
by the various indigenous communities.2  In Northern Nigeria, the two major 
Muslim states; the Sokoto Caliphate and the Kanem-Bornu Empire, imposed 
different types of taxes.3 In Southern Nigeria, various forms of taxes were 
imposed by the Yoruba Empire4 and The Benin Kingdom5. Under the Native 
Revenue Proclamation No. 2 of 1906,6 the British Colonialist first harmonised 
the tax system that hitherto operated in Northern Nigeria and introduced in the 
                                                 
1 Akanle, O ‘The power to tax and federalism in Nigeria: Legal and Constitutional perspectives on the 
sources of Government revenue’ (1988) Intec Printers Limited, Ibadan at 11. 
2 Okauru, IO ‘A comprehensive tax history of Nigeria’ (2012) FIRS Publication, Abuja at 69. 
3 In northern Nigeria the two major Muslim states; the Sokoto Caliphate and the Kanem-Bornu Empire, 
imposed different types of taxes. In the Sokoto Caliphate there was Zakkat which is one of pillars of 
Islam. It is a compulsory tax on all Muslims determinable by the nature of property owned by the 
taxpayer. Apart from zakat there were other form of taxes which included: 1) the agricultural tax 
(gandu) which was imposed at the rate of 1/8 of the total crops cultivated by a famer; 2) Plantation 
tax (Shuka-shuka); 3) land tax (Kurdin Kasa); 4) Cattle tax (Jangali); 5) Death tax (Kudin Ushira) a 
tax payable to the Emir when a person dies without legal heirs or as fee for the distribution of the 
estate to the eligible heirs; the accession tax (kurdin Sarauta) a tax payable to any person appointed to 
a traditional office. In the Kanem-Bornu Empire, there was Zakkat and other forms of taxes which 
included: 1) Compulsory income tax on all Muslims possessing tangible property (Sada’a); 2) Tax 
collected from all inhabitant of the Empire, whether or not Muslims (hakki bininram); 3) Grazing tax 
collected from nomadic-pastoral people (Kasasairam); Land tax (Kaleram); and 4) Death tax 
(Waratha). See Okauru, IO ‘A comprehensive tax history of Nigeria’ (2012) FIRS Publication, Abuja 
at 69; Omolewa, M. ‘Certificate History of Nigeria’ (1989) Longman Press Lagos, at 48; Benisheikh, 
A. K., ‘A Preliminary Investigation into the Revenue System of the Borno Government in the 
Nineteenth Century’ in Akinjogbin, IA and Osoba, S, (eds.) ‘Topics on Nigerian Economic and Social 
History’ (1980), University of Ife Press Ltd, Ile-Ife at 66. 
4 In Yoruba Empire taxes such as; land tax (Ishakole), tax for the support of the Kings (Owo ode) and 
personal service tax (Owo Asinghu). 
5Benin Kingdom imposed taxes such Ugamwen and Akorbore see Igbafe, AA. ‘The Pre-Colonial 
Economic Foundations of Benin kingdom’ in Akinjogbin, I. A. and Osoba, S (eds.) ‘Topics on 
Nigerian Economic and Social History’ (1980), University of Ife Press Ltd, Ile-Ife at 19. 
6 The first Income tax legislation in Nigeria. 
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Northern Protectorate of Nigeria. Section 3 (a) and (b) of the Proclamation, 
empowered the Resident of the Northern Protectorate to impose a tax on 
natives7 residing within the territory of his Province. This marked the beginning 
of the residence-based tax system in Nigeria.  
 
After the amalgamation, the above proclamation was repealed by the Native 
Revenue Ordinance No. 1 of 1917. The ordinance retained the provisions of 
section 3 (a) and (b) of the Proclamation which imposed income tax on a 
residence basis. The only difference between the two was the extension of the 
income tax regime to the Western Provinces.8 The income tax system was 
extended to the Eastern Provinces in 1927.9 Up to 1931, the income tax system 
was applicable only to the indigenous people residing in Nigeria. In 1931, the 
income tax system was extended to cover non-natives residing outside the 
Colony of Lagos.10 By 1940, all the ordinances mentioned above had been 
harmonised to form a single piece of legislation applicable throughout Nigeria 
except Lagos Colony.11 The Ordinance applied to all groups of individuals 
residing, carrying on business or being within any town, village or settlement 
or in any locality therein and included a band of nomad herdsmen’.12  
 
The corporate tax system was first introduced to Nigeria in 1939,13 but a year 
later Nigeria adopted a single tax regime for both individuals and corporations.14 
For the taxation of individuals, the new Ordinance abolished the native and non-
                                                 
7 Who were subject to the other forms of tax before the advent of British imperialism. 
8 Section 1 of the Native Revenue Ordinance No. 1 1917 and Section 2 Native Revenue (Amendment) 
Ordinance No. 29 1918. 
9 Sections 1 and 2  of the Native Revenue (Amendment) Ordinance No. 17 1927 
10 Section 4 (3) of the Non-Natives Income Tax (Protectorate) Ordinance No. 21 1931. By section 7 of 
the Ordinance, a non-native who was temporarily residing in Nigeria for less than six months in the 
year preceding the current year of assessment was exempted from the application of the ordinance. 
But the provision of the Ordinance was applicable only to male non-natives, as females were 
exempted. 
11 That was the Direct Taxation Ordinance No. 4 of1940. 
12 Ibid section 2 and 4. 
13 Companies Income Tax Ordinance No. 14 1939 
14 Income Tax Ordinance No. 3 1940 
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native dichotomy. Thus, the question was simply whether or not an individual 
was a Nigerian resident.  While installing the Nigerian corporate tax regime, the 
new Ordinance defined a ‘company’ as: 
“Any company incorporated or registered under any law in force in 
Nigeria and any company which, though incorporated or registered 
outside Nigeria, carries on business, or has an office or place of business 
therein.”15 
 
Nigeria maintained its single tax regime from 1940 up to 1954 when Nigeria 
switched from a Unitary to a Federal state. The introduction of the federal 
system marked the beginning of the devolution of the taxing power as between 
the federal and regional governments.16 However, the single tax regime 
continued up to 1961 when the individual and corporate tax systems were 
separated. Hence, the promulgation of two laws to regulate the income tax 
applicable to individuals and corporations, namely, the Income Tax 
Management Act No. 21 of 196117 and the Companies Income Tax Act 1961.18   
 
2.2 Highlights of the Current Legal Framework 
 
The above summarises the historical development of the Nigerian tax system 
and the chronicle of legislative developments. This heading focuses on the 
current legal regime. It highlights the Nigerian constitutional and legal 
                                                 
15 Section 2 of the Income Tax Ordinance No. 3 1940. By section 15 of the same Ordinance, a 
company was deemed to be resident in the country where its CMC is located. 
16 The switch to a federal system of government has serious implications for the Nigerian individual 
residence-based tax regime because the question became whether or not an individual is a resident of 
one region or another or is even a resident of Nigeria as a whole. 
17Several amendments were made between 1961 and 2011: Income Tax (Amendment) Decree No. 58 
1968, Income Tax Management (Amendment) Decree No. 35 1968, Income Tax Management 
(Amendment) Decree No. 24 1971, Income Tax Management (Amendment) Decree No. 41 1973, 
Income Tax Management (Uniform Taxation Provisions, etc.) Decree No. 7 1975, Income Tax 
(Armed Forces and Other Persons) (Special Provisions) Decree No. 51 1972; The Personal Income 
Tax Decree No. 104 1993, The Personal Income Tax Act Cap P8 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
2004 and The Personal Income Tax (amendment) Act 2011. 
18Amended between 1961 and 2007. The Companies Income Tax Act 1979 has been amended by 
various Finance (Miscellaneous Taxation Provisions) Decrees, the Companies Income Tax Act Cap 
C21 P8 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 and the Companies Income Tax (Amendment) Act 
No. 11 2007.  
14 
 
framework for its residence-based system. It traces the constitutional 
developments up to the 1999 constitution. For tax laws, only the current 
legislation is considered. The Constitution is relevant to the tax system of every 
state in defining the scope of the states’ taxing powers. Nigeria got its first 
constitution in 1914 which empowered the Governor-General to make laws for 
the administration of justice and revenue generation.19 The Lyttleton 
Constitution of 1954 set in place the current Nigerian constitutional framework 
for taxation. The relevant section provided that: 
“Where under any law enacted by the Federal Legislature any tax is 
levied on incomes or profit, … of persons, other than bodies corporate, 
resident in that Region during that year.”20 
 
The above provision has echoes of the principles of the residence-based system 
in Nigeria. In applying the income tax laws, the Governor-General was 
empowered to make laws for the determination of the residence of all persons.21 
The 1960 and the 1963 Constitutions followed the same trend of the previous 
constitutions by maintaining the principles of the residence-based tax system.22 
The 1979 constitution maintained the tenor of the residence-based system, but 
it introduced changes in the devolution of the taxing power between the states 
and the Federal Governments. Under this Constitution, the Federal Government 
was clothed with both substantive and enforcement taxing powers in respect of 
                                                 
19 Section VIII of the Nigeria Protectorate Order in Council 1913. The other three Constitutions that 
immediately followed the 1914 Constitution contained similar provisions. For instance, the Nigeria 
Protectorate Order-in-Council 1922 (the Clifford Constitution) extended application of the income tax 
to Eastern Nigeria; under the Richard Constitution of 1946 the Legislative Council was empowered 
to impose income tax without seeking the consent of the Governor-General. The MacPherson 
Constitution of 1951 established Regional Houses of Assembly with the power to impose tax, but 
subject to the approval of Her Majesty, the Queen of England.  
20 Section 162 (1) of the 1954 Nigerian Constitution. See also item 36 of part I of the first schedule to 
the 1954 Constitution.  
21 Ibid at section 162 (3) 
22 See section 10 (1) and 70 of the Nigeria (Constitution) Order-in-Council 1960. Both the federal and 
the Regional governments shared both the substantive and enforcement income tax jurisdiction for 
individuals, but the federal government retained the substantive power of enforcement over 
corporations. By sections 63 and 76 the powers of the Regional legislature over income tax were made 
subject to the recommendation of the president. 
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both corporations and individuals. The states were left with only enforcement 
tax jurisdiction in respect of individuals, which they share with the Federal 
government.23 
 
The current Constitution is the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1999. It sets out the framework for taxation in Nigeria and makes the payment 
of tax a duty that is imposed on all taxable persons in the following terms:  
“it shall be the duty of every citizen to declare his income honestly to 
appropriate and lawful agencies and pay his tax promptly”.24  
 
The section imposes the obligation to pay tax on a ‘citizen’ which extends to all 
taxable persons in Nigeria. The Constitution makes the compulsory acquisition 
of moveable and immovable properties of any person a breach of his 
fundamental rights. 25  However, the imposition and enforcement of tax is not 
considered a violation of fundamental rights.26 Therefore, the imposition and 
the collection of the tax in Nigeria is made under a specific statutory provision. 
Moreover, once a statute imposes a tax, the constitutional right to property is 
suspended to the extent of the provisions of that statute. 
 
The Constitution goes further and defines the scope of the taxing powers of the 
tiers of government, that is to say, the federal and state governments. It provides 
that:  
“The National Assembly shall have the power to make laws for the 
peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part thereof 
with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List set 
out in Part I of the Second Schedule to this Constitution.”27 
 
                                                 
23 See section 4 and part I and II of the second schedule to the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria. 
24 Section 24 (f) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 
25 Ibid Section 44 (1)  
26 Ibid section 44 (2) (a) 
27 Section 4 (2) of the 1999 Constitution 
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Item 59 of part of the second schedule provides for the – 
“Taxation of incomes, profits and capital gains, except as otherwise 
prescribed by this Constitution.”  
This means that exclusive substantive tax jurisdiction for the imposition of 
income tax on both individuals and corporations lies with the National 
Assembly (the second arm of the federal government). In addition to this 
exclusive jurisdiction, the National Assembly is also empowered to share the 
enforcement jurisdiction in respect of individual income tax with the states.  
Thus, section 4 (4) of the 1999 Constitution provides:  
“In addition and without prejudice to the powers conferred by subsection 
(2) of this section, the National Assembly shall have the power to make 
laws with respect to the following matters, that is to say: - (a) any matter 
in the Concurrent Legislative List set out in the first column of Part II of 
the Second Schedule to this Constitution to the extent prescribed in the 
second column opposite thereto;” 
   
Item 7 of part two of the second Schedule to the Constitution provides; 
“In the exercise of its powers to impose any tax or duty on - (a) capital 
gains, incomes or profits or persons other than companies … the National 
Assembly may, subject to such conditions as it may prescribe, provide 
that the collection of any such tax or duty or the administration of the 
law imposing it shall be carried out by the Government of a State or other 
authority of a State.” 
 
The above provisions governed the devolution of the taxing power between 
the Federal and State governments. All Nigerian tax legislation derives its 
validity from these constitutional provisions. However, the exercise of the 
power conferred on the federal and state legislature leads to some 
jurisdictional conflicts. In an attempt to resolve such disputes, the Taxes and 
Levies (Approved List for Collection) Act Cap T2 LFN 2004 was enacted 
to provide a list of the taxes that each of the three tiers of Government 
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impose or administer.28 In terms of the provisions of the 1999 Constitution, 
the Federal Government is clothed with both substantive and enforcement 
tax jurisdiction on all taxes imposed by the following Acts:  
(i) Customs and Excise Duties,29  
(ii) Personal Income Tax,30  
(iii) Companies Income Tax,31  
(iv) Petroleum Profits Tax,32  
(v) Education Tax,33  
(vi) Technology Tax,34 
(vii) Capital Gains Tax,35 
(viii) Stamp Duties.36 
(ix) Value Added Tax Act 
 
The State Governments are clothed with the enforcement tax jurisdiction in 
respect of the taxes imposed by the following Acts: 
i) Personal Income Tax,37  
ii) Capital Gains Tax,38 
iii) Stamp Duties.39 
 
The Taxes and Levies (Approved List for Collection) Act amplifies the above 
constitutional provisions. It delimits the enforcement jurisdiction of both the 
Federal Inland Revenue Service and the State Inland Revenue Service – all of 
                                                 
28 See Emiko, G.I. ‘An Analysis of Federal/State Taxing Powers’ in Ajemo, M.A. (ed) Tax Law and 
Tax Administration in Nigeria (1991) NIALS Publication, Lagos, 12 at 40 Okorodudu, MT ‘Nigeria: 
analysis of Federal and State taxing powers’ (1985) 11 Int'l Tax J. 305 at 307 
29  Customs and Excise Management Act, Cap C4 LFN, 2004.  
30 Personal Income Tax Act, Cap P8, LFN 2004  
31 Companies Income Tax Act, Cap C21, LFN 2004.  
32 Petroleum Profits Tax, Cap P 13, LFN 2004.  
33 Education Tax, Cap E4, LFN 2004.  
34 National Information Technology Development Tax Act, No – 1997. 
35 Capital Gains Tax Act, Cap C1 LFN 2004. 
36 Stamp Duties Act, Cap S8 LFN 2004. 
37 Personal Income Tax Act, Cap P8, LFN 2004  
38 Capital Gains Tax Act, Cap C1 LFN 2004. 
39 Stamp Duties Act, Cap S8 LFN 2004. 
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which are tiers of government. The Act provides that the Federal Inland 
Revenue Service40 shall administer the following:41 
1)  Companies Income Tax 
2) Personal Income Tax in respect of: 
 i) Residents of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja 
ii) Non-resident individuals 
iii) Military personnel 
iv) Members of the Nigeria Police Force 
v) Residents of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja 
vi) Individuals under the Employment of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and non-resident individuals 
3) Petroleum Profits Tax 
4) Value Added Tax 
5) Education Tax 
6) Capital Gains Tax on residents of Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, 
bodies corporate and non-resident individuals 
7) Stamp duties on the corporate bodies and the persons residing in the 
Federal Capital Territory, Abuja 
 
The Act also provides that the State Inland Revenue Service shall administer 
the following: 
1)  Personal Income Tax in respect of individuals residing within the States 
2) Capital Gains Tax (individuals only) 
3) Stamp Duties on instruments executed by individual 
4) Pool’s betting and lotteries, gaming and casino tax 
5) Road Taxes 
6) Business premises registration fee 
 
There is controversy on the validity of the Taxes and Levies (Approved List for 
Collection) Act vis-à-vis the provisions of section 4 of the Nigerian 
Constitution. Abiola42 argues that the division of taxing power must broadly 
                                                 
40 Established by the Federal Inland Revenue Service Act of 2007 
41 Part I of Schedule I of the Taxes and Levies (Approved List for Collection) Act Cap T2 LFN 2004 
42 Sanni, A, ‘Division of taxing powers’ in Abdulrazaq, MT (ed) CITN Nigerian Tax Guide and Statutes’ 
(2002) CITN, Lagos. At 653 
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follow the division of legislative power as enshrined in the Constitution. 
Therefore, each level of government can impose a tax in respect of any of the 
items in respect of which it has the power to legislate. However, the general 
purport of the Act is to streamline the taxing powers of all level of government 
by division into a list of 39 specific items to avoid conflicts arising from 
encroachment. 
 
2.3 Overview of the South Africa Fiscal system 
 
The South African legal system traces its origins from the Roman-Dutch Law 
introduced in 1652 when the Dutch East India Company established a base at 
the Cape of Good Hope43 and the law so introduced remained the applicable law 
up to 1806 when the British conquered the Cape.44 Initially, Britain allowed 
Roman-Dutch law to continue in operation.45 However, there was a gradual 
introduction of English Law into the Cape Colony. Dissatisfied inter alia with 
the introduction of English law, some Dutch Settlers trekked away from the 
Cape and established the Republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State.46  
 
These two Republics and Natal adopted Roman-Dutch Law as the basis of their 
law but retained some aspects of English law.47 After the conflicts of 1899 – 
1902, the Colonies of Cape Colony, Natal, Transvaal and Orange Free State 
were amalgamated to establish the Union of South Africa in 1910.48 This laid 
the foundation for the later Republic of South Africa. Sections 135 and 136 of 
the 1909 Act allowed for the gradual integration of the laws applicable to all 
                                                 
43Van der Merwe, C ‘The origin and characteristics of the mixed legal systems of South Africa and 
Scotland and their importance in globalization’ (2012) 18 Fundamina 91 at 92 
44 Farham, I ‘Some reflections on the study of South African legal system’ (2003) 9 Fundamina 1 at 7 
45 This was pursuant to Art 8 of the Articles of Capitulation, 1806 which provided that "the Burghers 
and Inhabitants shall preserve all their Rights and Privileges which they have enjoyed hitherto". The 
decision in the English case of Campbell v Hall (1774) 98 ER 848 held that the laws of the Cape 
Colony remained applicable until altered by the Sovereign. 
46 Van der Merwe (2012) at 96 – 97  
47 Ibid at 97 
48 Section 4 – 7 of The Union of South Africa Act, 1909.  
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four colonies thus maintaining the mixed legal system that was hitherto applied 
in those Colonies.49 This legal arrangement made South Africa one of the 
countries which applied a mixture of Roman-Dutch and English Law.50 The 
Union of South of Africa gained independence from the UK in 1931 in terms of 
sections 1 – 4 of the Statute of Westminster, 193151 and the Union of South 
Africa became a Republic in 1961.52 
 
At its inception, South Africa adopted a sourced-based income tax regime. This 
had its origins in the Cape of Good Hope Additional Taxation Act No. 36 of 
1904, which was the first legislation to introduce income tax in South Africa. 
Section 50 provided that: 
“From the 1st July 1904 … there shall be levied, collected and paid … an 
income tax … on all income … (1) arising or accruing to any person 
wheresoever residing…” 
 
Section 42 of the Act defined income as: 
“Any gain or profits derived or received by any company or person … 
from any source within this colony…” 
 
A source-based tax system was adopted when the income tax system was 
introduced to the whole of the Union of South Africa by the provisions of the 
Income Tax Act, 1914. This Act provided that: 
“Taxable income” means an income exceeding one thousand pounds, 
which has been received by, or accrued to or in favour of, any person 
wheresoever residing, from any source whatsoever in the Union…”53  
                                                 
49 Schreiner, OD ‘The contribution of English law to South African law; and the rule of law in South 
Africa’ (1967) Stevens & Sons, London at 6; Lenel, B ‘The History of South African Law and its 
Roman-Dutch Roots’ (2002) Toeberstrasse Thal, Switzerland at 5 
50 Palmer, VV ‘Introduction to the mixed jurisdictions’ in Palmer, VV (ed.) ‘Mixed Jurisdictions 
Worldwide: The Third Legal Family’ (2012) 2nd ed: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 3 at 5. 
See also Zweigert, K and Kotz, H ‘An introduction to Comparative law’ (1998) 3rd ed. Oxford 
University Press, New York at 232. 
51 Which is described as the turning point in the British imperial history. See Mohr, T ‘The statute of 
Westminster, 1931: An Irish Perspective’ (2013) 31 (4) Law and History Review. 
52 Section 1 of the republic of South Africa Act No. 31 of 1961. 
53 Section 4 (2) of the Income Tax Act No. 28 of 1914. For instance, section 5(1) and 6 of the Income 
Tax (Consolidation) Act No. 41 of 1971; section 5(1) and 7(1) of the Income Tax Act No. 40 of 1925; 




This provision has been substantially replicated in the all subsequent Income 
Tax legislation54 culminating in the 1962 Income Tax Act.55 The 1962 Act (as 
amended) is the current income tax legislation in South Africa. In the South 
African Income Tax Act, the source-based system derived from its definition of 
‘gross income’. Reflecting most source-based systems, the 1962 Act defined 
‘gross income’ as follows:  
”gross income” … means, in the case of any person, the total amount in 
cash or otherwise, received by or accrued to or in favour of such person 
… from a source within  or deemed to be within the Republic…”56 
 
 
2.4  Highlights of the Current South African Legal Framework  
 
South Africa’s source-based income tax system remained in operation to 2001 
when the Republic switched to a residence-based system through an amendment 
to the above-quoted definition of ‘gross income.  ‘Prior to this amendment, the 
residence status of a taxpayer was not relevant to the determination of income 
tax liability. Thus, a ‘person’, whether or not a resident of South Africa, had to 
include in gross income only such amounts as had their source in the Republic 
After the amendment, the definition of ‘gross income” was as follows: 
“'gross income', in relation to any year or period of assessment, means- 
(i) in the case of any resident, the total amount, in cash or otherwise, 
received by or accrued to or in favour of such resident; or 
(ii) in the case of any person other than a resident the total amount 
. . .  received by or accrued to or if avour of such person from a source 
within or deemed to b within the Republic …”57 
 
                                                 
54 For instance, section 5(1) and 6 of the Income Tax (Consolidation) Act No. 41 of 1971; section 5(1) 
and 7(1) of the Income Tax Act No. 40 of 1925; section 5 (1) and 7 of the Income Tax Act No. 25 of 
1940 and the Income Tax Act No. 31 of 1941 
55 Act No. 58 of 1962. It is should be noted that, for the purposes of ascertaining the amount that 
constitute ‘gross income’, source of income is still relevant in South Africa, despite the shift to 
residence-based regime. See Williams, RC (2006) at 43 
56 Section 1 of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 
57 section 2 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 59 of 2000 
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The amendments included a definition of the term ‘resident’ that draws a 
distinction between the residence of ‘natural persons’, that is to say, individuals, 
and the residence of juristic persons. 
 
The South African income tax system is a centralised system in the sense that 
the charging legislation emanates from only one legislative organ (the South 
African parliament) and the income tax system is administered by only one 
organ (the South African Revenue Service). The Constitution of the Republic 
clothes Parliament with the power to legislate on any matter including the list 
set out in Schedule 4 to the Constitution (which is headed ‘Functional Areas of 
Concurrent National and Provincial Legislative Competence’). However, 
Parliament does not have legislative power over the matters contained in the list 
included in Schedule 5 to the Constitution58 (which is headed ‘Functional Areas 
of Exclusive Provincial Legislative Competence’). The Constitution thus 
explicitly does not permit the provincial legislatures to legislate on income tax, 
value-added tax, and general sales tax.59 It would however be wrong to conclude 
that Provincial Legislatures have no say in the imposition and administration of 
income tax, since the Constitution defines ‘parliament’ as comprising both the 
National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces.60 Consequently, 
both the charging provisions (contained in the Income Tax Act) and the 
administrative provisions in respect of income tax (contained for the most part 
in the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011) will have been debated by delegates 
from the provinces.61 The latter Act is administered by the South African 
                                                 
58 Section 44 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 
59 Ibid at section 228  
60 Ibid at Section 42 (1) 
61 South African Reserve Bank and Another v Shuttleworth and Another (2015) ZACC 17. In his 
dissenting judgment at [95] Froneman J said, “The decision to raise revenue of whatever kind, tax or 
not, may only be done in original legislation passed by Parliament.  Judging from past practice, the 
principle appears to have been regarded as obvious.” See also Ynuico Limited v Minister of Trade 









In 1914, the British Colony of Lagos, and the Northern and Southern 
Protectorates were merged to form a political entity called ‘Nigeria’ under 
Section I of the Nigeria Protectorate Order in Council 1913. The Union of South 
Africa was brought into existence in 1910 in terms of the Union of South Africa 
Act of 1909 which was an Act of the British Parliament. Thus, Nigeria and 
South Africa were established at almost the same time through instruments 
emanating from the British Parliament.  Furthermore, their respective income 
tax systems were introduced in Nigeria and South Africa at almost the same 
time. However, Nigeria adopted a residence-based system in 1906 when its 
income tax system was first introduced, and it has been in operation ever since. 
South Africa operated a source-based system until it switched to a residence-
based system in 2001. Thus, both Nigeria and South Africa now operate a 
residence-based income tax system. This commonality is the basis of the 
comparative analysis in this thesis of the definitional rule adopted by the two 
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3.0    INTRODUCTION 
 
The necessary condition for a state to exercise tax jurisdiction over an individual 
or taxable entity is the existence of the requisite juridical link between that 
individual or entity and the state. The state can legislate for such a nexus to be 
the factor of residence1 within its territory, regardless of whether the income in 
question was derived from a source within the territory. Or the state can make 
the source of income the requisite nexus and legislate for jurisdiction in respect 
of income that has its source within its territory, whether or not it was derived 
                                                 
1 Or in the case of United States of America, if the person is a citizen even if he is not a resident. See 
Zelinsky, EA ‘Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation: Citizenship as an Administrable Proxy for 
Domicile’ (2011) 96 IOWA L. Rev. 1289Worster, WT ‘The Constitutionality of the Taxation 
Consequences for Renouncing U.S. Citizenship’ (2010) 9 Fla. Tax Rev. 921 at 1006; Kirsch, MS 




by a resident. Thus, each tax jurisdiction lays down its own definitional rules in 
this regard in their respective tax legislation, and these rules are of course 
subject to interpretation by their courts.  
 
This chapter will focus on one of the connecting links, mentioned above, 
namely, residence-based income tax. This chapter sets the stage for a 
comparative analysis of the principle of residence for income tax purposes, to 
ascertain the intricacies involved in the definitional rules of residence in Nigeria 
and the Republic of South Africa, respectively. Reference may occasionally be 
made to other jurisdictions for the purpose of an extended comparison.  
 
3.1  Residence as the Basis of Tax Jurisdiction 
 
 
Tax jurisdiction is exclusively a creation of statute.2 The taxing power cannot 
be conferred otherwise than by statute. However, the unsettled nature of the 
criteria used in determining such jurisdiction invites academic analysis of the 
fundamental operational concepts or connecting factors in the exercise of tax 
jurisdiction. As Avi-Yonah3 puts it, “Taxes are the last topic on which one 
would expect sovereign nations to reach consensus”. The analysis that follows 
will commence with the broad concept of state jurisdiction and then narrow the 
focus to tax jurisdiction. 
 
The tax jurisdiction of a state connotes the sovereign power of that state to 
legislate in respect of all persons within that jurisdiction, in regard to the 
application and enforcement of such legislation.4 The power of the state in this 
                                                 
2 Williams RC ‘Income Tax in South Africa: Law and Practice (2006) 4thed LexisNexis, Durban 7 
(Neither international law nor common law can in any way impose tax obligation on any person) 
3 Avi-Yonah RS ‘The structure of international taxation: A proposal for simplification’ (1996) 74 Tax 
L. Rev. 1301 1303 
4 Colangero A J ‘Jurisdiction, immunity, legality and jus cogens’ (2014) 14 Chi. J. Int’l L. 53 at 58 see 
also Ludsin H ‘Returning sovereignty to the people’ (2013) 46 Vand. J. Transnational L.  97 Beale, 
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regard is an attribute of sovereignty.5  The sovereignty of the state can be 
extended to everything that exists within the state,6 subject to any limitations 
imposed by international law,7 and may be exercised in varying ways according 
to the policies of the state in question.8 The sovereign power of the state can 
only be called into question or limited in terms of its own constitution or when 
it involves an international element where the action of the state affects a person 
who is not a subject of that state.9 The twin principles laid down in the case of 
France vs. Turkey10 (the Lotus case), namely. the principles of equality and non-
interference in the domestic affairs of other states11 established the limitations 
of the state sovereignty.The latter principle was first applied in the case of 
United Kingdom of Great Britain vs. Northern Ireland-Albania (the Corfu 
Channel Case).12   
                                                 
‘The jurisdiction of a sovereign state (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 241 see also Lowell A.L. “The limit of 
sovereignty’ (1988) 2 (2) Harv. L. Rev 70 at 72. 
5 Wurzel H ‘Foreign Investment and extraterritorial taxation’ (1938) 38 Colum. L. Rev 809, Mann The 
Doctrine of jurisdiction in international law (1968) III RdC 1 30 (jurisdiction is an aspect of 
sovereignty, it is coexistent with it, and indeed, incidental to but is also limited by, the state’s 
sovereignty, hence jurisdiction cannot exist without sovereignty.), Brownlie I ‘Principles of Public 
international law’ (1979) 3rded 289 
6 However, due to a particular relationship, a state may extend its jurisdiction to certain persons outside 
its territory. Also a state may lack power to exercise any form of jurisdiction over another group of 
persons living within its territory who enjoy certain legal immunity. 
7 Martha RSJ ‘The jurisdiction to tax in international law: Theory and practice of legislative fiscal 
jurisdiction (1989) Kluwer Netherland, l, Martha RSJ ’Extraterritorial taxation in international law in 
Meessen KM (ed) ‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction in theory and practice (1996) Kluwer Law 
International, London see also Yee S ‘Universal Jurisdiction: concept, logic and reality (2011) 10 (3) 
Chinese Journal of Int’l Law 503 at 530 
8 Albrech AR “The taxation of alien under international law (1952) 29 British Yearbook of 
International Law (Brit. Y. B. Int’l Law) 145 
9 Danziger E International income tax (1991) Butterworth, Durban, 13, Martha RSJ ‘The jurisdiction 
to tax in international law: Theory and practice of legislative fiscal jurisdiction (1989) Kluwer 
Netherland 
10 (1927) PCIJ 
11 Under the former principle no state is entitled to exercise any form of sovereign power beyond its 
boundaries, unless acting pursuant to a treaty or any principle of customary international law. The 
latter principle stipulates that in the absence of any prohibition by international law to the contrary; 
a state is at liberty to exercise any form of sovereign power within its boundaries without any form 
of outside intervention. see Shaw MN ‘International law’ (2008) Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge at 621; Ryngaert C ‘Jurisdiction in international law (2008) 1st ed oxford University 
Press, New York 
12 (1949) 4 ICJ and subsequently applied in the cases of Nicaragua vs. United States (1986) ICJ (the 




Tax jurisdiction is an aspect of the state's sovereign power to levy a tax on 
taxable persons within its sovereignty including those who derive their income 
from it. 13 The nexus between tax jurisdiction and sovereignty, suggests that 
every type of jurisdiction is limited and subject to any limitations inherent in 
sovereignty in general.14 In income tax, the state exercises this power by 
determining the taxable income, the taxable person, and the tax rate.15 The vital 
questions are whether international law imposes limitations on a state’s taxing 
powers; if it does, the nature of the limitations imposed by international law on 
the state’s taxing power and the extent to which such limitations affect the 
state’s taxing powers on domestic tax issues.  
 
                                                 
vs. Uganda (2005) ICJ see also Jamnejad M and Wood M ‘The principle of non-intervention’ (2009) 
2 Leiden J. Int’l L. 345 at 346 
13  Pires M ‘International judicial double taxation of income (1989) Kluwer   
14 Christians A ‘Sovereignty, taxation and social contract (2009) 18 Minn. J. Int’l L. 99 see also Jackson 
RH ‘Human Rights Protection in a World of Sovereign States’ in Ronald Tinnevelt and Gert 
Verschraegen (eds.) Between Cosmopolitan Ideals and State Sovereignty (2006) Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York 134‐146; Jackson RH ‘Sovereignty as a Doctrine of Moderation,’ (2004) in 
C. Nolan (ed.), Power and Responsibility in World Affairs: Praeger, New York. 57‐76; Epstein, RA 
‘Consent, not power, as the basis of jurisdiction frontiers of jurisdiction,’ (2001) University of 
Chicago Legal Forum 1 (He analysed the word ‘power’ being used in discussing sovereignty. He 
stated that the power mentioned refers to power of the subject who give consent to the state to 
exercise the power on their behalf.) see also Guzman AT and Hsiang J ‘Some ways that theories on 
customary international law fail: A reply to Loszlo Blutman’ (2014) 25 (2) Eur. J. Int’l law 559  
However, due to economic integration, transactions are being carried out across borders resulting to 
a situation where more than one country is able to tax the same item (should the country in which 
the recipient of income resides or the country in which the income derived) makes the intervention 
of international law very relevant.  
15 Cappelen AW ‘The Moral Rationale for International Fiscal Law’ (2006) 15 (1) Ethic and 
International Affairs noted some features of tax jurisdiction;  
1)  The character of the country (rich or poor) and that of the tax subject (whether he has the ability 
to pay are immaterial to justification of taxation. 
2)  Historical relationships do not create the right to tax, for example, former residence or former 
citizenship—do not create tax liabilities.  
3)  The nature of the nexus between a state and its tax subjects determines the tax liability of the 
tax subjects. That is a personal nexus creates unlimited tax liability, while an economic nexus 
creates limited tax liability.  
4)  It regulates the distribution of the taxing right among nations and it does not recognize the 
tax right of any other groups or entities. 
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The traditional approach to the first question views tax jurisdiction as an aspect 
of the state’s sovereign autonomy to tax those whom it is constitutionally proper 
to tax, without any outside interference.16 This approach traces its origin to the 
judicial line of reasoning expressed by Lord Mansfield: “No country ever takes 
notice of the revenue laws of another.”17 Wurzel succinctly argues in favour of 
the notion of states’ absolute taxing power, thus: 
   
“National taxing power is an essential attribute of sovereignty and 
sovereignty is omnipotence...This connection with the notion of 
sovereignty makes a nation's taxing power primarily a problem of 
international, rather than of municipal, law…What we are merely 
interested in knowing: is there anything in the written or unwritten law of 
nations to indicate a universally recognised rule is authoritatively 
assigning among nations, and thereby impliedly limiting, the jurisdiction 
to tax? The answer is very definitely in the negative...” 18 
 
The central argument of the proponents of this approach is that the state’s tax 
jurisdiction over persons within its sovereignty and any self-imposed limitation 
thereon is purely a creation of domestic laws. It could be argued that this 
approach was grounded on the principle of ‘non-interference’ in the domestic 
                                                 
16    Finke J ‘Sovereign immunity: rule, comity or something else’ (2010) 21 (4) Eur. J. Int’l Law 881 
(states are free to make as long as they observe the boundaries set by international law): Florani M 
‘The irony of int’l law: How int’l law limits state sovereignty (2010) available at 
www.aglr.wordpress.com/2010/04/05; Christians (2009) supra;  Rosenbloom, HD “Sovereignty and 
the Regulation of International Business in the Tax Area” (1994)  20 Canada-United States Law 
Journal 267at 267. (No area of the law is closer to the subject of sovereignty than taxation);  Park, 
WW ‘Fiscal jurisdiction and accrual basis taxation: lifting the corporation veil to tax foreign 
company’s profit (1978) 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1609 
17 Hollman V. Johnson (1775) 1120 at 1121.However, this line reasoning has been judicially negated 
in the cases of Government of India v. Taylor (1955) AC 491-8 and Krok v. CSARS (2015) ZASCA 
107 
18 Wurzel H ‘Foreign Investment and extraterritorial taxation’ (1938) 38 Colum. L. Rev 809 at 812 – 
814. Subsequent writers also followed this line of reasoning. See Norr ‘Jurisdiction to tax and 
international income’ (1962) 17 Tax L. Rev. 431 (No rule of international law exist to limit the extent 
of any country’s taxing jurisdiction): Mann ‘The doctrine of jurisdiction in international law (1968) 
III RdC 1 10; Hadari Y ‘The choice of national law applicable to the nationality of  such enterprise’ 
(1974) 1 Duke L. J. 1 at 53 (..a country is free to adopt any theory of tax jurisdiction for suitable to 
its legal system); also Tillinghast D ‘Tax aspects of international transactions (1978) see also Knechtle 
A ‘Basic problem in international fiscal law’ (1979) Kluwer, Deventer – asserts that national laws are 
not subject to any restrictions from international law. See also Burnet V. Brook  US 288 378 – (‘we 
determine national power in relation to other countries and their subjects by applying the principles 
of jurisdiction recognized  in international relations.) 
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affairs of a state by any other state as established in the Lotus case.19 However, 
this principle was established in cases involving issues other than monetary 
affairs (including taxation).20 Therefore, it cannot be slavishly applied to all the 
domestic affairs of the state, especially the exercise of a tax jurisdiction.21 Since 
the  view adopted in the traditional approach on the first question has made tax 
sovereignty a sacrosanct, it follows that the second question may not be 
addressed. 
 
A modern approach to both questions postulates that the state’s taxing power 
stems from sovereignty and that sovereignty is a power vested in the state. 22  
The co-existence of this power requires a principle of international law to give 
direction to these incompatible forces, hence the need for international norms 
regarding taxation, capable of distributing taxing power between states. 
Therefore, the taxing power of the state is subject to any limitation imposed by 
international law.23 Also, in the course of raising revenue, the state could come 
                                                 
19 And other subsequent decisions: Nicaragua vs. United States (1986) ICJ (the principle of non-
interference is an important aspect of sovereignty); Democratic Republic of Congo vs. Uganda 
(2005) ICJ see also Jamnejad M and Wood M ‘The principle of non-intervention’ (2009) 2 Leiden 
J. Int’l L. 345 at 346 
20  Hertogen A ‘An unusual suspect? Monetary sovereignty and financial instability (2010) 2 Goettingen 
J. Int’l L. 243 (He argues that a state’s exercise of monetary sovereignty through its monetary policies 
can affect financial stability of other countries. Therefore, the principle of non-interference of 
domestic affairs is not applicable in the regard) 
21 Christians A ‘Networks, norms, and national tax policy (2010) 9 (1) Wash. Univ. Global Studies L. 
Rev. 1 at 5 (‘that early decisions against multilateralism led to the soft global tax governance structure 
supported by the OECD today’) 
22 Christians (2009) supra at 105 Ring, DM ‘What’s at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate’ (2008) 49 Va. 
J. Int’l L. 1 Bruce G. et al ‘Negotiating Globalization: Global Scripts and Intermediation in the 
Construction of Asian Insolvency Regimes’ (2006)31 Law & Soc. Inq. 521 at 522; Stewart, M 
‘Introduction: New Research on Tax Law and Political Institutions’ (2006) 24 Law in Context 1, 1; 
Cockfield, AJ ‘The Rise of the OECD as Informal ‘World Tax Organization’ Through National 
Responses to E-Commerce Tax Challenge (2006) 8 Yale J.L. & Tech. 136 at 169: Li, J ‘Tax 
Sovereignty and International Tax Reform: The Author’s Response, (2004)52 Can. Tax J. 141 at 
144; Scholte JA ‘Globalisation: a critical introduction’ (2005) 2nd ed Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York, 519  Bräutigam, D ‘Building Leviathan: Revenue, State Capacity, and Governance’ (2002) 
33 IDS Bulletin 10, 10 Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, 
Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies (2001) 54 Tax L. Rev. 261 at 277   
23 For the purpose of imposing the limitation, sovereignty may be categorised into the personal and 
territorial. Martha RSJ ‘The jurisdiction to tax in international law: Theory and practice of legislative 
fiscal jurisdiction (1989) Kluwer Netherland - while establishing the limit imposed on municipal tax 
jurisdiction by international law, introduced the concepts of personal and territorial jurisdiction ; 
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into conflict with other States, or require the assistance of those States in 
achieving its desired tax base. Thus, the states’ divergence in defining the scope 
of their tax jurisdiction could lead to a situation where more than one state24 
seeks to exercise substantive tax jurisdiction over the same income, and where 
those states all rely on fiscal sovereignty to justify their stand. On the other hand, 
a state may require the assistance of other states to exercise its enforcement 
powers in respect of its tax jurisdiction.  This approach aligns the concept of 
national sovereignty with taxation in an integrated world economy.  
 
In most tax jurisdictional discourse states rely on their tax sovereignty to counter 
the influence of globalisation on their domestic tax regimes, especially when 
the subject matter involves a question of the definition of key terms.25 
Moreover, the connection between tax sovereignty and the impact of economic 
integration leads to an inconclusive debate among tax experts. Some 
commentators have claimed that raising revenue for the public good is an 
obligation imposed on the state, and that this duty cannot be severed from tax 
sovereignty, notwithstanding the impact of globalisation.26  Thus, states are 
                                                 
(the former gives the state the power to make and enforce its laws over any person that falls within 
its sovereignty by reason of his nationality, whereas the latter empowers a state to extend its laws 
over any alien who comes within the territory of the state) and from which he deduces the 
fundamental element that determines the extent of state tax jurisdiction – the elements are fiscal 
attachment, personal attachment and economic attachment. 
24  This can be the country where the recipient of the income resides or where the income was derived. 
25  Ring, (2008) supra at 9 (She identified quest for controlling revenue and fiscal policy as the functional 
rationales for grounding states’ tax policies on sovereignty. Melo, G M ‘Taxation in the Global 
Arena: Preventing The Erosion of National Tax Bases or Impinging on Territorial Sovereignty? A 
Critique of the OECD's Report,” (2000) 12 Pace Int’l L. Rev. 183, 186 
26 Zou A ‘International legal review of the relationship between international tax law and national tax 
sovereignty: Theoretical foundation and development practice (2014) Univ. of Hong Kong Faculty 
of Law Research paper No. 2014/010 Ring, DM (2008) 49 Va. J. Int’l L. (loss of tax sovereignty 
can undermine both revenue and fiscal policy of a no satisfactory method for balancing competing 
claims of tax sovereignty has not been articulated.); Bruce G. et al ‘Negotiating Globalization: 
Global Scripts and Intermediation in the Construction of Asian Insolvency Regimes’ (2006)31 Law 
& Soc. Inq. 521 at 522; Stewart, M ‘Introduction: New Research on Tax Law and Political 
Institutions’ (2006). 24 Law in Context 1, 1; Bräutigam, D ‘Building Leviathan: Revenue, State 
Capacity, and Governance’ (2002) 33 IDS Bulletin 10, 10 Graetz, MJ ‘Taxing International Income: 
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies (2001) 54 Tax L. Rev. 261 
at 277; Melo, G M ‘Taxation in the Global Arena: Preventing The Erosion of National Tax Bases or 
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entitled to reject any act that can reduce or take away their sovereignty. 
However, other commentators make the case for entrenching an obligation on 
the states to cooperate with each other in formulating tax rules and policies.27 
The reality of global economic integration raises a question as to whether tax 
sovereignty entitles a state to define its tax jurisdiction freely, and whether other 
states cannot insist on compliance with a minimum standard?28  
 
No state can declare the tax law of another state void,29 nor can it impose its tax 
law on another State as they all enjoy equality of sovereignty.30 However, even 
those31 insisting on the absolute sovereignty recognise the fact that no state can 
prevent another from levying a tax on any person within its territory or with 
whom it has personal or economic connections. It follows that the tax 
jurisdiction of each state implies a corresponding right vested in other States32 
                                                 
Impinging on Territorial Sovereignty? A Critique of the OECD's Report,” (2000) 12 Pace Int’l L. 
Rev. 183, 186 (“The right to tax forms one of the most intimate relationships between the sovereign 
and its subjects …The decision to tax or not to tax and the manner in which to tax within domestic 
borders is one that has always been within the absolute discretion of each sovereign.” See also 
Federal Board of Inland Revenue v. Nigerian General Insurance Company Ltd. (1966) LLR 88 at 
95 
27 Hertogen (2010) supra; Christians (2009) (argued that an international social contract imposed a  
sovereign duty to have mutual respect for each other and to align its tax law and policies in 
conformity with that of other states). Jamnejad M and Wood M ‘The principle of non-intervention’ 
(2009) 2 Leiden J. Int’l L. 345 at 346; Kwiecien R ‘Sir Hersch Lauterpacht’s idea of state sovereignty 
– is it still alive (2011) 13 Int’l community L. Rev 23 at 25: Leon I ‘when cooperation and 
intervention meet, sovereignty in the Mexico-United States relationship’ (2011) Keinan Y ‘The Case 
for Residency-Based Taxation  of financial transactions in developing countries (2008) 9 (1) Fla Tax 
Rev. 3; Amsterdam L. Forum 54 Mann FA ‘Further studies in international law’ (1990) Clarendon 
press, Oxford 4  
28 The minimum standard envisaged here distilled from the idea of the social contract as Christians 
argued. (Christians, A ‘Sovereignty, taxation and social contract’ (2009) 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 99 
at 101) The social contract imposed a duty on the sovereign states to voluntarily and unilaterally 
abstain from designing tax policies that impede the tax policies of other states.  
29 Christians (2009) supra 
30 Section 501 (a) of the US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) 2013 seems to have negate 
the above assertion. Because the section imposed a reporting obligation on all foreign financial 
institutions to furnish the US government will all relevant information on the US citizens’ foreign 
account.  For recent discussion on FATCA see Maxwell, J and Li, A ‘FATCA: What it Is, What it 
isn’t, and what’s Next’ (2015) 19 (2) Asia-Pacific Journal of Taxation. However, the provision of 
FATCA centred on the enforcement not on the substantive tax jurisdiction. Therefore, no state can 
exercise its substantive tax jurisdiction on another state. 
31 Melo (2000) supra Ring, DM (2008) Zou (2014) supra 
32 As a result of the increase in movement of persons from one state to another caused by globalisation, 
the corresponding exists even where there is no cross border trade between the states. 
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and that no state can implement its tax jurisdiction in isolation.33 It can be 
concluded, therefore, that no state can claim exclusive tax jurisdiction. 
However, how to cooperate is a challenging issue.  
 
It follows from the above that states need a forum where they can achieve co-
operation in exercising their respective tax jurisdiction without forfeiting or 
diluting their sovereignty. This forum would need to be set up by an 
international tax regime or body.34 It is submitted that co-operation in delimiting 
tax jurisdiction does not derogate from the sovereignty of the states but rather 
enhances it. Zou35 views states’ action in safeguarding their national 
sovereignty as a process of law-making revolution in taxation at an international 
level. The inconsistency of the European Court’s position on the tax sovereignty 
of its member states has led to brewing tension on tax jurisdiction in the 
European Community (EC).36 The jurisdictional conflict in the EC indicates that 
bilateral or multilateral treaties do not achieve the desired co-operation 
                                                 
33 Genschel, P ‘Globalization and the Transformation of the Tax State’ 13 EUR. REV. 53, 60 (2005)  
(The traditional idea that “all taxable events have a clearly identifiable place in space” within one 
jurisdiction or another “has always been a fiction.”).  
34 It is worth noting that, no consensus as to whether there is an international tax regime, capable of 
extracting an international norm on tax issue. Rosenbloom, D The David R. Tillinghast Lecture 
International Tax Arbitrage and the “International Tax System”, (2000) 53 Tax L. Rev.  137, 140-
1argued that what we claimed today to be the international tax regime comprises only the different 
tax laws of various countries exist and those laws vary greatly from each other. Avi-Yonah, RS 
‘International tax as international law (2007) Cambridge, Avi-Yonah, RS (2000) ‘Commentary on 
David Rosenbloom’s, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture International Tax Arbitrage and the 
“International Tax System”, 53 Tax L. Rev. 167, 169. It has been argued from other angle   that the 
network of bilateral treaties that are largely similar in policy, and even in language, constitutes an 
international tax regime, which has definable principles that underlie it and are common to the 
treaties. This assertion is supported by Brauner A ‘An international tax regime in crystallization 
(2003) 56 Tax L. Rev. 259 at 326; Sneirson JF ‘Soft paterlism for close corporation: helping 
shareholders helping yourselves’ (2008) Wis. L. Rev. 899; Trubek DM and Trubek LG ‘New 
Governance and legal regulation: complementary, revalvary and transformation (2007) 13 Colum. 
J. Eur. L. 539; Cords D ‘Let's get together: collaborative tax regulation’ (2013)11 Pitt. Tax Rev. 47   
35 Zou (2014) supra 
36 See Faulhaber, LV Sovereignty, Integration and Tax Avoidance in the European Union: Striking the 
Proper Balance, (2010) 48 Colum. J. Transnat'l. L. 177 at 181; Isenbaet M ‘The contemporary 
meaning of ‘sovereignty in the supranational context of the EC as applied to the income tax case law 
of the ECJ (2009) EC Tax Rev: Bizioli G ‘balancing the fundamental and tax sovereignty: some 
thought on recent ECJ case law on direct taxation (2008) 48 (3) European Taxation; Vanistendael F 
‘Denkavit international: the balance between fiscal sovereignty and the fundamental freedom (2007) 
47 (2) European Taxation 
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objectives.37 Apart from the EU co-operation regime, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is also playing a role in that 
respect, but the anticipated co-operation amongst the states has not yet been 
achieved. This shows the inadequacy of the current co-operation mechanism.38 
 
The difficulty of achieving the desired co-operation amongst the states may be 
a result of the peculiarities inherent in taxation.39 As a result of the delicate 
nature of tax jurisdiction most states that have recognised the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in order to co-operate in matters of trade, have refused to 
do so in matters of taxation. Rather, they have constituted themselves into 
various non-binding peer groups, such as the OECD, which generate soft laws. 
Also, the international tax regime acts more as a conflict resolution mechanism 
(mostly through the OECD and other organisational soft laws) than as positive 
law. The regime has only persuasive authority on domestic taxation. By its 
nature, as rules for conflict resolution, the international tax regime does not 
address the substantive issue of tax jurisdiction,40 but rather, the enforcement of 
the tax jurisdiction of the states involved.41 Thus, in analysing residence 
principles, the primary source is the domestic law of the selected jurisdictions 
as interpreted by case law. 
 
                                                 
37 Saint-Gobain vs. Aechen-Innenstadt C-307/97 ECR 1-6161; Gilly vs. Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin C-336/96 
ECR 1-2793; De Groot vs. Van financien C-385/00 ECR 1-5821(the Member States arefree to 
unilaterally define the connecting factors for the allocation of taxation rights or to do so in tax 
treaties.). However, in Bosal Holding BV v. Staatssecretaris van Financien, C-168/01 ECR 1-9409; 
Marks & Spencer C-446/03, ECR I-1083; Manninen’s case  C-319/02 ECJ departed from the earlier 
notion of tax sovereignty of the member states. 
38 Rosenbloom HD et al ‘The unruly world of tax: a proposal for an international tax cooperation forum’ 
(2014) 15 (2) Fla. Tax Rev. 57 Avi-Yonah, R S. "Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal 
Crisis of the Welfare State." (2000) 113 (7) Harv. L. Rev. 
39 Azam R ‘Global taxation of cross-border ecommerce income’ (2012) 31 Va. Tax Rev. 639 Palmer 
KL ‘Toward unilateral coherence in determining jurisdiction to tax income’ (1989) 30 Harv. Int’l L. 
J. 1 noted that historical antecedent, move to expand or protect jurisdictional based as well as having 
divergent views of the global integration led to this situation – absence of universal jurisdictional rule. 
40 Substantive and enforcement tax jurisdiction is explained later in this chapter. 
41 Martha (1989) 5 
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This thesis explores the possibility of achieving co-operation amongst states in 
defining the scope of their tax jurisdiction. What is required for such co-
operation is a close examination of each state’s tax jurisdiction. The 
examination ascertains the level of convergence and divergence of the States in 
defining their fiscal jurisdiction and how they extend mutual respect to each 
other’s tax sovereignty. The analysis seeks to ascertain how the states balance 
their respective interests against the interests of taxpayers in defining the 
connecting factor. However, the need for an in-depth critical analysis limits the 
comparison to the concept of residence as a connecting factor in just two 
jurisdictions, namely, Nigeria and South Africa. 
 
Hitherto, research of this kind has taken a broad approach with a  disregard for 
the dichotomy between substantive and enforcement tax jurisdiction.42 For 
instance, the problem associated with the definitional rule for determining 
individual residence for tax purposes (substantive) is less prominent than that 
of enforcing tax liability. However, the problems inherent in ascertaining 
corporate residency and of enforcing corporate tax liability are almost the 
same.43 That is why this thesis looks at the residency issues involved in 
substantive and enforcement tax jurisdiction (for both individuals and corporate 
entities). Residence as an aspect of substantive jurisdiction will establish a 
framework for analysing all issues relating to definitional rules of residency for 
tax purposes and the tax consequences that follow the application of those 
definitional rules. On the other hand, the analysis of enforcement jurisdiction 
will focus on residency issues involved in the tax enforcement mechanism.   
 
                                                 
42 For discussion on the misalignment of substantive and enforcement jurisdiction to tax, see Swain JA 
‘Misalignment of substantive and enforcement tax jurisdiction in a global economy: causes and 
strategies for realignment (2010) 63 (x) National Tax Journal, Fox special issue 
43 Avi-Yonah RS ‘The structure of international taxation: a proposal for simplification’ (1996) 74 Texas 
L. Rev. 1311 
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Despite the aforementioned concerns regarding the international tax regime, 
that regime is highly relevant in limiting the scope of domestic tax systems in 
the current integrated global economy. These limitations are the parameters that 
determine the extent of the state’s tax jurisdiction. These are the fiscal 
attachments; 44 that is to say, the relationship between the state and taxpayers.  
Such a relationship is deemed to exist when the same persons are subject to 
either the ‘personal sovereignty’ or the ‘territorial sovereignty’45 of the state. In 
other words, either personal fiscal attachment or economic fiscal attachment to 
the state.  Thus, a state’s tax jurisdiction can only be justified if it is exercised 
in respect of persons with some nexus, link, connecting factor46 or closeness47 
to the state.  
 
The fiscal attachments mentioned above, refer to the nexus and connections that 
link the taxing state with the persons sought to be taxed. The attachments serve 
as the basis for assuming tax jurisdiction. They are established through two 
fundamental principles that clothe the taxing authorities with jurisdiction to tax 
income. These principles are ‘source’ and ‘residence.’ Despite the interface 
between source and residence as a tax base, this research focuses only on the 
residence base. The residence-based principle is crucial to Nigeria and South 
Africa as they both adopt the same principle in their income taxation. 
 
The concept  of residence as a connecting factor in tax jurisdiction will be 
analysed from the perspective of the two discrete aspects of tax jurisdiction as 
formulated by Hellerstein.48 He describes tax jurisdiction as comprising two 
                                                 
44 Martha RSJ ‘The jurisdiction to tax in international law:   theory and practice of legislative fiscal 
jurisdiction (1989) Kluwer Netherland 
45Abraham B ‘An economic analysis of territorial sovereignty in international law (2012) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2280746   
46 Danziger (1991) 13 
47 Martha (1989) 117 
48Hellerstein W ‘Jurisdiction to tax income and consumption in the new economy: a theoretical and 
comparative perspective (2003) 38 (1) Ga. L. Rev 1. See also Hellerstein W ‘OECD – Jurisdiction to 
in the Digital Economy: Permanent and other establishments (2014) 68 (6/7) Bulletin for international 
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separate elements, namely ‘substantive’ and ‘enforcement’ tax jurisdiction.49 
The former relates to the power of the state to impose a tax on its taxable 
subjects and it encompasses the two fundamental principles mentioned above,  
source and residence. The latter relates to the power of the state to compel the 
collection of tax over which it has substantive jurisdiction, using its established 
legal and administrative mechanism for that purpose. The enforcement 
jurisdiction includes the jurisdiction of the state to impose an obligation on 
another person (the withholding agent, who is not the actual income earner) to 
collect the tax on behalf of the state. It also raises different residency issues from 
the one envisaged by substantive jurisdiction, hence the need for examining 
residency from both points of view.  
 
Hellerstein50 also argues that the question whether a state has jurisdiction to 
impose a tax is different from whether it has jurisdiction to compel the 
collection of the tax. These two powers are often exercised by different organs 
within the same tax jurisdiction.51 This is the reason for analysing tax 
jurisdiction from these two different perspectives, which are important aspects 
in a comparative analysis of a residence-based system.  
 
                                                 
taxation and Swain JA ‘Misalignment of substantive and enforcement tax jurisdiction in a global 
economy: causes and strategies for realignment (2010) 63 (x) National Tax Journal, Fox special issue 
– who traced the major causes of misalignment between substantive and enforcement jurisdiction and 
stated the strategies for achieving greater jurisdictional alignment include (1) reducing administrative 
and compliance cost, (2) adopting simplified compliance regimes for foreign taxpayers, (3) repealing 
the physical-presence test and (4) “reverse engineering” substantive jurisdiction rules in recognition 
of existing limits on enforcement capabilities, Cockfield AJ ‘ Jurisdiction to tax: A law and technology 
perspective (2003) 38 Ga. L. Rev. 85 – 118, Restatement of the law (Third), Restatement of the foreign 
relations law of the United States (1988) 2 
49 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987) § 421 - Jurisdiction to 
enforce is defined as the authority of a state “to employ judicial or non-judicial measurers to induce 
or compel compliance or punish non-compliance with its laws or regulations, provided it has 
jurisdiction to prescribe” 
50 Hellerstein (2003) 
51 For instance, in a federal state like Nigeria, the federal government possesses substantive jurisdiction 




A state needs to evaluate the central focus of its sovereignty, using a statist 
political conception.52 Thus, a state may consider population as the main focus 
of sovereignty. This entails imposing tax on all income of its residents based on 
the personal relationship with the state, irrespective of the source of that income 
(a residence-based system). Alternatively, a state could consider its territory as 
the primary focus, thereby imposing a tax on all income derived from within the 
territory, irrespective of the identity of the producer (a source-based system).53  
 
The difficulty in this regard is that most countries use a hybrid system, adopting 
a residence basis together with some aspects of a source basis or vice versa.54  
The driving force for such an election is a policy decision by the state.  
According to Graetz, this decision should be made on the basis of the culture, 
economic and political capacity and history of the state.55 Two definitional tests 
are being used to determine the residency of both individuals and corporations 
for tax purposes: That is the statutory criterion together with a facts and 
circumstances test. Each of these tests involves theoretical and policy issues. 
                                                 
52 Gliksberg D ‘The effect of the statist-political approach to international jurisdiction of the income 
tax regime – the Isreal case” (1994) 15 Mich. J. Int’l L. 459 
53 Ibid, see also Musgrave PB ‘Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in International Taxation’ 
(2001) 26:4 Brooklyn J. of Int’l L. that national right to tax the global income of residents is recognized 
in international law and the exercise of tax sovereignty over foreign source income is necessary to 
achieve equitable tax treatment of resident taxpayers by making all income, wherever earned, subject 
to tax, consistent with the accretion principle. 
54Williams RC ‘Income Tax in South Africa: Law and Practice (2006) 4thed  LexisNexis, Durban 56, 
Olivier L and Honiball M ‘International tax: A South African Perspective (2008) 4thed Siberink, Cape 
Town 51 – when a state adopt residence-based, an aspect of source is also adopted, in that non-
residents are taxed on the income sourced within the state. Likewise, state that adopts a source-based 
use to extend their tax net by deeming certain income from domestic source. This is a shift from what 
was obtainable in 1980s - Avi-Yonah RS Tax coverage and globalization (2010) working paper No. 
214, University of Michigan Law School, stated that in the 1980s the was divided into two group: the 
major group consisting of countries that tax both residents and non-residents on a territorial basis 
while exempting foreign source income. The other group tax their residents on a worldwide basis 
proving a foreign tax credit. Furthermore, the problems associated with choosing either residence or 
source-based systems is compounded by Australia. It adopted a hybrid system like other countries, 
but in 2006 it amended its law to exempt the foreign sourced income of a temporary resident as 
defined in section 768 – 900 of the Tax Laws Amendment Act No. 4 of 2006. 
55 Graetz MJ ‘International taxation: inadequate principles outdated concepts and unsatisfactory 
policies (2001) 54 Tax L. Rev 261,279 
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For the statutory test, tax policy considerations come to the fore, while the facts 
and circumstances test involves both conceptual and judicial interpretation, as 
well as tax policy issues. 
 
3.2   Underlying Principles and Policy Considerations of the Residence 
Base 
 
The prevailing rules governing tax jurisdiction consist of constitutional norms, 
statutory provisions, tax policy and accepted legal principles of taxation. This 
research focuses primarily on a legal analysis of tax jurisdiction in Nigeria and 
South Africa. However, an analysis of principles and tax policy will also allow 
for an understanding of the issue of justification of residence-based taxation 
from the perspective of equity, efficiency, and administration. According to 
Roxam,56 tax policy is the context in which a discussion of the structure and 
reform of a tax system should take place. It is a forum where those57 with 
competing interests in the operation of the tax regime adduce arguments in 
support of their interests and seek to influence the resulting structure of the tax 
system as embodied in tax law. These different and competing policy interests 
are part of the problem hindering the formulation of appropriate jurisdictional 
rules for the income tax regime.58  
 
In a tax policy analysis, the claims of these competing interests should be 
narrowed down to the central issues of equity, efficiency and administration.59 
Therefore, in determining the allocation of tax rights both law and economics 
                                                 
56 Roxan I “ Limit to globalisation: Some implications for taxation, tax policy and the development  
(2012) LSE  Law, society and Economy Working paper No. 3 available 
www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm 
57 Such as government, taxpayers, legislators and academics 
58 Misey Jr, RJ ‘Simplifying international jurisdiction for US transfer taxes: Rethinking citizenship and 
replace domicile with the green card test’ (1992) 76 Marquette L. Rev. 77 
59 Palmer RL ‘Toward unilateral coherence in determining jurisdiction to tax income (1989) 30 Harv. 
Int’l L. J. 1 at 64 
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have to interact.60 Thus, a lawyer may embark on the tax policy argument using 
language derived from economics, but from a legal perspective. For instance, 
tax neutrality is considered to be an economic concept while tax equity, on the 
other hand, is a legal concept. 
 
The residence-based system in the two countries under study, Nigeria and South 
Africa, have different antecedents. Nigeria adopted its residence-based system 
in 1906 when the income tax system was first introduced,61 and it has been in 
operation ever since. South Africa, on the other hand, operated a source-based 
system from 191462 up to 2001 when it switched to a residence-based system. 
Hence, it is necessary to analyse the policy considerations that justified the 
introduction and retention of the residence-based system in Nigeria and 
ascertained why South Africa changed its system from a source to a residence 
basis.  
 
This analysis highlights the lessons that each may learn from the other in terms 
of policy issues regarding a residence-based regime. The norm in the tax policy 
analysis63 is that the analyst must identify the perspective from which it is 
intended to address the issue. The aforementioned basic policy issues are 
                                                 
60 Vogel, K., ‘Worldwide vs source taxation of income A review and re-evaluation of argument’ (part 
1) (1988) 16 intertax 
61 It was first introduced in Northern protectorate via Native Revenue Proclamation No. 2 of 1906 and 
it was later extended to western and eastern protectorates via Native Revenue Ordinance of 1918 and 
1927 respectively 
62 Section 4(2) of the Income Tax Act of 1914 define income as “any gain or profit from any source 
within the union … taxable income is any income received by any person whosesoever residing, 
from any source whatever in the union 
63 For the purpose of analysis, tax policies can be divided into three aspects, namely: a) Policies that are 
general for all tax purposes, which include raising revenue, equity, efficiency and progressivity; b) 
Policies that are unique to income tax  like, policy discourse on benefit and ability-to-pay and  choice 
between source and residence base; and c) Policies that are unique to international income taxation, 
namely, neutrality,  foreign  tax credit, exemptions and deductions and double taxation. See Leandra, 
L ‘Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance’ (2007) 60 Stanford L. 
Rev.  695 
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broadly categorised into equity/fairness and efficiency.64 For the purposes of 
addressing residency issues from an enforcement tax jurisdiction perspective, 
efficient administration and simplicity will also be used as a benchmark for 
analysing the residence-based system. The analysis will bring to the fore the 
interface between tax policy and tax laws. Tax policy is a framework that 
provides the guidelines, principles and objectives to be achieved in the operation 
of the tax system, whereas, tax laws function, for examples, to create a tax base 
and the taxable person, to impose rates and to prescribe penalties for default.65  
 
3.2.1    Equity and Fairness  
 
An analysis of tax equity and fairness usually commences with the concept of 
horizontal and vertical equity.66 Horizontal equity connotes that persons who 
are economically in the same situation be treated equally by the tax system and 
vertical equity connotes that persons who are relatively well off economically 
should bear a greater tax burden than those who are less well off.67 The principle 
of equity can be applied to a residence-based system. It ensures that residents 
of the state who earn the same amount of income, either from within the state 
or from a foreign source should be taxed equally (horizontal equity).68 Income 
                                                 
64 Notwithstanding the fact that, using efficiency in tax policy analysis has been challenged as it favours 
the developed countries that are capital exporters that require efficiency to enhance it while equity 
and fairness analysis favours developing countries – Cockfield A ‘Purism and contextualism within 
international  law analysis: How trading analysis fails developing countries’ (2007) 5 (2) ejournal  
of tax research 199 While according to Greatz MJ ‘Taxing international income: inadequate 
principles, outdated concepts and unsatisfactory policies’ (2001) 54 Tax L. Rev. 261 the appropriate 
tax policy analysis required by developing countries (capital importers) is equity and fairness, while 
efficiency analysis is usually used for international taxation. 
65 Okauru I O ‘Federal Inland Revenue Service and taxation reforms in democratic Nigeria’ (2012) 
FIRS Safari Book Ltd, Ibadan 610 at 101 
66 Galle B ‘Tax Fairness’ (2008) 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1323Palmer RL ‘Toward unilateral coherence 
in determining jurisdiction to tax income (1989) 30 Harv. Int’l L. J. 1 at 64; Bittker, B I. "Equity, 
Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive Out Inequities" (1979) 16 San Diego 
L. Rev.735 For criticism of the whole idea of equity see Repetti J and Ring D ‘Horizontal equity 
revisited’ (2012) 13 (3) Fla. Tax Rev. 135  
67 Williams RC ‘Income Tax in South Africa: Law and Practice (2006) 4thed  LexisNexis, Durban 
68 Galle (2008) supra; Wood RJ ‘Supreme Court Jurisprudence of Tax Fairness’ (2006) 36 Seton Hall 
L. Rev. 421 (Horizontal is not controversial, the difficulty arises in its application rather than in its 
definition. The primary concern centres on the criteria that should be used to determine whether 
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tax lends itself to being levied on a person’s income at increasing marginal rates 
and this is a mechanism that can be applied to achieve the desired vertical and 
horizontal equity. However, the concept of horizontal and vertical equity has 
been criticised as irrelevant in the context of tax policy analysis.69 Some 
commentators base their criticism of horizontal and vertical equity on the 
inconsistency of the judicial application of these principles.70  
 
Nonetheless, tax scholars generally accept and endorse the concept of vertical 
and horizontal equity.71 These concepts, it is submitted, are relevant in assessing 
the fairness of a tax system, and the concept of vertical equity can be linked to 
tax rates. However, this thesis will not address issues relevant to determining 
the appropriate rate of tax. 
 
                                                 
taxpayers are similarly situated.) Dodge JM ‘Theories of tax justice: Rumination on the benefit, 
partnership and ability to pay principles’ (2005) 58 Tax L. Rev.399 at 402, Elkins D Horizontal equity 
as a principle of tax theory (2006) 24 Yale L. &Pol’y Rev. 43 88, Musgrave RA ‘Horizontal equity: 
A further note’ (1993) 1 Fla. Tax Rev. 354.   
69 Repetti J and Ring D ‘Horizontal equity revisited’ (2012) 13 (3) Fla. Tax Rev. 135 Galle B ‘Tax 
Fairness’ (2008) supra The concept of HE may be incoherent when it comes to comparisons between 
taxpayers in different jurisdictions, or, at least, comparisons that require us to decide the worthiness 
of those other sovereigns’ views.) Infanti AC ‘Tax equity’ (2008) 55 Buff. L. Rev. 1191(the notion 
of equity is not suitable for assessing the fairness of tax policy) Martinez, LP ‘The Trouble with 
Taxes: Fairness, Tax Policy, and the Constitution ‘(2004). 31 Hastings Const. L.Q. 413 Bagaric M 
and McConvill, J ‘Stop Taxing Happiness: A New Perspective on Progressive Taxation’ (2005) 2 
Pitt. TAX Rev. 65; Buchanan, NH ‘The Case Against Income Averaging’ (2006) 25 Va. Tax Rev. 
1151; Dodge, JM ‘Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership, and Ability-to-
Pay Principle’ (2005).58 Tax L. Rev. 399; Kahn, JH ‘The Mirage of Equivalence and the Ethereal 
Principles of Parallelism and Horizontal Equity’ (2006)  57 Hastings L.J. 645, 652 (Each instance 
of different tax treatments must be examined separately to determine whether the difference is 
warranted); Miller, JA ‘Equal Taxation: A Commentary (2000) 29 Hofstra L. REV. 529 (discussing 
challenges to the concept of horizontal equity); Kaplow L ‘ Horizontal equity: measures in search 
of principle’ (1989) 42 Nat’l Tax J. 139 
70 Henry Ordower, H  ‘Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation as Constitutional Principles: 
Germany and the United States Contrasted’ (2006) 7 Fla. Tax Rev. 259 Wood, RJ Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence of Tax Fairness’ (2006) 36 Seton Hall L. Rev. 421 Barker, WB ‘The Three Faces of 
Equality: Constitutional Requirements in Taxation’ (2006) 57 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1 Martinez, LP 
‘The Trouble with Taxes: Fairness, Tax Policy, and the Constitution’ (2004) 31 Hastings Const. 
L.Q. 413, 421, 427-38 (asserting that the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to employ notions of tax 
equity in determining the constitutionality of taxing statutes). 
71 I conducted a search on Hein Online on 8/11/2014 to find the number of article published between 
2000 to 2014 in which the horizontal and vertical equity appeared. The search revealed that 
horizontal equity appeared in about 341 articles while vertical equity appeared in about 268 articles. 
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The concept of equity and fairness features in both Nigerian and South African 
tax policy72 and is relevant in regard to both substantive issues of tax, and to 
issues of tax enforcement in these two countries. However, most writers73 on 
this issue have examined the equity and fairness of the residence-based system 
from the perspective of substantive tax jurisdiction and have ignored the aspect 
of enforcement.74   
 
For example, a state in exercising its substantive tax jurisdiction may impose 
tax on the global income of two of its residents. The determination of horizontal 
equity involves the question whether the tax so imposed is fair and the first issue 
in this regard is whether the two residents have the same amount of income.. 
The two residents may, for example, be working for the same employer and 
have the same seniority. However, one of the residents may incur deductible 
employment-related expenses and the other may incur the same amount of 
expenditure which, though business-related, does not meet the relevant statutory 
requirements for tax-deductibility. Consequently, the tax payable by one may 
be higher than by the other. 
 
                                                 
72 See the Nigerian National Tax Policy of 2010 and the Sir Sidney Phillipson commission on revenue 
allocation 1946, Raisman’s commission on revenue allocation 1954 the 3rd National Development 
plan 1975 -1980, the Shehu Musa task Force on tax administration of 1978 and Prof. Emmanuel 
Edozien’s Study Group on the Nigerian Tax System. As to South Africa, see the Steyn Committee 
of Inquiry (1951), the Franszen Commission of enquiry into fiscal policy in South Africa (1970), 
the Margo Commission of inquiry into the tax structure of the Republic of South Africa (the Margo 
Commission) (1987) and the Katz Commission of  enquiry into certain aspects of the tax structure 
of South Africa 
73 Repetti J and Ring D (2012) supra James R. Repetti, J R ‘Democracy and Opportunity: A New 
Paradigm in Tax Equity, (2008) 61 Vand. L. Rev. 1129; Galle (2008) supra; Palmer RL ‘toward 
unilateral coherence in determining jurisdiction to tax income (1989) 30 Harv. Int’l L. J. 1 at 64 
(administrative convenience may not constitute a tax policy goal at all) Bittker, B I. "Equity, 
Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive out Inequities" (1979) 16 San Diego 
L. Rev.735 Schoenblum JA ‘Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical 
Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals’ (1995) 12 Am. Tax. Pol’y 221.  
74 Swain JA ‘Misalignment of substantive and enforcement tax jurisdiction in a global economy: causes 
and strategies for realignment (2010) 63 (x) National Tax Journal, Fox special issue at 4-5 
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The fairness issue will be compounded in a situation where, under a typical 
residence-based system, a State imposes a tax on both residents and non-
residents but taxes only the domestic-source income of the non-resident.75 Even 
if their respective incomes are the same, they will not pay the same amount of 
tax. Elkins76 argues that horizontal equity only requires similarity in the 
taxpayers’ respective situations, and not complete identity. From the 
perspective of enforcement, the determination of equity and fairness involves 
questions as to whether the state’s tax administration mechanism is fair and 
equitable and is applied to all taxpayers in equal measure. For instance, under 
the Nigerian personal income tax regime, tax administrators assess and collect 
the tax of residents in formal employment through a Pay-As-You-Earn system. 
Under such a system, the tax is deducted from the salary of the residents by their 
employers who remit it to the tax authority. However, for other classes of 
residents, the regime applies direct assessment or a presumptive tax assessment. 
This may lead to treating two equal residents unequally in enforcing the 
collection of the tax. 
 
Equity and fairness raise considerations of equality between similar taxpayers 
and also raise the issues of ability to pay the assessed tax and the benefit 
principle, discussed below. 
 
3.2.1.1    Benefit principle  
 
The benefits principle is that a person’s contribution to the state by way of tax 
should take account of the benefits he received from that state.77 In the 18th 
century, the concept of benefit in this regard was viewed from the perspective 
                                                 
75 What he has earned in another state may not be taxable in the first state 
76 Elkins D ‘Horizontal equity as a principle of tax theory’ (2006) 24 Yale L. & Pol’y  Rev. 43 
77 Dodge JM ‘Theories of tax justice: Rumination on the benefit, partnership and ability to pay 
principles’ (2005) 58 Tax L. Rev.399 at 402 
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of a social contract.  Thus, the tax payable was considered to be the 
consideration furnished by the taxpayer in return for the provision by the state 
of security in respect of life, liberty, and property. In that era, the tax system 
was concerned only with real properties and excise on certain goods and 
services, since income tax was not based on the notion of benefits received from 
the state.78  The second version of the benefits principle, as it arose in the 19th 
century, extended to income tax and the implicit assumption was that the 
benefits that a person was entitled to receive from government were linked to 
the amount of tax paid by that person – the more he paid, the greater the benefits 
to which he was entitled. This policy came under challenge as it implicitly 
required that the poor pay more in tax than the rich because it was the poor who 
most needed government benefits; but no attempt was made to accurately 
measure such benefits.79 
 
The extended version of the benefits principle suggested that the measure of a 
person’s benefits from the government should be based on his financial well-
being. As the state established an enabling environment for wealth 
accumulation and set conditions for such accumulation, whoever satisfied the 
requirements would be required to pay tax, but without any linkage to any 
particular benefit he enjoyed from the state. The notion of the benefits principle 
could be traced to a report published under the auspices of the League of 
                                                 
78 Ibid note 402 
79 Ibid note  71 
45 
 
Nations.80 It also received judicial blessing in the locus classicus decision in 
Cook v. Tait by the US Supreme Court.81 
 
Some authors82 have argued that the benefits principle is more relevant in 
international than in national taxation. That is to say; a state can impose a tax 
on its residents without showing any benefit derived by those residents from the 
state. This assertion cannot be justified in the light of tax incentive regimes. 
Under a tax incentive regime, a high-income earner or even a multinational 
corporation (both of which enjoy the benefits of infrastructure provided by the 
host state) may be granted a tax holiday or even a total exemption from tax. 
Even those not exempted can enjoy government benefits without paying tax 
during the period that they utilise the infrastructure. For instance, an individual 
might escape tax if he failed a requirement of physical presence for tax 
residency. The difficulty in ascertaining the amount of benefit each person 
receives from the state makes the ability to pay principle a more appropriate 
fairness norm for residence-based taxation. Roxon83 has said that one of the 
problems of the ability-to-pay principle is that it separates a person’s liability to 
tax from the benefits he received from the state. However, it is submitted that 
he contradicts himself where he says that the benefits principle is not relevant 
                                                 
80 Committee of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, League of Nations, Double 
Taxation and Tax Evasion 5-9, 1927, available at 
www.law.wayne.edu/tad/Documents/League/League_Tech_Experts.pdf Avi-Yonah has stated that 
the benefit principle implies (in an international context) the taxation of active business income 
primarily at source, and passive investment income on the basis of residence; see Avi-Yonah,R.S.  
Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage and the International Tax Regime, Bulletin for International 
Taxation (2007) 61 at 130. 
81 Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924) (where a U.S. citizen residing in,  and apparently deriving all of 
his income from a foreign country may properly be taxed in the U.S. on his worldwide income 
"based on the presumption that government by its very nature benefits the citizen and his property 
wherever found"); see National Paper & Type Co. v. Bowers, 266 U.S. 373, 376 (1924) where 
reference was made to the "power of the United States to protect its interests and redress its wrongs 
in whatever parts of the world its business may take it".  
82 Avi- Yonah ‘Globalisation, tax competition and the fiscal crisis of the welfare state (2000) 113 
Harv. L. Rev 1572, Rixom (2012), Fleming (2001) supra. 
83 Rixom (2012), 
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to domestic taxation because of the difficulty of ascertaining the amount of 
benefit that a taxpayer has received from the state.84  
 
3.2.1.2    Ability-to-pay principle 
 
The ability-to-pay principle connotes that the amount payable by a taxpayer 
should reflect the quantum of the taxpayer’s resources, measured by income, 
wealth, consumption or whatever criterion is considered appropriate.85 The 
principles of ability to pay and the benefit principle can be applied in 
combination. 86 Some writers view ability-to-pay as an aspect of tax equity and 
fairness, encompassing both horizontal and vertical components of equity.87 
Fleming88 has made a case for applying the ability to pay principle in taxing the 
worldwide income of a resident. He is of the view that the most important 
criterion for spreading the income tax burden amongst individual taxpayers is 
the proposition that the tax burden should be allocated on the basis of relative 
economic well-being. It has been argued that income may be a poor measure of 
economic well-being because people who start with equal ability may make 
different decisions about working and saving that affect their income.89 Taking 
account of leisure and underachievement is an obstacle for the principle of 
ability to pay, since such manifestations of ‘income’ cannot be measured.90 
                                                 
84 Ibid  
85 Roxan I (2012) supra has noted that there is  a debate as to whether economic well-being of a person 
should be measured by reference to income that is both saved and consumed or only by reference to 
consumption, see McNulty JK ‘ Flat tax, consumption-type income tax proposals in the US: A tax 
policy discussion of fundamental tax reform (2000) 88 Cal. L. Rev. 2095 
86 Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., Source of Income in Globalizing Economies: Overview of the Issues and a 
Plea for an Origin-Based Approach’ (2006) Bulletin for International Taxation, November, 431 
87 Zolt EM ‘The uneasy case for uniform taxation (1996) 16 Va. Tax Rev. 39 86, see also Greatz MJ 
and Schenk DH ‘Federal income taxation: principles and policies’ (1995) 3rd  (ed) 31 Branford DF 
‘Untangling the income tax (1986) 53 150 
88 Fleming JC et al ‘Fairness in international taxation: The ability-to-pay case for taxing worldwide 
income’ (2001) 5 (4) Fla. Tax Rev.299 
89 Burman  LE ‘Taxes and inequality’ (2013) 66 Tax L. Rev. 563 




Other commentators have argued that there is a consensus that, in determining 
ability to pay, relevant items that cannot be measured; such as leisure and 
underachievement are to be omitted.91 The ability to pay principle is a 
constitutional limitation on the taxing power in Germany, Spain, and Italy.92 
Seto has criticised the ability to pay principle from the perspective of people 
with disabilities, and makes a case for a revision of the principle.93   
 
In discussing the relationship between the benefit principle and the ability to 
pay principle, Dodge has argued that the best basis for fairness is ability to pay. 
This is a less contentions concept than the benefit principle, because it separates 
tax fairness from social justice theory that tries to measure benefits.94  However, 
it is submitted that he fails to realise that the measurement issues he raises  will 
also be a problem in measuring ability to pay. It seems, therefore, that benefits 
and ability to pay should not be separated, since a person should pay tax on the 
benefits he has received from the state based on his ability topay. Avi-Yonah 
has said that the benefits principle was always part of the ability topay 
principle.95 Roxon has described ability to pay as an extended version of the 
benefits principle, and says that: 
“… Appropriate price for a person to pay for the whole of general 
government services, including redistribution, is the amount determined 
by measuring the ability to pay. The appropriate measure of the total 
benefit received from general government services is taken to be the 
amount of the tax payable on the basis of ability to pay.”96  
 
                                                 
91 Lindsey VW ‘The widening gap under the Internal Revenue Code: the need for renewed 
progressivity’ (2001) 5 Fla. Tax Rev. 1 
92 Vanistendael F ‘Legal framework for taxation in Thuronyi V, ‘Tax design and drafting’ (1996) 1 
IMF  
93 Seto, TP and  Buhai SL ‘Tax And disability: ability to pay and the taxation of difference (2006) 154 
Univ. Pennsylvania L. Rev. [Vol.: 1053 
94 Dodge (2005) 
95 Avi-Yonah (2007)  
96 Roxan I (2012) 
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The fusion of the ability to pay principle and the benefits principle in this 
statement, coupled with the immeasurability of government benefits (especially 
for non-residents) links the benefits principle with the concept of redistribution. 
There is consensus as to the legitimacy of redistribution in taxation, on the 
grounds of its social value.97 However, a libertarian could argue that 
redistribution is a means of taking from those who are entitled to market rewards 
and giving to those who are not. It is worth noting that the distinction between 
the redistributive element and the benefits principles of tax may not be clear.98 
One may argue that redistributive taxes can be understood as ‘benefits’ in the 
sense that wealthy individuals pay such tax to secure a benefit, such as a lower 
crime rate and a better-educated workforce. 
 
Thus, benefit and ability to pay are highly relevant to the determination of 
fairness in establishing a connecting factor between a potential taxpayer and the 
taxing authority on the grounds of residence. Thus, it is fair for the state to 
impose a tax on all the income99 of residents on the ground of the benefits being 
received by them from the state. The same consideration can legitimise the 
extension of tax liability to non-residents for the income they have derived from 
the state. Stratford CJ says in this regard that: 
“…the privilege and protection of a resident can justly be called upon to 
contribute towards the cost of the good order and the government of the 
country that shelter him.”100  
 
The benefit principle and the ability to pay principle are aspects of equity and 
fairness in a tax system and provide a theoretical basis for an equitable 
                                                 
97 Ibid 
98 Cappelen AW ‘The Moral Rationale for International Fiscal Law’ (2006) 15 (1) Ethic and 
International Affairs 
99 Both domestic and foreign. 
100 Kergeulen Sealing & Whaling Co. Ltd V CIR (1939) AD 487, 10 SATC 363 
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distribution of the tax burden. These principles are also relevant to issues of tax 
jurisdiction in that a state that functions within a globalised economy and 
chooses to adopt a residence-based system101 will need to interact with other 
states to try to ensure fairness toward taxpayers, in regard to their overall tax 
burden, where they are resident in one state but derive income sourced in other 
state.       
  
3.2.2.    Efficiency Principle 
 
The efficiency principle connotes that the prospect of tax should not be the 
dominant consideration when a taxpayer is making a decision to invest in a 
particular state.102  The efficiency principle takes account of both economic and 
administrative considerations. For their part, states use tax to achieve their 
respective economic goals103 and try to avoid violating the fairness principle in 
relation to the overall tax burden imposed on both residents and non-resident.104 
Thus, in determining the tax base and the taxable person or entity, decisions by 
states impact on taxpayers’ decisions. In other words, the states must try to 
balance fairness to taxpayers with their own goals of achieving economic 
efficiency in relation to  both residents and non-residents.105 Ideally, the trade-
off between equity and efficiency at a domestic level centres on the income 
                                                 
101 That is taking both domestic and foreign source income of those residing in the state on one hand 
and taxing the domestic source income of  the  resident of another state. Tax credit (for foreign paid 
tax), deductions and exemptions may bee applicable.   
102 Hasen D ‘Tax neutrality and tax amenities’ (2012) 12 (2) Fla. Tax Rev. 62 see also Weisbach, DA 
‘Line drawing, doctrine and efficiency in the tax law’ (1998) Chicago working paper in Law and 
Economics available at www.law.uchicago.edu/Publications/Working/index.html.  assessed on 
10/10/2014, see also Bittker, B I "Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations 
Drive Out Inequities" (1979). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 
2301.http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/2301 - to determine whether taxpayers or 
groups of taxpayers are equals or unequal, equity theorists compare their pretax economic incomes 
103 Palmer (1989) 
104 For example, the state may grant a tax holiday or incentives to certain class of residents or non-
residents. It may also exempt them totally from the tax regime. This segregation violates the fairness 
principle but in order to achieve an economic goal the state may close its eyes to that aspect. 
105 Thus, there are two competing interests: the taxpayers (both residents and nonresidents) want to be 
treated equally and fairly, on the other hand the state wants to maximize its economic efficiency. 
Therefore, tax legislation must be designed to balance these interests. 
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derived from activities such as labour and active domestic businesses or passive 
capital investment.106 However, the residence-based system calls for close 
interaction between the states, especially in respect of capital investment by 
their respective residents so that taxpayers are treated equally regardless of 
where they derive income. Lack of consistency in matters of fiscal definition 
may lead taxpayers to invest in states which offer greater certainty in this regard, 
even at the cost of a lower after-tax return .  
 
Creating a balance between economic efficiency and tax fairness at the 
international level, requires that tax policy should centre on two fundamental 
questions: 1) from which perspective is the efficiency of the tax regime to be 
judged – globally or domestically? 2) Is Capital Export Neutrality (CEN)107, 
Capital Import Neutrality (CIN)108 or National Neutrality (NN)109 the optimal 
benchmark to employ in assessing a tax regime?110 Most writers111 seem to 
support an analysis from a global perspective, with some112 supporting  CEN 
while others113 support CIN; but some writers support neither.114 CEN aims at 
                                                 
106 Knoll, MS ‘Reconsidering international tax neutrality’ (2011) 64 Tax L. Rev. 99; Shaheen F 
‘International tax neutrality: reconsiderations’ (2008) 27 Va. Tax Rev. 203. 
107 Involves using foreign tax credits in order to provide relief from double taxation. 
108 That is using exemptions from domestic tax to relieve double taxation. 
109 That is tax policy of a state should have focused on the national interest rather than global. Shaviro 
introduced a theory titled ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ in making case for cooperation between national and 
international interest which taking any tax policy decision. But he conceded that no country can purse 
global welfare at the expense of its own national welfare. Shaviro DN  ‘Why worldwide welfare as a 
normative standard in US tax policy? (2007) 60 Tax L. Rev. 155 
110 Kleinbard ED ‘The lesson of stateless income’ (2012) 65 Tax L. Rev 99 
111 Ibid, and Roxan (2012) Shaviro (2007) supra  note  63 
112Devereux MP ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: Economic principles and tax policy 
considerations’ (2009) 24 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol’y 698, Frisch DJ ‘The economics of international 
tax policy: some old and new approaches (1990) 47 Tax Notes 581 
113 Knoll (2011) , Green RA ‘The future of source-based taxation of the income of multinational 
enterprises’ (1993) 79 Cornell. L. Rev. 18 
114Shaviro DN ‘Rethinking foreign tax credibility’ (2010) 63 Nat’l Tax J. 709, Greatz, MJ ‘Taxing 
international income: inadequate principles, out-dated concepts and unsatisfactory policies’ (2001) 54 
Tax L. Rev. 261 –The famous distinction between CEN and CIN was invented by Richard Musgrave 
and his wife Peggy Musgrave, and has been discussed endless in the literature. This ‘battle of 
neutralities’ has never shows a winner. For example, neither the OECD nor the ECJ has expresses a 
clear preference for a particularly method, there is and will probably never be sufficient evidence on 
what form of neutrality is in the best interest for the international community. 
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achieving neutral tax behaviour as between investing domestically and abroad 
and this can only be achieved through residence-based taxation.115 By contrast, 
CIN aims at neutral tax behaviour between domestic and foreign investors by 
using exemptions, and this approach favours source-based taxation.116  
 
There is some dispute as to the appropriateness of tax efficiency in a tax policy 
analysis. Developed countries tend to consider efficiency as appropriate to tax 
analysis while developing countries tend to view efficiency as a consideration 
that favours developed countries.117  What all states require is to apply equitable 
principles that can check trading imbalances, in terms of capital flows and 
technology transfer.118 
 
CIN and CEN are thus the means for improving tax efficiency on the 
international, not the domestic level. Greatz argues that neither CIN nor CEN 
plays any role in US international tax policy. 119 They are a framework for 
achieving efficiency in the global arena rather achieving tax-neutrality 
domestically (by doing away with all exemptions and foreign tax credits) and 
ought to be a focal point in tax policy analysis. He further states that 
international tax policy analysis concentrates on tax neutrality whereas equity 
and fairness hold centre stage in the domestic tax policy analysis.120 He is of the 
view that it is wrong to say that globalisation signals the demise of national 
identity or national policies, 121 for economic globalisation does not lead to a 
                                                 
115 Roxan (2012) for contrary view see also Shaheen (2008) (The CEN and other neutrality theories are 
best and simultaneously satisfied by source-based taxation.) 
116 Ibid 
117 Cockfield A ‘Purism and contexualism within international  law analysis: How trading analysis 
fails developing countries’ (2007) 5 (2) E-journal  of tax research 199 
118 Ibid 
119 Greatz, MJ ‘Taxing international income: inadequate principles, out-dated concepts and 
unsatisfactory policies’ (2001) 54 Tax L. Rev. 261 
120 Ibid 
121 Yoo, J and Ku, J ‘Globalization and Sovereignty’ (2013) 31 Berkeley J. Int'l Law. 210 at 211 
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form of global government.122 Cockfield123identifies theoretical, empirical and 
behavioural uncertainties as factors that reduce the utility of the efficiency 
principle. However, Shaviro  argues, that criticism of US tax policy for focusing 
excessively on global norms such as CEN and CIN rather than on the interest 
of the American people is misguided.124 He views CEN and CIN as tools for 
promoting national welfare in a broader setting. 
 
National and international tax interests diverge, and no foreign body can 
reconcile the differing interests.125 Hence, from the perspective of domestic 
taxation, both CEN and CIN are inferior to national neutrality.126 National 
governments assign a tax burden and provide benefits to citizens and residents. 
At the international level, the issue of neutrality arises where two or more 
jurisdictions lay claim to be entitled to levy tax on income from an international 
transaction, the one jurisdiction on the basis of where the investment took place 
and the other jurisdiction on the basis of where the investor resides. In a 
domestic context, only one organ lays claim to tax, using either residence or 
source as the connecting factor.127  
 
As noted earlier, the state can have a connection with the taxpayer either 
because the economic activity that generated income took place within its 
territory, or because the taxpayer resides in that state. However, the 
jurisdictional rules that define the economic activity or the income earner are 
characterised by inconsistencies and conflicts both at the domestic and the 
                                                 
122 Rosenbloom, HD ‘International Tax Arbitrage and the International Tax System’ (2000) 53 Tax L. 
Rev. 137 at 166  
123 Cockfield (2007) see also Hasen D ‘Tax neutrality and tax amenities’ (2012) 12 (2) Fla. Tax Rev. 
62 
124 Shaviro, DN ‘Why worldwide welfare as a normative standard in US tax policy? (2007) 60 Tax L. 
Rev. 155 
125 Cockfield A ‘Purism and contexualism within international  law analysis: How trading analysis 
fails developing countries’ (2007) 5 (2) E-journal  of tax research 199 
126 Shaviro, DN  (2007) at  155 
127 Hasen D ‘Tax neutrality and tax amenities’ (2012) 12 (2) Fla. Tax Rev. 62 
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international level.128 These issues could affect the commercial decisions of the 
taxpayer. To avoid this predicament, the definitional rules as to the source of 
income and of residence should be designed in a neutral form. Economic 
efficiency as a policy issue always asks whether the tax system promotes or 
hinders economic efficiency and the extent to which the tax regime distorts the 
behaviour of the taxpayer. 
 
Considerations of administrative efficiency, on the other hand, suggest that the 
state should have a tax system that can be efficiently administered and enforced 
at low cost.129 Taxpayers, for their part, want the tax regime to be simple and 
certain in its application. Tax administrative efficiency as a tax policy issue 
relates to enforcement of the rules of the tax jurisdiction. The nature of the tax 
imposed determines the mechanism for such enforcement. States usually 
impose taxes without regard to the juridical or other nature of the taxpayer.130  
For instance, consumption tax system assesses and collects taxes regardless of 
the identity or circumstances of the taxpayer; by contrast, in an income tax 
system, the character of the taxpayer is crucial for both the imposition and the 
collection of tax. Thus, in the realm of enforcement jurisdiction, tax regimes 
                                                 
128 The inconsistencies do occur in the national legal regime. For instance, the determination of 
residence rule as contains in sections 2, 8 (7), 15 and 27 of the Nigerian Personal Income Tax Act 
2004 (as amended) amplified by the 1st schedule to the Act. (Detailed analysis of these provisions 
will be made later in this thesis) The conflicts, on the other hand, do happen at international as a 
result of different definitional rule adopted by various countries. That is to say, two or more countries 
can claim tax jurisdiction over the same income of one person, due to the divergence of definition 
of the income or the income earner as the case may be. 
129 Williams, RC (2006) at 4 
130 Zolt EM ‘The uneasy case for uniform taxation’ (1997) 16 Va. Tax Rev. 39 103; Substantive 
jurisdiction to impose tax relates to the power of the state to impose a tax on its residents and on the 
income sourced from its territory. Whereas enforcement jurisdiction relates to the power of the state 
to compel the collection of tax over which it has substantive jurisdiction.  See Hellerstein W 
‘Jurisdiction to tax income and consumption in the new economy: a theoretical and comparative 
perspective’ (2003) 38 (1) Ga. L. Rev 1. 
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can be either ‘taxpayer-dependent’131 (as in the case of income tax) or ‘taxpayer-
independent’132 (in the case of consumption tax). 
 
The tax enforcement jurisdiction aims at achieving tax compliance at low 
administrative cost. Achieving this goal depends on the character of the 
taxpayer (such as whether he is resident or non-resident) as well as the nature 
of the income earned by the taxpayer.133 Administrative efficiency as a tax 
policy issue always centres on the fairness of compliance and enforcement and 
on the administrative cost of such enforcement.134 To maximise revenue 
generation at a lowest cost, the State imposes collection and the supply of 
information obligations on classes of persons other than the earners of the 
income in question. The collection (or remission) of tax can beh achieved by a 
withholding tax regime135 which can raise tax residency issues. 
 
One of the problems associated with enforcement in a withholding system is 
that the system treats residents of the state unequally. Assuming, for example, 
that one resident works in either the public or private sector, and the other is 
                                                 
131 This type of regime requires knowing the personality of the taxpayer as well as the place where he 
derived the taxable income. Hence the taxpayer is obliged to furnish the taxing authority with 
information relating to his personality (especially where he resides) only or information relating to 
where he derived the income only or both depending on whether the taxing authority operate 
residence or source-based taxation.  
132 Under this regime, character of the taxpayer is immaterial in assessing and collecting the tax 
imposed. This where the regime appoints a withholding agent (in case of income tax) or collecting 
agent (in case of consumption tax) 
133 Zolt (1997) supra 
134 Schizer, DM ‘Enlisting the Tax Bar’ (2006) 59 Tax L. Rev. 331, 
135 Lederman, L ‘Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance’ (2007) 60 
Stan. L. Rev. 695 (withholding uses both employee and employer as third party enforcer of their 
respective obligations). Withholding tax regime is an advance tax payment deducted and withheld 
from any income due to a taxpayer for onward remittance to the relevant tax authority as the final 
seeettlement income tax liability of the taxpayer. The deduction and remittance are obligations 
imposed on the person making payment to the taxpayer. Failure to withhold and remit to the tax 
authority attracts punitive fines and penalties. The withholding tax regime is administratively simple 
to implement as oppose to direct assessment and collection that attracts high compliance cost. It is 
the effective means of taxing passive income flows crossing State borders. See Zee, HH ‘Taxation 
of financial capital in a globalized environment: the role of withholding taxes’ (1998) 51 (3) National 
Tax Journal 587 at 596 
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self-employed, and they earn the same amount. The withholding system deducts 
tax from the former’s earnings, but not from the latter’s.  According to Kahng, 
a withholding system is usually applied to income derived from labour rather 
than from capital investment.136 Horizontal equity requires a justification for 
having different enforcement rules. 
 
The literature137 that argues against the different treatment given to income from 
labour and income from capital investment makes the point that the enforcement 
mechanism also treats the two form of income unequally. For example, the 
income of an independent contractor, trading business or partnership is not 
subject to the withholding mechanism. Consequently, where two residents of a 
state derive the same amount of income, the enforcement mechanism may be 
applied to them differently. 
 
There could be a trade-off between equity and efficiency in a quest for a fair 
enforcement mechanism that has a higher compliance rate at low administrative 
cost. A taxpayer-independent tax regime may raise questions regarding the 







                                                 
136 Kahng L ‘investment income withholding in the United States and Germany’ (2010) 10 (3) Fla. 
Tax Rev. 316  
137 Kahng (2010) Turnier, WJ ‘Theory Meets Reality: The Case of the Double Tax on Material Capital, 
27 Va. Tax Rev. 83 (2007) (He analysed the various  ways in which income from capital and income 
from labor are treated differently); Buckley, J ‘Tax Changes Since Woodworth's Time: Implications 
for Future Tax Reform’ (2008) 34 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1 at 7 – 8; Lederman (2007); Cavetti, LU 
‘Automatic informatics information exchange vs the withholding tax regime globalization and 






3.2.3    Certainty  
 
Fairness and efficiency in a tax system cannot be achieved if the objectives of 
the tax policy are not certain. Certainty includes qualities such as simplicity, 
clarity and consistency.138 In determining the tax liability of a person, the state 
may utilise both objective and subjective criteria, but shortcomings in the design 
of such tests, which results in their being less than clear and straightforward 
may leave a taxpayer in uncertainty as to his tax liability and result in a loss of 
confidence in the tax system. The certainty and simplicity of a provision are 
assessed by assessing its opposite quality, namely, its complexity.139 The 
question is how to assess the complexity of a tax provision?  
 
The usual methods for identifying the complexity of tax provisions are: 1) the 
ease of readability of the law; 2) the compliance cost to the taxpayer; 3) the 
volume of the statutory provisions. Inconsistency between the taxing provisions 
of the various state’s fiscal legislation can lead to the undesirable outcomes of 
double or even multiple taxation of the same income. The rules, inter alia, for 
determining fiscal residence, ought therefore to be expressed in simple and clear 
language. 
 
3.3 Residence-Based Taxation 
 
There is broad agreement on the two general principles that underlie residence-
based taxation. Taxpayers that have a sufficiently close nexus to the state are 
treated as ‘residents’ of that state, and are consequently liable to tax on their 
global income. Taxpayer who lack such a nexus are regarded as ‘non-residents’ 
and are liable for tax vis-à-vis that state only on the income they derive from or 
                                                 
138 Cooper, G 'Themes and Issues in tax simplification' (1993) 10 Aust. Tax Forum. 417.  
139 Tran-Nam, B ‘Tax Reform and tax simplicity: A new and ‘simpler’ tax system?’ (2000) 6 UNSW 




which is connected with the state. As was noted earlier, where individual 
taxpayers are concerned, the ability-to-pay and the benefits they receive from 
the state provide the theoretical justification for residence-based taxation. 
Moreover, residence within a state enables that state to determine the capacity 
of the individual to pay tax on his overall income.  
 
In the case of corporations, there is greater difficulty in ascertaining ability to 
pay, and the principle of ability to pay consequently has no role in tax policy, 
in that tax liability is determined simply on the basis of the quantum of taxable 
income; the ability to pay of its shareholders is of course not a consideration140 
because they have no liability for the corporation’s tax, save where anti-
avoidance statutory provisions provide otherwise. 
 
Corporate tax must thus be justified on grounds other than ability- to-pay. 141 
There are two competing methods of taxing a corporation. The first is the 
integration of both corporate and individual income tax into a single system. In 
the second method, a corporation can deduct the dividend it pays to its 
shareholders. The shareholders then pay tax on the dividend at the individual 
level.142Where a state adopts a residence-based system, the state must provide a 
                                                 
140 K ‘The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World’ (2000). 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1055, 1113 at 
1114 
141 Fleming, J C et al  ‘Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing 
Worldwide Income’ (2001) 5 Fla. Tax Rev. 299  
142 For detailed discussion on this systems see: Graetz MJ and. Warren  AC ‘Unlocking business tax 
reform’ (2014)  Tax Notes 707 See also Graetz MJ and Warren, AC ‘Integration of Corporate and 
Individual Income Taxes: An Introduction’ (1999) Tax Notes, Sept. 27, 1767Graetz MJ and. Warren  
AC, ‘Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and Economic Integration of Europe,’  (2006). 115 
Yale L. J. 1186; Amiram D et al., ‘‘Tax Avoidance at Public Corporations Driven by Shareholder 
Demand: Evidence From Changes in Shareholder Dividend Tax Policy’ (2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2111467; Ikin C and Tran, A ‘Corporate Tax 
Strategy in the Australian Dividend Imputation System,’ (2013) 28 Australia Tax Forum 523; Vann, 




framework for determining who its residents are. However, as has already been 
noted, states differ in their determination of ‘resident’ and ‘non-resident’.  
 
The distinction between residence and source-based systems is irrelevant to the 
person who earns and invests his income in the state he resides. The distinction 
becomes relevant where a person derives his income in a state other than where 
he resides, for in such a situation, the state where the person resides and the state 
from which he derives the income may both assert a taxing power over the same 
income. In resolving such conflicting claims, the state of residence may 
recognise the primary right of the source state to tax the income derived from 
within its territory.143 This could be implemented through the instrumentality of 
a ‘foreign tax credit’. Alternatively, the state of residence may recognise the 
exclusive right of the source state to tax the income through the mechanism of 
a ‘foreign tax exemption’. The conflict occurs where one state adopts a 
residence-based tax sytem, and the other adopts a sourced-based system.144 
 
Situations can occur where an overlapping taxing power occurs between two or 
more states that have both adopted a residence-based system. In resolving this 
kind of conflict, the affected states commonly resort to Double Taxation 
Agreements (DTA) to resolve the conflicting jurisdictional claims and enhance 
co-operation between them. A DTA is a bilateral treaty entered into by the two 
states involved. However, the point has already been made that, due to global 
economic integration, the network of bilateral tax treaties cannot serve the 
desired coordination objective.  That is why many commentators145 have called 
                                                 
143 Dagan, T ‘The Tax Treaties Myth’ (2000) 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 939 at 980 
144 This is outside the scope of this research. 
145 Cockfield, AJ ‘International Tax Competition: The Last Battleground of Globalization’ (2011) 63 
(12) Tax Notes International 867; from the empirical research conducted there are more than 2600 
DTA around the globe. See Braun, J and Zagler, M ‘An economic perspective on double tax treaties 
with(in) developing countries’ (2014) 6 (1) World Tax Journal 1.  Sawyer, A ‘Developing an 
international (world) tax organisation for administering binding rulings and APAs – the way forward 
(2006) 21 Austl. Tax Forum 287 (He examined the possible model of the international tax 
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for a shift from a bilateral treaty regime to a multilateral treaty146 in order to 
address the issue of divergence of tax laws between states. As has already been 
noted, multilateral tax treaties may come under constitutional challenge on the 




The reality of global economic integration erodes the exclusive tax jurisdiction 
of states. In economic terms, the states’ borders are fading, and the domestic 
laws of tax jurisdiction and the network of bilateral tax treaties148 are being 
questioned. This can encourage taxpayers to exploit any ambiguity created by 
the divergence of the definition of tax residence between the States, hence the 
need for achieving inter-states co-operation in delimiting their tax jurisdiction 
without losing their sovereignty. This research explores the possibility of 
reaching cooperation amongst the states in defining the scope of their 
substantive and enforcement tax jurisdiction. 
 
The usual approach to cooperation is bilateral tax treaties.149 The tax treaties 
focus on protecting the tax base of the party-state, ignoring the taxpayers who 
face conflicting claims due to inconsistencies in the definitional rules of tax 
                                                 
organisation, balancing between creating an independent body or to subsumed it into the existing 
international organisations like WTO or IMF.). see also Raad, KV 'International Coordination of 
Tax Treaty Interpretation and Application' (2001) 29 Intertax 212 Thuronyi, V ‘In Defense of 
International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Tax’ Treaty' (2001) 22 Tax Notes International at 
1291; Pinto, D ‘A Proposal to Create a World Tax Organisation' (2003) 9 New Zealand Journal of 
Taxation Law and Policy at 14. Hadida, J ‘Prospects for Multilateral Cooperation in Taxation’ 
(2006) unpublished LL.M Thesis submitted to the Institute of Comparative Law, Faculty of Law, 
McGill University Montreal, Canada.  
146 Which could be either regional (like Nordic countries tax treaty) or global tax treaty. 
147 XU, M ‘Road forward to a multilateral tax treaty regime? ‘ (2014) Global Tax News available at 
hhtp://www.dlapiper.com/en/global/insights/publication/2014/10  assessed on 10/5/2015 (He 
observed that the proposed multilateral tax treaty would require significant changes to the domestic 
tax laws. Therefore, the states that are highly protective of their sovereignty such as US China Russia 
and the UK are not likely to endorse to the proposal. Thus, the proposal may end up remain at 
regional level.) 
148 That resolves jurisdictional conflict between two states. 
149 Or the recent call for multilateral tax treaty. 
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jurisdiction of the States.150This research argues that co-operation should be 
achieved through comparative analysis of the definitional rules to ascertain the 
extent of convergence and divergence and how they could extend mutual 
respect for each other’s tax sovereignty and balance their interests against that 
of the taxpayers in defining the tax residence outside the realm of tax treaty 
regime.  
 
The next chapter analyses the alternative cooperation mechanism envisaged by 
the thesis. This involves a shift from the tax treaty regime to a comparative 
analysis model. Chapter five has comparative analysis of the concept of fiscal 
residence as applicable in selected jurisdictions that are representative of global 
legal families. For the purpose of an in-depth analysis of the definitional rules, 
the research is restricted to Nigeria and South Africa as two pilot states. The 
research examines the level of convergence and divergence of the Nigerian and 
South African legal regimes in this regard.  
                                                 
150 DTAs usually contain Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) provision. The MAP supposed to be a 
mechanism for resolving disputes arising from the DTA. However, the taxpayer involved in the 
dispute is not a party to the MAP. It is purely between the competent authorities of the party-states. 





FISCAL RESIDENCE:  INTERNATIONAL TAX COOPERATION 
OUTSIDE TAX TREATY REGIME 
 
Table of Contents 
4.0 Introduction: ........................................................................................................ 61 
4.1 Overview of the current International tax cooperation mechanism .................... 63 
4.1.1 Tax Treaty ..................................................................................................... 67 
4.1.2 The OECD Model Tax Convention as a baseline for DTA .......................... 69 
4.1.3 Relationship between Tax Treaty and Domestic Law ............................. 71 
4.1.4 The impact of globalisation on the OECD and UN Models Convention 77 
4.1.5 Initiative for new international tax regime – The OECD-BEPS Project . 79 
4.2 Comparative model for tax cooperation ............................................................. 85 
4.3 How Comparative Model for Fiscal Residence Work ........................................ 89 





Historically, jurisdiction to levy tax was conceived as a national issue with 
exclusively domestic implications.1 Consequently, sovereign states could 
devise their domestic tax rules, without regard for conflict with other states.2 
Consequently, there tended to be significant divergence between states in 
designing their respective tax systems, including their definition of key terms, 
such as that of residency, and the formulation of the power to levy and collect 
tax from taxpayers residing within its boundaries.3 The domestic definition of 
fiscal residence determined resident or non-resident status. However, cross-
                                                 
1 Utz, SG ‘Tax Harmonization and Coordination in Europe and America’ !1994)  9 Conn. J. Int'l L. 
767 at 768  
2 Avi-Yonah, RS ‘International tax as international law’ (2004) 57 Tax L. Rev. 483 
3 Martha RSJ ‘The jurisdiction to tax in international law: Theory and practice of legislative fiscal 
jurisdiction (1989) Kluwer Netherland, 11 
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border business activities of course make it possible for the residents of one 
state to derive income from another or other states.4 The interaction of the 
various definitional rules of fiscal residence could led to jurisdictional conflict 
between states and to double taxation. For their part, taxpayers could attempt to 
exploit conflicting rules to their advantage, to the detriment of revenue 
collection by the taxing states. 
 
The need for avoiding such conflict makes it imperative for the states to co-
operation with each other in fiscal matters. The co-operation mechanism could 
be by way of a unilateral approach, whereby a state may provide for the 
exemption of a certain class of income or provide a credit for foreign tax paid 
by a resident. This approach could be effective if it was reciprocated by other 
states. In a bilateral approach, the requisite reciprocity is secured by way of a 
binding agreement between two states, inter alia for the prevention of double 
taxation. Double Taxation Agreements (DTAs) generally follow one of two 
models: the OECD model or the UN model. The OECD model is the more 
widely used. 
 
As was noted earlier, economic integration triggered by globalisation has 
impacted the viability of bilateral treaty regimes. The OECD has recognised the 
weakness of the bilateral treaty regime, hence the inclusion of multilateral 
initiatives in its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project. The OECD-
BEPS project set up fifteen action plans for the actualisation of the project.5 The 
OECD recognised that the implementation of the BEPS Action Plans would 
                                                 
4 Townsend, A ‘The Global Schoolyard Bully: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s Coercive Efforts to Control Tax Competition’ (2001) 25 (1) Fordham Int’l L. J. 215 
at 221 
5 For instance, Action Plan 2 inter alia recommended certain changes in both the domestic rules the 
OECD Model Convention to neutralise the effect of hybrid mismatch. Action Plan 14 recommended 
the improvement of the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) which involve the inclusion of a 
mandatory binding MAP Arbitration.  
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take a long time if every bilateral tax treaty had to be amended individually. 
Therefore, Action 15 has created a process to develop a multilateral instrument. 
In the same vein, commentators have argued for the adoption of a multilateral 
approach to tackling double taxation and its associated problems.  
 
Treaty regimes cannot provide a long-term solution to these problems. This 
thesis explores by way of a comparative analysis the resolution of potential 
conflicts caused by the interaction of different domestic rules for defining fiscal 
residence. This chapter has highlighted the nature of the current mechanisms 
for tax co-operation (the treaty regimes) and role played by the OECD. It has 
also shown the impact of globalisation on the regime as well as the nature and 
scope of the OECD-BEPS initiatives. This chapter has also explored the 
framework for the comparative analysis envisaged by the thesis. 
 
4.1 Overview of the current International tax cooperation mechanism  
 
Global economic integration paves the way for increased participation in cross-
border business transactions which highlight the interaction of various domestic 
rules. These interactions inevitably engender conflicts between the definitional 
rules of residence designed by various states which may negatively affect both 
the states and the taxpayers. The states may lose revenue when the taxpayers 
explore the opportunities created by the conflicting rules to avoid or minimise 
their tax liability.6  
 
For their part, taxpayers may be exposed to the danger of double taxation. 
Double taxation is of two types, namely, juridical and economic double 
                                                 
6 Brauner, Y ‘What the BEPS?’ (2014) 16 FLA. Tax Rev. at 7-8; Avi-Yonah, RS ‘Double Tax Treaties: 
An Introduction, In Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds. ‘The effect of treaties on foreign direct 
investment: bilateral investment treaties, double taxation treaties and investment flows’ (2009); 
Dagan, T ‘Community Obligations in International Taxation’ (2015) available at: 




taxation. The former occurs where one person is subject to tax on the same 
income or capital by more than one state.7 The latter occurs where two different 
persons are subject to tax on the same income or capital.8 Domestic laws usually 
permit economic double taxation. For instance, where a corporation is taxed, 
and the shareholder is also taxed on the same income when the company 
distributes the profits as a dividend. Economic double taxation could be 
unilaterally avoided by adopting an integrated corporate and shareholder tax. 
Integration takes place when the law gives the corporate shareholder credit for 
all or a portion of the corporate taxes that have been paid.9 The co-operation 
envisaged in this thesis focuses on the mechanisms for avoiding juridical double 
taxation rather than on economic double taxation. 
 
Even if states design their tax residence rules with the same objective in mind, 
a failure to take the rules of other jurisdictions into consideration could frustrate 
the policy goals of both jurisdictions which may together have an effect on 
                                                 
7 Juridical double taxation occur when two States, with inconsistent definitions for determining the tax 
residence, impose a world-wide income tax on either  individual or corporation. For instance, State A 
may adopt incorporation test in determining the corporate tax residence, whereas State B may apply 
CMC or POEM tests for ascertaining the corporate residence. In the same vein, State A may adopt 
physical presence test treat forrr determining the residence of an individual. However, state B may 
apply ordinary resident test for determining the residence of that same individual. This type of double 
taxation can be eliminated on the basis of tax treaties using the tie-breaker rules contained in Article 
4 paragraphs 2-3 of the tax treaties, which determine the states, which would qualify as the only 
country of residence of the person in question. Dean SA ‘Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A 
New Approach to Tax Havens, Tax Flight, and International Tax Cooperation’ (2007) 58 Hastings 
L.J. 911 at 939 see also Vogel, K ‘Double Taxation Conventions’ (3rd ed) Kluwer Law International, 
at 1124. 
8 Ibid at 1124 
9 For detailed discussion on this systems see: Graetz MJ and. Warren  AC ‘Unlocking business tax 
reform’ (2014)  Tax Notes 707 See also Graetz MJ and Warren, AC ‘Integration of Corporate and 
Individual Income Taxes: An Introduction’ (1999) Tax Notes, Sept. 27, 1767Graetz MJ and. Warren  
AC, ‘Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and Economic Integration of Europe,’  (2006). 115 
Yale L. J. 1186; Amiram D et al., ‘‘Tax Avoidance at Public Corporations Driven by Shareholder 
Demand: Evidence From Changes in Shareholder Dividend Tax Policy’ (2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2111467; Ikin C and Tran, A ‘Corporate Tax 
Strategy in the Australian Dividend Imputation System,’ (2013) 28 Australia Tax Forum 523; Vann, 




taxpayers that neither jurisdiction foresaw.10 Thus, the success of a state in 
enforcing its tax rules can depend on the impact those rules have in other states. 
Therefore, to avoid the consequences of double taxation, there is a need for co-
operation among the states in designing their respective definitional rules for a 
fiscal residence. It has been argued that international cooperation in tax matters 
may serve the long-term interests of a state.11 States can reduce the risks of 
double taxation through unilateral relief in their respective domestic laws or by 
way of bilateral relief in double taxation agreements (DTAs). 
 
The co-operation may be in the form of a unilateral action of the states using 
their domestic laws.12 The unilateral mechanism has been described as the most 
important means of resolving overlapping definitional rules.13 Under the 
unilateral approach, a state may make provision in its domestic legislation for 
an exemption from tax for certain types of income that may be taxed by other 
                                                 
10 Daine argued that “Those inconsistencies matter because taxpayers (and their capital) can cross 
borders with relative ease. In a sense, those tax conflicts are analogous to those that could be produced 
by the choice of driving on the left or right side of the street. There may be slight advantages to driving 
on a given side (say, if right-handed drivers drive more safely on the right side of the street). But so 
long as left-driving and right-driving vehicles find it more difficult to move from one jurisdiction to 
another than it is for capital to move around the globe, there will be relatively few accidents triggered 
by the differences among jurisdictions. Because taxpayers face little difficulty in moving assets around 
the globe, there is a significantly greater likelihood the equivalent of a left-driving car will find its 
way into a right-driving jurisdiction.” Ring, DM ‘One Nation among many: policy implications of 
cross-border tax arbitrage’ (2002) 44 B.C. L. Rev. 79; see also Ring, DM ‘International tax relations: 
theory and implications’ (2007) 60 Tax L. Rev. 
11 Shaviro, D ‘Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard in U.S. Tax Policy?’ (2007) 60 Tax 
L. Rev. 155; see also Dagan, T ‘The Costs of International Tax Cooperation’ Working Paper No. 1-
03, January 2003 (who argued that It is widely agreed that double taxation should be eliminated. It is 
also agreed that it is better for a state to eliminate double taxation unilaterally, even without 
cooperation from other states.) 
12 Unilateral cooperation effort generally by way of granting exemption to certain types of income that 
may be taxed by other countries, or by providing a deduction or credit against domestic taxes for the 
foreign taxes paid. See Shaviro, DN ‘Rethinking Foreign Tax Creditability’ (2010) 63 Nat’l Tax J. 
709 at 710  
13 Christians, AD ‘Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa A CASE STUDY’ (2005) 
71 (2) Brooklyn L. Rev. 639 at 650 (“most other countries imposing worldwide income taxation 
generally relieve double taxation on a unilateral basis under statutory law. The same result is attained 
under treaties.”)  Dagan, T ‘The Tax Treaties Myth’ (2000) 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 939 at 980 
(Arguing that “tax treaties play a negligible role or are not needed at all in relieving double taxation, 
if each state would unilaterally relieve double taxation in their domestic laws.”) 
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countries. Alternatively, the state may to allow double taxation to take place but 
permit a deduction or credit against domestic taxes for the taxes paid by its 
residents in another state.14 
 
However, unilateral solutions may negatively affect the revenue of a state where 
other countries do not reciprocate the concessions made or if the concessions 
are made even in the absence of overlapping definitional rule.15 Thus, 
coordinated reciprocity is required if the two states are to share the benefits of 
unilateral tax concessions. For instance, state ‘A’ cedes its jurisdiction to tax its 
resident by way of granting foreign tax credit in its domestic law. However, 
state ‘B’ does not grant a tax credit or any other similar mechanism for relieving 
double taxation of their residents.  In this situation, business and investment in 
state ‘A’ will be disadvantaged compared to doing business and investment in 
state ‘B’ country. Thus, the residents of state ‘B’ may prefer to do all their 
business and investment at home without engaging in any form of cross-border 
transaction. Therefore, the failure of the state ‘B’ to reciprocate what state ‘A’ 
has done curtails capital flow from state ‘B’ to state ‘A’. This gives rise to a 
need for another mechanism for attaining the desired reciprocity in resolving 
the jurisdictional conflict. This mechanism is an international agreement that 
divides the taxing right among states and prevents overlapping or conflicting 
rules.16 The international agreement referred to here is the tax treaty or double 





                                                 
14 Ibid at 170; see also  
15 Christian, AD ‘How Nations Share’ (2012) 87 (4) Indiana Law Journal 1407 at 1416 
16 Christians, AD ‘Sovereignty, Taxation and Social Contract’ (2009) 18 Minn. J. INT’L L. 99  
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4.1.1 Tax Treaty 
 
The interaction of different definitional rules often raised the following 
questions on how to impose a tax on the income.17 The questions are: who taxes 
the income? Whose rules apply? What happens when the states involved 
disagree? Which state is to prevail and why? In order to address these questions, 
states need to cooperate in designing a solution to the problems associated with 
the different rules.18 As discussed above, tax treaty is currently the chosen 
mechanism for addressing the questions raised. 
 
Double tax treaties are international agreements, generally between two states 
that serve as the instrument for designing reciprocal jurisdictional 
concessions.19 The primary role of these treaties is to prevent the incidence of 
double taxation caused by the interaction of different definitional rules. DTAs 
limit the circumstances in which or the extent to which, one state’s taxes will 
apply to residents of the other state. Tax treaties do not impose taxes or create 
an alternative joint tax regime. The DTA only coordinates the operative 
provisions of each treaty partner's tax rules.20 Thus, the tax liability of a taxpayer 
is determined by reading the tax treaty in conjunction with domestic rules of 
each of the treaty partners.  
 
Despite the significance of states’ cooperation in remedying potential inter-
jurisdictional conflict, states tend to be reluctant to surrender their tax 
                                                 
17 Ring, DM ‘International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications’ (2007) 60 TAX L. REV. 83; Diane 
M. Ring, DM ‘One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage’ (2002) 
44 B.C. L. REV. 79  
18 Despite the need for states’ cooperation in remedying the potential inter-jurisdictional conflict, the 
states are quite reluctant to surrender their autonomy in this area. Rosenbloom, HD ‘Sovereignty and 
the Regulation of International Business in the Tax Area’ (1994)  20 Can.-U.S. L.J. 267 at 268 
19 Prussia and Austria tax treaty of 1899 was the first bilateral tax treaty. See Holmes, K ‘International 
Tax Policy and Double Tax Treaties An Introduction to Principles and Application’ (2014) (2nd  ed) 
IBFD Publication, Amsterdam  
20 Dean SA ‘Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A New Approach to Tax Havens, Tax Flight, 
and International Tax Cooperation’ (2007) 58 Hastings L.J. 911 at 942 
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sovereignty for the sake of tax cooperation.21 That is to say state take different 
views on the appropriate terms to be inserted into their DTAs. Hence, the need 
for international co-operation.  
 
Current efforts at international cooperation originated in the 1920s attempt by 
the League of Nations to eliminate juridical double taxation and to allocate 
taxing rights between states.22 The committee set up by the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) urged the League of Nations to eradicate the evils 
of double taxation by using a multilateral approach.23 In 1920 the Provisional 
Economic and Finance Committee of the League of Nations reviewed this 
recommendation and in its final report of 1923, the committee rejected the idea 
of a multilateral convention. The recommendation of the League of Nations’ 
Committee led to the 1928 model convention for the elimination of double 
taxation which left many details for bilateral negotiations.24  
 
The model embodies an international consensus on the manner in which 
jurisdiction to tax should be divided between residence-based and source-based 
tax jurisdictions to prevent double taxation.25 The consensus was that 
jurisdiction to tax active business income is accorded to the country of source, 
and jurisdiction to tax passive investment income is granted to the residence 
country.26 The efforts of the League of Nations contributed substantially to the 
                                                 
21 Rosenbloom, HD ‘Sovereignty and the Regulation of International Business in the Tax Area’ (1994)  
20 Can.-U.S. L.J. 267 at 268 
22 Rixen, T ‘The Institutional Design of International Double Taxation Avoidance’ available at 
http://mpra.ub.uni muenchen.de/8322/     
23 Morriss AP and Moberg, L ‘Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the OECD’s Campaign against 
“Harmful Tax Competition” (2012) 4 Colum. J. Tax L. 1 at 33  
24 BRUINS, GWJ  Et  al. ‘Report on Double Taxation: Submitted to the Financial Committee, of the 
League of Nations, Economic and Financial Commission (1923).   
25 Graetz, MJ and O’Hear, MM ‘The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation’ (1997) 46 Duke 
L.J. 1021 at 1094-95  
26 Avi-Yonah, RS ‘The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification’ (1996) 74 
Tax. L. Rev. 1301 at 1306  
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design of existing bilateral treaties and formed the basis for the current OECD 
and UN Models of tax treaties.27  
 
4.1.2 The OECD Model Tax Convention as a baseline for DTA 
 
 
The OECD model DTA allows pairs of nations to negotiate openly for taxing 
rights.28 Most international tax conflicts arise between tax systems that are very 
similar.29 Thus, the model takes two similar tax regimes and refines those 
similarities.30 The main aim of the OECD model DTA is to provide guidance to 
states wishing to enter into a bilateral DTA with appropriate provisions inserted 
into the agreement.31  Thus, the model DTA is the starting points for the states’ 
DTA negotiations. However, there is, no binding obligation in this regard as the 
model is not enforceable. The efforts of the OECD in developing a system for 
the avoidance of double taxation picked up where the preliminary research of 
the League of Nations left off.32 Thus, the OECD Model was based on a series 
of model treaties promulgated by the League of Nations. It has been updated 
several times to cope with the developments in technology and the international 
economy, and the impact of globalisation.33  
                                                 
27 Vogel, K ‘Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation’ (1986) 4 Int'l Tax & Bus. Law. 1  at 10 (The 
League of Nations’ fiscal committee developed two additional models: the Mexico Draft in 1943 and 
the London Draft, in 1946). See also Morriss, AR and Lotta Moberg, L ‘Cartelizing Taxes: 
Understanding the OECD’s Campaign against “Harmful Tax Competition’ (2012) 4 COLUM. J. TAX 
L. 1, 33  
28 Dagan, T ‘The Tax Treaties Myth’ (2000)  32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 939 at  98o  
29 Brauner, Y ‘An International Tax Regime in Crystallization’ (2003)  56 Tax L. Rev. 259, at 290 
30 Dean, SA ‘More Cooperation, Less Uniformity: Tax Deharmonization and the Future of the 
International Tax Regime’ (2010) 84 Tul. L. Rev. 125  
31 Daurer, V and Krever. R ‘Choosing between the un and OECD tax policy models: an African case 
study’ WU International Taxation Research Paper Series No. 2014 – 16 available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2499980  
Owens J and Bennett, M  ‘OECD Model Tax Convention Why it works, published by OECD Centre 
for Tax Policy and Administration (CTP) Available at: 
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/2756/OECD_Model_Tax_Convention.html
#sthash.EgTTMUcf.dpuf  
32 Vogel, K ‘Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation’ (1986) 4 Int'l Tax & Bus. Law. 1  at 11 
33 The OECD Model Tax Convention has been updated in 1994, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 




Although DTAs are negotiated individually, the product of the negotiations is 
usually similar to the OECD model.34  Indeed, the OECD Model has had such 
an influence on tax treaties that “one can pick up any modern tax treaty and 
immediately find one’s way around, often even down to the article number.”35 
The OECD has facilitated the development of a network of more than three 
thousand DTAs.36 It standardised the treaty structure and content, which has 
contributed greatly to the proliferation of the tax treaty network.37 Its standard 
and universal coverage provides clarity in tax practice.38 Thuronyi39 argues that 
“the OECD Model has almost acquired the status of an international 
agreement.” The OECD Model dominates current tax treaty law.40  
 
However, the international tax regime promoted by the OECD has remained a 
primarily soft-law based regime.41 In addition, geopolitical changes have 
                                                 
and Developing Countries has been updated twice: in 2001 and 2012 respectively. See Qureshi, AH 
‘Coherence in the public international law of taxation: developments in international taxation and 
trade and investment related taxation’ (2015) available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2600132; see also 
Christians, AD ‘Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa a case study’ (2005) 71 
(2) Brooklyn L. Rev. 639 at 653 
34 A research has shown that about 75% of the language of treaties is identical to the language of the 
OECD model. See Brauner, Y ‘What the BEPS?’ (2014) 16 Fla. Tax Rev. 55,   
35 Jones, JFA ‘The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Are Tax Treaties Necessary?’ (1999) 53 Tax L. Rev. 
1 at 2  
36 Rosenbloom, HD ‘Sovereignty and the Regulation of International Business in the Tax Area’ (1994)  
20 Can.-U.S. L.J. 267;  Brauner, Y ‘An International Tax Regime in Crystallization’ (2003) 56 Tax 
L. Rev. 259  (arguing that the  OECD is the key source of international coordination); see also  
Cockfield,  AJ ‘The Rise of the OECD as Informal ‘World Tax Organization’ Through National 
Responses to E-Commerce Tax Challenges’ (2006) 8 Yale J.L. & Tech. 136  
37 Townsend, A ‘The Global Schoolyard Bully: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s Coercive Efforts to Control Tax Competition’ (2001) 25 (1) Fordham Int’l L. J. 215 
at 221 
38 Ibid 
39 Thuronyi, V ‘International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty’ (2001) 26 Brook. J. Int'l L. 
1641; see also Salzman, J ‘The organization for economic cooperation and development’s role in 
international law’ (2011) 43 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 101 at 102; Han, S ‘The Harmonization of 
Tax Treaties and Domestic Law’ (2011) 7 BYU Int'l L. & Mgmt. Rev. 29 (the OECD Model 
Convention “has achieved a consensus position as the benchmark against which essentially all tax 
treaty negotiations take place,”) 
40 Lang, M et al ‘The Impact of the OECD and Un Model Conventions on Bilateral Tax Treaties’ 
(2012) Cambridge University Press, New York   
41 Christians, A ‘Hard Law & Soft Law in International Taxation’ (2007) 25 Wisc. Int'l L. J; Ring, D 
‘Who is Making International Tax Policy? International Organizations as Power Players in a High 
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thrown into question the dominance of the OECD in the tax system.42 These 
changes jeopardise the future of tax treaties, which are the building blocks of 
the current tax system. Triangular situations also give rise to another challenge 
to the bilateral tax regime. This is the situation where the transactions involve 
multiple parties to a tax treaty and span more than two tax jurisdictions.43 Most 
such situations are beyond the reach of the current bilateral treaty regime. For 
example, an individual or company might be found to be resident in more than 
two tax jurisdictions.  
 
The OECD has been unsuccessful in transforming the network of DTAs into a 
multilateral treaty regime.44 This failure was a result of the reliance of DTAs on 
the domestic legal framework and also the institutional framework of the treaty 
partners. The OECD model entrenches the dependence of the DTAs on 
domestic laws in interpreting undefined terms. 
 
4.1.3 Relationship between Tax Treaty and Domestic Law 
 
Theoretically, tax treaties and domestic laws are designed to work in harmony. 
Art. 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties established principles 
of international law that govern the relationship between treaties and the 
domestic law. It provides that “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties 
to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” Furthermore, Art. 27 of the 
VCLT provides that “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law 
                                                 
Stakes World’ (2010) 33 Fordham Int'l L. J. 649; Ault, HJ ‘Reflections on the Role of the OECD in 
Developing International Tax Norms’ (2009) 34 Brook. J. Int'l L. 757 (2009); Calderón, JM ‘The 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as a Source of Tax Law: Is Globalization Reaching the Tax Law?’ 
(2007) 35 Intertax 4   
42 Brauner, Y and Pistone, P ‘BRICS and the Emergence of International Tax Coordination’ (2015) 
IBFD Publication, Amsterdam. 
43 Fett, E ‘Triangular Cases: The Application of Bilateral Income Tax Treaties in Multilateral 
Situations’ (2014) IBFD, Publication 
44 Rosenbloom, HD ‘Sovereignty and the Regulation of International Business in the Tax Area’ (1994)  
20 Can.-U.S. L.J. 267  
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as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” This an expression of the 
pacta sunt servanda principle. 
 
However, compliance with the international law principle mentioned above 
depends on each state’s Constitution, laws, and judicial decisions. In some 
countries, domestic legislation prevails over an inconsistent provision of a 
treaty.45 In some states tax treaties are legally superior to domestic law. One 
consequence of the legal priority given to treaties is that the tools used to 
interpret those treaties implicitly receive that same priority. However, in other 
states, domestic legislation is required to implement tax treaty obligations. In 
these countries, treaties are subject to repeal by later legislation.46 
 
DTAs are similar and always refer to concepts embedded in the OECD or UN 
model treaties and the domestic laws.47  This has led to an interface between 
domestic legislation and the DTAs. Indeed, DTAs explicitly state that domestic 
law provides the meaning of any undefined term.48 Article 3 (2) of both the 
OECD and UN Model Conventions provides that: 
“As regards the application of the Convention at any time by a 
Contracting State, any term not defined therein shall, unless the context 
otherwise requires, have the meaning that it has at that time under the 
law of that State for the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention 
applies, any meaning under the applicable tax laws of that State 
prevailing over a meaning given to the term under other laws of that 
State.” 
 
This provision allows each of the contracting states to define any term not 
defined in the tax treaty by a provisions of their respective domestic law at the 
                                                 
45 Han, S ‘The Harmonization of Tax Treaties and Domestic Law’ (2011) 7 BYU Int'l L. & Mgmt. Rev. 
29  
46 John H. Jackson, JH ‘Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis’ (1992) 86 
Am. J. Int’l L. 310, 314 at 315 
47 Kysar, KM ‘Interpreting Tax Treaties’ (2016) 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1387 at 1390 
48 Ibid at 1390 
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time the treaty is applied. That is to say; the definition is based on the provisions 
of the domestic law as periodically amended.49  Thus, the domestic legislation 
of the treaty partners is the ultimate source of the definitional rules.   
 
Furthermore, given the nature of the definitional rules for tax residence, the 
incorporation of domestic law into the DTA is inevitable. For instance, when a 
DTA refers to the legislation of the party states in defining residency, the 
domestic residence rules must be consulted for the definition. The DTA only 
steps in to provide tie-breaker rules. Kyar50 argues that the determination of 
residence is the main issue which the DTA has delegated to the domestic law. 
He asserts that the incomplete and uniform nature of DTAs, the technicality of 
the tax system and the reality of tax abuse make DTAs unsuitable as the single 
interpretative mechanism. Therefore, there is a need to rely on extrinsic sources 
of interpretation which include the domestic laws of the treaty partners.  
 
Due to the divergence of the definitional rules under the domestic legislation of 
each treaty partner, the provisions of the tax treaty may be understood 
differently by them. Different perceptions of the terms used in a tax treaty may 
lead to a continuation of jurisdictional conflict and negate the rationale of a tax 
treaty. 51  Thus, the application of domestic laws in interpreting tax treaties could 
create conflict which may, in turn, lead to double taxation which the treaty 
sought to prevent.  Furthermore, when the meaning of a term of a tax treaty is 
not defined in the DTA, paragraph 3, Article 25 of the OECD Model provides 
                                                 
49 Hammer,  RM ‘The Continuing Saga of the PE: Will the OECD Ever Get it Right?’ (2004) 33 Tax 
Mgmt. Int’l J. 472 (arguing that “treaties may deviate from the international consensus even if they 
closely follow the model treaties due to periodic updates to the models and commentary thereto.”) 
50 Kysar, KM ‘Interpreting Tax Treaties’ (2016) 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1387 at 1437 
51 Postlewaite, PF and  Makarski, DS ‘The ALI Tax Treaty Study—A Critique and a Modest Proposal’ 
(1999) 52 Tax Law. 731 at 741(arguing that “when countries take different approaches to treaty 




that the competent authorities of the party States shall resolve any difficulties 
arising from the interpretation using Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP).  
 
DTAs are agreements entered into by two contracting states for the elimination 
of double taxation. However, the agreement involves the interest of a third 
party— namely, the taxpayer.52 Therefore, a breach of that agreement can be 
easily detected because there is a third party involved. If one of the treaty 
partners violates a DTA, the taxpayer will notice this violation and notify the 
competent authorities in the taxpayer’s home country. The states then enter into 
MAP negotiations in order to reach an agreement over the DTA violation. 
Article 25 of the OECD Model sets up the mechanism for the MAP: 
“Where a person considers that the actions of one or both of the 
Contracting States result or will result for him in taxation not in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention, he may, irrespective 
of the remedies provided by the domestic law of those States, present his 
case to the competent authority of the Contracting State of which he is a 
resident or, if his case comes under paragraph 1 of Article 24, to that of 
the Contracting State of which he is a national. The case must be 
presented within three years from the first notification of the action 
resulting in taxation, not in accordance with the provisions of the 
Convention.” 
 
The core objective of a tax treaty is the mutual resolution of disputes between 
the taxpayer and the tax authorities. The parties are concerned as to how to 
resolve the jurisdictional conflicts. The tax treaties usually establish a dispute 
resolution mechanism, that is the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP). The tax 
treaties contain a provision defining the MAP, by which the competent 
authorities of the two States, are authorised to resolve disputes. 53 Therefore, the 
                                                 
52 Rixen, T ‘The institutional Design of international double Taxation Avoidance’ (2008) MPRA Paper 
No. 8322, available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8322/ 
53 Rosenbloom, HD ‘Sovereignty and the Regulation of International Business in the Tax Area’ 
(1994) 20 Can.-U.S. L.J. 267 at 268 
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MAP is a very crucial aspect of the tax treaty network. To make a request for a 
MAP, the taxpayer must be a resident of one of the treaty partners and must 
establish that an action by one or both of the States results in taxation outside 
the provisions of the DTA. Once the taxpayer exercises his right under MAP, 
the remaining process is a government-to-government relationship. However, 
the MAP requires close co-operation between the taxpayer and the competent 
authorities. The taxpayer provides information to the competent authority in his 
State of residence which, in turn, communicates that information to the other 
State.54 The legal status of the agreement and the actual steps necessary for its 




The MAP serves as a mechanism to raise issues in dispute between the 
competent authorities in the treaty partners so they can resolve the jurisdictional 
conflict. The MAP ensures that the conflict will not frustrate the DTA’s goal of 
eliminating double taxation.55 It has been argued that the non-mandatory nature 
of MAP reduces the threat posed by the international tax regime to the fiscal 
sovereignty of the treaty partners.56 However, it appears that the MAP may find 
it difficult or even impossible to resolve successfully most of the disputes 
arising from DTAs.  The reason is that the application of the procedure hinges 
on the competent authorities of the party states, which derive their respective 
powers from domestic laws. As with the interpretation of undefined terms of 
the DTA, the MAP also rely on the domestic law.  
 
                                                 
54 Ault, HJ ‘Dispute resolution: the Mutual Agreement Procedure’ in Trepelkov, A et al (ed) ‘United 
Nations Handbook on Selected Issues in Administration of Double Tax Treaties for Developing 
Countries’ (2013) UN, New York 309 - 340 
55 Ault, HJ  ‘Reflections on the role of the OECD in developing international tax norms’  (2009) 34 (3) 
Brook. J. Int’l L. 758 
56 Green, RA ‘Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes Between Governments: A Comparison 
of the International Tax and Trade Regimes’ (1998) 23 Yale J. Int'l L. 79    
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The implementation of the provisions of DTAs depends on the relevant 
domestic legislation of the party states. Therefore, the OECD Model and the 
DTAs designed from it could not address the potential conflict arising from the 
interaction of the local legislation. The MAP requires the taxpayer first to 
communicate with his state of residence. If the state cannot resolve the problem 
unilaterally, it has an obligation under the treaty to communicate with the other 
state through the MAP in order to settle the issue. However, If the two countries 
follow the MAP but fail to reach a mutual agreement, the taxpayer is potentially 
left with unrelieved double taxation, thus thwarting the principal purpose of the 
treaty. Therefore, there is a need for exploring tax cooperation outside the tax 
treaty provisions.  
 
The weaknesses mentioned above of the OECD model and the DTAs derived 
from it generates new opportunities for taxpayers to reduce their tax burdens 
through avoidance arrangements.57 Thuronyi suggests that multilateral treaties 
could redress the problems posed by bilateral treaties.58 Genuine reform of the 
international tax system requires multinational action as opposed to dissected 






                                                 
57 Thuronyi, V  ‘In Defense of International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Tax Treaty’ (2001) 22 
Tax Notes Int’l 1291 at 1293 
58 Thuronyi, V ‘Coordination Rules as a Solution to Tax Arbitrage, 57 Tax Notes Int’l 1053 (2010); 
Victor Thuronyi, ‘Tax Treaties and Developing Countries’ in Michael Lang, M. et al (eds.) ‘Tax 
Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics’ (2010) IBFD Publications, Amsterdam 441 
at 455 Thuronyi, V ‘International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty’ (2001) 26 Brook. J. Int'l 
L. 1641;  
59Thuronyi, V ‘International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty’ (2001) 26 Brook. J. Int'l L. 
1641; Pinto and Sawyer   have similarly made case for a world tax organization; see Pinto, D and 
Sawyer, A ‘Building Bridges between Revenue Authorities: Would a World Tax Organisation be a 
Key Facilitator?’ (2011) J. Applied L. & Pol’y 25; see also Sharkey, N ‘A South East Asian tax 
organisation, (2013) Brit. Tax Rev. 175;  
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4.1.4 The impact of globalisation on the OECD and UN Models Convention 
 
 
Globalisation has been defined as the processes of economic, social, cultural, 
and political integration across national borders. It brings the laws of states into 
direct and frequent contact.60 Globalisation has an effect on the concept of 
physical territory. A person physically present in a state may communicate, 
interact, or work with someone abroad. 61 Thus, physical territory has become 
less important in defining an individual’s identity. The political pressures that 
influence the formulation of tax laws are principally domestic. However, the 
ability of taxpayers to relocate themselves, their activities, or their assets to 
other jurisdictions and the inability of the states to monitor such moves of their 
taxpayers, is a reflection of the impact of globalisation.62 This creates an 
external threat to the integrity of a state’s tax regime.63  
 
Stressing the significance of international tax cooperation in a globalised 
economy, Christians states that:  
 
"The international tax regime is flawed because of the failure of states to 
agree on an increasingly lengthy list of key areas. In effect, the flaw is a 
series of unrelieved collective action problems among states, each 
multiplying the harm of the other. The need for revenue to address 
growing inequality and growing social needs and the increasing unease 
about the distributional effects of regulation in an economically 
integrated world require that this web of collective actions be addressed 
and, if possible, overcome. Further, states cannot raise revenue 
effectively or fairly in the modern international economic regime without 
interacting with other states and their citizens, as people, goods, 
                                                 
60 Ku, J and Yoo, J ‘Globalization and Sovereignty’ (2013) 31 Berkeley J. Int'l Law. 210  
61 Gerber, DJ ‘Globalization and Legal Knowledge: Implications for Comparative Law’ (1990) Tulane 
  Law Review, 950 
62 Terrill, R ‘What Does 'Globalization' Mean?’ (1999) 9 Trans Nat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 217 at 218 
Higgins argued that (“Globalization represents the reality that we live in a time when the walls of 
sovereignty are no protection against the movements of capital, labour, information and ideas—nor 
can they provide effective protection against harm and damage.”)  Roslyn Higgins, R ‘International 
Law in a Changing International System’ (1999) 58 Cambridge L. J. 78 at 82  
63 Dean SA ‘Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A New Approach to Tax Havens, Tax Flight, 
and International Tax Cooperation’ (2007) 58 Hastings L.J. 911 at 924 
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services, and capital increasingly crosses global borders."64 (emphasis 
added) 
 
Tax law reflects the national characteristic of states which includes their 
language, history, location, and natural resources, and explains the different 
nature of their laws.65 However, despite the divergence of the tax rules, 
globalisation has increased the closeness of the states.66 Thus, what happens in 
one state can cause a chain reaction, transcending traditional borders to shape 
and affect other sovereign states. As a result of globalisation, States draw closer 
either intentionally or unintentionally toward a homogeneous world. However, 
globalisation has led to the proliferation of tax competition,67 which is the anti-
thesis to the tax cooperation championed by this thesis. For instance, high tax 
rate encourages residents of developed countries to seek more favourable 
locations to hold their funds and transact business. The developing countries, 
on the other hand, can lower their tax rates to attract the residents of developed 
countries.  
 
Given the above interface of globalisation on states’ tax sovereignty, co-
operation among states in designing their tax rules is crucial. However, there is 
a need to shift away from the traditional method of tax cooperation – the treaty-
based mechanism. The traditional method is focused on bringing States with 
unequal bargaining power into an agreement. The parties with superior 
bargaining power dictate the form of the agreement through the OECD and UN 
model conventions. Empirical research shows that in negotiating tax treaties, 
the states usually rely on the two model treaties designed by the OECD and UN 
                                                 
64 Christians, A et al ‘Taxation as a Global Socio-Legal Phenomenon’ (2008) 14 ILSA J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 303 at 305  
65 Avi-Yonah, RS ‘Tax convergence and globalisation’ (2010) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636299  
66 Leviner, S ‘The intricacies of tax and globalization’ (2014) 5 Columbia J.  Tax Law 207 at 212 
67 Townsend, A ‘The Global Schoolyard Bully: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 




respectively. While the OECD model assigns more taxing powers to developed 
countries,68 the UN model reserves more taxing powers for the developing 
countries.69 Avi-Yonah70 is of the view that the OECD Model represents an 
international consensus that the appropriate jurisdiction for tax income arising 
from cross-border transactions is primarily the residence jurisdiction.71. 
 
 
4.1.5 Initiative for new international tax regime – The OECD-BEPS Project 
 
 
Globalisation has increased the mobility of both human and capital thereby 
encouraging both individuals and corporations to circumvent the domestic tax 
rules of the states. At the other end of the spectrum, the emergence of BRICS 
countries erodes the dominance of the OECD in the promotion of 
standardisation and convergence of international tax rules.72 As a result of these 
problems, some taxable income may escape the tax net of the states, thereby 
eroding their revenue base.73 For their part, the states compete for revenue and 
investment.74 The current treaty-based co-operation mechanism has proven 
incapable of addressing the twin challenges facing the international tax regime. 
The OECD has realised that the current bilateral treaty regime cannot address 
the revenue crisis outlined above, regardless of its concerted efforts in 
                                                 
68 Avi-Yonah, RS and Lahav, Y ‘The Effective Tax Rates of the Largest US and EU Multinationals’ 
(2012) 65 Tax L. Rev. 375 (Argued that over ninety percent of multinationals are residents in OECD 
member-states.) 
69 Daurer, V and Krever. R ‘Choosing between the un and OECD tax policy models: an African case 
study’ WU International Taxation Research Paper Series No. 2014 – 16 available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2499980  
70 Avi-Yonah, RS ‘The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification’ (1996) 74 
Tax. L. Rev. 1301 at 1303 
71 Christians, A ‘How Nations Share' (2012) 87 Ind. L. J. 1407 at 1411 (Arguing that “tax treaties are 
biased against developing countries and work in favour of the developed countries.”) 
72 Dagan, T ‘BRICS—The Potential of Cooperation’ (2016) available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538105  
73 Avi-Yonah, RS ‘Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’ (2000) 
113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573  
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promoting standards through the OECD model convention. Hence, the OECD 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative. 
 
The OECD-BEPS project assumes that the current international tax regime is 
constructed around a competition framework. The regime is designed to 
enhance competition, not co-operation among tax jurisdictions. The principles 
embedded in the BEPS project envisage that a competition-based regime is no 
longer tenable. Thus, states cannot proceed to make completely independent tax 
rules due to the interdependence of their economies.75  These challenges have 
tested the efficacy of tax treaties and further exposed the existing weaknesses 
of tax treaties. Therefore, BEPS is a response to failures of the current (OECD-
led) international tax regime. 
 
The core idea of BEPS Action Plan can be summarised as follows:  
“Taxation is at the core of countries’ sovereignty, but the interaction of 
domestic tax rules in some cases leads to gaps and frictions. When 
designing their domestic tax rules, sovereign states may not sufficiently 
take into account the effect of other countries’ rules. The interaction of 
independent sets of rules enforced by sovereign countries creates 
frictions, including potential double taxation for corporations operating 
in several countries. It also creates gaps, in cases where corporate income 
is not taxed at all, either by the country of the source or the country of 
residence, or is only taxed at nominal rates. In the domestic context, 
coherence is usually achieved through a principle of matching—a 
payment that is deductible by the payer is taxable in the hands of the 
recipient unless explicitly exempted. There is no similar principle of 
coherence at the international level, which leaves plenty of room for 
arbitrage by taxpayers.”76 
 
                                                 
75 Brauner, Y ‘What the BEPS?’ (2014) 16 Fla. Tax Rev. 55 
76 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 9 (2013), available at  
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf    
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The OECD-BEPS initiative is aimed at designing a new international standard 
to ensure the coherence of income taxation at the international level.77 Baker78 
opines that the dominance of the OECD in shaping the international tax system 
might only continue if the OECD-BEPS project succeeds in reforming the 
current regime. Brauner argues that the OECD-BEPS project is premised on 
three core principles thus: 
“(i) the necessity of establishing the international tax regime on a 
collaborative-based paradigm rather than a competition-based paradigm; 
(ii) the importance of taking a systematic or holistic approach to 
substantive international tax reform rather than an ad-hoc approach, 
acknowledging the interdependence of the norms of the international tax 
regime; and (iii) the inevitability of accepting completely new solutions 
to problems that could not be resolved by the applicable norms, contrary 
to the traditional conservatism of the international tax regime.” 
 
 
The goal of Action 15 is to design the framework for drafting a multilateral 
instrument that can modify the existing bilateral treaty regime.79 Although, this 
Action represents a significant step towards multilateralism participation in 
developing the multilateral instrument is voluntary, and a participating country 
is not obligated to sign it. This tends to encourage more states to take part in the 
development process. However, it is uncertain how many states will sign it in 
the end. If the participating countries are obligated to sign the multilateral 
instrument, many countries will not be interested in participation.80 This 
dilemma reflects inadequate multilateralism represented by the OECD. 
Therefore, the understanding of various domestic rules through comparative 
                                                 
77 Goutam, S ‘Critical account of the OECD’s Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting’ (2014) 
8 MLJ 9 
78 Baker, P ‘Is There a Cure for BEPS’, (2013) 5 Brjt. Tax Rev. 605 at 606  
79Avi-Yonah, RS and Xu, H ‘Global taxation after the crisis:why beps and maatmare inadequate 
responses, and what can be done about it’  available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2716124     
80 However, the BEPS treaty-based initiative is structured to do so without abandoning the basic 
structure of bilateral of tax treaties. The OECD realised that changing the architecture bilateral regime 
may create fear of tempering with states tax sovereignty. See OECD/G-20 ‘Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting Project, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties’ (2014)  
OECD Publishing  available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264219250-en.  
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analysis is the most promising platform to develop a universally accepted tax 
co-operation mechanism. 
 
The core principles embedded in Action Plan 15 of the BEPS, suggest that 
inclusiveness should be the driving force for meaningful reform of the current 
regime. There is a need for global leadership to achieve the tenets of the basic 
principles. It is arguable that “The gradual emergence of global tax governance 
is unavoidable in an ever more interdependent and globalised world.”81 The next 
question is – what will be the forum for negotiating the multilateral instrument? 
There have been several calls for establishing an International Tax Organisation 
to undertake the co-ordinating role in tax co-operation,82 but there is no sign of 
such an organisation emerging.  
 
It is worth noting that, there is some contradiction in BEPS Action plans. For 
instance, Action Plan 2 call for designing domestic rules to neutralise the effect 
double non-taxation, double deduction, long-term deferral in respect of hybrid 
instruments and entities.  The Action Plan advocated for a domestic law solution 
to the problem of double non-taxation of hybrid mismatch entities. Any 
domestic law approach to a problem envisages unilateral action of each of the 
states. By contrast, the core principle of BEPS project, as illustrated by Action 
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Plan 15, is centred on developing a multilateral solution to the challenges facing 
the current regime.  
 
Given the current OECD-BEPS initiatives and other issues discussed above, the 
bilateral treaty regime is being marred by global economic integration. The 
multilateral treaty regime would have been the best mechanism for the co-
operation. A multilateral approach is both essential and feasible in the 21st 
century.83 However, there are divergent views about the viability of multilateral 
tax treaties. Some commentators made a case for a global multilateral treaty that 
would replace the current bilateral tax treaty regime.84  Other scholars have 
advocated a multilateral treaty that would address one or two very specific 
aspects of international taxation.85 However, other commentators argue for 
regional multilateral tax treaty regimes that could be signed by regional or 
trading blocks.86 Goldsmith, on the other hand, downplays the utility of a 
multilateral treaty as follows: 
“most multilateral treaties that are not purely hortatory are based on some 
form of embedded bilateral cooperation. What little genuine multilateral 
cooperation we might see is thin, in the sense that it does not require 
nations to depart much, if at all, from what they would have done in the 
absence of the treaty.”87 
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Therefore, the states’ reluctance to surrender their substantive jurisdiction to 
any multilateral body hinders any positive move toward having a multilateral 
treaty regime.  
  
Furthermore, what advocates for multilateral tax treaty fail to realise is that 
entering into a multilateral treaty suggests the surrendering of some aspect of 
the states’ tax sovereignty. Therefore, there is a need to treat the issue with 
caution – that is, to find a middle course between the multilateral approach and 
the states’ tax sovereignty. The co-operation should not be in the form of a treaty 
(either bilateral or multilateral) with legally binding international commitments. 
Rather, the focus should be on a co-operation mechanism in which states can 
have some degree of assurance that restrictions on their tax sovereignty is 
extended to all other states in the forum. 
  
The co-operation envisaged in this thesis should be gradual. At the initial stage 
of the development of this international cooperation, there is no need for any 
binding commitments in the form that a treaty would entail. The co-operation 
mechanism underscores the relevance of co-operation not necessarily having a 
formal treaty obligation. A typical example of this type of co-operation 
mechanism is the OECD Model Convention which was initiated by the OECD 
but is now adopted by non-OECD members.88 The non-OECD members did not 
enter into any form of a multilateral treaty but considered themselves bound by 
the OECD model. Therefore, the most feasible step toward international 
cooperation89 is to explore means outside the tax treaty regime. The co-
operative method envisaged in this thesis involves a comparative analysis of the 
rules that define the scope of the states’ substantive tax jurisdiction. 
                                                 
88 There are over 3000 bilateral tax treaties fashioned in line the OECD model…. Thuronyi, argued that 
“The OECD Model has almost acquired the status of an international agreement.” See Thuronyi, V 
‘International tax cooperation and a multilateral treaty’ (2001) 26 brook. J. Int'l L. 1641. 
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4.2 Comparative model for tax cooperation  
 
 
Comparative law is the most appropriate method of co-operation because it 
requires unilateral action by the state in reviewing and evaluating the tax rules 
adopted by other states. And thereafter to compare and contrast those rules in 
order to understand the level of their interaction. Thuronyi argues that the 
classification of tax systems posits “insight to the historical roots of any 
particular country’s system, thereby providing a better understanding of the 
underlying legal culture.”90 He further makes a case for identifying the core 
structural features of the tax laws of states.91  
 
The basic methodology of all comparative law is that of functionality.92 The 
functional theory posits that similar problems produce similar solutions.93 In 
adopting a functional approach to comparative analysis, the comparatist must 
identify the problem to be studied: “Incomparable cannot usefully be compared, 
and in law, the only things which are comparable are those who fulfil the same 
function.”94 He must choose the legal systems to be compared, which depends 
on the problem to be studied. The comparatist must also compare and contrast 
the legal systems selected for study in an effort to identify similarities among 
and differences between them.95 Zweigert and Kötz also believe that the 
functionalist approach to comparative analysis will lead to the conclusion that 
different tax systems approach the same problems in the same or similar ways: 
“But if we leave aside the topics which are heavily impressed by moral 
views or values, mainly to be found in family law and the law of 
succession, and concentrate on those parts of private law which are 
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relatively ‘unpolitical’, we find that as a general rule developed nations 
answer the needs of legal business in the same or in a very similar way.”96 
 
 
Infanti argues that comparative analysis will assist in identifying the rules 
currently in place in other states. In this regard, comparative analysis will: 
 
“provide a much richer range of model solutions than a legal science 
devoted to a single nation, simply because the different systems of the 
world can offer a greater variety of solutions than could be thought up in 
a lifetime by even the most imaginative jurist who was corralled in his 
own system.”97 
 
The forces of globalisation have fuelled a resurgence in comparative legal 
analysis.98 Thus, states must design their domestic tax rules and also navigate 
the intersections of their rules with that of other states. The main focus of 
comparative tax law has been the resolution of conflicts between states’ tax 
jurisdictions and the development of domestic rules affecting cross-border 
transactions.99 In some cases, the comparative analysis considers two or more 
tax regimes that are similar and refines those similarities. 100  
 
Comparative tax law should be based on the functions of tax rules. It is  aimed 
at understanding the similarities and differences between domestic tax 
systems101 and that should indicate potential alternative solutions to common 
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Norton & Co 346 
99 Garbarino, C ‘An evolutionary approach to comparative taxation: methods and agenda for research’ 
(2009) 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 677 
100 Dean, SA ‘More Cooperation, Less Uniformity: Tax Deharmonization and the Future of the 
International Tax Regime’ (2010) 84 Tul. L. Rev. 125  
101 Livingston, MA ‘From Milan to Mumbai, changing in Tel Aviv: Reflections on Progressive 
Taxation and "Progressive" Politics in a Globalized but Still Local World’ (2006) 54 AM J. Comp. 
L. 555 at 582  
87 
 
policy issues.102 The functional approach suggests that, after identifying a 
common problem, there is a need to examine the way in which the problem is 
solved in each of the compared jurisdictions.103 The main focus of comparative 
tax law has been the resolution of conflicts between states’ tax jurisdictions and 
the development of domestic rules affecting cross-border transactions.104 
However, it is important to compare legal rules that are narrow enough to be 
practically manageable and meaningful enough in terms of explaining the 
context in which the legal rules operate."105  
 
The use of comparative analysis to achieve international co-operation outside 
of the tax treaty regime is more concerned with juridical rather than economic 
double taxation. Economic double taxation is more closely related to 
enforcement tax jurisdiction whereas the juridical in connected to the 
substantive tax jurisdiction of the states.106 It is worth noting that there is 
significant multilateral cooperation on enforcement tax jurisdiction through a 
multilateral tax treaty.107 For instance, as at 12th July 2016, there were over 
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ninety states participating in the Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters (MAATM).108  
 
The MAATM serves as a multilateral instrument that ensures mutual 
administrative assistance among States on the issues of assessment, collection 
and enforcement of their substantive tax rules. The MAATM is not a substitute 
for DTAs because its coverage is information exchange and assistance in the 
recovery of debts and servicing of documents.109  On the other hand, DTAs (that 
are based on the OECD Model) primarily deal with substantive tax rules. They 
also provide mechanisms for avoiding double taxation, in addition to the 
exchange of information110 and assistance in the collection of taxes.111 
However, the MAATM has the most extensive scope for exchange of 
information, but it cannot operate to eliminate double taxation as provided 
through a DTA. 
 
The call for a multilateral tax treaty regime for juridical double taxation is not 
feasible. The reason is that juridical double taxation is closely connected with 
the substantive tax jurisdiction of the states. Substantive jurisdiction to tax 
denotes the power of the state to impose tax. Thus, it determines the persons112 
and income sought to be taxed as well as the tax rate. Enforcement jurisdiction 
in respect of tax, on the other hand, deals with the issues of assessment, 
collection and enforcement of the tax imposed by substantive rules. This 
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explains the reason for achieving some degree of co-operation in respect of 
mutual administrative assistance in tax matters. 
 
 
4.3 How Comparative Model for Fiscal Residence Work 
 
 
There is a need for co-operation between states to eliminate double taxation. 
This thesis argues that such cooperation could be achieved outside the tax treaty 
regime. It is imperative to review the current mechanism for preventing double 
taxation, unilateral, bilateral and multilateral. The latter two are treaty-based 
mechanisms while the unilateral method is carried out by the states 
independently without entering into any form of a treaty. Globalisation has 
marred the effectiveness of the bilateral mechanism. In the same vein, states are 
reluctant to surrender their tax sovereignty (especially on substantive 
jurisdiction to tax) through a multilateral instrument. 
 
Therefore, the failure of both the bilateral and multilateral methods of 
eliminating double taxation encourages states to revert to unilateral means.113 
The co-operation envisaged by this thesis leans toward the idea of allowing the 
states to preserve their tax sovereignty by designing their definitional rules 
unilaterally. However, in designing such rules, regard must be had to the rules 
devised by other states. Thus, the states are required to understand the 
implication of the domestic rules of other states on their rules. The need for 
understanding the different nature of the domestic rules calls for adopting a 
comparative approach. By this method, the states can compare their respective 
rules with those of others. This is a co-operation mechanism outside of a tax 
treaty. Rosenzweig114 also makes a case for tax co-operation outside tax treaties. 
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http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538105’   Dagan, T ‘The Costs of International Tax Cooperation’ 
Working Paper No. 1-03, January 2003 
114 Rosenzweig, AH ‘Thinking Outside the (Tax) Treaty’ (2012) Wisconsin Law Review 717  
90 
 
He argues that the main problem with cooperation in the current international 
tax regime is that it builds on the tax treaty model. He also proposes the creation 
of a non-treaty-based cooperation mechanism, incentivizing co-operation of the 
least co-operative states. However, he fails to suggest a clear model that could 
serve as an alternative to the tax treaty regime. 
 
It could be argued that tax co-operation envisages a complete harmonisation of 
the different definitional rules. However, the unique structure of the 
international tax system requires that international cooperation initiative should 
not be all-or-nothing.115  It must be carried out in a gradual process. The 
proposed comparative model hinges on the need for states to understand the 
intricacies of their respective definitional rules through a comparative study. 
Therefore, it has taken a middle ground between the proponents of 
harmonisation of all the definitional rules applicable in all states and those 
agitating for maintaining the status quo, that is to say the use of a unilateral 
solution that leads to tax competition. In pursuing this alternative, states need to 
understand the interaction of their different definitional rules. The comparative 
model has the significant advantage of improving compatibility between the 
different definitional rules that the states adopt. It could reinforce the investors’ 
certainty and potential co-operation in tax enforcement among states. The 
comparative alternative aims at achieving gradual cooperation between States.  
 
The success of designing a road map for the comparative analysis depends on 
the exposition of the context underlying the comparison and the main concept 
sought to be examined. It has been argued that “The comparative study of the 
tax law is not strictly theoretically oriented rather it is a study of what may 
indeed become a reality in the foreseeable future.”116 Thus, the starting point for 
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the alternative is the contextualization stage. At this level, a tax concept and 
specific jurisdictions are selected and analysed from a comparative perspective. 
For this thesis, the concept of fiscal residence is chosen. The concept is to be 
comparatively analysed using some selected jurisdictions. The jurisdiction 
chosen represents the natural candidates for comparative tax studies. They 
represent the major legal families in the world.117 Chapter five of this thesis 
focuses on this segment of comparison. The comparative analysis at this stage 
serves as the benchmark on which the other level of comparison is based, which 
is captured in chapter six of the thesis. 
 
The next stage of the comparative alternative is at the level of trading partners. 
At this level, the definitional rules of two or more trading partners could be 
comparatively analysed. Comparative analysis can pave the way to 
understanding the nature of their tax rules. The use of this method could be a 
forum to promote the joint interests of the parties with like minds.  Rosenbloom 
analyses the advantages of such kind of cooperation thus: 
“First, cooperation among countries that share similar interests is 
beneficial because it reduces the "competitiveness" threat-a fear that 
investors will withdraw or that Domestic companies will be unable to 
compete against foreign companies. Second, cooperation among 
influential countries may be utilised to further tax policies and achieve 
consensus, and in the event consensus is not possible, to set a coordinated 
policy that may be preferable to either the status quo or acting 
unilaterally. Third, this proposed model would permit different groups 
of states that share similar interests to set their own tax policy agenda 
and cooperate on issues that may not have broad interest. Fourth, 
cooperation within a group of countries may help policymakers 
overcome domestic political pressures and lobbies against policy 
changes. Fifth, the proposed model, is practical, feasible, and within the 
current framework of international institutions”.118   
                                                 
117 Thuronyi proposes Germany, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom as natural choices 
for tax comparison. These countries can be regarded as leaders in influencing the tax laws of other 
countries. See Thuronyi, V ‘Comparative tax law’ (2003) Kluwer Law International, London 
118 Rosenbloom, HD et al ‘The Unruly World of Tax: A Proposal for an International Tax Cooperation 




The present treaty-based mechanism on which international tax co-operation is 
based does not provide an adequate platform in which states with similar 
interests can effectively promote the collaborative effort. Therefore, the 
proposed co-operation alternative will enable states that share similar interests 
to co-operate and reach understandings of their respective definitional rules.  
The advantage of the proposed co-operation mechanism cannot be over 
emphasised. As mentioned above, the current tax co-operation mechanism is 
encouraging competition among the states.119 The competition is triggered by 
substantial variations in definitional rules across states.120 Therefore, if a state 
designs its rules differently from the ones adopted by its competitors, the 
potential investors may shift their capital to the competing trading partners with 
favourable definitions, especially where the difference in the rules led to double 
taxation. Thus, co-operation among states having similar business interests may 
enable them to suppress undesired competition in an effective way. 
 
Furthermore, states’ cooperation outside tax treaties suggests an informal 
platform for collaboration among the states. By its informal and flexible nature, 
the envisaged co-operation preserves the tax sovereignty of the members of the 
platform. The comparative model allows the states with similar economic 
interest or states that are trading partners to reach a consensus in defining fiscal 
residence. Thus, it may be advantageous for such groups of states to cooperate 
even if there is no global consensus. 
 
                                                 
119 Dagan, T ‘BRICS—The Potential of Cooperation’ (2016) available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538105  
120 Ndikumana, L ‘International Tax Cooperation and Implications of Globalization’ (2015) UN 





At the regional level, states are torn between two desires: the need to achieve 
tax co-operation and the quest to protect their respective tax sovereignty. 
Gradualism embodies a compromise between the need for fiscal co-operation 
and tax sovereignty concerns. Therefore, the success of the co-operation 
mentioned above of the trading partners could strike a balance between the tax 
cooperation and tax sovereignty at the regional level. The comparative approach 
at the regional level of, the member states needs to develop an enhanced 
understanding of how their tax regimes interact through a comparative analysis 
of their respective rules.  
 
The comparative process could be carried out by a Working Group of tax 
experts from each member state. The Group would present a forum for 
developing a fuller understanding of the intricacies of the definitional rules of 
the members. A comprehensive knowledge of these rules would ease the 
process of co-operation among the members outside any tax treaty.  Gradualism 
in comparative analyses would pave the way for the interaction of the 
definitional rules of states who are members of a regional body as dictated by 
globalisation while preserving their tax sovereignty. The alternative would 
permit the members to enjoy the benefits of tax co-operation without rapidly 
sacrificing taxing powers. The absence of uniform tax treaties among the 
members of a regional bloc proves the undesirability of a tax treaty regime in 
achieving international co-operation. The success of the comparative model at 
one particular regional bloc could lead other similar regional bodies to follow 
the same line. The adoption of this model by most of the regional organisation 
could lead to its extension to the international level. That is to say; the model 





4.4  Conclusion  
 
The current international tax regime allows states to impose tax and define the 
tax base. Where two states assert jurisdiction to tax, the regime identifies the 
residence or other jurisdictional links of the persons to be subject to tax in a 
state.  It also provides a rule for resolving inter-jurisdictional conflicts, thereby 
preventing double taxation by more than one state. The main building block of 
the regime is domestic law, unilaterally enacted and implemented by a State 
subject to the limitations imposed by weak bilateral tax treaties.  
 
As a result of the growing weakness of the bilateral treaty regime, there has 
been a call for a multilateral tax treaty to address the definition of residence and 
other relevant issues.121 The proponents of the multilateral treaty did not take 
into cognisance that the fiscal sovereignty of the state comprises both 
substantive and enforcement jurisdiction over the taxpayer. Therefore, it is 
possible for states to surrender enforcement jurisdiction as a result of any 
multilateral treaty. However, it could be difficult for the states to surrender their 
substantive tax jurisdiction because it impacts on their sovereignty. Thus, the 
multilateral treaty option is not feasible. This thesis explores a tax co-operation 
mechanism from a comparative perspective.  
 
It is trite that different States adopt various different sets of definitional rules. 
To understand how such rules converge and diverge is a crucial step toward 
crystallising necessary mechanisms for international co-operation without 
                                                 
121 From the empirical research conducted there are more than 3000 DTA around the globe. See Braun, 
J and Zagler, M ‘An economic perspective on double tax treaties with(in) developing countries’ 
(2014) 6 (1) World Tax Journal 1. See also Cockfield, AJ ‘International Tax Competition: The Last 
Battleground of Globalization’ (2011) 63 (12) Tax Notes International 867 (argued that while trade 
and investments becomes international, taxation remains national as the states are unwilling to 
surrender their tax sovereignty to multilateral tax treaty.) Ring. DM ‘Prospects for A Multilateral 
Tax Treaty’ (2001) 26 (4) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1699 at 1710; Thuronyi, V 
‘International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty’ (2001) 26 Brook. J. Intl L. 1641 
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derogating from the sovereignty of the states involved.122  An understanding in 
this regard is best achieved by an in-depth comparative analysis.  
 
This chapter has analysed the rise and fall of the current cooperation mechanism 
and provided an exposition of the methodology to be used to achieve the 
alternative envisaged in this thesis. The next chapter (chapter five) gives a 
comparative analysis of the concept of fiscal residence. Chapters six and seven 
focus on the definitional rules applicable in the two jurisdictions selected as a 
case study in this thesis, namely the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the 
Republic of South Africa. 
 
                                                 
122 Rosenzweig, AH ‘Why Are There Tax Havens?’ (2010) 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 923 (arguing that 
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5.0  Introduction 
 
The concept of tax sovereignty suggests that a state could impose a tax on any 
person or entity within the scope of its jurisdiction. The preceding chapter 
discussed the dynamics of fiscal jurisdiction and how states’ tax sovereignty is 
affected by the current economic integration. The analysis of the challenges 
foisted by globalisation on the states’ efforts to define their residents for income 
tax purposes, always proceeds from two perspectives,1 namely, the views of the 
states and of the taxpayer. The states aspire to design their definitional rule in a 
way that protects the tax base and impedes manipulation from the taxpayers. 
Moreover, the states need to be in tune with the reality of globalisation, by 
taking into consideration the rules applicable to other states. Taxpayers do not 
question their liability to pay tax on their income, but they fear that the 
divergence of the definitional rules may expose them to being regarded as tax 
residents of more than one state. Therefore, taxpayers argue that if they must be 
taxed, then the states must co-operate with each other in defining ‘resident’ for 
tax purposes.2 
 
This research proposes a comparative analysis of various definitional rules as a 
route toward achieving cooperation between states in defining the scope of their 
tax jurisdiction. This chapter sets the stage for such a comparative analysis by 
comparing and analysing the various rules for the determination of the residence 
of both individuals and corporations for income tax purposes. The chapter 
scrutinises the definitional rules through the lens of the substantive tax 
jurisdiction of the selected common law and civil law jurisdictions.3 These 
                                                 
1 The determination of the residence status of the taxpayers is crucial because it affects all other aspects 
of the tax system. It determines the scope of the taxable income, the rate of the tax, the level of 
allowable deductions, the availability of exemptions and the obligation to withhold tax. 
2  RL ‘Palmer Toward unilateral coherence in determining jurisdiction to tax income (1989) 30 Harv. 
Int’l L. J. 1 at 2 
3 Such as the United Kingdom, United States of America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and some 
civil law jurisdictions notably, France, Germany, Netherland, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria and 
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jurisdictions were chosen because of the influence of their legal regime in 
Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa.  
 
 
5.1 Meaning and Nature of Residence 
 
Nationality and territoriality are two grounds for exercising jurisdiction under 
the general international law.4 The former ground is usually understood as 
equivalent to citizenship and gives the state the power to make and enforce its 
laws in respect of any person falling within its sovereignty on account of the 
latter’s nationality. The latter ground empowers a state to extend its laws to any 
activity that has or is intended to have an effect within its territory. For tax 
purposes, the concept of nationality has been broadly and differently defined by 
different states. States can redefine nationality to mean something less than its 
ordinary meaning under public international law. The redefined nationality 
comprise both citizens and non-citizens having the requisite territorial link with 
the state or having a physical presence for a specified period in the state.5 This 
concept is then redefined as constituting ‘residence’.6 The adoption of a general 
notion of nationality could defeat the policy objectives of the residence-based 
system. Hence, a person could be physically present in and derive benefit from 
one state, while still claiming to hold nationality in another state. 
                                                 
Spain. The reason for selecting these states is that the selected states belong to civil law and common 
law legal family. According to Nikolakakus, the current trend is that, both states do not slavishly 
confine themselves to the general notion of residence earlier adopted by the legal family they belong. 
Instead, they view the concept of residence as a connecting factor, which is the tool used to make a 
distinction where the laws are not intended to speak to or about everyone. However, the significance 
of residence as a connecting factor depends on the precise conception of residence being employed 
by a state. See Nikalakakus, (2009) A ‘Civil law and common law perspectives: a view from the left’ 
in Miasto, G (ed) Residence of Individual under tax treaty and EC law’ (2009) IBFD Publication. 
However, Thuronyi proposes Germany, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom as natural 
choices for tax comparison. These countries can be regarded as leaders in influencing the tax laws of 
other countries. See Thuronyi, V ‘Comparative tax law’ (2003) Kluwer Law International, London 
See also Thuronyi, V ‘Tax law design and drafting’ (1996) 1 International Monetary Fund, xxiii-xxxv 
(Thuronyi, V. ed.). 
4 Martha RSJ (1989) 
5 Avi-Yonah, RS ‘International tax law as international law’ (2004) 57 (4) Tax L. Rev. 482 




In exercising income tax jurisdiction, a state can choose to invoke the link to 
the person of the income earner who resides7 within its territory, whether or not 
the income was derived from a source within its territory. The principle of 
residence is a central concept in both domestic tax law and the international tax 
rules8 of many states throughout the world.9 A resident for income tax purposes 
could thus be either a citizen or a non-citizen with the requisite territorial link 
as defined by the state. There are no universal rules for determining the 
residence of a person (either natural or juristic) for tax purposes that apply in all 
circumstances. The concept of residence posits that, for tax purposes, the 
taxpayer’s residence is the place where that person (natural or juristic) is subject 
to unrestricted tax liability.  
 
5.2  Concept of Individual Residence  
 
The definition of residence in respect of an individual for income tax purposes 
varies between states. However, the definitions generally fall under any 
combination of the following: 
1) Definitions that depend on the facts and circumstances in determining 
the connection of individuals with a particular state. The terms 
‘residence’, ‘ordinary residence’ or ‘permanent place of abode’ are used 
for this purpose; 
                                                 
7Or in the case of the United States of America, if the person is a citizen even if he is not a resident 
8 The concept of residence features in almost all tax treaties and the OECD Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital and the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries. 
9 Apart from Hong Kong and Eritrea that adopt purely source-based income tax system. Followed by 
countries like; Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and to 
some extent Kenya, Malaysia, Singapore and Uruguay, that operate the source-based tax system to 
varying degrees. See Thuronyi, V ‘Comparative Tax Law’ (2003) Kluwer Law International 
287.Almost all the countries today adopt residence-based system, which is usually in the form of 
residence-minus. That is taxing residents of a state on their worldwide income subject to some relief 
on their foreign income being taxed abroad while non-residents are only taxed on their income 
sourced in that territory. 
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2)  The definitions based on the general legal concepts (that are applicable 
in other areas of the law) such as domicile and citizenship;10 
3)  The definitions based on the physical presence of the individual 
determined by the number of days the individual has spent in the state. 
The assessment of the number of days can either be based on a calendar 
year or a tax year. It could also be a cumulative period within a year or 
it could or span a number of years. 
5.2.1 The definitions that depend on the facts and circumstances 
 
 
Various conceptions of individual residence such as; ‘residence’, ‘ordinary 
residence’ and ‘permanent place of abode’ are commonly used in ascertaining 
the residence of an individual based on fact and circumstances. Other types of 
individual connecting factors (such as ‘domicile’ and ‘citizenship’) are used 
differently by states to denote the residence of an individual. The diverse 
approaches taken by states in determining individual residence are not restricted 
to a single connecting factor. Such divergence extends to the specific purpose 
of choosing a particular term. Thus, states differ in considering the degree and 
nature of individuals’ physical presence in the state that is sufficient to 
constitute a connection with the taxing state. Hence, two states may adopt a 
similar term, but the definitional rules of that term may differ significantly 
between states. 
 
Where the concept of ‘residence’ has not been defined statutorily, it is necessary 
to take account of what the courts consider to be  the residence of an individual 
for income tax purpose. The meaning adopted by the courts may not be in line 
with what lay persons consider as residence. Thus, the court may hold an 
individual to be a resident of a state in circumstances that no lay person would 
                                                 
10 However, unlike the citizenship, domicile is usually determined by way of fact intensive analysis. 
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done.11 In arriving at the meaning of residence, courts apply the rules of 
statutory interpretation or rely on the facts and circumstances of each case.12 
However, the infinite variations in ‘facts’ and the ‘circumstances’13 has led to 
inconsistencies in judicial decisions14 in attributing a meaning to the term 
‘residence’.15 Furthermore, while arriving at their various decisions, the courts 
have formulated some guiding principles to determine the residence of an 
individual for tax purposes.16  
 
 
                                                 
11 For instance, in England, the court in the case of Reid v. IRC (1926) 10 TC 673 considered residence 
as something beyond any particular building. Lord Clyde stated that: “Take the case of a homeless 
tramp, who shelters tonight under a bridge, tomorrow in the greenwood and as the unwelcome 
occupant of a farm outhouse the night after. He wanders in this way all over the United Kingdom. 
But will anyone say he does not live in the United Kingdom? – and will anyone regard it as a misuse 
of language to say he resides in the United Kingdom?” see also the dictum of Lord Viscount summer 
in Lysaght v. IRC (1928) 13 TC 511 at 528 
12 Rowlatt, J in Loewenstein v. De Salis (1926) 10 TC 424 at437  stated that “when you are considering 
a question like residence, you are considering just a bundle of actual facts…” ; “The legal 
test of residence has a substantial factual component”: per Sharlow J.A. in The Queen v. Laurin (2008) 
FCA “It has frequently been  pointed out that the decision as to the place or places in which a person 
is resident must turn on the facts of the particular case”: per Cartwright J. in Beament v. 
Minister of National Revenue (1952) 2 S.C.R 486.  
13 The fact refers to actual fact that led to the litigation, which could the duration of the individual in a 
state or how regular and frequent he visits the state. The circumstances on the other hand refer to the 
peculiarities of the parties involved. Therefore, whether or not an individual is resident depends on 
the individual circumstances. See FCT v. Miller (1946) 73 CLR 93. Thus, two different case 
(involving different parties) may have similar sets of facts but the peculiar circumstances of the parties 
such as: place of birth, family and business ties and the nature of the visit could significantly differ. 
As the determination of residence is dependent upon the circumstances of the individual involved, it 
is possible for two courts in the same state to give different decisions in the two cases before them 
that shared similar facts. Since the circumstances of the individual party before them may differ. 
14 Even under the same legal system and based on the same facts. 
15 For instance, a state may individual resident as a person who resides in the state for six months. The 
other state, from where that individual came, may provide that such individual remains its resident 
one year after he left the state. The inconsistency in such definition may expose the taxpayer to the 
risk of being tax twice. 
16 It should be noted that, since the determination of residence is a question of fact, in formulating the 
guiding principles most of the courts recognized and adopted the findings of facts (based on evidence) 
made by the Revenue Authorities or the Tribunal of facts. For instance Lord Viscount Summer in 
Lysaght v. IRC stated that“It is well settled that, when the Commissioners have thus ascertained the 
facts of the case and then have found the conclusion of fact which the facts prove, their decision is 
not open to review, provided (a) that they had before them evidence, from which such a conclusion 
can properly be drawn, and (b) that they did not direct themselves in law in any of the forms of legal 





In the absence of a statutory definition, the starting point for interpreting any 
legal concept is often taken to be ascertaining the literal meaning of the word.17 
The term then is given the meaning as ordinarily understood by the language of 
the time. The everyday meaning of the word ‘residence’ implies the place where 
a person actually resides. A literal construction of a taxing legislation attempts 
to discern the so-called ‘intention of the legislature’.18. On the relevance of 
ascertaining the ordinary meaning of the word ‘residence’ from an English 
dictionary Viscount Cave LC said:  
“My Lords, the word ‘reside’ is a familiar English word and is defined 
in the Oxford English Dictionary as meaning ‘to dwell permanently or 
for a considerable time, to have one’s settled or usual abode, to live in or 
at a particular place.’ No doubt this definition must for present purposes 
be taken subject to any modification that may result from the terms of 
the Income Tax Act and Schedules; but, subject to that observation, it 
may be accepted as an accurate indication of the meaning of the word 
‘reside...”19 
 
                                                 
17 Even though modern principles of interpretation have moved away from literal method of 
interpretation. See Tretola, J ‘The Interpretation of Taxation Legislation by the Courts - A Reflection 
on the Views of Justice Graham Hill’ (2006) 16 (5) Revenue Law Journal 73; Silke, J ‘The 
interpretation of fiscal legislation- canons of construction, recent judicial comments and new 
approaches’ (1995) Acta Juridica 123. 
18 Burton, M ‘The rhetoric of tax interpretation – where talking the talk is not walking the walk’ (2005) 
1 (3) Jour. Aust. Tax Teacher Assoc; Hill, DG ‘A judicial perspective on tax law reform’ (1998) 72 
Aust. L. J. 685; Allerdice, RC ‘The swinging pendulum: Judicial trends in the interpretation of 
revenue statute’ (1996) 19 UNSW L.J. 162; Mason, A ‘Taxation policy and the Courts’ (1990) 2(4) 
CCH J. Aust. Tax 40 
19 Levene v Inland Revenue Commissioner, (1928) AC 217, Wilcox, J in Hafza v Director-General of 
Social Security (1985) 6 FCR 444, 449 stated “there is a plethora of decisions arising in various 
contexts relating to the legal concept of residence. As a general concept residence includes two 
elements, physical presence in a particular place and intention to treat that place as home at least for 
the time being not necessarily forever.” See also Applegate v F C T (1979) 9 ATR 899, 905; 79 ATC 
4307, 4313 where Northrop J relied on the Shorter English Oxford Dictionary. Williams, J in Koitaki 
Para Rubber Estate Ltd v. FCT (1941) 64 CLR 241 stated that “The place residence of an individual 
is determined ... by reference to where he eats and sleeps and has his settled or usual abode.” 
Residence in a place means some degree of permanence, some degree of continuity or some 
expectation of continuity. See Fox v Stirk [1970] 2 QB 463, 477; Goodwin v Curtis (1998) 70 TC 
478, 510; it where an individual eat and sleep -  Cesna Sulphur Co. Ltd v. Nicholson (1876) 1 TC 88. 
On what constitute “home” see Olowofoyeku, AA ‘“Where is my home” reflection on the law of 
residence’ (2003) 4 British Tax Review 306 -323 
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The English courts have considered the concept of ‘residence’ in several cases20 
and set out various factors for establishing the residence of an individual.21 In 
Roger v. IRC,22 the appellant had a house in which his family lived but he was 
not physically present in the United Kingdom throughout the year of 
assessment. Nonetheless, he was was held to be a UK resident for tax purposes. 
The court considered the physical presence of the wife and family of the 
appellant as a factor in determining his country of residence. However, in 
Turnbull v. Foster23 the court held that some physical presence (no matter how 
brief) is required to establish UK tax residence. Thus, when an individual was 
physically absent from the UK for the whole year, he ceased to be a resident of 
the UK.  
In Levene v. IRC24 a UK citizen lived abroad but returned to the UK every year 
for less than six months.  The question was whether or not he was a UK resident 
for tax purposes. The court considered various factors in arriving at the 
conclusion that Levene was a resident and ordinarily resident in the UK. The 
court examined the history of his past and present mode of life. It was held that 
Levene had lived a nomadic life for many years before he bought a flat at Monte 
Carlo, where he had stayed for the whole year of assessment. Similar factors 
were considered in Reid v. IRC.25 In both cases, the court found that taxpayer’s 
mode of life was the same before and after departure from the UK, and they 
were therefore held to be UK residents for tax purposes.  
                                                 
20 Lemos observes that as at 2005 there were about forty reported cases on the issues of residence  and 
ordinary residence. See  Lemos, M ‘United Kingdom’ in Miasto, G (ed) Residence of Individual 
under tax law EC law’ (2010) IBFD Publication at 603. 
21 No one or more group of factors are conclusive and decisive in determining the residence status of an 
individual.. 
22 (1879) 1 TC 225 see also Re Young (1875) 1 TC Rowlatt J in Pickles v Fulsham (1923) 9 TC 261 at 
275 stated that a sailor resides at the port where his wife and children live. 
23 (1904) 6 TC 206. The same position was taken in Reed v Clark [1985] STC 323 
24 (1928) AC 217 at  
25 (1926) 10 TC  
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However, in the cases of IRC v. Brown26 and IRC v. Zorab,27 the court took a 
different line of reasoning. In the former case, the respondent gave up his house 
at Folkestone and lived with his relatives or in a hotel whenever he visited the 
UK, and he also lacked any business in the UK. The court found that he had the 
habit of spending two to three months of the winter even before the period in 
dispute, and held that he was a UK resident because there had been no break 
from his previous habits in this regard. In the latter case, the court held that, 
despite the taxpayer’s prior habit of spending five to six months every year in 
the UK, he was a mere visitor to the UK. The court held that the respondent did 
not have any business interests in the UK and had no intention of setting up a 
permanent home in the UK. The court also considered the purpose of his visit 
and resolved that issue in his favour. However, in Lysaght’s case, the taxpayer’s 
purpose was regarded as an adversely influence in the outcome of the case.28 In 
deciding whether or not the physical presence of an individual established 
residence, the courts consider the amount of time spent in that place, the nature 
of his presence there and his connection with the place.29  
The nationality of the parties seems to influenced the decisions in Brown and 
Zorab’s cases and to have been taken into account in Levene and Reid. The 
significant distinction, it seems, is between a UK national who had UK 
residence, but later absented himself from the country, and an individual who 
has never been a UK resident. This distinction is drawn in the dictum of Lord 
Cave where he stated that: 
“The most difficult case is that of a wanderer… if such a man is a 
foreigner who never resided in this country, there may be great difficulty 
in holding that he is resident here. But if he is British subject the 
                                                 
26 (1926) 11 TC 292, 6 ATC 486 
27 (1926) 11 TC 289, 6 ATC 68 
28 Lord Viscount Sumner stated that “I see no ... fundamental antithesis between ‘residence’ and 
‘temporary visit’ as would prevent Mr. Lysaght’s visit, periodic and short as they are, from 
constituting a residence in the United Kingdom.” 
29 IRC v Zorab (1926) 11 TC 289, 291; 
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Commissioners are entitled to take into account all the facts of the case, 
including facts such as those referred to…”30 
In Cooper v. Cadwalader, 31 the court held that the taxpayer was a UK resident 
because his presence in the country was not casual but a regular habit of his life. 
In this case, the nationality of the individual was not regarded as a significant 
factor. The court relied the taxpayer’s retention of a house in the UK by the 
taxpayer; the same principle was influential in Loewenstein v. De Salis32 
In some reported decisions, UK residents who lived abroad and those who had 
never been UK resident claimed that they were mere visitors in the UK and 
should not be regarded as residents. In such situations, the courts in Levene, 
Lysaght and Kinloch v. IRC33 considered the regularity and duration of their 
visits as the main factor for consideration. This was particularly evident in 
Lysaght’s case where the court held that physical presence, no matter how brief, 
is, may be a basis for residence if it is regular.34  
To sum it up, in determining an individual’s place of residence the English 
courts have considered factors such as: 
  physical presence35 in the UK and its frequency,36 
  regularity and duration of visits37,  
                                                 
30 Lysaght v Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1928) 13 TC 511 at 529  
31  (1904) 5 TC 101,. where an American citizen based in New York leased a house in the UK for three 
years, he lived there for only two months every year and in the rest of the time it remained empty, 
even though it was kept ready for his return by his two servants. 
32 (1928) 10 TC 424, where a Belgian citizen based in Brussels used his company’s house situated in 
the UK and which he visited regularly for the hunting. The court held that the ownership of the place 
of abode in the UK is not essential for the application of the factor. 
33 (1929) 14 TC 736 
34Mr. Levene sold his only house and place of abode in London and moved to Ireland. But he kept 
visiting the UK and staying there for a week every month to attend board of directors meeting of their 
company. The maximum numbers of days he spent in the UK in the assessment year was 101 days.  
35 Rogers v. IRC, Re Young (the position of wanderer who had no other home abroad) Turnbull  v. 
Foster  and Reed v. Clark 
36 Cooper v. Cadwalader 
37 Gaine-Cooper’ case 
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 the purpose 38 or intention of visits to or absences from the UK, 
  the maintenance of a home in the UK, and family ties;  
 business39 and employment40 ties with the UK;  
 the present habits and way of life of the individual; 41 
 the nationality of the individual.42  
 
The same trend is evident in judgments of the Australian courts.43 where 
decisions on fiscal residence have adopted the approach of the English courts in 
the defining residence. The Australian tax system does not utilise the concept 
of ‘ordinary residence’.44 In Gregory v. Deputy Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation,45 Dixon J emphasised that the Australian courts should define 
residence in the same way asthe English courts. Also in FCT v. Miller46 and 
Applegate v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, 47 the courts echoed the views 
of Viscount Cave LC in Levene.48 Therefore, In establishing the residence of an 
individual, the Australian courts also consider factors similar to those 
considered by the English courts, as mentioned above. For instance, they 
                                                 
38 IRC v Zorab 
39 Lysaght’s case, Cooper v. Cadwalader, Hankinson v. HMRC (2009) UKFTT 384 (TC)  
40 HMRC v. Grace [2008] EWHC 2708 (Ch) 
41 Gaine-Cooper’ case, IRC v Zorab and  HMRC v. Grace 
42 Once an individual becomes a UK resident, he will have presumed to remain so until he proves that 
he is no longer a resident. See Tuczka v. HMRC (2011) UKUT 113 (TCC) 
43 Section 6(1) of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, upon which the earlier case was 
based, provided that “In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears – ‘resident’ or ‘resident of 
Australia’ means ...” Therefore, it did not mention ‘ordinary resident’ and even if ‘resident of 
Australia’ is taken to mean ordinary resident, the section did not treat it separately. 
44 By the combined effect of section 995-1 of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 and 
section 6 (1) of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, “a resident or Australian resident 
is (a) a person other than company who resides in Australia and includes a person: i) whose domicile 
is in Australia, unless the Commissioner is satisfied that the person’s permanent place of abode is 
outside Australia...” It has not mentioned ordinary resident. Also, the Australian non-resident has not 
been defined by the Act. It only made a cross-reference to the definition of the resident. That is 
whoever is not a resident, then he is a non-resident. 
45 (1937) 57 CLR 774  
46 (1946) 73 CLR 93  
47 (1979) 9 ATR 899 see also F.C.T. v. Miller (1946) 73 C.L.R. 93  
48 Levene v. IRC at 
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consider the taxpayer’s physical presence,49 the nature of his business and social 
ties, the nature of the terms of his employment,50 the nature, frequency and 
purpose of visits to the UK. The completion of a passenger card has also been 
regarded as a relevant factor in determining the Australian resident status of an 
individual for tax purposes; see in this regard FCT v. Wong,51 where the court 
took cognisance of the completion of a Passenger’s Card52 and held that the 
respondent as was not an Australian resident. However, the Canadian courts 
have determined the questions of ‘residence’ and ‘ordinary residence’ 
conjunctively and it is difficult to discern the separate positions of these courts 
on the issues of ‘residence’ and ‘ordinary residence’.53  
 
The UK notion of residence tends to be premised on the physical presence of 
the taxpayer in the UK. 54 In most jurisdictions that group the concepts of 
‘residence’ and ‘ordinary residence’ together, the physical presence aspect of 
                                                 
49  Gregory v. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation   (1937) 57 CLR 774; FCT v. Efstathakis (1979) 9 
ATR 86; FCT v. Subrahmanyam (2002) 49 ATR 29; Joachim v. FCT (2002) 50 1072 See also 
Applegate v. FCT (1979) 9 ATR 899 and  FCT v. Jenkins (1982) 12 ATR 745;  In Iyengar v. 
Commissioner of Taxation (2011) AATA 856 factors such as: history of residence and movements, 
habits and mode of life and maintenance of a place of abode were considered.  
50 FCT v. Pechey (1975) 5 ATR 322 
51 (2002) ATC 4538, see also Sneddon v. FCT (2012) ATC 10-264 and Ellwood v. FCT (2012) ATC 
10-287  
52 which indicated that the Respondent made only three visits to Australia, and that stated that he was 
a ‘visitor and temporary entrant departing. 
53 This is because Section 9 of the Canadian Income War Tax Act of 1922 (upon which the earlier 
decisions like Thomson v. Minister of National Revenue (1946) SCR 209) clearly merged the 
concepts of ‘resident’ and ‘ordinary resident’ together. It stated that “There shall be assessed levied 
and paid upon the income during the preceding year of every person (a) residing or ordinarily resident 
in Canada during such year...” Also sections 2(1) of the Canadian Income Tax Act 1985 stated that 
“An income tax shall be paid, as required by this Act, on the taxable income for each taxation year of 
every person resident in Canada at any time in the year.”  Section 250(3) of the same Act state that 
“In this Act, a reference to a person resident in Canada includes a person who was at the relevant 
time ordinarily resident in Canada.” Furthermore, New Zealand regime did not make reference to the 
concept of residence at all let alone mentioned ‘ordinary resident’. Section YD (2) of New Zealand 
Income Tax Act 2007 “Despite anything else in this section, a person is a New Zealand resident if 
they have a permanent place of abode in New Zealand, even if they also have a permanent place of 
abode elsewhere.” 
54 Thus, by the combined effect of sections 831 and 832 as well as the judicial established principles, 
the IR20 and subsequently the HMRC6 the principles embodied in those factors have been 
summarised into the twin objective tests, that is the 183 – day and 91 – day tests. The nature and the 
antecedents of these tests have been discussed in 5.4 below 
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the individual tax residence regimes is couched in the form of an objective test. 
Thus, the factors mentioned above for establishing ‘residence’, as considered 
under the UK regime55 are not applicable. Therefore, the analysis of the concept 
of ‘ordinary residence’ is the most appropriate criterion for those jurisdictions.  
 
5.2.1.2 Ordinary Residence 
 
An individual whose peculiar circumstances falls within one or more of the 
factors for determining residence, will be treated as a resident for tax purpose. 
Before 2013, the concept of ‘ordinary resident’ was an important connecting 
factor for the determination of individual residence in the UK. The concept 
remains relevant in jurisdictions like Canada, Nigeria and South Africa. Given 
the influence of the UK courts’ decisions on almost all the common law 
jurisdictions on the issues of ordinary residence, it is necessary to analyse the 
UK cases on the subject. The discussion of ordinary residence is premised on 
two basic questions: how and when did an individual acquire ordinary resident 
status? If he has acquired such status, then how and when has such status ceased 
to exist?  
 
In dealing with the concept of ordinary residence, the English courts have 
focused on a determination of the resident status of the individuals living 
abroad. Thus, they are more concerned with the second question.56 Most of the 
                                                 
55 From 2013most of the principles embodied in those factors were ceased to apply.  
56For example, IRC v. Combe (1932) 17 TC 405 Gaine-Coopers v. HMRC (2011) UKSC 47, HMRC 
v. Grace (2008) EWHC 2708 (Ch), Turberville v. HMRC (2010) UKFTT 69 (TC), Reed v Clark 
(1985) 58 TC 528, 556 Shepherd v. HMRC (2006) STC 1821, Barrett v HMRC (2008) STC (SCD) 
268. None of these cases concentrated on the issue of acquisition of ordinary residence. One may 
argue that in the cases of Tuczka v, HMRC (2011) 113 UKUT 1 at 9 (TCC)56 and Genovese v HMRC 
(2009) STC (SCD) 373 
56The individuals involved conceded that they were residents of the UK. Therefore, issue before the 
courts was whether they were also ordinarily resident in the UK. Yes, the question on the 
establishment of ordinary residence seemed to have been arisen in those cases. But by closer look at 
the decisions, both courts relied, to some extent, on the HMRC’s guidance on the establishment of 
ordinary resident (IR20) which stated that “If you are resident in the UK year after year, you are 
treated as ordinarily resident here...”56 This guidance emanated from the judicial principles set out for 
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decision that analyse the concept of ordinary residence revolve around the 
provisions of sections 829 and 831 of the UK Income Tax Act 2007. These 
sections are crucial provisions that serve as the starting point for analysing 
ordinary residence under the UK regime. Section 829 provides that: 
“(1) This section applies if— (a) an individual has left the United 
Kingdom for the purpose only of occasional residence abroad, and (b) at 
the time of leaving the individual was both UK resident and ordinarily 
UK resident. (2) Treat the individual as a UK resident for the purpose of 
determining the individual’s liability for income tax for any tax year 
during the whole or a part of which the individual remains outside the 
United Kingdom for the purpose only of occasional residence abroad.”  
 
 Section 831 provides that: 
“(1) Subsection (2) applies in relation to an individual if— (a) the 
individual is in the United Kingdom for some temporary purpose only 
and with no view to establishing the individual’s residence in the United 
Kingdom, and (b) during the tax year in question the individual had 
actually resided in the United Kingdom at for a total period equal to 183 
days (or more).” 
 
Section 829 deals with a situation where an individual who has satisfied the 
requirement of being a resident or ordinary resident has left the UK for the 
purpose of occasional residence abroad.  The issue for determination in this 
circumstance is whether or not that individual is a resident or ordinary resident 
of the UK as the time he left the UK. However, Section 831 deals with a 
situation where a UK resident57 enters the UK for a temporary purpose. Equally, 
the issue here is whether or not the presence of the individual in the UK is for a 
temporary purpose. The words ‘resident’ or ‘ordinary resident’ is mentioned but 
not defined. These sections focus on the situation where a UK resident or 
                                                 
the establishment of resident. In Tuczka’s case, the tribunal acted on the notion that residence is a 
prerequisite of ordinary residuary residence. 
57 Either on grounds of common law principles or he falls within the meaning of section 829 above or 
he has never been to the UK. 
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ordinary resident ceased to be such, not when a foreigner becomes a UK resident 
or ordinary resident. 
 
Two leading cases addressed the first question, but they only analysed the 
meaning and features the concept of ‘ordinary residence’. Lord Viscount Cave 
LC in Levene’s case stated that: 
“The expression “ordinary residence” is found in the Income Tax Act of 
1806 and occurs again and again in the later Income Tax Acts, where it 
is contrasted with the usual or occasional or temporary residence; and I 
think that it connotes residence in a place with some degree of continuity 
and apart from accidental or temporary absences. So understood, the 
expression differs little in meaning from the word “residence” as used in 
the Acts...”58 
 
In the same vein, Lord Viscount Sumner in Lysaght’s case stated that: 
 
“My Lords, the word "ordinary" may be taken first. The Act, on the one 
hand, does not say "usually" or "most of the time" or "exclusively" or 
"principally", nor does it say on the other hand "occasionally" or 
"exceptionally" or "now and then", though in various sections it applies 
to the word "resident", with a full sense of choice adverbs like 
"temporarily" and "actually". I think the converse to 'ordinarily' is 
‘extraordinarily’ and that part of the regular order of a man’s life, adopted 
voluntarily and for settled purposes, is not ‘extraordinary’.”59 
 
Lord Scarman in Shah v. Barnet LBC re-echoed the above statement of 
Viscount Cave and summarised the meaning and nature of the ordinary resident 
as follows: 
“Following Levene and Lysaght, the words are to be construed in their 
natural and ordinary meaning as words of common usage in the English 
language …The words are not to be interpreted as comparable with 
domicile …They do not imply an intention to live in a place permanently 
or indefinitely … Unless the statutory framework or legal context 
requires a different meaning, the words refer to a person's abode in a 
particular country which he or she has adopted voluntarily as part of the 
regular order of his or her life for the time being, whether of short or long 
duration … The mind of the individual is relevant in two (and only two) 
                                                 
58 Levene v. IRC at 225 
59 Lysaght v. IRC at 243 
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particular respects. The residence must be voluntarily adopted, and there 
must be a degree of settled purpose, having sufficient continuity to be 
described as settled... The purpose, while settled, may be for a limited 
period, and common reasons for a choice of regular abode include 
education, business or profession, employment, health, family, or mere 
love of the place… The "real home" test is wholly inconsistent with the 
natural and ordinary meaning of the words as construed 
in Levene and Lysaght.” 60 
 
The trend of the English courts in the cases of Levene and Lysaght and Shah, 
cited above, is that they accord the terms ‘ordinary resident’ a natural and 
ordinary meaning. Thus, the facts and circumstances of each case determine 
whether or not an individual is a UK ordinary resident. These cases did not 
provide any guidance as to the factors to be considered in deciding whether or 
not an individual becomes a UK ordinary resident.61 Despite the importance of 
the concept of ordinary residence, it has not been defined statutorily in the UK. 
The courts deal with the question whether or not a UK resident or ordinary 
resident has ceased to be such, not on how and when a foreigner becomes a UK 
ordinary resident. The non-binding statements of the HMRC are the only 
guidance. That is IR20 and HMRC6, which claim to give guidance on how to 
apply the judicially established principles on an ordinary resident.62 The 
reliance of the HMRC’s guidance on ordinary resident is tend to equate the 
concepts of ordinary resident and resident. However, the UK regime envisages 
the separation of the two concepts.  
The distinction between the concepts is evidenced by the fact that whenever an 
individual becomes a UK resident, ordinary resident or domiciliary he is liable to 
worldwide taxation on the basis of income arising. However, a UK resident 
                                                 
60 (1983) 2 AC 309  at 343 
61 The only case that seemed to established the degree of duration of stay that can constitute ordinary 
resident is found in the case Reed v Clark (1986) Ch 1 where the considered the length of time Mr. 
Clark spent in the USA without setting foot in the UK as indicia that Mr. Clark had established himself 
as both resident and ordinary resident of the USA not the UK. 
62 And by the above argument there was none for the ordinary resident. 
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simpliciter is entitled to elect that his foreign income shall only be taxed in the UK 
if he did not bring it into the UK or enjoy it in the UK. This choice is not available 
to the UK ordinary resident or domiciliary.63 Despite this statutory provision, the 
UK courts taken a different direction on the issue of ‘resident’ ‘ordinarily resident’ 
dichotomy. Stressing the thinness of the distinction between ‘resident’ and 
‘ordinary resident,' Lord Viscount Cave in Levene’s case64 said that ordinary 
residence is predicated upon residence, in other words, that an individual cannot 
be an ordinary resident without being a resident. He stated that “I find it difficult 
to imagine a case in which a man while not a resident here is yet ordinarily 
resident here.” Roth J. in Tuczka v. HMRC65 accepted the proposition that there 
can be no question of ordinary residence without considering whether the 
individual is a resident. 
 
The above proposition explains the reason behind the English courts’ failure to 
give clear guidance on how ordinary resident status is acquired. Instead, the courts 
made the determination of ordinary residence dependent upon the determination 
of resident. Lord Buckmaster in Lysaght’s case66 said that once the residence of 
an individual is established, the ordinary residence is no more than an adjective 
qualifying the residence to be more than casual. 
 
                                                 
63 Section 25 The UK Income tax (Earning and Pension) Act 2003 provides that “(1) This section applies 
to general earnings for a tax year in which the employee is resident but not ordinarily resident in the 
United Kingdom if they are—(a)general earnings in respect of duties performed in the United 
Kingdom ... (2) The full amount of any general earnings within subsection (1) which are received in 
a tax year is an amount of “taxable earnings” from the employment in that year.” Section 26 of the 
same Act provides that “(1) This section applies to general earnings for a tax year in which the 
employee is resident, but not ordinarily resident, in the United Kingdom if they are neither— 
(a)general earnings in respect of duties performed in the United Kingdom … (2) The full amount of 
any general earnings within subsection (1) which are remitted to the United Kingdom in a tax year is 
an amount of “taxable earnings” from the employment in that year.” See also Paragraph 1.3 and 1.5 
of the RDR 1 2013. 
64 At 507 
65 (2011) 113 UKUT 1 at 9 (TCC) 
66 Lysaght v. IRC (1928) at 535 
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The English courts have taken a different direction from the English statutory 
provisions on the dichotomy between ‘resident’ and ‘ordinary resident’. The area 
of concern here has to do with the possibility of an individual being an ordinary 
resident of two states at the same time. On the other hand, almost all the English 
cases have concentrated on determining whether a UK ordinary resident becomes 
an ordinary resident of another country. However, they have failed to give 
guidance on how an individual becomes a UK ordinary resident in the first place. 
It is submitted that the examination of the resident status of an individual in 
another state cannot supplant that of the state that claims the taxing right. Finally, 
it is arguable correct to say that the UK regime considers the same set of factors 
in establishing both the ‘resident’ and ‘ordinary resident’ status of an individual. 
The only area of distinction is to be found in the case of the second question, that 
is to say, the cessation of the ordinary resident status. 
From the decisions cited above, the physical presence of an individual in the UK 
is the focal point for the determining whether or not that individual is a UK 
resident. On the other hand, the question of ordinary residence has focused on both 
the physical presence coupled with the quality of the physical presence. Thus, the 
intention of the individual to live (either for a short or long duration) in the UK 
voluntarily for a settled purpose and as part of the regular order of his life is 
relevant.67 Thus, an ordinary UK resident could be liable to pay income tax even 
if he is not physically present in the UK. Moreover, an individual could be a UK 
ordinary resident without being resident in the UK.68  
Furthermore, an individual can easily sever his UK resident status by the duration 
of his physical absence from the UK. For instance, if an individual is absent from 
the UK throughout a tax year, his UK resident status may be cut off. However, as 
                                                 
67 Shah’s case (1983) 2 AC 309 at 343 - In determining the settled purpose, factors such as education, 





the acquisition of the ordinary resident status is premised on the quality of the 
presence rather than its duration, it is always difficult for an individual to sever his 
ordinary resident status. In addressing the second question,  the common trend 
taken by the UK courts is that they consider whether or not the individual’s 
absence from the UK is sufficient to sever his ordinary resident status. In such 
situations, the UK courts look to the first limb of section 82969 to determine the 
nature and purpose of the absence. That is whether or not the individual in 
question left the UK and if he did, whether his absence constitutes a distinct 
break from his UK mode of life. For instance in IRC v. Combe,70 the court 
considered the question as to whether the absence amounts to a severance from 
the UK and abandonment of the UK ordinary resident status. The court held that 
whenever an individual has a residence in the UK, the court may only treat him 
as non-resident if he has left the UK and established a definite break from his 
UK mode of life. 
 
In Reed v Clark,71 the respondent was a UK resident and ordinary resident who 
moved to the USA in 1978 and established a home and business there. He later 
returned and resided in the UK, without visiting the UK in the interim. The vital 
question was whether or not the respondent was a UK resident for the tax year 
at issue. While affirming the findings of the special commissioner, the court 
held that Mr Clark was not a UK resident because he left the UK for a purpose 
that was not occasional in nature. Hence, he was not liable for UK tax during 
the period of his absence (that is the 1978-79 tax year). Hence, Mr Clark had 
acquired ordinary resident status in the US because the court held that 
“occasional residence was the converse of ordinary residence.” Therefore, since 
Mr Clark had not established an occasional residence in the US, he had 
                                                 
69 Section 829 of the Income Tax Act 2007 which stated that “...if— (a) an individual has left the United 
Kingdom for the purpose only of occasional residence abroad...” which is in pari material  with 
section 334 of the UK Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 
70  (1932) 17 TC 405 
71 (1985) 58 TC 528, 556 
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established an ordinary residence. The court did not set out the criteria for 
establishing a UK ordinary residence, but formulated guidance on how a person 
can establish an ordinary residence in the US. What was required under the 
notion of having a defined break, as enunciated in IRC v. Combe, was that even 
a discernible change in the lifestyle of the individual in question is enough to 
constitute a break. The subsequent cases misconceived this proposition in 
deciding what constitutes the break. In some of the cases, the distinct break 
required is akin to a complete breaking of ties with the UK if an individual wants 
to sever his UK ordinary resident status.  
 
For instance, in the case of Shepherd v. HMRC,72 the key issue was whether 
Shepherd had done sufficient to constitute a distinct break from his UK mode 
of life. The court held that the presence of Shepherd in Cyprus was for an 
occasional purpose and did not constitute a distinct break from his UK mode of 
life. However, in Turberville v. HMRC, 73 the HMRC argued that the 
appellant’s departure from the UK only lasted for sixteen months and was 
subject to a frequent return visit to the UK. Thus, the absence did not constitute 
a distinct break in the pattern of his UK life. The court considered all the events 
as they appeared at that time and held that there was a sufficient break that made 
Mr Turberville to cease to be a UK resident as at July 2001.  This was held to 
be so notwithstanding the fact that Turberville has retained his UK house. This 
case supports the notion of a defined break enunciated in the IRC v. Combe.  
 
The court in HMRC v Grace74 emphasised the need for conducting a 
multifactorial inquiry in deciding whether or not an individual has made a 
distinct break from the UK. Unlike Shepherd,Grace had left the UK;  therefore 
                                                 
72 (2006) STC 1821 Mr. which is also premised on section 334 of Income and Corporation Act 
1988was British citizen who jointly owned a house in London with his wife and the . 
73 (2010) UKFTT 69 (TC) 
74 (2009) EWCA Civ 1082  
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the issues before the court were whether or not Grace had left the UK for an 
occasional purpose and, if so, whether his subsequent return was for a temporary 
purpose only or was no more than a gap measure.75 The special commissioner 
found that Grace was not a UK resident or ordinary resident within the meaning 
of sections 334 and 336. On appeal to the High Court, the findings of the Special 
Commissioner were set aside and it was held that Grace was a resident. 
However, the Court of Appeal transferred the case back to the first tribunal for 
reconsideration of whether or not the absence of Grace from the UK was for a 
temporary purpose. 
 
The case of Gaines-Cooper and Davies & Anor v HMRC76 is very instructive 
on the issue of a distinct break. The held, among other things, that an individual 
requires a clean break with the UK before he can be accorded a UK resident or 
ordinary resident status as a result of his departure from the UK. The individual 
must have substantially loosened his social and family ties with the UK 
required. The same was the result in Lynette Dawn Yates v. HMRC77 where the 
court held that in determining the extent to which the family and social ties had 
been loosened for the purpose of establishing a distinct break, a multifactorial 
inquiry is required, which is intended to evaluate what the individual did to alter 
his mode of life from the previous mode. The court also considered the 
appellant’s repeated return trips to the UK and the evidence of her close family 
ties and other factors.78 In Hankinson v. HMRC,79  it was held that the 
individual’s intention to return to the UK is relevant in deciding whether or the 
absence is an occasional one. Moreover, in Reed’s case it was held that there is 
                                                 
75 Goodwin v Curtis (1998) 70 TC 478, 510 “Physical presence in a particular place does not necessarily 
amount to residence in that place where, for example, a person’s physical presence there is no more 
than a stop gap measure.” The Grace’s case involved questions under both sections 334 (829) and 
336 (831). 
76 (2011) UKSC 47 
77 (2012) UKFTT 568 (TC) 
78 See also Barrett v HMRC (2008) STC (SCD) 268; Darrell Healey v HMRC(2014) UKFTT 889  
79 (2009) UKFTT 384 (TC) 32 
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no clear time period for an occasional absence. In Glyn v. HMRC,80 despite the 
fact that the appellant retained his London house and visited the UK several 
times during the year, he was held to have distinctly broken his ties with the 
UK. Mr Glyn convinced the Tribunal that he had broken from his UK business 
completely and adopted a new way of life in Monaco. 
 
The Canadian courts have recognised ‘residence’ as an integral part of ‘ordinary 
residence’, and addressed both the first and second questions collectively. In 
other words, they provide for the legal consequence of acquiring Canadian 
resident or ordinary resident status and the cessation of such status.81 However, 
as in the UK, the expressions ‘resident’ or ‘ordinary residence’ have not been 
statutorily defined, and require judicial interpretation. The Canadian Supreme 
Court summarised the nature of both ‘resident’ and ‘ordinary resident’ in 
Thomson v. Minister of National Revenue as follows in the words of Rand, J: 
                                                 
80 (2013) UKFTT 645 (TC) 
81 The Canadian Income Tax Act 1985 provides; Section 2. (1) “An income tax shall be paid, as required 
by this Act, on the taxable income for each taxation year of every person resident in Canada at any 
time in the year.” (3) “Where a person who is not taxable under subsection 2(1) for a taxation year 
(a) was employed in Canada, (b) carried on a business in Canada, or (c) disposed of a taxable 
Canadian property, at any time in the year or a previous year, an income tax shall be paid, as required 
by this Act, on the person’s taxable income earned in Canada for the year determined in accordance 
with Division D.” section 250 (3) “In this Act, a reference to a person resident in Canada includes a 
person who was at the relevant time ordinarily resident in Canada.” 
 
For discussions of the nature of Canadian individual tax resident regime see P Lefebvre ‘Canada's 
Jurisdiction to Tax: Residency and the Thomson Decision 60 Years Later’ (2006), 54 (3) Canadian Tax 
Journal 762; Hogg, PW et al ‘Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law’ (2007).  [6th Ed] Thomson 






“The gradation of degrees of time object intention continuity and other 
relevant circumstances shows, I think, that in common parlance 
“residing” is not a term of invariable elements all of which must be 
satisfied in each instance. It is quite impossible to give it precise and 
inclusive definition It is highly flexible, and its many shades of meaning 
vary not only in the contexts of different matters but also in different 
aspects of the same matter... The expression “ordinarily resident” carries 
restricted signification … It is held to mean residence in the course of 
the customary mode of life of the person concerned and it is contrasted 
with special or occasional or casual residence. The general mode of life 
is, therefore, relevant to the question of its application… The ordinary 
residence can best be appreciated by considering its antithesis occasional 
or casual or deviatory residence. The latter would seem clear to be not 
only temporary in time and exceptional in circumstance but also 
accompanied by a sense of transitoriness and of return … so-called 
“permanent residence”, “temporary residence”, “ordinary residence”, 
“principal residence” and the like, the adjectives do not affect the fact 
that there is in all cases residence and that quality is chiefly matter of the 
degree to which person in mind and fact settles into or maintains or 
centralizes his ordinary mode of living with its accessories in social 
relations interests and conveniences at or in the place in question.”82 
In the same case, Estey J. described the nature of resident and ordinary 
resident as follows: 
“A reference to the dictionary and judicial comments upon the meaning 
of these terms indicates that one is 'ordinarily resident' in the place 
wherein the settled routine of his life he regularly, normally or 
customarily lives. One 'sojourns' at a place where he unusually, casually 
or intermittently visits or stays. In the former the element of permanence; 
in the latter, that of the temporary predominates. The difference cannot 
be stated in precise and definite terms, but each case must be determined 
after all of the relevant factors are taken into consideration, but the 
foregoing indicates in a general way the essential difference. It is not the 
length of the visit or stay that determines the question…”83  
                                                 
82 (1945) SCR 209 at 224-225 in this case a Canadian resident left Canada for Bermuda with intention 
of settling there. He stayed there for over 183 days in a year. But within the interim, he made frequent 
visit to Canada and live in his own house. It was held that he was a Canadian resident for tax purposes. 
See also Beament v. Minister of National Revenue (1952) 2 S.C.R. 486; Schujahn v. M.N.R., 62 DTC 
1225 (Ex. Ct.); 
83 Ibid, see also Fisher v. Canada,  (1995) 1 C.T.C. 2011, 
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The establishment of Canadian resident status (other than deemed resident status) 
or ordinary resident status is a question of fact.84 The courts have set out various 
factors such as the past and present habits of life; regularity and length of visits 
in Canada, personal and economic ties in Canada and elsewhere and the 
permanence of otherwise of purposes of stays abroad.85 These factors are 
applicable not only for the cessation of resident status but also for the 
establishment of residence as well. While stating the difference between the 
Canadian and the UK approach to questions of ‘resident’ and ‘ordinary resident’ 
Bowman, J. in Kadrie v. Canada,86 stated that: 
“It is, I believe, apparent from the decision of Schujahn v. M.N.R. 62 
DTC 1225 and the Thomson case that one should treat with some caution 
the decisions under the United Kingdom taxing statutes.”  
The Canadian cases on the questions of the resident or ordinary resident fall into 
three categories: 
1. The cases where the individual has been a Canadian ordinary resident 
and claims to have terminated his ordinary resident status because he left 
Canada and established a residence in another country. The issue for 
determination in these type cases is whether or not the individual severed 
his relationship with Canada; 
2. The cases where an ordinary resident of another country acquires 
resident status in Canada. The issue for determination is whether or not 
he has become a Canadian ordinary resident eligible for all the 
deductions and other benefits available to an ordinary resident; 
                                                 
84 The Queen v. Laurin (2008) FCA 58 
85  The Queen v, Reader 75 DTC 5160 at 5163, Kadrie v. The Queen (supra). But the main factor being 
considered in determining the residence or ordinary residence of an individual is sufficient 
residential ties with Canada. That is the location of a dwelling place in Canada.  
86 (2001) T.C.J. No 601 (Q.L.) 
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3. The cases where a Canadian resident emigrates to another country and 
cuts all his relationship with Canada, but later re-acquires his ties with 
Canada. The issue is at the point at which he resumed his Canadian 
resident status. 
The trend of the Canadian Courts is to consider the temporary absence of the 
individual as insufficient to terminate Canadian ordinary resident status. In 
Beament v. MNR,87 Beament left Canada in the UK for an overseas job. 
However, before he left, he terminated his tenancy and stored all his belongings 
in a room of his parent's house. He married and established a matrimonial home 
in the UK. The court held that, irrespective of the appellant’s intention to return 
to Canada; he was neither resident nor ordinarily resident in Canada during the 
portion of 1946 before his return to Canada.88 In the somewhat similar case of 
The Queen v. Bergelt,89 while leaving Canada, the respondent left his wife 
behind to monitor the renovation of their house before its intended sale. He also 
deposited his U.S. pay cheque into his Canadian bank account, and he made 
several trips to Vancouver. The court held he ceased to be a Canadian resident 
at the time he left for California for an overseas job, In the case of Griffiths v. 
The Queen,90 the court held that a retired Canadian executive who amicably 
separated from his wife and moved to a Caribbean Island ceased to be a resident 
of Canada despite the fact that he made occasional visits to Canada and retained 
substantial investments there.  
 
On the second category mentioned above, there are various cases involving the 
question of residence where it was the individuals91 who wanted the Revenue 
                                                 
87 (1952) 2 S.C.R. 486 
88 However, this decision has been overruled by section 250(1) (b) of the Canadian Income Tax Act 
1985 that provides that all members of Canadian Forces are deemed to be Canadian resident to tax 
purpose. 
89 (1986) 1 CTC 212 (FCTD) 
90 (1978) CTC 372 (FCTD) 
91 For the purpose of enjoying certain benefits under the Income Act, 
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Authority to treat them as ordinary residents. In these cases, the question has 
always been one of establishing the ordinary resident status of the individual. In 
Perlman v. Queen,92 the court held the appellant to be a Canadian resident for 
2003 and 2004 and eligible for the Child Care Tax Benefit93 even though he had 
been  absent from Canada since 1994. The court considered the length of the 
appellant’s stay in Israel, but was inclined to attach more weight to the 
appellant’s social and economic ties with Canada. 
  
Furthermore, in the case of Fatima v. The Queen,94 the appellant, had not 
acclimatised to the Canadian life within her first six months in Canada before 
she left Canada for a temporary visit to Pakistan. The court held that she was a 
Canadian resident and entitled to the benefit at issue. The court also found that 
her ties with Canada had been acquired when she arrived in Canada because her 
husband had been settled in Canada for several years. The court considered the 
nature of the appellant’s husband’s stays in Canada in arriving the decision. 
Thus, it applied the rule in Re Young and Rogers’ cases in another form. 
However, in Nedelcu v. The Queen, (2010) FCA 156 the appellant immigrated 
to Canada and became a Canadian resident, then left Canada without signifying 
any intention to return to Canada and did not return. She argued that all the 
factors that tied her with Canada had continued to be present up to 2003, 2004 
and 2005 and that there was no reason for the Minister to issue a Notice 
terminating her Canadian ordinary resident status. The court decided that she 
was not a Canadian ordinary resident because her mode of life was more 
Romanian rather than Canadian.  
 
                                                 
92 (2010) TCC 658 
93 Pursuant to section 122.6 of the Canadian Income Tax Act 1985 only a Canadian resident is entitled 
to the CCTB. Mr. Perlman wanted to benefit from the scheme but he was denied on the ground that 
he was not a Canadian resident. He challenged the decision of the Minister of Revenue on that ground. 
94 (2012) TCC 49 
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For the third category, the courts look at the issue from the perspective of dual 
residency and consider whether there is any applicable Double Taxation 
Agreement between Canada and the country where the individual resides. Thus, 
even if the Court decided that the individual did not sever his ties with Canada, 
the courts go further to examine the applicability of any existing DTA between 
Canada and the other country. The Court discussed this issue in the case of 
Allchin v. The Queen,95 where the appellant was born in Canada but moved to 
the US with her parent, obtained a Green Card and also worked as a nurse there. 
She moved back to Canada, but still maintained her job and the US Green Card. 
She commuted from Canada to the US for the work. The Tax Court held that 
since the appellant did sever her tie with Canada, she remained an ordinary 
resident and liable to Canadian tax. However, the Court of Appeal considered 
not only the issue of severing relations with Canada but also the issue of whether 
the individual can establish a residence in another state without necessarily 
severing his Canadian ordinary resident status. It set aside the decision of the 
Tax Court and ordered a retrial of the case to reconsider the issue of the Canada 
– US Tax Treaty. 
 
The US notion of individual residence is worthy of consideration. In the US 
both citizens and permanent residents (Green Card holders) are liable to tax on 
their worldwide income.96 Moreover, individuals who are neither citizens nor 
permanent residents (resident aliens) are considered as a non-resident alien. 
Before 1984, the terms ‘resident alien’ and ‘non-resident alien’ had not been 
statutorily defined.  However, the Treasury Regulation defined a resident as an 
individual who was not a mere transient or sojourner in the US. The intention 
                                                 
95 (2004) FCA 206 see also Black v. The Queen, (2014) TCC 12; Gaudreau v The Queen, (2005) CTC 
2702 Smith v. The Queen (2000) CanLII 352 (TCC); Huh v. The Queen, 2000 CanLII 229 (TCC) 




of the individual to stay in the US97 was the key factor determining the residence 
status of individuals by the Internal Revenue Service and the courts have 
intervened in disputed cases. 
 
In ascertaining the actual intention of an individual, the courts have considered 
the physical presence of the individual in the US as well as his intention to reside 
in the US with some degree of permanence. For instance, in Ingram v. Bower98 
the court held that living and working in the US for six months per year was not 
enough to establish an intention to stay in the US. The court was persuaded by 
the domicile of the individual in arriving at the decision. However, in 
Commissioner v. Nubar,99 the court held that the domicile of a person should 
not be a factor in determining the intention of a person to stay; therefore, the 
respondent was a US resident.100 In Adams v. Commissioner,101 the court 
maintained the test for determining the residence of individuals to be the 
physical presence and the intention to say in the US. The US courts inferred the 
intention to stay from the purpose and character of the visit;102acquisition of US 
home;103 social, cultural and business ties;104 relocation of families;105 bank 
account106 and type of visa.107 However, in Part v. Commissioner,108 the court 
held that the residence of an individual is a question of fact to be decided based 
                                                 
97 Which is measured by the length of time and the nature of the stay. If an individual entered the US 
with the intention to accomplish something promptly or with a limited visa, he would be presumed 
as a non-resident. But the presumption could be rebutted by the intention of the individual. 
98 (1931) 47 5 DNY 925 
99 (1951) 341 US 925 
100 However, in Constantinescu v. Commissioner (1948) 11 T.C. 37 which share similar fact with that of 
Nubar’s case, the court held the appellant not US resident. In both cases the individuals were forced 
to stay in the US due to the World War II situation in the Europe at that time. But in Constantinescu’s 
case the court concentrated on the facts and circumstances of the case, while in Nubar’s case, the 
court considered similar facts but arrived at different decision.  
101 (1966) 46 TC 352 
102 Siddiqi v. Commissioner (1978) 70 TC 553 
103 Adams v. Commissioner (1966) 46 TC 352 
104 Schoneberger v. Commissioner (1980) 74 TC 1016 
105 Maclean v. Commissioner (1980) 73 TC 1045 
106 Hoskins v. Commissioner (1983) 52 TC 508 
107 Escobar v. Commissioner (1977) 68 TC 304; section 1.871-2(b) Treasury Regulation 1960 
108 (1982) 79 TC 252 
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on all relevant facts and circumstances. Hence, only the unique personal 
situations of the individual could provide the needed guidance. The court was 
not persuaded by the judgments cited by both parties.  
 
Due to the complexity and uncertainty inherent in the subjective test developed 
by the courts in determining the residence of individuals, a committee was set 
up to address the issue.109 The committee recommended an objective definition 
of US residence for income tax purposes. This recommendation culminated in 
the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and section 1810 (1) of the Act 
which amended section 7701(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1960. The 
amended section set out the framework for a statutory test for individual 
residents in the US for both federal and states income taxes.110  
 
The above discussion reflects on the nature and meaning of ‘residence’ and 
‘ordinary residence’ in the UK tax regime. The judicial analyses of the two 
expressions were carried out by way of a facts and circumstances inquiry as 
they were not statutorily defined. The courts considered various factors in 
determining the question as to how an individual acquires and loses UK resident 
status.111  However, for ordinary residence, the courts seemed to have focused 
                                                 
109 House Committee on Ways and Means – HR 4170 
110See Rothschild Jr and Schinner, M ‘United States: Determining Residency for Federal Income Tax 
Purposes’ (1993) 47 BFID Publication 85, Williams, D ‘ Back to the future: A time for rethinking 
the test for resident alien status under the Income Tax Laws’ (1988)  21 Vand. J. Trans. L. 965. 
What is not clear from the committee’s report as well as the amendment is whether the earlier cases 
that dealt with the issue of intention of the individual to stay in the US remains valid under the new 
objective test as the UK ‘Statutory Resident Test’ regime did to the pre-2013 cases? This question 
is very important due to the number of exception attached to the substantial presence test introduced 
by the amendment. The individual tax residence discussed above is about the US federal income tax 
only. The states of the US are empowered by the US Constitution to impose an income tax on their 
residents and non-resident. Although the states use the statutory definition of both resident and non-
resident, the definition is premised on the concept of domicile, which has been defined statutorily 
by all states of the US. Therefore, in the US context domicile is a very important concept, though 
not at the federal level. See Hashmi, A ‘Is home really where the heart is?: State taxation of 
domiciliaries, statutory residents, and nonresidents in the District of Columbia’ (2012) 65 Tax 
Lawyer 797. 
111 That served as models followed in most of the common law jurisdictions. 
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on its cessation rather than its acquisition. The courts have inclined toward a 
proposition that ‘residence’ is a prerequisite of ‘ordinary residence’, and there 
was a little difference between the resident and ordinary resident. However, the 
UK statutes have recognised the distinction between the two concepts.112  On 
the issue of cessation of ordinary residence, the courts haveevolved the idea of 
a distinct break as the core requirement for the termination of ordinary 
residence. From the above analysis, the establishment of the UK ordinary 
resident status was governed by the combination of the various principles 
formulated for the purposes of resident simpliciter as well as the non-binding 
IR20 and HMRC6. 
 
5.2.1.3  Permanent Place of Abode 
 
 
The Australian and New Zealand tax regimes have introduced the concept of 
‘permanent place of the abode’ to determine the residence of an individual for 
income tax purposes. Under the Australian regime, two definitions of residence 
involve the facts and circumstances inquiry,113 the common law residence test and 
the domicile test. The presence of ‘permanent place of abode’ in Australia 
involves a sine qua non as regards the domicile test.114 That is to say, even if an 
individual is domiciled in Australia, he will not be considered as an Australian 
resident if he satisfies the Commissioner that his ‘permanent place of abode’ is 
outside Australia.115 In determining whether or not the ‘permanent place of abode’ 
                                                 
112  See section 829 and 831 of Income Tax Act 2007 and section 25 and 36 of the Income Tax 
(earning and Pension) Act 2003. 
113 By the combined effect of section 995-1 of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 and 
section 6 (1) of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, “a resident or Australian resident 
is (a) a person other than company who resides in Australia and includes a person: i) whose domicile 
is in Australia, unless the Commissioner is satisfied that the person’s permanent place of abode is 
outside Australia...” It has not mentioned ordinary resident. 
114 “The Act is not concern with domicile except to the extent necessary to show whether a taxpayer 
has an Australian domicile. What is importance is whether the taxpayer has abandoned any 
residence or place of abode in Australia” Northrop J. In FCT v. Applegate “ 
115Alley,C et al ‘In Need of Reform? A Trans-Tasman Perspective on the Definition of 
"Residence”’(1995) 5(1) Revenue Law Journal 
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is in Australia, the Commissioner and the courts conduct a facts and circumstance 
inquiry. Thus, the determination of ‘permanent place of abode’ is a fact-intensive 
inquiry.  
The New Zealand system, on the other hand, has adopted the concept of 
‘permanent place of abode’ as the facts and circumstances test for the 
determination of individual residence.116 However, unlike the Australian regime, 
it does not link the concept of ‘permanent place of abode’ to that of domicile. 
Thus, domicile has no relevance in New Zealand’s notion of a ‘permanent place 
of abode’. However, despite the importance of the concept of ‘permanent place of 
abode’, it has not been statutorily defined under either of the two regimes. Hence, 
the concept is being defined by the courts. 
The Australian court in Applegate v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
explained what constitutes a ‘permanent place of abode’. The court considered 
whether or not the establishment of ‘permanent place of abode’ outside 
Australia requires an intention to live outside Australia indefinitely and whether 
the word ‘permanent’ should be given its ordinary meaning. The court held that 
even though the respondent ultimately intended to return to Australia this did not 
stop him from establishing a permanent place of abode outside Australia. It was 
also held that the word ‘permanent’ should be defined within the context of the 
Act. That is to say, it does not mean everlasting or forever as the liability for tax 
(especially the rate payable) is determined annually. Justice Fisher succinctly 
explained the nature of ‘permanent place of abode’ as follows:   
“…the word “permanent” is used to qualify the expression ‘place of 
abode’ i.e. the physical surroundings in which the person lives, and to 
describe that place. It does not necessarily direct attention to the 
taxpayer's state of mind in respect of that or any other place… the proper 
construction of place upon the phrase ‘permanent place of abode’ is that 
                                                 
116 Section YD(2) of New Zealand Income Tax Act 2007 “Despite anything else in this section, a person 
is a New Zealand resident if they have a permanent place of abode in New Zealand, even if they also 
have a permanent place of abode elsewhere.” 
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it is the taxpayer's fixed and habitual place of abode. It is his home, but 
not his permanent home… Material factors for consideration will be the 
continuity or otherwise of the taxpayer's presence, the duration of his 
presence and the durability of his association with the particular 
place.”117 
 
In this case, the court gave a broad meaning to ‘residence’, but applied a 
contextual approach to defining ‘permanent’ in the phrase ‘permanent place of 
abode.' In analysing the concept of ‘permanent place of abode’ both the 
Australian and the New Zealand courts considered the expression ‘place of 
abode’ to mean an individual’s residence as defined in Levene and Lysaght, that 
is to say, the dictionary meaning. However, Australian courts defined 
‘permanent’ in the context of section 6 of the Income Tax Assessment Act. 
 
The central issue under the Australian regime is that, for an individual to lose or 
abandon his Australian domicile, he needs to satisfy the commissioner that he has 
established a place of abode outside Australia. The tax regime does consider the 
possibility of an individual’s becoming a dual resident of Australia and the other 
country. For instance, in AAT Case 12551,118  the appellant had been overseas 
for almost five years. The Tribunal held that she was still a resident because she 
had not abandoned her domicile nor established a ‘permanent place of abode’ 
elsewhere. The next question was whether it was possible for her to stay 
overseas for about five years without becoming a tax resident there.  
 
                                                 
117 Applegate v. FCT (1979) 79 ATC 4307 at 4317 See also FCT v. Jenkis (1982) 82 ATC 4098 (where 
the  issue for determination was  whether or not fixed term of stay overseas and the early termination 
of the overseas stay prevented  an individual from  establishing permanent place of abode  overseas. 
Hence, there is no limit of period that an individual must stay outside Australia before he can establish 
a permanent place of abode there.)  The same line of reasoning was followed in the case of Mayhew 
v. FCT (2013) AATA 130.  However, in Iyengar v, Commissioner of taxation (2011) AATA 856 the 
Tribunal found that the terms of the appellant’s overseas employment was fixed and more specific 
than that of Jenkins.. It was also found that he maintained all his social, family and business ties with 
Australia. Therefore his stay in Dubai was temporary and transitory and it does not amount to 
permanent place of abode. 
118 (1998) 37 ATR 1263; cited in Dirkis M ‘...Nowhere man sitting in his nowhere land': The continuing 
saga of cross border arbitrage,’ (2012) 22Revenue Law Journal 1 at 6.   
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The early New Zealand decisions viewed the concept of a permanent place of 
abode in the case of Geothermal Energy New Zealand Ltd v CIR119 as a place 
around which the individual’s domestic life revolved, that it so say, a place that 
makes the individual have an enduring domestic relationship with New Zealand. 
As Alley put it, the permanent place of abode of a married man (or woman) is 
where his wife (or her husband) or their children reside at that particular time. 
In the case of a single person, it is the place that is the centre of their interests 
and affairs.120 However, subsequent cases have enunciated other notions of a 
permanent place of abode as meaning a place where an individual normally or 
habitually lives, but it does not require that a residence is always vacant and 
available for the person.121  
 
A fundamental difference between Australia’s and New Zealand’s notion of a 
permanent place of abode is that the availability of a permanent place of abode 
in another country is not relevant to the inquiry as to whether the individual also 
had a permanent place of abode in New Zealand. Thus, the New Zealand regime 
focuses on the whether or not an individual has a ‘permanent place of abode’ in 
New Zealand. The availability of place of abode in New Zealand is a condition 
precedent for treating an individual as a resident. Moreover, once he ceases to 
have a permanent place of abode in New Zealand, he ceases to be a resident. 
The fact that the individual has a permanent place of abode abroad is immaterial. 
The New Zealand model of permanent place of abode is thus a mechanism for 
establishing the residence of individual for tax purposes.  
 
The Australian regime, on the other hand, focuses on the question whether the 
individual has a ‘permanent place of abode’ outside Australia. Thus, the 
                                                 
119 (1979) 4 NZTC 6478.   
120 Clinton, A et al ‘The New Zealand definition of “residence” for individual: Lessons for Australia 
in a “Global” environment ‘(2002) 4 (1) J. Aust. Taxation 40 at 53. 
121 Case Q55 (1993) 15 NZTC 5313 
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availability of a place or abode abroad will make an individual a non-resident 
of Australia for tax purposes.  It follows, therefore, that an individual could 
revert to his Australian resident status as soon as he relinquishes his established 
permanent place of abode even though he is yet to return to Australia. For 
instance, an Australian expatriate can create a permanent place of abode outside 
Australia and relinquish it upon the completion of his overseas job. However, 
he may decide to take a retirement leave in another country without establishing 
a permanent place of abode there. Under the Australian regime, that individual 
is liable to tax in that year, even though he did not set his foot in Australia. The 
Australian model of ‘permanent place of abode’ is a means of rebutting the 
presumption of continued Australian-domiciled status imposed on an 
individual. 
 
An analysis of the subjective approach to the determination of residence and 
ordinary residence of individual by the five common law jurisdictions122 reveals 
that the leading UK decisions are the cases of Levene v. IRC and Lysaght v. 
IRC. The leading Canadian authority on the subject is the case of Thomson v 
MNR, 123 where the Canadian Supreme Court recognised and applied the 
principles enunciated in the UK cases of Levene and Lysaght. The leading 
Australian cases on residence are Gregory v. Deputy Commissioner of 
Taxation,124 and FCT v. Miller125 which also followed the principles in Levene 
and Lysaght. The UK decisions have influenced cases of common law 
jurisdictions. Both the Nigerian and South African courts make reference to 
those judicial decisions. Despite the influence of the UK decisions, in 2013 the 
                                                 
122 The United Kingdom, United States of America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand. 
123 By the research conducted from November, 2014 to June 2015, there is no Canadian Tax case (which 
involves the question of residence or ordinary residence) that did not cited and of the principles 
formulated in the Thomson v. MNR 
124 (1937) 57 CLR 774 From a survey conducted in May, 2015 through an Australian search engine, 
this case has been cited in more than fifteen  Australian cases that discussed the issue of individual 
residence. The most recent cases include; Micheal Shord v. Commissioner of Taxation (2015) AATA 
355    
125 (1946) 73 CLR 93 As at May 2015, this case has been cited in about sixty-two Australian Tax cases.  
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UK completed changed its individual residence regime. It introduced a statutory 
residence test that eschews all the judicial principles cited above.  
 
The jurisdictions discussed differ in both the statutory framework and the 
judicial approaches to the determination of an individual’s residence based on 
facts and circumstances. The underlying need for subjective tests arises from 
the inability of the objective test to adequately account for the divergent 
interests of potential taxpayers. However, due to the variations in an individual 
circumstance, this test is prone to fail the tax equity evaluation. Some common 
law jurisdictions such as the Republic of Ireland have adopted the same set of 
terms used by the UK for determining individual residence. However, the Irish 
tax regime has clearly defined both ‘resident’ and ‘ordinary resident’. It has 
adopted an objective test based on the physical presence of the individual in the 
state. Thus, an individual becomes an Irish resident if he has spent at least 183 
days in Ireland in the year of assessment.126 Also, a resident for each of the three 
years preceding the year of assessment becomes an ordinary resident.127 The 
converse applies if an individual has ceased to be an ordinary resident and he 
has not been residing in Ireland for each of the three years.128 The UK has 
followed Ireland’s path by abandoning all the facts and circumstances test it 
hitherto applied.   
 
 
5.2.2 The definitions may depend on the general legal concepts 
 
 
 In the search for a suitable method of determining individual residence for tax 
purposes, some states use legal concepts that are applicable in other areas of 
law, such as domicile and citizenship. 
 
                                                 
126 Section 819 of the Ireland Income Tax Act 1997 (as amended) 
127 Ibid section 820 (1) 






Domicile is a legal relationship between a person and a country by which the 
person can invoke the country’s laws as their own.129 Domicile means an 
individual’s fixed and permanent place of abode in which he intends to remain 
indefinitely, or if he has left the place, he maintains an intention to return.130 It 
is considered as an individual’s permanent home as opposed to where he 
resides. Thus, an individual could be a resident of the state he currently lives 
but remains domiciled in another state to which he has the intention to return. 
As a rule, no individual can live without a domicile, and he cannot have two 
domiciles at the same time.131 That is why the domicile of an individual could 
be either the ‘domicile of origin’ or ‘domicile of choice’. The individual 
acquires the domicile of origin at birth. It could be the domicile of the father or 
that of the mother, depending on whether the individual is a legitimate or 
illegitimate child at birth.132 The latter is acquired upon the attainment of full 
age, capacity and the intention to make the new domicile his permanent base. 
Therefore, the law presumes all individuals to have a domicile of origin in their 
place of birth. It is the acquisition of a new domicile (the domicile of choice) as 
well as the termination of the domicile of origin or former domicile of choice 
that generates controversy. 
 
                                                 
129 Henderson v. Henderson (1965) All ER 179 
130 However, the Australian notion of domicile as a means of establishing individual residence for tax 
purposes has brought another dimension to the concept of domicile. The Australian regime provides 
that even if an individual is domiciled in Australia, he can escape the tax liability if he can satisfy 
the Commissioner that his permanent place of abode is outside Australia. Thus, the Australia regime 
does not consider domicile as an individual permanent home. 
131 Mark v. Mark (2006) 1 AC 98; IRC v. Bullock (1976) 1 WLR 1178 at 1184. For discussion on the 
significance of the parent domicile to the determination of an individual domicile see Lollman, J 
‘The significance of parental domicile under the citizenship clause’ (2015) 101  Va. L. Rev. 455 
132 Udny v. Udny (1869) 1 Sc & Div 441 at 457 
132 
 
The focal point for determining the domicile of an individual is his intention to 
either remain in the domicile of choice or return to his domicile of origin, or to 
acquire a new domicile and abandon the former one. Is there a universal 
criterion for ascertaining the intention of a person? The determination of such 
intention is a question of fact and the rules as well as the case law in each state 
may differ. One commentator133 has argued that whenever residence is defined 
as domicile, both residence-based and citizenship-based systems overlap, as 
both take account of the intention of an individual to remain in or to return to 
his state of domicile rather than his physical presence. Domicile resembles 
citizenship in that both embody permanent allegiance of an individual to a 
particular state even if he is not physically present. But an individual may 
acquire a domicile in a state different from the state where he is a citizen. The 
new state of domicile may not accord him all the privileges available to its 
citizens. Thus, it may not expect him to have any political allegiance to the state. 
The individual may decide to abandon the domicile so acquired and return to 
his domicile of origin. Therefore, domicile and citizenship are two different 
concepts because the acquisition of the former does not alter the position of the 
latter. However, the question is whether the notion of domicile is a suitable test 
determining individual residence.  
 
For an individual to be considered as domiciled in a state, he must have the 
intention to remain in that state indefinitely. If he has the intention to return to 
his state of origin, then he remains domicile of that state,134 notwithstanding the 
fact that he resides for a long period in a particular state, enjoying all the benefits 
and protections from the new state. Thus, staying in a state for an extended 
period is not determinative for establishing domicile. Also, long absence from 
                                                 
133 Zelinsky, EA (2011)  at 1324 
134 IRC V. Bullock (1976) 3 ALL ER 353. 
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a state may not terminate the domicile status of an individual. The rigid nature 
of the concept of domicile renders it unsuitable for determining tax liability.  
 
Two questions are often asked in assessing the justification for taxing 
individuals based on their personal relationship with the state.  Is it proper to 
tax an individual who is temporarily present in a state, without enjoying any 
benefits from that state? Is it justifiable for an individual to stay in a state for a 
long time135 without paying tax, on the ground that his domicile in another state 
and he has no intention to abandon it and establish a new one in the current 
status? The concept of residence answers these, because it renders the individual 
liable to tax based on the length and quality of his stay in the state. 
 
The notion of domicile applies to the civil law jurisdictions and is similar to the 
concepts of ‘ordinary residence’ applicable in the UK, Canada, and other 
common jurisdictions. It is also analogous to the ‘permanent place of abode’ 
under the Australian and New Zealand tax regimes. The French tax regime 
adopted the concept of ‘tax domicile’ which provides that an individual 
becomes a French resident if his permanent home or principal abode is in 
France. Alternatively, if he performs his professional activity in France, or his 
centre of economic interest is in France.136 All these criteria are based purely on 
the facts and circumstances of each case. Thus, there is no physical presence 
test involving the number of days in France. Conversely, the German tax regime 
has adopted the concepts of ‘domicile’ and ‘habitual abode’137, and the two 
terms have been defined statutorily. Domicile is defined as a fixed 
                                                 
135 Enjoying the benefits provided by the state to the same extent as the citizens. 
136 See Art.4B of the French Tax Code 1977. See also Message, N ‘France’ in Maisto, G (ed) ‘Individual 
residence under tax treaties and EC Law’ (2010) IBFD Publications, Netherland 329; Juilhard, P 
‘Towards a New Definition of Tax Residence in France – A Critical Analysis of the Larcher Case’ 
(1996) 50 Bull. Int’l Fiscal Doc.141.  
137 See section 1(1) of the German Income Tax Act 2000. The same concepts adopted and defined by 
Austria – section 26 of the Austrian Federal Fiscal Code 2009. 
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accommodation available for frequent use of an individual in Germany.138 
Habitual abode is defined as a place where an individual is physically present 
and is deemed to be present in that place if he stays for more than six months. 
The place need not be fixed.139 Both definitions are premised on the objective 
test as the intention of the individual is irrelevant. The same trend is followed 
by other civil law jurisdictions.140 
 
5.2.2.2 Citizenship  
 
Citizenship is a general concept that can be viewed from political, social and 
legal perspectives.141 From the legal perspective, citizenship is connected with 
certain rights which the law of a state guarantees to all citizens of the state in 
exchange for a political allegiance to the state by the citizens. Thus, it serves as 
a strong link between the state and individual. However, for the purpose of 
                                                 
138 Section 8 of the German Fiscal Code 1986 
139 Ibid section 9 see also Rust, A in in Maisto, G (ed) ‘Individual residence under tax treaties and EC 
Law’ (2010) IBFD Publications, Netherland at 361. 
140 For instance, by Article 2(1) of the Belgium Income Tax Code 1992, Belgium has adopted the 
concepts of ‘residence’ and ‘seat of wealth’ to determine the individual residence. But two concepts 
were not defined, hence, they are determined by the fact and circumstances test.  Factors such as 
place of individual’s main residence and place from which the individual’s property is managed 
are considered. By Article 4 of the Dutch General Taxes Act 2001 defines the residence of 
individual as “where someone lives is assessed on the basis of circumstances” see Gunn, A ‘The 
Netherland’ in Maisto, G (ed) ‘Individual residence under tax treaties and EC Law’ (2010) IBFD 
Publications, Netherland at 470 (According to Gunn The Netherland adopted an open norm as it is 
difficult to identify, with precision the factors to be considered in determining individual 
residence.). The Spanish regime adopted the concepts of ‘habitual residence’ and the ‘main centre 
of economic interest’. By section 9 of the Natural Persons’ Income Tax Act habitual residence is 
defined as staying in Spain for 183 days, while the determination of main centre of economic 
interest is determined by fact and circumstances. The Swiss regime also adopted both personal and 
economic relationship as the criteria for imposing income tax liability. For the personal relationship 
criteria, the regime adopted the concept of domicile (which determined by fact and circumstances) 
and residence based on number of days spent in Switzerland; which is either 30days (where the 
individual stays and conduct gainful activity) or 90 days (where he stays in Switzerland without 
any interruption). See Article 3 and 4 of the Federal Tax Harmonization Act. See also Pfister, RA 
and Obrist, T ‘The Netherland’ in Maisto, G (ed) ‘Individual residence under tax treaties and EC 
Law’ (2010) IBFD Publications, Netherland at 541; Rossi, MQ ‘Italy’s Supreme Court rules on 
establishing tax residency’ (2014) Tax Notes Int’l 557- The recent Italian Supreme court decision, 
an individual can be treated as non-resident if he produces copies residential lease agreement, utility 
bills and bank account details.   
141 Iija, VI ‘An analysis of the concept of citizenship: Legal Politocal and Social Dimensions’ (2011) 
Master’s Thesis submitted to Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki 4 
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exercising tax jurisdiction, only a few countries recognise citizenship as a 
connecting factor for tax jurisdiction. Among those states that have adopted the 
concept, it is only the United States of America that taxes its citizens on a 
worldwide basis.142 
 
The US regime adopts two independent methods for determining the resident 
status of individual for income tax purposes. It relies on the immigration status 
of an individual as well as the length of his physical presence in the US. The 
former is solely determined under the US immigration legislation. Thus, all US 
citizens and permanent residents (Green Card holders) are taxed on their 
worldwide income.143 The justification for taxing citizens on their worldwide 
income has been upheld in the case of Cook v. Tait144 where the US Supreme 
Court stated that: 
“The power to tax does not depend on the situs of property or domicile 
of the citizen but is instead based on his relation as a citizen of the US 
and the relation of the latter to him  as a citizen.” 
 
Most of the commentators145 that justify citizenship-based also base their 
arguments on the benefits of US citizenship which the citizens enjoy while 
living abroad. They argue that even though US citizens living abroad may not 
receive the benefit immediately they will take advantage of the prior 
infrastructure put in place if they return to the United States.146 Other defenders 
                                                 
142 For example, section 23 (A) and (B) of the Phillippines National Revenue Code 1997 provide for 
separate mode taxation for both citizens who reside in Phillippines and those citizens who are not 
residing therein. The former are liable to worldwide taxation while the latter are liable to sourced-
based taxation.  
143 Section 7701 (b) of the US Internal Revenue Code 
144 (1924) 47 US 265 
145 Kirch, MS ‘Revisiting the tax treatment of citizens abroad: reconciling principle and practice (2014) 
16(3) Fla. Tax Rev. 117; (He argued that the United States should retain its citizenship-based 
taxation regime, but it should take steps to  ameliorate unnecessary burdens faced by overseas 
citizens); Michael S. Kirsch, MS ‘Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy’(2007) 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
443; Sobel, RJ ‘United States Taxation of Its Citizens Abroad: Incentive or Equity’(1985) 38 Vand. 
L. Rev. 101; Colon, JM ‘Changing US tax jurisdiction: expatriates, immigrants and the need for a 
coherent tax policy (1993) 34 San Diego L. Rev. 1  
146 Kirch, MS (2014) at 221 
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of citizenship-based taxation reject benefits as the justification, but rather 
consider it as an administrative proxy of domicile.147  
 
However, the rationale for the US citizenship-based taxation regime has been 
criticised by many commentators.148 The criticisms of citizenship as a 
connecting factor for taxation is premised on the rationale for taxing the foreign-
sourced income of a non-resident US citizen on a worldwide basis. The US tax 
regime imposes obligations on US citizens living abroad to report details of their 
foreign financial accounts and assets. It also imposes a reporting obligation on 
foreign financial institutions to furnish the US with all information about the 
overseas accounts of a US citizen.149 Under citizenship taxation, the residence 
of the individual is irrelevant while, in residence-based taxation, residence is 
                                                 
147 Zelinsky, EA ‘Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation: Citizenship as an Administrable Proxy for 
Domicile’ (2011) 96 IOWA L. Rev. 1289(Who stated that “An individual's citizenship is an 
administrable, if sometimes overly broad, proxy for his domicile, his permanent home. Both 
citizenship and domicile measure an individual's permanent allegiance rather than his immediate 
physical presence.”); 
148 Mason, R ‘Citizenship Taxation’  paper presented at the New York University School of Law, 
Colloquim on Tax Policy and Public finance, Spring (2015) (Arguing that the US citizenship-
taxation regime  may subvert immigration law goals of attracting wealthy and highly skilled 
immigrants.); Avi-Yonah, RS ‘The case against taxing citizens’ (2010) Univ. of Mich Working 
Paper No. 190; Avi-Yonah, RS ‘International tax as international law’ (2004) 57 Tax L. Rev. 483; 
hervey JR ‘Schneider, B ‘The End of Taxation Without End: A New Tax Regime for U.S. 
Expatriates’ (2012)  32 Va. Tax Rev. 1 (proposing a “departure tax regime” that would apply to 
residence changes); Blum, C and  Singer, PN ‘A Coherent Policy Proposal for U.S. Residence-Based 
Taxation of Individuals’ (2008) 41 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 705 (proposing replacing citizenship 
taxation with an extended tax-residence rule). Worster, WT ‘The constitutionality of the taxation 
consequences for renouncing U.S. citizenship’ (2010) 9 (11) 923 at 930; Fleming, JC et al ‘Fairness 
in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income’ (2001) 5 Fla.Tax 
Rev. 299, 309; Ault, HJ and   Arnold, BJ ‘Comparative income taxation: a structural analysis’ (2010) 
429;  Postlewaite, PF and Stem,  GE ‘Innocents Abroad? The 1978 Foreign Earned Income Act and 
the Case for Its Repeal, 65 VA. L. REv. 1093 (1979); Sobel, RJ ‘United States Taxation of Its 
Citizens Abroad: Incentive or Equity, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 101 (1985); Gann, PB ‘The Concept of an 
Independent Treaty Foreign Tax Credit’ (1982)  38 Tax L. Rev. 1 58-69   
149 Section 501(a)  of the Foreign Account Taxpayer Compliance Act (“FATCA”), 2010; See Harvey, 
JR ‘Worldwide Taxation of U. S. Citizens Living Abroad Impact of FATCA and Two Proposals’ 
(2013)  Villanova Univ Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 2013-3057 available at  
http://ssr.com/abstract=2318463; For the historical antecedent of FATCA, see Harvey, JR ‘Offshore 
Accounts: An Insider’s Summary of FATCA and Its Potential Future’ (2012),  57 Vill. L. Rev. 471 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1969123. Harvey, JR ‘FATCA – A Report From the Front 
Lines’ (2012) 136 Tax Notes 713available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2122491. (“many foreign 
financial institutions are blaming FATCA’s reporting obligations for their refusal to provide 
necessary financial services to U.S. citizens”)    
137 
 
the determining factor. Unlike the citizen-based system, a residence-basis 
reflects both the equitable notion of benefit that the individual enjoys from the 
state and the enforceability of the tax. Citizenship-based tax is not based on 
benefits and enforcement. 
 
Therefore, citizenship-based taxation treats two similarly situated US citizens 
differently. Thus, it fails to satisfy the horizontal equity criteria. For instance, if 
one of the citizens lives in the US, and another stays abroad. The one in the US 
will be in a better position to benefit from the state's infrastructure. The 
citizenship-based regime also fails the administrative convenience criteria from 
the perspective of both the individual taxpayer and the government. Thus, even 
if the government can trace all non-resident citizens and exercise substantive 
tax jurisdiction over them, it will face the problem of exercising the enforcement 
jurisdiction over non-resident citizens. However, Zelinsky150 opines that 
citizenship is better than residence as a tax basis because a state that adopts 
citizenship does not require an establishing nexus like that of residence. This 
argument fails to consider the fact that the substantive jurisdiction of a state may 
be rendered nugatory if it lacks enforcement jurisdiction over the individual 
involved. From a tax efficiency perspective, adopting citizenship as a 
connecting factor for tax will distort the behaviour of the individuals as some 
citizens may decide to renounce their citizenship to escape tax. 
 
The current global economic integration is a serious challenge to the 
justification of using citizenship as a connecting factor for tax jurisdiction.151 If 
citizens are taxed on the basis of their individual relationship with the US, then 
it could be possible for the individual to have relationships with many states. 
                                                 
150 Zelinsky EA (2011) at 1291 
151 Kirch (2007) and Kirch (2014) supra (it was argued that globalization strengthen rather than weaken 
the notion of taxing citizens living abroad. especially with the current legal mechanism for 
mandatory reporting of foreign incomes.) 
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For example, the person could be born in one state, could be a citizen of other 
two states and he could be a resident of several. Why should one of these 
relationships be regarded as stronger than the others?  
 
5.2.3  The definition that depends on the objective test 
 
The facts and circumstances tests are characterised by complexity and 
uncertainty, due to the diverse nature of individual facts and circumstances as 
well as the judicial approach in formulating the guiding principles. The quest 
for certainty led to the introduction of the objective test. However, the 
formulation of the test could lead to diminishing tax fairness. There is always a 
trade-off between fairness and certainty while formulating objective criteria. 
Arnold152 argues that combining subjective and objective tests can provide a 
balance between simplicity and equity. 
 
5.2.3.1 Physical Presence 
 
The physical presence test is premised on the quest for certainty in the definition 
of residence. This test dictates that an individual is resident or non-resident in 
particular circumstances for specific tax provisions, irrespective of the physical 
residence of that individual.153 The objective test is usually formulated on the 
physical presence of the individual in the state, measured by the number of days 
spent by the individual in the state during the tax year. Since it is based on the 
number of days spent within the taxing state, this test appears to be simple and 
easy to analyse. There are many divergent issues surrounding the physical 
presence test, because the states differ on; 
A)    What constitutes a ‘day’? Does it mean a period of 24 hours? Alternatively, 
does it refer to part of a day? Is the date of arrival or departure included?   
                                                 
152 Arnold (2010) supra at  22 
153 Kamal, S ‘Individual tax residence’ (2011) Sweet & Maxwell, London at 15. 
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B)    The number of days that can trigger the application of the test. Many states 
use 183 days,154 others 91 or 30.155 
c)    The time-frame in which the days are counted. In other words, what 
constitutes a ‘year? – a calendar year, the tax year, or simply any period of 
365 days? 
D)    Whether the number of days must be consecutive, or can be interrupted 
and if so, the nature of the interruption.   
Some tax regimes156 make reference to a previous period of physical presence 
by the individual to determine resident status.  
 
5.2.3.1.1. The United Kingdom: 
 
The statutory test applicable in the United Kingdom can be examined from two 
perspectives: before and after 2013. Before 2013, the extent to which an 
individual was subject to income tax depended on whether the individual was a 
‘resident’, ‘ordinary resident’ or ‘domiciled’ in the UK.157 These expressions 
were not defined in the UK Income Tax Act. The courts determined their 
respective meaning based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 
The diverse nature of the possible facts and circumstances called for the 
provision of guidance on how to apply the principles established by the court in 
practice.158 Hence, in 1939, the first set of guidelines was incorporated into the 
Income Tax Codification Committee’s Report. In 1973 the Her Majesty’s 
                                                 
154 For instance, in Wilkie v IRC (1952) 1 All ER 92. the court held that the 183-day rule is not satisfied 
even if the individual spent 182 days and 20 hours in an income year of 366 days in the UK. 
Therefore, he is not a UK resident. 
155 Switzerland – Art. 3(3) of the Federal Income Tax Act RS 642.11 (stay for 30 days or 90 days 
without interruption in Switzerland). 
156  Like the US, Malaysia and South Africa 
157 Lemos M ‘Individuals and private international law – United Kingdom’ in Maisto, G (ed) ‘Individual 
residence under tax treaties and EC Law’ (2010) IBFD Publications, Netherland 583. See also Kamal 
S (2011). 
158 Freedman, J and Vella, J ‘HMRC’S management of the UK tax system: The boundaries of legitimate 
discretion’ WP 10/22 Oxford Centre for Business Taxation, 4. 
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Revenue and Customs issued an elaborate statement159 known as ‘IR 20.160 In 
2009, new Guidance was published by the HMRC clarifying when residence 
and ordinary residence is established or terminated. It repealed and improved 
the framework provided by the IR 20. By the combined effects of sections 831 
and 832 and the judicially established principles, the IR20 set out twin objective 
tests for the determination of when an individual becomes a UK resident or 
ordinary resident by way of a 183 day  test161 and a 91day test 162 
                                                 
159 on how the main factors that are taken into account in determining the residency of individual as set 
out by various courts. 
160 The HMRC formulate by the IR 20 and HMRC6 pursuant to a considerable discretion given to it by 
the combine effect of sections 5, 9 and 51(3) of the Commissioner for Revenue and Customs Act 
2005 (as amended). In particular section 9 states that “to do anything which they think (a) necessary 
or expedient in connection with the exercise of their functions, or (b) incidental or conducive to the 
exercise of their functions.” Although the discretion is bounded by the primary duty of the HMRC 
of collecting taxes. See Wilkinson v Inland Revenue Commissioner (2005) 1 WLR 1718. Each of 
the two Guidance statements stated that: “The notes below are not binding in law and do not affect 
rights of appeal about your own tax….. You should bear in mind that the booklet offers general 
guidance on how the rules apply, but whether the guidance is appropriate in a particular case will 
depend on all the facts of that case.” see IR 20 and HMRC6. Thus, the guidance statements are not 
binding. However, they still serve as the reference point for the determination of whether or not an 
individual is present in the UK for certain number of days to warrant the application the relevant 
judicial principle on it. The concern is that these statements they hinge on the judicially established 
principles that interpreted residence and its allied words. The HMRC is always one of the parties to 
the cases that produced such decisions. That is why some commentators argued that HMRC based 
the statements on the decisions that favoured them and ignored those that favoured the taxpayers. 
See Schwarz J ‘Booth and Schwart: Residence, domicile and UK’ (2014) Bloomsbury, London; see 
also Tiley J and Loutzenhiser G ‘advanced topics in revenue law (2013) Hart Publishing, Oxford; 
Freedman, J and Vella, J ‘HMRC’S management of the UK tax system: The boundaries of legitimate 
discretion’ WP 10/22 Oxford Centre for Business Taxation.  
161 Under this test, an individual who spent 183 days or more in the UK during a tax year, becomes a 
UK resident for income tax purposes for that tax year. Tax year starts from 6 April to this year to 5 
April of next year. See Schwarz J (2014) This test is explained the principle in Re: Young (1875) 1 
TC;Reid V. IRC (1926) 10 T.C. 673 where it was held that a significant amount of time spent in the 
UK may suffice to establish residence. The HMRC considered 183 days as sufficient enough to 
establish residence. 
162 The test provided that when an individual arrives the UK  with the intention to spend 91 days, and 
he did stay in UK up 91 days, then he is deemed a UK resident from the date of arrival. As a corollary 
to this, if an individual spends an average of 91 or more per tax in the UK for a period spanning 
from the tax year of arrival up to a period of four years, then becomes an ordinary resident of UK 
from the fifth tax year in the absence of definite intention, on his arrival, to spend the 91 days in 
UK.This test emanated from the principles in Pittar v. Richardson (1916) 116 LTR 823; Levene v. 
IRC (1928) 13 TC 486 HL; Lysaght v. IRC (1928) 13 TC 511; Kinloch v. IRC (1929) 14 TC 736; 
R. v. Barnet London Borough, ex parte Shah (1980) 3 All ER 679; R v  Barnet LBC ex parte Shah 
[1983] 1 All ER 226 (Ordinary residence is established based on a regular, voluntary habitual mode 
of life in a particular place whether of short or long duration, the continuity of which has persisted 
apart from temporary or occasional absences.) Both the 183 – days and 91 – days must be in the tax 




The guidance statements contain the objective tests for individual tax residence 
in the UK. The UK objective criterion was characterised by uncertainties from 
two perspectives. Firstly, the HMRC statements, especially the HMRC6, set out 
factors to be considered in ascertaining the UK residence or ordinary residence 
of an individual.163 It restated the uncertainty inherent in judicial decisions. 
Therefore, the HMRC6 did not solve the problems it sought to resolve. 
  
The HMRC was a party to almost all the decisions that established the 
principles. It was accused of issuing statements based on the decisions that 
favoured them whilst ignoring those that favoured the taxpayers. The 
unreliability and inconsistency of the HMRC in formulating and applying 
guidance statements were manifested in the joined cases of Davies & Anor and 
Gaines-Cooper.164 In the first case, the appellants, Davies and James, were born 
in the UK and lived and worked in Wales. In March 2001, they moved to 
Brussels and resided in a rented apartment. At the same time, they incorporated 
a Belgian company in which each held one-third of the share capital. On 1 April 
2001 they took a three-year full-time job with the company they had established. 
They frequently returned to see their families, attend to their UK business 
interests and their ties to local sporting institutions. In December 2001 the 
appellants disposed of their shares in a UK company and HMRC treated them 
as UK residents and required them to pay tax. In the second case, the appellant 
(Gaines-Cooper) was born, lived and worked in the U.K. until 1975 when 
bought a house in the Republic of Seychelles. From 1976 up to 2004 he spent, 
on average, several weeks a year in the Seychelles. He also had international 
business interests in several countries. However, the appellant maintained a 
house in the UK throughout the period. Thus, he had an available residence in 
                                                 
163 Paragraph 1.5,22; 2.2 and 8.1 of the HMRC6 




the UK, and he spent about three months a year in the UK. He married in 1993 
and in 1998 had a son, who was born in the UK. The appellant’s wife and son 
lived in the UK during the school year but joined him in the Seychelles during 
school holidays. 
 
The HMRC refused to apply the 91 days test it had earlier formulated which 
favoured the appellants in the two cases. The appellants had relied on the 
statements issued by the HMRC andhad  brought themselves within the ambit 
of paragraphs 3.1 of the IR20 as well as section 832 of the Income Tax Act 
2007. Their visits to the UK during the years after their departure were for less 
than six months in any tax year and averaged less than 91 days in each such 
year.165 However, the HMRC treated them as UK residents.The appellants 
challenged the decision of the HMRC in the UK Supreme Cour which dismissed 
their appeal. The appellants argued that the content of IR20 raised a legitimate 
expectation that the guidance statement would bind the HMRThe court upheld 
the appellants’ argument. However, it was held that the appellants were liable 
to UK tax because what is required to become UK non-resident is a distinct 
break in the appellants’ pattern of life in the UK.  
 
It is submitted that before 2013, there was no clear statutory test for an 
individual’s residence in the UK. The UK Income Tax Act based the 
determination of an individual’s income tax liability on ‘residence’, ‘ordinary 
residence’ and ‘domicile’, but did not define any of those terms. The courts 
played a role in interpreting these expressions. However, the diverse nature of 
factual situations rendered some of the decisions of the courts very cumbersome 
for an ordinary taxpayer to understand, which was the reason cited for 
introducing the HMRC guidance statement.  
                                                 
165 as envisaged by paragraphs 2.2, 2.8 and 2.9 of the IR20; Gaine-Cooper’s case  (2011); see also Mock 
P and Dodwell B ‘Gaine-Coopers: The decision’ (2011) 1098 Tax Journal; Goodall, A ‘Gaines-




The HMRC issues statements on how judicially established principle will be 
applied in specific cases. Complex legal issues arose in the cases of Gaines-
Cooper and Davies & Anor and triggered demands for a statutory test of 
individual residence for tax purposes. Hence, the combined effects of section 
218 of the UK Finance Act 2013 and Schedule 45 of the same Act set out a 
comprehensive statutory test for the UK residents and non-residents.  
Furthermore, the concept of ordinary residence has been removed from the 
determinants of individual income tax liability.166 The Finance Act came into 
effect on the 6th April 2013. 
 
The statutory test is applicable under three broad circumstances:167 
1) The ‘automatic overseas test’: In this test an individual is considered as 
a non-resident if: 
i) He was not resident in the U.K. in all of the previous three tax 
years and was present in the U.K. for less than 46 days in the 
current tax year;168 or 
ii) He was resident in the U.K. in one or more of the previous three 
tax years and was present in the U.K. for less than 16 days in the 
current tax year;169 or  
iii) He spent “sufficient hours” working overseas, and he or she is 
present in the UK for a period less than 91 days in the tax year 
and fewer than 31 days are spent working in the United 
Kingdom.170 
 
                                                 
166 Section 219 of the UK Finance Act 2013 abolished the concept of ordinary residence a connecting 
factor for individual income tax. Thus, an individual who is not an ordinary resident can only be taxed 
on his foreign employment income if he remits it to the UK.  
167 See generally schedule 45 of the UK Finance Act 2013 
168 Paragraph 12, Schedule 45 of  the UK Finance Act 2013 
169 Ibid para 13 
170 Ibid para 14 
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2) The ‘automatic UK test’: In this test an individual is considered as a UK 
resident for the tax year in issue if:   
i) He was in the United Kingdom for 183 days in a U.K. tax year: 
For this test, a day in the U.K. is a day in which the individual is 
present in the U.K. at midnight;171 or  
ii) He has a home, which is available to him in the U.K. for at least 
91 days and was present in that home for at least 30 days during 
the tax year. Also, that throughout the 91- day period he had no 
home abroad, even if he has spent fewer than 30 days in that home 
in the tax year under consideration;172or  
iii) He spent ‘sufficient hours’ working in the U.K. for over a 365-
day period173 (all or part of which must fall within the tax year 
under consideration) and he had significant breaks174 from the UK 
work. 
The above tests are applicable in order of priority. Thus, the 1st automatic 
UK test takes precedence over all other tests, and once it is satisfied, an 
individual becomes a UK resident. If the 1st automatic UK test is not 
satisfied, then the three automatic tests are considered, before considering 
the 2nd and 3rd automatic UK test. If any of the automatic overseas tests is 
satisfied, then the individual is not a UK resident.175 
3) Where neither automatic overseas nor automatic UK tests are satisfied 
(that is where there is a middle ground) then a ‘sufficient ties test’ is 
                                                 
171 Paragraph 7, Schedule 45 of  the UK Finance Act 2013 
172 Ibid para 8 
173 Ibid para 9 
174 Absence of significant break means at least 75% of the 365-day period must be days on which the 
individual works for more than three hours in the UK 
175 Gelardi, AMG ‘The new United Kingdom statutory residence rules (2014) May-June Int’l Tax J. 
40; see also HMRC Guidance Note: Statutory residence test (2013. 
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applicable. Under this test factors such as the level of individual 
connection with the UK is considered. This includes: 
i) Family tie: This is a situation where the spouse or civil partner of an 
individual (provided they are not separated) or his minor children are 
residing in the UK.176 
ii) Accommodation tie: Where there is accommodation available for the 
of the individual in the UK for at least 91 days, and he uses it for at 
least one night or sixteen nights (if the accommodation belongs to a 
relative) during the tax year.177 
iii) Employment tie: a substantive job in the UK during the fiscal year, at 
which an individual spends at least 40 working days (comprising more 
than three hours’ work a day).178  
iv) The 90 –day tie: UK presence in the previous year if an individual 
spends 90 days or more in the United Kingdom in either or both of 
the previous two tax years.179 
 v) Country tie: Where an individual spends more time in the UK than in 
other countries.180 
The sufficient ties test considers the number of days an individual spend in the 
UK as well as the extent of the individual connection with the UK. It considers 
the two concurrently in determining the residence status of an individual whose 
circumstances does not fall with the ‘automatic over sea test’ or ‘automatic UK 
test’. Moreover, in considering the above factors, different tests apply in the 
case of an ‘arriver’181 and the case of ‘leaver’.182 For the former only the first 
four of the above ties are a relevant while for the latter case,  all the five ties are 
                                                 
176 Paragraph 32, Schedule 45 of  the UK Finance Act 2013 
177 Ibid paragraph 34 
178 Ibid paragraph 35 
179 Ibid paragraph 37 
180 Ibid paragraph 38 
181 That is an individual who is non-UK resident in all of the previous three years. See Ibid paragraph 
18  
182 An individual who was a UK resident in one or more of the previous three years. Ibid paragraph 19 
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relevant. Thus, an individual needs to combine the number of days he spends in 
the UK and a small number of ties. The statutory test makes harder for an 
individual who is already a UK resident to become a non-resident than an 
individual arrives the UK for the first time. That is, the more the number of days 
spent in the UK the smaller number of factors required to tie an individual with 
the UK.  
  
It is submitted that the UK statutory resident test did not achieve the desired 
certainty in determining the tax residence of an individual. It was excessively 
complex to the extent that an individual required more expert legal assistance 
that he required under the old regime. For instance, section 218 of the UK 
Finance Act 2013 sets out the framework for the statutory residence test. The 
detail of the test is contained in the Schedule 45 of the Act. The Schedule is 
divided into five parts with about 159 paragraphs running to 66 pages of the 
Act. Apart from the cumbersome provisions contained in Schedule 45, the 
HMRC also issued a Guidance Note (RDR3) which sought to interpret the 
provisions of the Finance Act 2013 regarding the statutory residence test. 
Therefore, both individual and their tax advisers are expected to read the 
schedule 45 in conjunction with the HMRC guidance note. Certainty is 
fundamental to the rule of law; it suggests that the law should be clear, easily 
accessible, comprehensive and stable.183Is it possible to achieve certainty in a 
complex form? 
 
The statutory residence test places a greater burden on individuals who are 
internationally mobile than those who live and earn their income in the UK. 
                                                 
183 Pagone, GT ‘Tax uncertainty’ (2009) 33 MU L. Rev. 887; Raz J ‘The rule of law and its virtue 
(1977) 93 L. Q. Rev. 195 at 198 
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Under this regime, an individual is required to keep extensive records of his 
movement and working time in the UK.184 
 
5.2.3.1.2 The United States 
 
The US regime imposes a worldwide income tax on all US citizens and resident 
aliens.  From 1983 to date, a US resident for tax purposes has been statutorily 
defined as an individual who is admitted into the US as a permanent resident 
(Green Card holder). Individuals who do not hold a ‘Green Card’ are also 
taxable based on a calculation of the number of days of their physical presence 
in the US. Therefore, there are two basic tests; the ‘Green Card test’ and the 
‘substantial presence test’.  The immigration laws govern the resident status of 
a Green Card holder. Under the substantial presence test, an individual is 
deemed to be a resident of the US if he spends 31 days during the calendar year 
in the US. The total he spent in the US during the current calendar year and the 
two preceding years must be at least 183 days. 
 
In computing the number of days spent in the US, the days in the current year 
is multiplied by one. The days in the first preceding year is multiply by one-
third and the days in the second preceding year is multiplied by one-sixth. For 
instance, an individual spent 130 days in the year 2014, 120 days in 2013 and 
90 days in 2012.185 Applying the above formula, the computation of the days 
will be as follows:  
2014 (current year)    130 x 1 = 130 
2013 (1st preceding year)    120 x 1/3 = 30 
2012 (2nd preceding year)             90 x 1/6 =15 
                                                 
184 Paragraph 7 HMRC Guidance note: statutory residence test 2013 (The RDR3) which provides for 
list of what an individual is expected to keep record of, including evidence of days of work in the 
UK and overseas, evidence of where the individual’s personal life is attached , evidence of home 




The total days spent in the US by that individual will be 130 +30+15 = 185 days 
and 185 days, thus exceeding the threshold stipulated by the law that is 183 
days. Therefore, he becomes a US resident –alien for the year 2014. However, 
in terms of the above formula, an individual can avoid the substantial presence 
test by limiting his presence in the US to 121 days or less in each calendar year. 
For instance, using the scenario cited above: 
2014 (current year)   121x1 = 121 
2013 (1st preceding year)   121x1/3 = 40.33 
2012 (2nd preceding year)  121x1/6 = 20.17 
 
In this scenario, the total of days spent in the US by that individual will be 121 
+40.33+20.17 = 181.49 (181 days) which is below the threshold stipulated by 
the law that is 183 days. Therefore, he is not a US resident –alien for the year 
2014 in that he spent more days in the US than the first case, but he is not a 
resident for tax purposes. 
 
However, there are certain exceptions attached to the ‘substantial presence test’. 
The regime provided that an individual regularly commuting to the US for 
employment and returning to his place of residence either in Canada or Mexico 
was exempted. So too an individual who is in transit in the US and is physically 
present in the US less than 24 hours will not be treated as present on that 
particular day of transit. The exemption applies to an individual who happens 
to be in the US but cannot leave due to a medical condition. Students, teacher-
trainer, professional athletics are also exempted from the substantial presence 
test.186   
                                                 
186  For more discussion on these exceptions see Hoose, MS ‘Trading one danger for another: crating 
US tax residency while fleeing violence at home’ (2012) 12 (10) Fla. Tax Rev. 827 (making case 
for extending the exception to cover individuals who fled their home countries as a result of 
violence there.) see also Rosenberg, M ‘Expanding the exceptions to the US income tax resident 
alien definition’ (2008) 9 Corp. Bus. Tax Monthly 9 (He advocated for new exception to cover 




An individual who spent less than 183 days in the current year may not be 
treated as a US resident for that year187 if he establishes a ‘tax home’ and ‘closer 
connection’ in another country. Even though the statute defined ‘tax home’ as 
an individual’s main location or main place of employment,188 it did not define 
what amounts to the main location or main place of employment. Thus, only the 
facts and circumstances of the case can determine whether the location or the 
place of employment is the main one for the individual. Furthermore, there is 
no definition of the ‘closer connection’, and its determination is based on the 
fact and circumstances of the case.  It could be argued that the substantial 
presence test claims to be an objective test, but on closer scrutiny it seems to be 
a mixture of objective and subjective tests.189 
 
5.2.3.1.3  Canada 
In Canada, an individual is deemed resident throughout a tax year if he 
sojourned in Canada for a total period or periods of at least 183 days.190 There 
is no provision as to what constitutes a ‘day’191, but the regime provides for a 
time frame for counting the period.192 The period could be either consecutively 
or intermittently because the Act mentions ‘a period’ or ‘periods’. However, the 
Act did not define ‘sojourn’. Therefore, reference must be made to judicial 
                                                 
187 Section 7701(b)(3)(B) of the IRC 1986 
188 Sections  162(a)(2) and 911(d)(3)  of I.R.C. 1986 
189 Also  
190 Section 250 (1) (b) of the Canadian Income Tax Act 1985 
191 Whether a 24-hour period or any part thereof. 
192 However, section 114 of the Canadian Income Tax Act 1985 provided for the taxation of a part-time 
resident. Under this provision an individual who resides in Canada for a period of 183 or less but 
leaves Canada during a tax year is to be treated as a resident up to the time he leaves and thereafter, 
he will have treated as a non-resident. Thus, he liable for the period he was a resident pro rata. But 
the deemed resident is taxable on his worldwide income for the whole year. This rule treats similarly 
situated individual differently, because section 250 (1) (b) deemed certain class of individual who 
reside abroad (such military personnel and Canadian diplomats) as residents and made them liable 
to the whole year tax. But part-time resident is liable to part-year tax. 
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interpretation. In Thomson v, MNR193the appellant contended that he merely 
sojourned in Canada for a period less than 183 days in the tax year at issue, but 
was not an ordinary resident. In defining sojourn Estey, J stated that “one 
sojourns at a place where he unusually, casually or intermittently visit or stay.” 




Under the Australian tax regime, an individual becomes a resident for income 
tax purposes is if he is “physically present in Australia continuously or 
intermittently for more than half of the year of income.”195 Dirkis196 views this 
test as a 183-day test. However, half of a year cannot be automatically translated 
to 183 – days as it could be extended in the case of a leap year. Also, the time 
frame for calculating half of the year is the Australian Financial Year, which 
runs from 1st July to 30th June.197 Thus, many uncertainties surround the 
Australian physical presence test. The duration of physical presence that could 
trigger the application of the test is not certain. Therefore, the time frame for the 
calculation is not certain. What is certain under the Australian regime is that the 
period of stay in Australia need not be consecutive, because, the Act provides 
that the stay could be continuously or intermittently. 
 
An individual who satisfies the deemed resident provision may not be treated 
as a resident if he can prove that he has a usual place of abode outside Australia 
                                                 
193 (1946) SCR 209. See also R & L Food Distribution Ltd. V. MNR (1977) CTC 2579 at 2581 (It 
held that shareholders’ stay overnight in Canada for only six to seven times a year did amount to 
Sojourning in Canada) 
194 McGregor, G ‘Deemed resident’ (1974) 22 Canadian tax Journal 381 at 386 
195 See Section 995-1 of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 and section 6 (1) (ii) of the 
Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1936.  
196 Dirkis, M ‘Australia’ in Miasto, G (ed) Residence of Individual under tax treaty and EC law’ 
(2009) IBFD Publication. 197 
197 Section 4- 10 (2), 9-5 (2) and 995.1 of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 
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and he has no intention to establish residence in Australia. The Act does not 
define the expression ‘usual place of abode’ or what amounts to ‘intention to 
reside’. Therefore, these tests depend on the individual facts and circumstances. 
Furthermore, in defining the place of abode for the purpose of this test, the 
Australian Act uses the word ‘usual’ instead of ‘permanent’ as used in the 
domicile test. Another dimension of the complexity surrounding the 
determination of ‘permanent place of abode’ is that there is no guidance on what 
makes ‘permanent’ different from ‘usual’ in qualifying ‘place of abode’. The 
Australian physical presence requirement shares the same trend with that of the 
US, where the expressions ‘tax home’ and ‘closer connections’ are left for a 
fact-intensive inquiry. Thus, the US and Australian regimes are a mixture of 
both physical presence tests and fact and circumstance tests. If the rationale for 
adopting the physical presence test is to remedy the complexity involved in the 
facts and circumstances tests, then it has not been achieved.  
 
The New Zealand regime provides that an individual is a resident if “he is 
present in New Zealand for more than 183 days in total in a twelve-months 
period commencing from the first day of the 183 days.”198 The individual 
residence status terminates if he spent more than 325 days over a twelve months 
period outside New Zealand.199 Moreover, from the first day of the 325 days he 
remains a non-resident until he acquires that status again.200  Therefore, the New 
Zealand regime defines both resident and non-resident based on the number of 




                                                 
198 Section YD 1 (3) and (4) of the New Zealand Income Tax Act 2007  
199 Ibid (5) 





The above analysis reveals a divergent approach adopted by the states in the 
determination of individual residence for tax purposes. The definition of 
individual residence takes the following forms: 
(1) The automatic physical presence: in this test the residence status of an 
individual is triggered automatically by a fixed duration of physical 
presence in a particular state. The duration is usually 183 days in the 
year.201 Most arguments cited in support of this test are based on the need 
to tax individuals who might be physically present in a state for an 
extended period, but who did not satisfy any of the factors set out by the 
courts for the determination of their residence status. However, this 
method is also used by states to deem a certain class of individuals as 
residents even though some members of that class are not residing within 
the state. This type of provision questions the impact of the physical 
presence test in determining individual residence.202 The question is – 
can a state design the deeming provisions arbitrarily?  The answer is no. 
The general notion of residence requires states to reflect the real 
connecting factor in their deemed residence provisions. In the light of 
globalisation, the states can only satisfy the above requirement if they 
co-operate with each other in designing the rules.  
 
                                                 
201 But there is a divergence of approach by the states regarding what constitute a ‘day’ does it mean a 
full period of 24 hours spent in the state? Or does it refer to a ‘partial day’? That is whether the date 
of arrival or departure is included;  the number of days that can trigger the application of the test. 
Most of the states use 183 day, others 91; the time-frame within which the days are counted. That is 
what constitutes a ‘year’ for the purposes of the test. Does this mean a calendar year? Tax year? Or a 
period of 365 days? Whether the number of days must be consecutive or it could be interrupted and 
if so, what are the qualities of the interrupting events.  
202 Kirch, MS ‘The role physical presence in the taxation of cross-border personal service (2010) 51 
B.C.L Rev. 993 (He challenged the relevance of physical presence test on the activities of cross-
border service provider. He argued that the physical location of the service provider should not be the 
focus. But rather the places of the service impact)  
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(2) The subjective physical presence (residence simpliciter): By this 
method, an individual’s residence is defined subjectively. Other factors 
are employed to augment the short physical presence of an individual 
within a state.  
(3) The ordinary residence: In determining residence simpliciter, the 
courts focus on the tax year at issue, whereas in deciding ordinary 
residence, the court examines the individual’s activities over a period. 
The court examines whether there is some degree of permanence in the 
individual’s residence, that is to say, that it is more than casual residence.  
(4) The Domicile: The residence of individual for tax purposes is also 
defined as the individual's fixed and permanent home, which he 
permanently intends to remain in or return.  
 
States define the concepts of residence, ordinary residence and domicile 
differently. Thus, there is a divergence among the states even when two or more 
states formulate their respective individual residence test in identical terms. The 
tax policy issue also adds to this divergence. In designing the definitional rule, 
states differ on whether to rely on the individual’s personal or economic interest 
in the state in adopting one rule or the other.  Most common law jurisdictions 
lean towards the personal interest of the individuals in the state. Civil law states, 
on the other hand, give preference to the economic interests of the individuals. 
Apart from choosing one concept of residence or the other, states within the 
same legal family may adopt different tests in determining the selected 
concepts.  Whenever the tests are based on specific externally observable 
actions, they are objective standards, and when the tests centre on the 
individual’s state of mind, they are subjective standards.  For the purposes of 
this research, these tests are categorised into statutory and facts-and-
circumstances tests. The above analysis reveals that the appropriateness of 
adopting a particular conception of residence against another or even a 
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particular test against another in a globalised economy requires cooperation 
between the states in designing their residence rules.  A state should not restrict 
itself to their particular economic and social values in defining the tax residence. 
 
5.3  Concept of Corporate Residence 
 
Both statutes and common law recognise corporate bodies, 203 as an artificial 
person, separate and distinct from its shareholders.204 Therefore, incorporation 
clothes the corporation with the power to engage in all commercial activities (as 
prescribed in its constitution) in the same way as an individual and it is also 
subject to taxation. The concept of corporate residence is used in determining 
the sufficiency of the personal and economic ties between the corporate body 
and the taxing authority as justification for imposing income tax on a residence 
basis. For the individual, this can be easily analysed and appreciated. However, 
in the case of a corporation, the issue is complicated because corporations have 
no physical existence – they are everywhere and nowhere.205 They have no 
physical identity not do they reside anywhere. They have no home or place of 
abode that serve as the factors indicating the residence of an individual. The 
corporation is made up of shareholders, directors, managers, employees and 
have assets that might be spread around the globe. 
 
The peculiar nature of corporations calls into question the rationale for taxing 
the income of corporations on a residence basis because it will be difficult to 
ascribe resident status to a corporation. Even if it is ascertained successfully 
through any connecting factor, it will be difficult to choose between competing 
                                                 
203 Cousin, R ‘Corporate residence and international taxation’  (2002) IBFD Publication 
204 Solomon v. Solomon (1897) AC 22 (HL) 
205 Avi-Yonah, RS ‘Corporation, society and the state – a defense of the corporate tax’ (2004) 90 Va. 
L. Rev. 1194 – it is everywhere because almost all economic, political and social activities are being 
carried out through corporate institutions, for example bank, school, hospital and even the state itself. 
The corporation is nowhere because its existence as an entity is very controversial and many theories 
have been formulated in order to analyse its existence or otherwise. 
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connecting factors. Income earned by a corporation and distributed to the 
shareholders as dividends is subject to tax both at the corporate and shareholder 
level. Thus, if the income earned by the corporation is retained and reinvested 
in the corporation, the law taxes the corporation only as the shareholders are 
liable to tax only when they receive a dividend.  
 
5.3.1  Why Tax on Corporations? 
 
In analysing the rationale for corporate income taxation, the central question is 
– who bears the burden of corporate tax, the corporation or the shareholder?206 
The debate on the propriety of corporate taxation revolves around theories of 
the corporation.207 Avi-Yonah208 argues that the real entity nature of the 
corporation permits it to acquire power and the original rationale for adopting 
                                                 
206 Weisbach, DA ‘The irreducible complexity of firm-level income taxes: theory and doctrine in the 
corporate tax (2007) 60 Tax L. Rev. 215 
207 Because the corporations are legal rather than natural persons that is why corporate law plays a 
greater role in the determination of corporate location. The relevant theories are:  
a) Artificial theory: this theory posit corporation as an artificial person who owed its existence to 
the positive law of the state rather than to the private initiatives of the individuals who formed 
it. Therefore, the corporations are legal fiction, invisible and intangible.  
b) Aggregate theory posit that in a real sense, corporations do not exist but rather they only serve 
as meeting point for various relationships between the shareholders, directors, employees and 
the customer/clients. This theory champions the shareholder supremacy in a corporation.  
c) Real theory recognised corporation as real entity with all the powers of natural person which 
vested in the corporate management. Its existence is separate from the shareholders and the state. 
Therefore, even though the corporations exist by operation of the law, the corporate management 
and its powers over shareholders and employee are real. It upholds the supremacy of directors. 
This theory posits corporate tax as a means of regulating the shareholders and management of a 
corporation. 
See Kane, MA and Rock, EB ‘Corporate Taxation and International Charter Competition’ (2008)106 
Mich. L. Rev. 1229 at 1235 Ho, VH ‘Theories of corporate groups: corporate identity reconceived’ 
(2012) 42 Seton Hall L. Rev. 879; Avi-Yonah, RS ‘Citizen united and the original form’ (2010) 9 
Wis. L. Rev. 999; Millon, D ‘Theories of the corporation’ (1990)  Duke L. Rev. 201; Braton, WW ‘ 
The new economic theory of the firm: critical perspective from history’ (1989) 41 Stan. L. Rev 1471; 
Butler, HN ‘The contractual theory of the corporation (1989) 11 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 99; Rudnick, 
RS ‘Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?’ (1989) 39 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 965; 
Arlen, J and Weiss, DM ’ A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation’ (1995)105 Yale L.J. 325, 327   
208 Avi-Yonah, RS ‘Corporation, society and the state: a defence of the corporate tax’ (2004) 90 Va. L. 
Rev. 1194 (Which is vested with the corporate management and exercisable over both the 
shareholders and employees of the corporation. But he noted that the complications and transactional 
cost of corporate tax can drive potential investors away from transacting through a corporation.) See 
also Doron M ‘Manager, shareholder and the corporation double tax’ (2009) 95 Virg. L. Rev. 517 
at 524; Bainbridge, SM ‘Director primacy: the means and end of corporate governance’ (2002) 
UCLA Research paper No. 02-06 
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corporate income tax in the USA was to regulate managerial powers of the 
corporations. He maintains that that rationale remains valid in so far as 
corporations are viewed as a real entity. 209 Although a corporation could be 
termed as a real entity, the argument of Avi-Yonah on the rationale for imposing 
the corporate tax is not appealing. There are other legal regimes (particularly in 
corporate law) that directly regulate the so-called powers of corporate managers 
better than taxation. Therefore, the regulation of corporate management cannot 
be the justification for imposing a corporate tax. Furthermore, the degree of 
separation between owners and managers of a corporation and whether or not 
corporate management possesses a certain power is determined by the corporate 
law of the respective states. 
 
From the perspective of the aggregate theory, each shareholder is an owner of 
the undivided interest in the corporate assets and liabilities. Therefore, corporate 
tax is an indirect way of taxing the shareholder. This theory conceives corporate 
tax as a means of preventing shareholders from earning income through the 
corporation and sheltering such income from being taxed.210 Hence, corporate 
tax is no more than a withholding mechanism imposed on the corporate earned 
income of the shareholders.211 Brauner212 argues that there is no rationale for 
                                                 
209 This argument cannot stand the test of aggregate or artificial theories of corporation that is why many 
commentators criticized this line of reasoning – Shaviro DN ‘Decoding the US corporate tax (2009) 
The Urban Institute Press, Washington 23 “even the most persuasive of the recent corporate tax 
proponents Avi-Yonah admits that prior attempt to defend the existence of corporate tax are 
unconvincing.”; see also Bird, RM ‘Why tax corporation’ (2002) 56 Bull. For Int’l Fiscal 
Documentation 194 
210 Bird (2002) 
211 But the problem with this mechanism is that, once a corporation engages into a buss activity other 
class of persons (apart from the shareholders) become interested in the economic well-being of the 
corporation. These are the employee (whose wages may be affected by the corporate tax) and the 
ultimate consumer of the business activity (who will pay more as a result of the corporate tax). So 
what is the justification for making this class of people to suffer for the purposes of withholding the 
shareholders’ corporate income? But it should be noted that even under withholding system the 
determination of residence of the collector of tax is very important, because for a state to impose 
withholding obligation on a person, it must have tax enforcement jurisdiction over that person. See 
Hellerstain (supra) 
212 Brauner, Y ‘The non-sense tax: a reply to new corporate income tax advocacy’ (2008) Mich. St. L. 
Rev. 591. But contrast this with Bank, SA ‘Is double taxation a scape-goat foe declining dividend? 
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imposing income tax at the corporate level. By way of historical, normative and 
tax policy analysis he concludes that corporate income tax is not desirable, that 
there is no need to debate its desirability and that it should be abolished.  He213 
also advocates replacing corporate tax with an integrated system by way of a 
withholding system or credit imputation.214  
 
The artificial theory views corporate tax as payment for the benefits provided 
by the state to corporations, such as the right to operate in corporate form. Thus, 
there is justification for the state to tax such income. That argument is not 
convincing because, by the nature of the corporation in the current economic 
setting, it is hard to quantify any benefit derived by a company that would 
warrant the imposition of the corporate tax. Some commentators215 have argued 
that the state provides the enabling environment for the corporation to earn 
income. However, the state accords the same kind of benefit to some corporate 
bodies that are not subject to tax. For instance, S corporations and partnerships 
                                                 
Evidence from history’ (2003) 56 Tax L. Rev. (He argued that both corporate tax and integration is 
not earning retention problem. The legislature must take both tax and non-tax motivating factors into 
consideration to come up with a definite solution.) 
213 Brauner, Y ‘Should corporation be taxpayer?’ in Infanti C (ed) ‘Controversies in tax law: a matter 
of perspective’ (2015) Ashgate, Farnham 178. See also Weisbach (2007);  
214 That is integrating the both corporate and individual income tax into a single system. Under this 
system, both the corporation and the shareholder pay part of the corporate income tax, but the 
shareholder is granted a credit to offset the tax already paid by the corporation. Contrast another 
method of dividend deduction whereby a corporation can deduct the dividend it pays to its 
shareholders that will then renders it taxable income to zero. For detailed discussion on this systems 
see: Graetz MJ and. Warren  AC ‘Unlocking business tax reform’ (2014)  Tax Notes 707 See also 
Graetz MJ and Warren, AC ‘Integration of Corporate and Individual Income Taxes: An Introduction’ 
(1999) Tax Notes, Sept. 27, 1767Graetz MJ and. Warren  AC, ‘Income Tax Discrimination and the 
Political and Economic Integration of Europe,’  (2006). 115 Yale L. J. 1186; Amiram D et al., ‘‘Tax 
Avoidance at Public Corporations Driven by Shareholder Demand: Evidence From Changes in 
Shareholder Dividend Tax Policy’ (2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2111467; Ikin C and Tran, A ‘Corporate Tax 
Strategy in the Australian Dividend Imputation System,’ (2013) 28 Australia Tax Forum 523; Vann, 
RJ ‘Corporate Tax Reform in Australia: Lucky Escape for Lucky Country?’ (2013) 1 Brit. Tax Rev. 
59-75. But it should be noted that even under withholding system the determination of residence of 
the collector is very important. Because for a state to impose withholding obligation on a person, it 
must have tax enforcement jurisdiction over that person. See Hellerstain (supra) 
215 Great, MJ and O’Hear MM ‘The “original intent” of the US International taxation’ (1990) 46 Duke 
L.J. 1021 at 1036 
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in the United States, enjoy most of the so-called benefits equally with other 
corporations, but they are not a taxable subject. 
 
From a tax policy perspective, corporate income tax satisfies the fairness 
criterion. It serves as a mechanism for checking a potential imbalance that may 
occur when a taxpayer earns income through a corporation and allows the 
corporation to retain such income. Another taxpayer in a similar position to the 
first-mentioned taxpayer (who earns income from a source other than a 
corporation) pays tax on his income. This scenario indicates that the corporate 
tax also satisfies the efficiency criterion because other taxpayers may consider 
tax in deciding whether or not to invest in a corporation. As a corollary, 
corporate tax is the most convenient method of taxing income from corporate 
earnings. As Avi-Yonah216 puts it; there are fewer corporations than 
shareholders. Therefore, collection of income tax from corporations is more 
administratively convenient. Therefore, with the current global economic 
integration, the most convenient way to tax shareholders (especially 
shareholders of publicly traded corporations) on corporate income is by taxing 
that income at the corporate level. 
  
Even commentators who question the rationale for corporate tax do not totally 
reject the general idea of taxing the corporation. They advocate for corporate 
income integration, which is an alternative corporate tax system. However, 
many states that adopt the integration system have reverted to the classical 
corporate tax system as a result of globalisation, where markets become 
integrated and cross-border activities increase. On this note, Brauner217 cited the 
lack of global co-operation in designing tax. 
 
                                                 
216 Avi-Yonah (2004) 
217 Brauner, Y ‘Integration in an integrating world’ (2005) NYU J.L. Buss. 51 
159 
 
It is submitted that the main difference between corporate and individual 
income tax stems from the nature of the personality of the individual and the 
corporation.218 The idea of ascertaining the tax residence status of corporations 
hinge son the proposition that a corporation is a taxable subject separate from 
its shareholders.219 Apart from the divergent views on the propriety of corporate 
tax the next line of divergence is on how to tax the corporation. This leads to 
the second question, namely, how residence status should be ascribed to the 
corporation.220 The main purpose of the concept of corporate residence is to 
determine the corporations that are taxable on their worldwide income.221 The 
complexity of corporate residence involves the interface between the legal 
status of the corporations and how they behave. 
 
5.3.2  How to Determine Corporate Residence 
 
In general, jurisdictional discourse, connecting factors are required to link a 
corporation with a particular state. These connecting factors are context 
specific.222 For instance, in private international law, the common issue for 
determination is the proper law applicable in a particular transaction. However, 
in the tax law context, it is the scope of jurisdiction of the taxing state that is in 
issue. States prescribe differently the extent of their tax jurisdiction under their 
                                                 
218 Brauner (2015) 
219It has been argued that corporate taxes are eventually borne by real people not by imaginary people. 
See Omri, M ‘meaningful corporate tax residence’ (2013) Tax Analysis (Special Report). See also 
Auerbach, AJ ‘Who Bears the Corporate Tax Burden: A Review of What We Know’ (2006).20 Tax 
Pol’y and Econ. 1.  
220 This question is relevant even under the integrated system, because there is always a need to 
ascertain the scope of the taxing authority over the corporation in issue. 
221 Anold, B.J ‘A tax policy perspective on corporate residence’ (2003) 51(4) Canadian Tax  J. 1559 at 
1561. 
222 That is to say the factors that link corporations to a state under general or private international law 
are different from those applicable for the determination of corporate residence for income tax 
purposes. See Behrens, P ‘General principle on residence of companies: a comparative analysis of 
connecting factors used for the determination of the proper law of companies in Maisto, G  (ed) 
‘Residence of companies under tax treaties and EC law’ (2009) IBFD Publication 27 (There is 
diversity in the definition and practical use of connecting factor of companies under the private 
international law and tax law…a proper interpretation of connecting factors can only be achieved by 
contextual legal analysis on case-by-case basis). 
160 
 
respective domestic laws. The determination of the residence status of a 
corporation is easy and straightforward if the corporation in issue is 
incorporated in and governed purely by the corporate law of a particular state. 
That is to say, if the corporation carries on business (and makes all its corporate 
decisions) exclusively within that state and all its shareholders; directors and 
managers reside in that state. However, complexity in ascertaining the residence 
of a corporation arises where it is incorporated in one state but223 carries out its 
business activities in another state. Alternatively, where the shareholders, 
directors or and managers reside in more than one state. 
 
The idea of applying connecting factors is to determine whether a particular 
corporation is domestic or foreign224 for income tax purposes. Most states use 
the concept of corporate residence. Omri225 argues that the importance of the 
concept of corporate residence in determining corporate residence is not 
restricted to the residence-based system, but extends to a territorial system. The 
states adopts either objective and subjective tests or a combination of the two226  
in determining corporate residency.  
 
                                                 
223 Due to the economic advancement coupled with current globalisation 
224 The domestic corporations are being taxed by some state (like USA) on their worldwide income 
while other states like UK and Canada exempt passive income of the corporation. The foreign 
corporations, on the other hand, are taxed on their income which is sourced from the taxing state. 
See Cousin R. ‘Corporate residence and international taxation’ (2009) 
225 Omri, MY ‘The function of corporate tax-residence in territorial system’ (2014) 18 (1) Chapman L. 
Rev. 157 at  161 (in deciding the source of income from interest or dividend, the residence of income 
earner is very relevant.) see also Omri MY ‘Jurisdiction to tax corporation’ (2013) B.C. L. Rev.  
226 Ault, HJ and Arnold, BJ ‘Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis’ (2010)  (3rd ed) at 
434 (The former is use to establish a personal jurisdictional connection for a corporation. The latter 
is more of economic and commercial connection of the corporation with the state. For instance, USA 
and Japan adopted a purely legal test while until 1988 UK adopted purely legal test but later 
combined the two tests); see also Mitchell A. Kane, MA and Rock, EB ‘Corporate Taxation and 
International Charter Competition’ (2008) 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1229 at 1235; Cousin, R (2002); 
Brauner, Y ‘United States’ in Maisto, G  (ed) ‘Residence of companies under tax treaties and EC 
law’ (2009) IBFD Publication 855, 865; Broe, LD ‘Corporate Tax Residence in Civil Law 
Jurisdiction’ in Maisto, G  (ed) ‘Residence of companies under tax treaties and EC law’ (2009) IBFD 
Publication 95 at 96 
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5.3.2.1     Objective Statutory Test 
 
Corporations acquire legal personality upon registration, and the place of 
incorporation is determined by the registered office of the corporation as 
defined in its memorandum and article of association. Thus, the law ascribes the 
resident status of a corporation, inter alia, through the instrumentality of the 
place of incorporation test. By way of analogy, the law assigns the same resident 
status to the individuals by using a similar method, which is based on the 
physical presence of the individual in the state. However, a corporation does not 
have physical attributes and, therefore, it cannot be physically present in any 
state even for a day.227 However, the determination of corporate residence by 
way of an objective test is purely a question of law.  
 
5.3.2.1.1 Place of Incorporation 
 
What is required under this test is to ascertain that the corporation in issue falls 
within the statutory definition of a corporate resident. It is premised on the 
provisions of the laws of the state. Thus, once a corporation has satisfied the 
legal requirement and obtained a Certificate of Incorporation, it automatically 
becomes a resident in the state of its incorporation. Most states complement this 
test with a subjective test. However, some developed states like the US adopt it 
as the sole test for determining corporate residence. The policy issue in this test 
is that, in adopting the place of incorporation as a test for corporate residence, 
the state disregards the notion of equity in taxation. States do not base tax policy 
on the economic connection of the corporation with the state. Thus, once a 
corporation is registered in a state, it becomes liable to tax even if it does not 
conduct any business within the state. 
                                                 




5.3.2.1.2 Registered office (The Legal Seat) 
 
Apart from the incorporation, some states228 impose a tax on corporations that 
locate their registered office in the state. The corporation need not be 
incorporated in that state. The registered office of a corporation is usually 
determined by its initial subscribers or shareholders. As with the place of 
incorporation test, this test is governed by corporate law, which does not require 
the corporation to conduct any business at the registered office. As the time of 
incorporation, the shareholders may not be certain whether or not their chosen 
location of the registered office could expose the corporation to taxation. 
 
5.3.2.2    Facts and Circumstances (Subjective) Test 
 
The subjective test comprises ‘central management and control’ (CMC) and 
‘place of effective management’ (POEM). The test is based on where the ‘real 
business of the corporation is carried on’.229 Behrens230 argues that these tests 
have something in common. They all determine the factual connection between 
the corporation and the taxing state by considering the relevant management 
decisions of the corporation, 231 the person who takes the decision and the place 
where he made the decision. The nature of a corporation and the type of its 
business determine the form and frequency of its strategic decisions. Some 
corporations require frequent decision-making while other corporations require 
a long-term strategic decision. On the other hand, the day-to-day management 
                                                 
228 Like Italy, Portugal, Belgium and Spain. See Gall, JPL ‘Is it possible to avoid conflicts of companies’ 
tax residences? in Maisto, G  (ed) ‘Residence of companies under tax treaties and EC law’ (2009) 
IBFD Publication 889 at 891 
229 De Beers’ case at 458 (“The real business is carried on where the central management and control 
actually abides.”) 
230 Behrens, P ‘General Principles of residence of companies’ in Maisto, G (ed) ‘Residence of 
companies under tax treaties and EC law’ (2009) IBFD Publication 95 at 96 
231 Which Broe, LD ‘(2009) argued that it could be either 1) strategic decision – the fundamental policy 
affecting the key elements of the corporation’s business; 2) day-to-day decision – the decision which 
implements the key strategic decision or 3) Shop-floor decision – that is the immediate supervision 
of the day-to-day operation of the corporation. 
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decisions are subordinate decisions of the corporation that implements the 
outcome of the strategic decisions.  
 
The central question is – which of the corporate decision takes priority in 
determining whether or not a corporation took a management decision in a 
particular state. Broe232 opines that the strategic decision takes precedence. 
However, in assigning priority to the various decisions of a corporation 
reference must be made to the nature of the corporation at issue. For example, 
in corporations that are composed of a parent and subsidiary most of the 
decisions are taken at the parent corporate level, whereas the implementation of 
such decision is carried out at subsidiary corporate level. In this situation, the 
strategic decision is that of the parent corporation while the day-to-day 
management decision is the one taken at the subsidiary level. What is relevant 
here is the management decision that generated the corporate income, and this 
is a pure question of fact.233 Broe emphasises the corporate structure of a large 
corporation, whereby the strategic decisions are taken by the board of directors, 
while the managing director and his team carry out the day-to-day decisions. 
  
The articles of association of the company and the corporate law of the state 
where the corporation was registered determine what constitutes strategic, day-
to-day or shop-floor decisions of the corporation, who takes the decision and 
where it is taken  The corporate law and tax regimes of states deal with these 
vital questions differently. There may be a divergence on the relevant decision 
that can pin down a corporation to a particular state. The determination of CMC 
and POEM is a fact-intensive inquiry by the courts that centres on an analysis 
                                                 
232 Ibid 
233 For instance, Article 4(3) of the OECD Model Tax Convention on income and on capital (2005) 
attempted to set out criterion of determining the Place of effective management such as ‘place where 
key management and commercial decisions that are necessary for the conduct of the corporate 
business’ ‘place where the most senior persons or group of person make their decision. But in 2008 
it abandoned those criteria and leave the issue of place of effective management to be determined by 
fact and circumstances. 
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of the above vital questions. Even though both CMC and POEM share a 
common goal of determining the real seat of a corporation, there is a need to 
highlight their silent features. 
 
5.3.2.2.1 Central Management and Control  
 
It is significant to differentiate the role of the courts in the UK in developing the 
CMC test and that of other common law jurisdictions. Thus, the UK courts 
formulated the concept of CMC by drawing an inference from other non-tax 
judicial precedents.234 Before 1988,235 there was no any statutory definition of 
corporate residence in the UK. However, in other common law jurisdictions, the 
application of the CMC is based on statutory provisions.236 Therefore, the role 
of courts in other common law jurisdictions like Australia is purely that of 
applying the principles of statutory interpretation237 to come up with a meaning 
based on the fact of the case at hand. The judges in De Beer and other cases 
have formulated a legal rule. In the same way, Lord Atkin in the case of 
Donoghue v. Stevenson238 formulated the neighbourhood principle of 
establishing the duty of care in the tortious act of negligence. It may be argued 
that the CMC test provided by a statute is no longer a subjective test because a 
statute provides for the test, not a judicial formulation. It should be noted that 
such a CMC test is a question of law, but its application is purely a question of 
                                                 
234 Even Lord Loreburn formulation of CMC in De Beers Consolidated Mines v Howe [1905] 5 TC 
198drawn inferences from the notion of the County Court jurisdiction (that empowered the court to 
decide on matters where the defendant dwells (later resides) and carry on business within the area 
of its jurisdiction) see for example, Attorney General v. Alexander (1874) LR 10 Exch 20. And the 
judicial trend in determining the residence of railway companies, where the cases held that railway 
companies carried on businesses in their respective head office not the multiple railway stations (that 
spread all over the country) where the actual business took place. See for example Brown v. London 
and North Western Railway Co.; Adam v. Great Western Railway Co. 
235 UK Corporate Income Tax Act of 1988 
236 For instance, section 6(1) (b) of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act of 1936 provided for 
three different tests for corporate residence including the CMC. 
237The plain the wordings of a statute must be given their full meaning and effect and the judicial 
pronouncement should not override the actual word of a statute. 
238 (1932) AC 562 (HL) 
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fact. According to Cousin,239 corporate residence is found not where the CMC 
should be in terms of its constitution, but where it abides. That is where the de 
factor CMC took place. 
 
The notion of CMC in determining corporate residence has its origin in the twin 
decisions in Calcutta Jute Mills Co Ltd v Nicholson240and Cesena Sulphur Co 
Ltd v Nicholson.241 In these cases, the court defined corporate residence by way 
of analogy with the residence of an individual, that is “where he sleeps and 
lives”. Thus, the corporate residence is “where it carried on its real trade and 
business”.242 Lord Loreburn followed the same line of reasoning in De Beers 
Consolidated Mines Ltd. v. Howe.243 In De Beer’s case, the appellant was 
incorporated in South Africa, and its registered office was also located in 
Kimberley, South Africa. The general meetings of the company had always 
been held in South Africa. A few directors of the company also resided in South 
Africa with board meetings held in both South Africa and London. In this case, 
the court determined whether the appellant was a resident of the United 
Kingdom for tax purposes. The appellant contended that the company resides 
where it is registered, and nowhere else. The court held that the appellant was a 
UK resident for tax purposes. The case enunciated the leading principles for 
establishing corporate residence. The principles are summarised as follows:  
a) The residence of a corporation for tax purposes is where the corporation 
carries out its real business; 
b) The corporation carried on its real business where the central 
management and control abides.  
                                                 
239 Cousin (2002) at 42  
240 (1876) 1 TC 83 at 107. 
241 (1876) 1 TC 88 
242 But the main question was where the real business of the corporation carried on? The court held the 
place to be the London offices of the Appellants. 




c) The determination of the ‘central management and control’ is a question 
of fact. Thus, the court should not base its decision on the provisions of 
the article or the constitution of the corporation, but should examine the 
course of business or trade. 
d) In determining the CMC the court should consider factors like:  the 
location of the principal business office, the place of the directors' 
meetings, the residence of a majority of the directors, the place of 
incorporation and registered office, and the location of the policy and 
decision-making process of the entire corporate activity in determining 
residence include. 
 
The above principles have been followed and expanded by subsequent decisions 
of the English Courts. For instance, the cases of Swedish Central Railway Co 
Ltd v Thompson and Egyptian Delta Land and Investment Co Ltd v Todd 
addressed the issue of whether the word ‘central’ in the CMC test suggest that 
the strategic decision must be made by more than one body of the 
corporation?244 In Swedish Railway’s case, 245 the court enunciated the 
proposition that the CMC of a corporation may take place in more than one 
jurisdiction. Once a corporation has two CMCs, it follows that it has two 
residences. 
 
Therefore, the court held that the management decision taken in the UK was 
sufficient to make the appellant a UK resident for tax purposes. Jones246 argues 
that a corporation may reside in more than one place, but it may not have two 
                                                 
244 Before 1988 the UK determined corporate residence solely on the principles in De Beers’ case. The 
place of incorporation was not a test then. Therefore, before these cases, a UK incorporated can move 
all its directors to the location where the corporation operates its main business. In that situation the 
court found it very difficult to determine the residence of the corporation based on the DeBeers’ 
principle of CMC. Therefore, the court addressed the possibility of dual corporate residence. 
245 (1925) 1 AC 495 at 501 
246 Jones, JFA ‘Corporate residence in Common law:  The origins and current issues’ in Miasto, G (ed) 
Residence of corporations under tax treaty and EC law’ (2009) IBFD Publication at 121 
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residences for tax purposes.  He also stated that a corporation’s CMC might be 
exercised in either ‘one centre’, ‘two equal centres’ or ‘major and minor centre’. 
Linking this argument with the Swedish Railway’s case, it could be seen that 
the court had considered both the Swedish and the UK Board as an equal centre 
in the exercise of the Appellant’s CMC. The Appellant was found to be a UK 
resident, due to the sufficiency of the UK CMC. 
 
The decision in Swedish Railways was distinguished in Egyptian Delta. In that 
case,  the articles of association provided and maintained a register of members, 
a local secretary and an office in England, whereas the active secretary and the 
directors were residing in Egypt. The court held that the Appellant’s CMC was 
in Egypt. Thus, it was an Egyptian resident for tax purposes. The court 
emphasised the real business location of the Appellant instead of what was 
contained in the articles of association. Therefore, the issue of having CMC in 
more than one place can only be tenable where the argument does not hinge on 
statutory requirements. 
 
The Egyptian Delta case raised another vital issue regarding the determination 
of the CMC, namely, the dichotomy between de jure and de facto management 
exercise of the CMC. In Unit Construction Co. Ltd v. Bullock247 the Kenyan 
directors of a subsidiary of UK company had never functioned as a board of 
directors. Despite the fact that the articles of association gave them managerial 
powers and the court did not consider any meetings held in the United Kingdom 
as valid. The Court found that in determining the CMC, the court ought to 
consider facts beyond the contents of the articles or any other regulation. Thus, 
based on the facts, the court could conclude that the board of directors had ceded 
their powers to another person or that the other persons have usurped such 
powers. Thus, where the court found that the board has ceded its powers or 
                                                 
247 (1960) AC 351 (HL) 
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someday has usurped it, the company is a UK resident if such person exercised 
the usurped power in the UK. The question is what amounts to the usurpation 
of the board’s power?  
 
In Wood v. Holden,248 the court addressed this question by distinguishing the 
role of an outsider who advises and influences the decision taken by the board 
and that of an outsider who dictates the decision taken by the board. In this case, 
it was argued that the appellant was managed and controlled by a sole director 
pursuant to the provisions of its articles of association. However, the HMRC 
argued that a UK-based adviser exercised and influenced the decision of the 
appellant and that the Netherland-based sole director performed only an 
additional role in the managing and controlling the appellant. The court held 
that despite the fact that the UK-based adviser influenced the decision of the 
Netherland sole director, it could not be inferred that he actually dictated the 
decision taken by the director. Therefore, the appellant was not a UK resident. 
This decision distinguished between exercising the CMC of a corporation and 
advising the directors of the corporation on what decision to be taken. On the 
basis of this decision, the Revenue Authority must satisfy the court that any 
advice given by an outsider did not merely influence but dictated the decision 
of the board. 
 
The decision in Laerstate BV v. HMRC249 further illustrated the issue of 
usurpation of the board’s power of CMC. In this case, the appellant, a Dutch 
company with two directors, Trapman a UK non-resident and Bock a UK citizen 
as well as the principal shareholder of the company. Bock as the sole 
shareholder of the company had admitted that there were no board meetings let 
alone taken any decision there. The court held that Bock had continued to exert 
                                                 
248 (2006) EWCA 26 see also News Datacom Ltd and another v Atkinson (2006) STC 732; 
249 (2009) UKFTT 209 (TC) 
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influence over the company after his resignation as a director and that he 
exercised the de facto control of the company in the UK. Therefore, the 
appellant was found to be a resident of the United Kingdom.  
 
The UK case law on the CMC that is premised on the principles established in 
De Beers has influenced other common law jurisdictions such as Canada and 
Australia. Like the UK, the Canadian statute does not mention the CMC test for 
corporate residence. Thus, reference is always made to De Beers principles.250 
However, the earlier Canadian decisions have based the CMC test on ‘de jure 
management and control’ In British Columbia Electric Railway v. The King251, 
the articles of association of the appellant, authorised it to hold all general 
meetings in Canada, and that all the directors must be Canadian residents. The 
Privy Council held the CMC of the company to be in Canada in line with the 
provisions of the articles.252  
 
However, in subsequent cases, the Canadian courts have followed the trend of 
the UK courts in giving more emphasis to the ‘de facto exercise of CMC’. In 
Capitol Life Insurance Co. V. The Queen253, the company executed a power of 
attorney in favour of its agent (who resided in Canada) to take control of its 
business. The court held that the agent was not exercising any control over the 
company’s affairs. Thus, the CMC of the company remained in the US. This 
decision adopted the principle in the UK case of Unit Construction Co. Ltd v. 
Bullock. In Fundy Settlement v. Canada,254 the Canadian Supreme Court 
                                                 
250 For discussion on the Canadian Corporate residence see Cousin, R ‘Corporate residence and 
international taxation’ (2002) IBFD Publications, Amsterdam, Wilkie, S ‘Locating Corporate 
business income: Reconsidering the tenets of international tax jurisdiction’ (2003) 51 Canadian Tax 
Journal; Pyrez, OA ‘The basis of Canadian Corporate taxation: residence’ (1973) 21 Canadian Tax 
Journal. 
251 (1946) AC 527  at 538 (PC) 
252 The same line of reasoning was followed in Zehder & Co. v. MNR, (1970) CTC 85. See also the 
case of  Bedford Overseas Freighters Ltd. v. MNR, (1970) CTC 69 
253 (1984) CTC 141 
254 (2012) SCC 14 
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extended the De Beers principle to the determination of the residence of trusts. 
The court held that the trust was a resident of Canada for tax purposes because 
it was the beneficiaries who exercised the CMC of the trusts, and they exercised 
it while residing in Canada. The court did not say that the residence of a trust 
can never be the residence of the trustees if the trustees (not the beneficiaries) 
exercised the CMC. The Trustees in this relied on the earlier decision255 where 
the court held that the residence of a trust for tax purposes was where the 
majority of the trustees reside. 
 
To sum up: the Canadian courts adopt most of the principles established by the 
UK courts on the CMC up to the case of Wood v. Holden. Ordinarily, the factors 
considered by the court ought to be similar to those of the UK; Brook256 argues 
that the Canadian Courts tend to follow the decisions of the UK courts. 
However, a close examination of the trend of the Canadian decisions reveals 
that the courts consider the residency of the directors, the location of the 
registered office and meetings of the directors as the factors that determine the 
central management and control of the corporation. These factors are not 
conclusive because they are the minimum statutory requirements for the 
existence of the corporation. The trend of the UK courts is to emphasise the 
‘real business’ location of the corporation rather that statutory requirements. 
The Canadian Courts, on the other hand, consider formal requirements as 
corroborative factors for determining the ‘real business’ location of the 
corporation. These inconsistencies usually result from the application of a facts 
and circumstances test. 
 
                                                 
255 Thibodean Family v. The Queen, 78 DTC 6376 
256 Brook, K ‘Canada’ in Miasto, G (ed) Residence of Individual under tax treaty and EC law’ (2009) 
IBFD Publication. At 407. The same view shared by other commentators; Krishna, V ‘The 
fundamentals of Canadian income tax law’ (2006) (9th ed)  Thompson Carswell, Toronto at 113; 
Kroft, E ‘Jurisdiction to tax: an update’ (1993) Corporate Management Conference, Toronto at 1:25 
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In defining corporate residence for tax purpose, Australia combines the CMC 
with carrying on business.257 Thus, a corporation is a resident if it is either 
incorporated in Australia or “carries on business” and has its “central 
management and control” in Australia. The relevance of the “carrying on 
business” element in the Australian CMC test generates controversies. It is 
debatable whether the two elements of the test are independent of each other. 
Some judicial decisions258 and commentators259 have viewed the element as 
redundant and as dependent on the satisfaction of the second element, namely, 
‘management and control’. Dirkis260 holds a contrary opinion. He points out that 
the Tax Rulings261 of the Australian Tax Office consider the two elements of 
the test to be independent of each other. Thus, there is a conflict between the 
above mentioned view and Tax Rulings. Legislative intervention is necessary. 
However, Dirkis did not consider the legal position of the ATO Tax Ruling vis-
à-vis the judicial pronouncements on the issue. He cited the efforts of the 
Commissioner in designing the Tax Rulings to distinguish the facts of those 
cases, but a question arises as to whether he has the power to do so. The level 
                                                 
257 Section 6 (1) (b) of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act of 1930 
258 In Malayan Shipping Co v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1946) 3 AITR 258 at 261; Williams 
J stated “The purpose of requiring that, in addition to carrying on business in Australia, the central 
management and control of the business .must be in Australia is to make it clear that the mere trading 
in Australia by a Company not incorporated in Australia will not of itself be sufficient to cause the 
company to become a resident of Australia. But if the business of the company carried on in Australia 
consists of or includes its central management and control, then the company is carrying on business 
in Australia and its central management and control is in Australia.” See also North Australian 
Pastoral Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1946) 3 AITR 314, 319 Esquire Nominees 
Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1973) 4 AITR 75; Waterloo Pastoral Co Ltd v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation [1946] 72 CLR 262  
259 Sadiq, K ʹJurisdiction to tax and the case for threshold reformʹ (2004) Paper presented at the 16th 
Australasian Tax Teachers Association Conference, Adelaide, 30 January 2004 9; Kohl, U ‘The 
Horror‐Scope for the Taxation Office: The Internet and its Impact on “Residence”’ (1998) 21 UNSW 
L. J. 436, n 45; Magney, T ‘Australia‐Singapore Taxation Aspects of Carrying on Business in 
Singapore – Part II’ (1975) 4 Aust. Tax Rev. 67at 69; Vann R and Parsons, R ‘The foreign tax credit 
and reform of international taxation’ (1986) 3 Aust. Tax Forum 131 at 148.   
260 Dirks, M ‘Still a problem child: central management and control after RITA’ (2005) 15 Revenue L. 
J. 126 
261 Australian Tax Office Taxation Ruling TR 2004/15: Income Tax: residence of companies not 
incorporated in Australia – carrying on business in Australia and central management and control. 
172 
 
of inconsistencies inherent in the application of the CMC by the states is 
striking. 
 
On the second segment of the Australian CMC test the Australian courts 
followed the trends of the United Kingdom and Canada, namely, the principles 
in De Beers. In Koitaki Rubber Estates Ltd. v. FCT,262 the Court applied the 
rule in De Beers and held that the appellant was an Australian resident for tax 
purposes since the CMC of the company was exercised in Australia. The court 
considered the fact that the directors and the majority of the shareholders resided 
in Sydney. The appellant’s rubber plantations and the production operations in 
Papua New Guinea were merely auxiliary. The appellant was under the 
supervision, direction, and control of the Sydney office. This decision shows 
that the court gave greater emphasis to the place where management and control 
of the company took place rather than where the physical operations of the 
company’s business were carried out. The decision of the court could have been 
different if the focal point was the day-to-day management decision rather than 
the strategic decisions.263  
 
In the recent case of Hua Wang Berhad v.  Commissioner of Taxation,264 the 
court followed the UK court’s decision in Wood v. Holden. It distinguished the 
influence of an adviser of the board and the actual decision of the board. The 
Australian tax regime clearly separated the board’s control and the 
shareholder’s control over a corporation. Apart from the CMC test that has 
regard to the board, the regime adopted ‘the voting power test’ that focuses on 
the power of the shareholder at the General Meetings of the corporation. 
                                                 
262 (1941) HCA 13 
263The Koitaki’s case applied the principles in De Beers, Egyptian Delta and the Swidish Railway cases. 
Also the subsequent case of North Australian Pastoral Co Ltd v FCT (1946) 3 AITR 258, Esquire 
Nominees Ltd v FCT (1973) 4 ATR 75 followed Koitaki case. 
264 (2014) FCA 1392 
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However, this latter test is less significant to this research because it is an anti-
avoidance mechanism.265 
 
All the cases cited centred on the principles in De Beers. Therefore, in the 
determination of the CMC, the focus is on those who actually took the decisions 
of the corporation rather than those who had the right to take the decision. Under 
the corporate law of various states, the strategic decisions of a corporation lie 
with the board of directors. However, in reality, the strategic decisions may not 
be taken by the board. Given the fact that the De Beers principles are determined 
based on the facts and circumstances of each case, it is difficult to apply the 
CMC test accurately. For instance, the appellant in De Beers had active 
businesses in South Africa and also had directors there. However, the court 
focused on the activities of the board rather than the actual business of the 
appellant. This is one of the weaknesses in the De Beers decision Furthermore, 
under the De Beers principles, it may not be difficult to have board meetings in 
various locations, have boards meet otherwise than in person or have boards 
comprised of individuals residing in different locations. The difficulty lies in 
the scope and number of such meetings that would be sufficient to establish the 
CMC. 
 
5.3.2.2.2 Place of effective management 
 
 
The place of effective management (POEM)266 traces its origin from the notion 
of central management and control (CMC).267  It is a tie breaker rule for 
                                                 
265 Kohl, U ‘The horror-scope for the taxation office: the internet and its impact on ‘Residence’ (1998) 
21 University of New South Wales Law Journal 436 at 449. 
 
266 Chapter seven of this thesis captured detailed discussion of the South African notion of the POEM 
encapsulated in the Oceanic Trust case. 
267 Cerrioni, L ‘The place of effective management as a connecting factor for companies’ tax residence 




allocating taxing jurisdiction between the states who are parties to a Double Tax 
Agreement (DTA).268  It is also used as a connecting factor in imposing income 
tax on the corporation under the domestic laws of most civil law jurisdictions. 
Thus, the POEM serves as either a tie-breaker rule in the DTA or a connecting 
factor for domestic tax jurisdiction.  
 
Due to the dual roles plays by the POEM even states that adopt the CMC test 
find it useful in the interpretation of DTA provisions.  Therefore, once a 
corporation is proved to have its CMC outside the state asserting tax 
jurisdiction, the existence of any DTA between the asserting state and the CMC 
state must be enquired into.  If there is a DTA, then the POEM will be used to 
resolve the conflict rather than the CMC. Conversely, where the CMC was 
found to be in the asserting state, the corporation can escape liability if it can 
prove that its POEM was held in another state that has an existing DTA with 
the asserting state. 
 
Despite the vital role played by the POEM on the allocation and determination 
of the taxing right between the states, there is no unanimity as to its meaning. 
This research focuses on the POEM as a connecting factor. In the absence of a 
universal definition, an analysis of the concept of POEM centres on two broad 
views. The first group views the POEM to mean the place where the strategic 
management decisions of the corporation are taken which is usually where the 
board of directors’ meetings are held.  The second group argues that the POEM 
refers to the place where the day-to-day management decision is reached by the 
managing director and his management team.  
 
                                                 
268 That is a situation where a corporation falls within the definition of residence under the domestic 




To reconcile these divergent views recourse should be had to the similar 
concepts used by various states. As stated above, the POEM as a connecting 
factor stems from the notion of a CMC. Thus, the concept of CMC agrees with 
the view of the first group.269 Civil law jurisdictions adopted the different 
concept of the POEM that varies between the first and the second view. For 
instance, the German tax regime has adopted ‘place of management’ which has 
been defined as the centre of the chief business management of the 
corporation.270 Therefore, the German POEM is the centre of the strategic 
decisions of the corporation. 
 
The Belgian tax regime adopts the ‘registered office’, ‘principal establishment’ 
and the ‘seat of management or administration’.271  The last two are conflicting 
variations of the POEM. Bammens272 argues that the principal establishment is 
the nerve centre of the corporation, and the location of the registered office 
determines the principal establishment. It is the place where the shareholders or 
board of directors meets. The seat of management or administration, on the 
other hand, refers to the location of the day-to-day management and 
administration of the corporation. The registered office is a test of its own as 
well as the determinant of the principal establishment. There is no clear 
guidance on which of two tests takes precedence. Furthermore, the regime 
separates the place of strategic decisions from that of the management and 
administration. Superficially, the dichotomy reconciled the two conflicting 
views on POEM. However, it is not clear whether the ‘principal establishment’ 
and the seat of management or administration are to be satisfied concurrently or 
disjunctively.  
                                                 
269 The concept of CMC has been fully analysed in the immediate preceding heading. 
270 Section 10 of the German General Tax Code See also English, J ‘Germany’ in Miasto, G (ed) 
Residence of Individual under tax treaty and EC law’ (2009) IBFD Publication.  455 
271 Article 2(5) (b) of the Belgium Income Tax Code 1992 
272 Bammens, N ‘Belgium’ in Miasto, G (ed) Residence of Individual under tax treaty and EC law’ 




Austria has adopted the POEM and the legal seat as the test for determining 
corporate residence.273 According to Simader,274 the POEM is situated where 
the actual not statutory (legal) seat of the corporation is located. He argues that 
the real seat refers to the centre of business direction. Thus, the most important 
decision is that day-to-day management was exercised by the managing director 
who usually operates from the actual seat. However, this view is not appealing 
because assuming that the legal seat is where the corporation reaches its 
strategic decisions, it is not clear whether or not the POEM and the legal seat 
tests are to run concurrently. Therefore, Simader did not shed light on the 
dichotomy between the strategic and day-to-day decisions. It is still debatable 
whether the decision to be taken at the actual seat must be on strategic or day-
to-day management. 
 
Some jurisdictions clearly define the POEM within the context of their domestic 
laws. For instance, in Switzerland, the POEM is the place where important 
decisions on the affairs of the corporation are taken.275 The Dutch regime, on 
the other hand, gives a blanket provision for the determination of corporate 
residence based on facts and circumstances.276 It does not mention the POEM, 
but the Dutch Supreme Court in BNB 1993/1932277 endorsed the Dutch notion 
of POEM to be based on the strategic decisions taken by the board of director. 
 
Given the above, the factors considered in determining both the POEM (as a 
connecting factor), and the CMC are substantially the same. They are all 
premised on the issue of the real business of the corporation. The main reason 
for viewing POEM different from the CMC is the failure to appreciate the dual 
                                                 
273 Section 1 (2) of the Austrian CorporateTax Act 2009 
274 Simader,K ‘Austria’ in Miasto, G (ed) Residence of Individual under tax treaty and EC law’ (2009) 
IBFD Publication.339 at 350 
275 Article 50 of the Federal Income Tax Act 1990 
276 Article 4 (1) of the General State Taxes Act 1962 
277 No. 27 293  
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role being played by the POEM (as tie-breaker rule and a connecting factor). As 
a tie-breaker rule, the POEM only applies to the parties to a DTA.  The parties 
to a DTA are at liberty to define the scope of the POEM or to simply adopt the 
OECD model. However, when the POEM is used as a connecting factor, it is 
purely determined pursuant to the domestic laws. The dual roles of the POEM 
lead to confusion in the determination of corporate residence. The CMC is a 
more viable connecting factor for corporate residence. The viability of the CMC 
is evident in the current move by the US to introduce the CMC test alongside 
its ‘place of incorporation.278  
 
 
5.3.3 How to choose between competing connecting factors 
 
There are divergences of opinion as to which of the tests279 is suitable for the 
state to adopt in determining the corporate tax residence. The divergence centres 
on two traditional normative criteria used in evaluating the corporate residence 
tests; one supports the objective tests while the other supports the subjective 
test.280 Those advocating the adoption of the objective test base their arguments 
                                                 
278 Avi-Yonah, R S. ‘Beyond Territoriality and Deferral: The Promise of "Managed and Controlled’ 
(2011) 63 (9) Tax Notes Int’l. 667 at 668 (He argued for the amendment of section 7701 of the US 
Inland Revenue Code, to cover corporation that are managed and controlled in the US. He 
specifically makes a case for the UK model of the CMC. He also argued that there is a distinction 
between CMC and POEM) See also New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Report on the 
Management and Control Provision of the International Tax Competitiveness Act of 2011, dated 
7th January 2011. See also Holmes, RY ‘Deconstructing the rules of corporate tax’ (2010) 25 Akron 
Tax J. 1 at 21 (Making case for a shift from the objective to subjective tests in determining the US 
corporate residence) 
279 The statutory (objective) test, (the place of incorporation) or the subjective tests (the center of 
effective management and control) or the combination of the two tests, one supplementing the 
other. 
280Ault and Arnold, (2010) at 434 (There are two basic approaches are used in establishing corporate 
residence: one is to focus on some formal legal connection to the jurisdiction the other is based on 
economic and commercial connection.) Couzin, R (2009) at 22 ( who discussed the distinction 
between  the ‘place of incorporation test’ and the ‘place of  permanent establishment test’); Brauner, 
Y United States, in Maisto, G (ed) Residence of Companies Under Tax Treaties and EC Law (2009) 
855 at 865 (contrasting between the ‘place of incorporation test’ in the United States and other fact 
and circumstances tests used by other countries); Broe, LD (2009) at 96 (differentiating between 
“formal and factual tests” used in civil law countries); Martin Norr, M (1961) at 437 (contrasting 
“fiscal domicile” with “legal domicile”); David R. Tillinghast, DR ‘A Matter of Definition: 
‘Foreign’ and ‘Domestic’ Taxpayers’ (1984) 2 Int’l Tax and Bus. Law. 239 at 266  
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on efficiency as a normative value.281 They argue that the objective test makes 
the taxpayer indifferent regarding the place of incorporation.282 The proponents 
of the subjective test ground their arguments on the need to have a connection 
between the state that wants to impose a tax and the corporation at issue, 
resulting from the benefit it derives from the state’s machinery.283 Some 
commentators284 view these two arguments as unconvincing to justify both the 
objective and subjective tests for corporate residence. They argue that the 
concept is meaningless because corporations are merely imaginary, and 
residence in the real sense, easy to manipulate by the taxpayers and that the 
corporate residence tests fails normative evaluation.  
 
Omri,285 on the other hand, rejects this view and argues that the corporate tax 
residence test should be designed to support the policy purposes of corporate 
taxation. Thus, each of the corporate residence tests should be linked with a 
                                                 
281 Kane, MA and Rock, EB ‘Corporate Taxation and International Charter Competition’ (2008)106 
Mich. L. Rev. 1229 at 1235; Shaviro, DN ‘The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Rising Tax- 
Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence’ (2011) 64 Tax L. Rev. 377at 413; 
282 For instance, a corporation may be registered in state A but it carries out its business in state B which 
determines the residence of corporations exclusively by way of objective test. In this scenario, the 
corporation at issue is a foreign corporation for tax purpose in state B, notwithstanding the fact that 
it operates that state, because it was not incorporated there. But it could resident of state A if it also 
adopts objective test, even though it is not operating in state A. Thus, once a corporation is registered 
in a particular state and that state adopts objective test, the location of the corporate business is 
immaterial in determining the residence status of the corporation. Therefore, objective test is 
efficient in this regard. 
283 Pistone, P ‘EC law and tax residence of companies’ in Miasto, G Behrens (2009) Broe (2009) Couzin 
(2008) 
284 Avi-Yonah, RS ‘Tax Competition and the Trend Toward Territoriality’ (2012), Univ. of Mich. Public 
Law Research Paper No. 297(3) available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2191251; Kleinbard, ED ‘The Lessons of Stateless Income’ 
(2011) 65 Tax L. Rev. 99 at 159; Graetz, MJ ‘The David R. Tillinghast Lecture —Taxing 
International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies,’ 
(2001); 54 Tax L. Rev. 261 at 320; Kirsch, MS ‘Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy’ (2007) 82 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 443, 465-467; see also Nikolakakis, A ‘The unbearable lightness of being 
incorporated: The diminishing relevance of corporate residence’ in Maisto, G  (ed) ‘Residence of 
companies under tax treaties and EC law’ (2009) IBFD Publication 903; Bouthillier, J ‘Residence-
Based Taxation and FAPI: A World of Fictions’ (2005) 53(1) Canadian Tax J. 179 at a180 (“The 
concept of residence, however, is elusive and may not be adapted to modern economic realities.”) 
285 Omri, YM ‘Jurisdiction to tax corporation’ 
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particular corporate theory.286 He argues that “there is no perfect residence test, 
but there are perfect residence tests” because the corporate residence test is 
country specific. Therefore, the call to have a ‘best residence test’ should be 
abandoned. With the current global economic integration in mind, I take a 
different line of reasoning from Omri, particularly on the last point. He premises 
his argument on the US system with total disregard of the impact of 
globalisation that has caused the tax sovereignty of the state to be questioned. 
Omri’s argument that the states should face a different direction in designing 
their corporate residence is a misconception.  
 
Omri puts this argument in response to the challenge by other commentators on 
the meaningfulness of corporate residence tests. The missing point is that, 
assuming the normative justification for the residence test cannot be distilled 
for the reasons cited by those commentators the policy rationale for corporate 
taxation is diverse as argued by Omri. In summary they all head in the same 
direction. That is to tax the income earned by the shareholder through their 
ownership interest in the corporations indirectly. Therefore, the divergence of 
the corporate theories is more of form rather substance. 287 And any test 
formulated to determine the residence of a corporation for income tax purposes 
                                                 
286 For instance, the notion that corporate tax is imposed to regulate corporate management is more in 
tandem with the USA regime, where limited liability corporations with only one member are 
exempted from corporate tax unless they choose to be treated as corporation. That is why some argued 
that corporations are taxed in the United States for the very purpose of taxing the corporation’s equity 
holders and to regulate the corporate managers. See Bank, SA ‘Entity Theory as Myth in the US 
Corporate Excise Tax of 1909’ in Tiley, J (ed) ‘Studies in the History of Tax Law’ (2007) 393 at 394; 
Bank, SA Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax’ (2001) 43 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 447, 452 Bank, SA ‘The Dividend Divide in Anglo-American Corporate Taxation’ (2004)  
30 J. Corp. L. 1, 15–18.  
287 By closer look at these approach, through the lens of globalisations, the traditional approach is more 
appealing, because it creates a universal evaluative criterion that address the silent issues involves in 
the residence test that are country specific. For instance, ‘place of incorporation has been justified 
because it is efficient and easy to administer. The only challenged raised against this efficiency is 
that, since corporate tax is not efficient itself, how can a rule of determining residence be efficient. 
See Omri (2013). On the issue that the objective test is easy to manipulate, the current trend of 
enacting CFC regimes could greatly prevent allay that the fear of manipulation. 
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goes to the substance. Hence, there is no need to have different tests for 
corporate residence by each state. 
 
Furthermore, both Omri and those he challenges view the competing connecting 
factors from an objective and subjective tests dichotomy. They fail to realise 
that there are competing models, especially in the subjective test. For instance, 
most civil law countries use the ‘place of effective management’ (POEM) as the 
subjective test, whereas, most of the common law states use ‘central 
management and control’(CMC).288 Even within these classes, there is a 
divergence of the judicial approach to the interpretation and formulation of the 
guiding principle or factors to be considered in defining either POEM or 
CMC.289  
 
As the divergence increases, economic integration also expands. The economic 
integration is a reality that cannot be avoided.290 There is a need to stick to the 
insistence on having the ‘best test’ for ascertaining corporate residence. This 
could be achieved if there is consensus about the rationale for imposing the 
corporate tax at the corporate level. Given the reality of globalisation, the 
imposition of corporate tax is inevitable because even some states that 
abandoned the corporate tax have been forced to revert to it.291 Thus, the 
assertion that corporate tax is an inefficient method of revenue collection, let 
                                                 
288 Ault and Arnold, (2010) at 434,Broe (2009)  
289 For instance, the USA exclusively adopted objective test, while from 1988 UK adopted both 
objective and subjective test (CMC model). Within the subjective test category, the UK and other 
common law countries use CMC model whereas most of the civil law jurisdiction as well as the 
OECD Model convention apply POEM. Also within the CMC jurisdiction, the courts arrived at 
different decision as to what constitute ‘central management and control’ means. In De Beer 
Consolidated Mines Ltd. V. Howe (1906) AC 455 – CMC means where the directors exercise their 
power, while in Australian case of Northern Australian Pastoral Co, ltd v. FCT (1946) 71 CLR 623 – 
CMC is located where actual business operation carried on. 
290Bird, R ‘Taxing electronic commerce: A revolution in the making’ (2003) available at 
www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_187.pdf  (The implication of globalisation has thrown the 
application of tax law into disarray. What constitute state and its tax jurisdiction is not based on 
geography). 
291 Brauner (2005) 
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alone any test to determine the residence of the corporation292 cannot be valid. 
Therefore, both the objective and subjective tests represent two different types 
of locating rules (legal v. factual) that are worth keeping separate.293 
 
 
Finally, the dilemma of choosing between objective and subjective or even the 
combination of the two centres on the fact that, the objective test is simple and 
straightforward, but leaves room for easy manipulation.294 The subjective test, 
on the other hand, is complex in nature, but is difficult to manipulate. However, 
the dilemma of choosing the subjective test is the fact that two or more states 
may adopt either CMC or POEM tests. Also, even within the CMC and POEM, 
States may apply different approaches in determining them. In choosing the 
combination of substantive or objective criteria the two, the hierarchy of the 





In the absence of a single residence test that could be applied globally, the 
inconsistency and conflict inherent in the definition of residence would continue 
to rise. Besides, states approach the determination of the residence of the person 
(both natural juristic) for income tax purposes differently. This chapter has 
examined the trends in the existing laws (both statutory and judicial) of the 
selected common law and civil law jurisdictions. These states set out various 
tests in determining the tax residence.  Whenever the tests are exclusively 
                                                 
292 Nikolakakis, A ‘The unbearable lightness of being incorporated: The diminishing relevance of 
corporate residence’ in Maisto, G (ed) ‘Residence of companies under tax treaties and EC law’ 
(2009) IBFD Publication 903; Bouthillier, J ‘Residence-Based Taxation and FAPI: A World of 
Fictions’ (2005) 53(1) Canadian Tax J. 179 at a180 (“The concept of residence, however, is elusive 
and may not be adapted to modern economic realities.”) 
293 Kane and Rock (2008) 
294 A resident of a state which only applies an objective test for the determination of corporate residence 
may move to another state and incorporate a company thereby running from being taxed in his state 
of residence. Therefore, to adapt to the current wind of globalization the subjective test is preferable. 
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founded on externally observable actions, they are objective standards, and 
when the tests centred on the taxpayer's state of mind, they are subjective 
standards.295 For this research, these tests are categorised into statutory and 
facts-and-circumstances tests. 
 
The diversity and inconsistencies in defining both the individual and corporate 
tax residence stem from the notion of tax sovereignty. The states protect their 
taxing power. Thus, they define tax residence differently. Conflicts of 
jurisdiction arise where a taxpayer falls within the definition of resident 
provided by two states. The states resolve the conflicts through a Double Tax 
Agreement (DTA). The reality of globalisation renders the DTA less important 
because a taxpayer could be trapped in a triangular situation by falling within 
the definition of another state, which is not a party to the DTA. A taxpayer may 
be exposed to uncertainty about his tax status, where the tie-breaker provision 
of the DTA could not resolve the jurisdictional conflict between the two 
states.296  
 
As a result of the growing weakness, there has been a call for a multilateral tax 
treaty to address the definition of residence and other relevant issues.297 The 
proponents of the multilateral treaty did not take into cognisance that the tax 
sovereignty of the state comprises both substantive and enforcement jurisdiction 
over the taxpayer. Therefore, it is possible for the states to surrender 
                                                 
295 McGacrry, SJ ‘State of mind stand in taxation’ (1988) 7 Am. J. Tax Pol’y 249 
296 Most of the DTA provides that where the tie-breaker rule fails, the parties shall resolve the conflict 
by mutual agreement. Before such agreement is reach, the person remains in uncertain situation. 
Failure to reach the mutual agreement reached by the parties exposes the person to become dual 
resident for tax purposes.  
297 From the empirical research conducted there are more than 2600 DTA around the globe. See Braun, 
J and Zagler, M ‘An economic perspective on double tax treaties with(in) developing countries’ 
(2014) 6 (1) World Tax Journal 1. See also Cockfield, AJ ‘International Tax Competition: The Last 
Battleground of Globalization’(2011) 63 (12) Tax Notes International 867 (argued that while trade 
and investments becomes international, taxation remains national as the states are unwilling to 




enforcement jurisdiction as a result of a multilateral treaty. However, it could 
be difficult for the states to surrender their substantive tax jurisdiction because 
it goes to their sovereignty. Thus, the multilateral treaty is not feasible. The crux 
of this research is that the states need to co-operate with each other in defining 
tax residence. The co-operation could be achieved through comparative analysis 
of the states’ domestic regime on the definition of residence. The next chapter 
addresses all the above-mentioned concerns, particularly the nature and scope 
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6.0  Introduction  
 
 
The residence-based system suggests that states should impose a tax on both the 
domestic and foreign earned income of their residents. The residence status of 
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a person is crucial in determining his tax liability because the ascertainment of 
tax liability is a necessary condition for a person to become subject to tax. Thus, 
liability to tax is different from being subject to tax. Under a residence base 
regime, a person becomes ‘liable to tax’ and ‘subject to tax'1 once he falls within 
the definition of resident provided by the regime. He remains liable to tax even 
if, for some reasons, the regime exempts him from paying tax, or it grants him 
certain tax relief thereby making the person not subject to tax. Thus, all persons 
subject to tax are liable to tax, but not all persons liable to tax are subject to tax. 
Therefore, the concept of residence could be used to determine whether or not 
a person is liable or subject to tax. The crux of this thesis is the notion of 
residence as a determinant of establishing ‘liability to tax’ not ‘subject to tax’. 
The preceding chapter discussed the diversity of the definitional rule of tax 
residence for both individuals and corporations. The chapter highlighted the 
States’ efforts to resolve the conflict inherent in the determination of fiscal 
residence.  
 
In addressing the conflicts, states adopt both unilateral and bilateral 
mechanisms, that is to say, double taxation relief provisions in their domestic 
laws and a bilateral Double Taxation Agreement with each other.2 The 
comparison is centred on the function of the concept of residence as a means of 
establishing jurisdictional nexus not for determining the eligibility to tax 
exemption or relief.  Thus, this chapter and the next chapter do not only describe 
the relationship between Nigeria and South African residence-based regimes; it 
makes an in-depth analysis of the definitional rule of individual residence in 
Nigeria and South Africa. The comparative analysis explores the possibility of 
                                                 
1 Wheeler, J ‘Persons qualifying for treaty benefits’ in Trepelkov, A et al (ed)  ‘United Nations 
Handbook on Selected Issues in Administration of Double Tax Treaties for Developing Countries’ 
(2013) UN Publication, New York 60 at 63. 
2 The reference made to the bilateral or multilateral tax treaty regime is only limited to the definitional 
rule of ‘resident’ for the purposes of the treaty not the detailed content of the treaty 
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achieving co-operation among the states outside the realm of the tax treaty 
(bilateral or multilateral). 
 
6.1 Residence-Based Taxation of Individuals and other Entities in Nigeria 
 
 
Payment of tax is a duty imposed by the Nigerian Constitution:  
“it shall be the duty of every citizen to declare his income honestly to 
appropriate and lawful agencies and pay his tax promptly.”3  
 
Even though the section seems to impose the tax payment obligation on the 
‘citizen’, the obligation is extended to all persons living in or having an 
economic connection with Nigeria. The protection against compulsory 
acquisition of movable and immovable properties of persons is a fundamental 
right recognised in chapter four of the Nigerian Constitution. The protection 
mentioned above is not restricted to Nigerian citizens. 4  However, “nothing in 
subsection (1) of this section shall be construed as affecting any general law for 
the imposition or enforcement of any tax, rate or duty.”5 Therefore, the 
imposition and collection of the tax in Nigeria shall be made pursuant to a 
statutory provision. Moreover, once a statute imposes a tax, the right to property 
is suspended to the extent of the provision of that statute. 
 
The taxation of individuals is governed by the Personal Income Tax Act (from 
now on referred to as ‘PITA’)6 and individual includes a corporation sole and a 
body of individuals.7  In addition to individuals, section 1 of the Act imposes a 
tax on the income of a partnership or trustee,8 estate, and on communities and 
families.9 In other words, any entity that does not fall under the definition of a 
                                                 
3 Section 24 (f) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 
4 Ibid Section 44 (1)  
5 Ibid section 44 (2) (a) 
6 Cap P8 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (as amended by PITA 2011).   
7 Section 108 of  the PITA 
8 Not incorporated trustees, because an Incorporated Trustees is registered under Part C of  the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act C20 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 
9 section 1 of the PITA 
187 
 
company10 is a taxable person under the Act.11 The taxpayers are liable to pay 
tax on their global income12 to the relevant tax authority of the state of their 
residence13 as at the 1st day of the year of assessment.14 The significance of 
section 3(1) PITA is that all the income is taxable whether sourced inside or 
outside Nigeria. The section reads: 
“Subject to the provisions of this Act, the tax shall be payable for each 
year of assessment on the aggregate amounts each of which is the income 
of every taxable person, for the year, from a source inside or outside 
Nigeria…” 
 
 Hence, it established a worldwide income tax system.  
 
In any federal state, there is the notion of fiscal federalism that envisages the 
decentralisation of the taxing power between the states of the federation and the 
central government. The Nigerian constitution devolved the taxing power 
between the states and the federation government.15 However, it gives the 
federal government the exclusive substantive tax jurisdiction for both the 
individual and corporate income tax, while the federal and state governments 
shared the enforcement tax jurisdiction for individual16 income tax.17 The PITA 
recognises the shared enforcement jurisdiction and that is why it makes separate 
                                                 
10 Under section 105 of the Companies Income Tax Act 2007 - "Company" means any company or 
corporation (other than a corporation sole) established by or under any law in force in Nigeria or 
elsewhere”  
11 Saulawa JCA in Lagos State Internal Revenue Board v. Motorola Nigeria Ltd and another (2012) 
LPELR-14712 (CA) 
12 Section 3 of the PITA 
13 Section 2 PITA 
14 By section 108 of the PITA the year of assessment commences from the 1st January each year.  
15 Emiko, G.I. ‘An Analysis of Federal/State Taxing Powers’ in Ajemo, M.A. (ed) Tax Law and Tax 
Administration in Nigeria (1991) NIALS Publication, Lagos, 12 at 45 
16 And other entities 
17 This constitutional arrangement traced its origin from section 10 (1) of the Nigerian (Constitution) 
Order-in-Council Act 1960 “The Parliament of the Federation of Nigeria may make laws for the 
peace, order and good government of any Region of the Federation with respect to taxes on income 
and profits, not being taxes on the income or profits accruing in, or derived from, that Region, of 
Africans resident in that Region and African communities in that Region.” And section 70 of the 
1960 Constitution. Prior to the 1960 constitutional arrangement, each region (North, West and East) 
imposed and enforced the collection of the income tax of all persons with their territory. 
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provision for the determination of residence both of states and at the federal 
level.  
 
6.1.1 Residence of Individual within the states of the federation of Nigeria 
 
 
The PITA set out the criteria for the determination of the residence of all taxable 
persons. It provides that, for any year of assessment, income tax shall be 
assessed and collected only by the state in which the individual (other than 
itinerant worker) resides in that particular year.18 Thus, the taxable persons are 
liable to tax in the state of Nigeria where they are residing from the first day of 
January (i.e. for 12 months) in the year of assessment.19 In the case of an 
individual, he becomes liable if he has a ‘place of residence’ or ‘principal place 
of residence’ in the state. Therefore, all individuals and other taxable persons 
under PITA20 who reside within the territory of a state of the federation are 
liable to pay their income tax to the state they reside.21 This heading determines 
the residence of the individual other than those mentioned under section 2 (1) 
(b) of the PITA.22 Therefore, any mention of individual refers to that class of 
individuals. An objective test principally determines the individual tax 
residence. The PITA provides for two statutory tests for the determination of 
the tax residence of individuals that falls under this heading. That is ‘place of 
                                                 
18 Section 2 (1) (a) and (2) PITA 
19 In Shittu V. Nigeria Agricultural & Cooperative Bank Ltd19 the court elaborated the provisions of 
section 2 PITA in the following words: “Section 2 (2) of the Personal Income Tax Decree No. 104 
of 1993, empowers the State Government to impose Personal Income Tax for every year of 
assessment on the Personal Income of individuals who are resident for the year in the State under 
the provisions of the First Schedule to the Decree”.  
20 Like trust, estates, communities and families with the exception of the members of the armed 
forces, the police and the itinerant workers. 
21 Section 2 (2) of the PITA (as amended) 
22 Section 2 (1) “(b) the following other persons, that is— (i) persons employed in the Nigerian Army, 
the Nigerian Navy, the Nigerian Air Force, the Nigerian Police Force other than in a civilian 
capacity; (ii) officers of the Nigerian Foreign Service; (iii) every resident of the Federal Capital 




residence’ as connecting factor and ‘principal place of residence as a tiebreaker 
test for resolving the interstate jurisdictional conflict. 
 
6.1.1.1  Place of Residence 
 
The location of residence of individual for tax purposes has been defined23 as a 
place available for the domestic use of the individual in Nigeria on a relevant 
day.24 It does not include a hotel, guest-house or any other lodge temporarily 
stayed by the individual unless he has no any permanent place available for him 
on that day.25  In determining the residence of individuals under this test, the 
PITA provides that if the individual:  
“holds a foreign employment on the 1st day of January in a year of 
assessment, or who first becomes liable to income tax in Nigeria for that 
year by reason of his entering that employment during that year, shall be 
deemed to be resident for that year in the territory in which the principal 
office of his employer is situated on that day or on the day his foreign 
employment commences, as the case may be.”26 (emphasis added) 
 
However, where an employee does not have a place of residence in Nigeria as 
at the relevant day the rule applies to the foreign employees as well.27 For an 
individual under Nigerian employment, the PITA provides a different criterion 
for determining his residence. That is if he 
“holds a Nigerian employment on the 1st day of January in a year of 
assessment, or who first becomes liable to income tax in Nigeria for that 
year by reason of his entering that employment during that year, shall be 
deemed to be resident for that year in the territory in which he has a 
place or principal place of residence on that day or, as the case may be, 
                                                 
23 Paragraph 1 of the first schedule to the PITA 
24 1st January each year 
25 Paragraph 1 of the first schedule to the PITA  
26 Ibid Paragraph 2  
27 Ibid Paragraph 4 
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on the day on which he enters upon the full duties of that employment in 
Nigeria”28 (emphasis added) 
 
When an individual retires from his job the criteria for ascertaining his tax 
residence changes from the one applicable to him during the employment. The 
Act provides that: 
“(1) An individual whose only source of earned income arising in 
Nigeria on the 1st day of January in a year of assessment was a pension, 
and who had a place or principal place of residence on that day shall be 
deemed to be resident for that year in the territory in which that place or 
principal place of residence was situated on that day. (2) An individual 
whose only source of earned income arising in Nigeria on the 1st day of 
January in a year of assessment was a pension, and who had no place of 
residence on that day, shall be deemed to be resident for that year— (a) 
if the pension is a Nigerian pension wholly payable by the Government 
of one territory, not being a Nigerian pension in respect of which the 
subsection (1) (b) of section 2 of this Act applies, in that territory; (b) if 
the pension is not a Nigerian pension, in the territory in which the 
principal office in Nigeria of the pension fund or another person 
authorizing payment of the pension is situated. (3) An individual whose 
only source of earned income arising in Nigeria on the 1st day of January 
in a year of assessment was a Nigerian pension, and who had no place of 
residence on that day shall, if the pension is payable to more than one 
government or if there are two or more pensions arising in different 
territories to the individual on that day, be subject to subsection (1) (b) 
of section 2 of this Act.”29 
  
The above provisions hinge on the source of income as the determinant of the 
individual residence because all the items mentioned relate to the source of the 
individual’s income. One may argue that the provision concentrates on the 
income derived from employment. However, for the individuals whose income 
is not derived from employment, the PITA provides: 
                                                 
28 Ibid paragraph 3 
29 Ibid paragraph 5 
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“An individual who has a source of earned income in Nigeria for a year 
of assessment, other than employment or a pension, shall be deemed to 
be resident for that year in the territory in which he had a place or 
principal place of residence on the 1st day of January in that year.”30 
And where 
“An individual who has no source of earned income in Nigeria for a year 
of assessment, but who has one or more source of unearned income in 
Nigeria for that year shall be deemed to be resident for that year in the 
territory in which he has a place or principal place of residence on the 
1st day of January of that year”31 
 
From the above provisions, it is clear that the individual’s tax residence is 
determined by his ‘place of ‘residence.' Also, that the source of the individuals’ 
income is the sole determinant factor of the place of residence. Thus, the source 
of income determines the residence of the individual. In defining the taxable 
income, the PITA provides that: 
“Subject to the provisions of this Act, tax shall be payable for each year 
of assessment on the aggregate amounts each of which is the income of 
every taxable person, for the year, from a source inside or outside 
Nigeria, including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing— 
(a) gain or profit from any trade, business, profession or vocation, for 
whatever period of time such trade, business, profession or vocation may 
have been carried on or exercised (b) “any salary, wage, fee, allowance 
or other gain or profit from employment including compensations, 
bonuses, premiums, benefits or other prerequisites allowed, given or 
granted by any person to any temporary or permanent employee..”32 
 
The scheme stipulates different criteria for determining residence and each of 
the criteria hinges on the source of income. Thus, the nature of the income 
determines the criteria applicable for ascertaining the resident status of 
individuals. Therefore, the ascertainment of the sources or sources of the above 
array of incomes is the first inquiry for the determination of the residence of 
                                                 
30 Ibid paragraph 6 
31 Ibid paragraph 7 
32 Section 3 (1) PITA 
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individuals. The main problem with this scheme is to determine which of the 
criteria would be applied to determine an individual’s residence where he 
derived his income from different sources?  
 
6.1.1.2 Principal Place of Residence 
 
Under the Nigerian regime, an individual is required to pay income tax to the 
state where he resides as at 1st January each year.33 Nigeria is a federal state with 
thirty-six states and a Federal Capital Territory (Abuja).34 In applying the 
provisions of section 2 (2) of PITA, there is the likelihood of a conflict of 
jurisdiction between the states because an individual may be resident in two or 
more states at the same time. To address the potential conflict, the PITA makes 
the ‘principal place of residence’ a tiebreaker test applicable in resolving the 
conflict. Thus, where an individual resides in more than one state, he is liable 
to pay tax to the state where his ‘principal place of residence’ is located. In 
determining the principal place of residence, the Act provides that the source of 
the individual’s income is the sole factor for consideration. That is to say, where 
the source of the income is a pension in Nigeria, the ‘principal place of 
residence’ “is the place or places in which the individual usually resides.”35 The 
same rule applies to an individual who derived his income from ‘unearned 
income’.36However, where the income is an ‘earned income’37 the ‘principal 
place of residence’ “is the place nearest to the individual’s usual place or places 
                                                 
33 Section 2 (2) PITA 
34 By section 2 (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 which states that “Nigeria 
shall be a Federation consisting of States and a Federal Capital Territory and section 3 (1) provides 
that “There shall be 36 states in Nigeria, that is to say, Abia, Adamawa, Akwa Ibom, Anambra, 
Bauchi, Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, Enugu, Gombe, Imo, 
Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Lagos, Nasarawa, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, 
Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, Sokoto, Taraba, Yobe and Zamfara.” 
35 Paragraph 1 (a) of the first schedule of the PITA 
36 Paragraph 1 (c) of the first schedule of the PITA Unearned income refers to income derived from 
investment such as dividend, royalty from patent or trade mark, rental income 
37 This refers to income derived from trade, business, profession, vacation or employment carried on or 
exercised by the individual, which include profits, salaries, commission, bonuses and pension. 
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of work.”38 Where an individual works in a branch office or operational site of 
a company with at least fifty workers, his ‘principal place of residence’ “is the 
location of the branch office or the site.”39  
 
The PITA stipulates that when dual or multiple residence cases occurs the 
individual pays tax to the state where he has the principal place of residence.  
However, it does not provide the criteria for determining the ‘principal place of 
‘residence.' Furthermore, the PITA provides certain exceptions to the above-
stated tiebreaker rule. Firstly, members of the Nigerian armed forces and the 
police, who by the nature of their job, resides in more than one state, are deemed 
to be residents of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.40 Thus, wherever this 
class of the individual resides, their tax residence is in Abuja. Secondly, the case 
of an itinerant worker.41  The PITA provides that:  
“In the case of an itinerant worker, the tax may be imposed for any year 
by any State in which the itinerant worker is found during the year.”42  
 
Both the definition and the method of determining the residence of the itinerant 
worker raise a concern in terms of apportioning the taxable income to the two 
or more states in a year of assessment. For instance, an individual may work in 
two or more states at a different time in a month. The question is – where is he 
supposed to pay the tax?  If he requires a Tax Clearance Certificate, from which 
state will he obtain the certificate? 
 
                                                 
38 Paragraph 1 (b) of the first schedule of the PITA 
39 Ibid paragraph 1 (d) 
40 Section 2 (1) (b) and (2) of the PITA 
41 Who is defined by Section 108 of the PITA (as amended) 2011 as “‘Itinerant worker’ includes an 
individual irrespective of his status who works at any time in any state during a year of assessment 
(other than as a member of the armed forces) for wages, salaries or livelihood by working in more 
than one state and work for a minimum of twenty (20) days in at least three (3) months of every 
assessment year.” See also section 28 for the mode of assessing the income of an itinerant worker 
“The assessable income for any year of assessment of an itinerant worker shall be determined either 
under the provisions of sections 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 of this Act or be the income of the year ending 
on the thirty-first day of December within the year of assessment. 
42 Section 2 (3) of the PITA 
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The key terms used under this heading are the ‘place of residence’ and the 
‘principal place of residence’. As stated above, the PITA defines these two 
expressions, but the definitions are too vague. The Act defines individuals 
‘place of residence’ as: 
“A place available for his domestic use in Nigeria on a relevant day, and 
does not include any hotel, rest-house or another place at which he is 
temporarily lodging unless no permanent place is available for his use on 
that day.”43  
 
This definition suggests that the available place for the individual on that day 
must be a permanent one because it clearly excludes any form of temporary 
place. In United Bank for Africa Plc. V. Odimayo the Court defined residence 
within the context of PITA as: 
“One is said to reside if he lives, dwells, lodges or abides at a designated 
place. The residence is accordingly about personal presence at some 
place of abode with the purpose to remain for some undetermined period. 
One can be said to reside in a place without necessarily staying 
permanently thereat. Residence conveys the fact of abode and the 
intention of remaining. It means more than the physical presence”.44 
 
Therefore, the ‘place of residence’ means a permanent residence. What does 
‘permanent residence’ mean? The answer to this question needs to be inferred 
from the definition of ‘permanent place of abode.' Justice Fisher succinctly 
explained the nature of ‘permanent place of abode’ as follows:   
“…the word “permanent” is used to qualify the expression ‘place of 
abode’ i.e. the physical surroundings in which the person lives, and to 
describe that place… the proper construction of place upon the phrase 
‘permanent place of abode’ is that it is the taxpayer's fixed and habitual 
place of abode. .. Material factors for consideration will be the continuity 
or otherwise of the taxpayer's presence, the duration of his presence and 
                                                 
43 Paragraph 1 of the first schedule to the PITA 
44 (2005) 2 NWLR (Pt 909) 21 at 38 E-F   
195 
 
the durability of his association with the particular place.”45(emphasis 
added) 
 
The ‘permanent residence’ suits the above description of the permanent place 
of abode because the only difference between the two expressions is the ‘place 
of abode’ and the ‘residence’. Lord Viscount Cave LC  in Levene’s case46 
defined residence as the place of abode. Based on this pronouncement, 
residence, and place of abode mean one and the same thing.  It follows that 
permanent residence and permanent place of abode are the same. That is a 
residence with some degree of permanence. Conversely, in defining the 
‘principal place of residence,’ the PITA uses the word ‘usual’ in all the three 
circumstances to qualify the word ‘residence’. That is the individual’s usual 
residence. Therefore, the central question is – what is the distinction between 
‘permanent residence and usual residence’? Ordinarily, they all suggest that the 
residence should be a continuous one.  
 
However, there could be a conflict between the definition of ‘place of residence’ 
and ‘principal place of residence’. The PITA defines ‘place of residence’ as an 
available place for the individual’s domestic use that is not a hotel or guest-
house. On the other hand, in defining ‘principal place of residence’, the PITA 
does not exclude a hotel and guest house.47 In all the circumstances that could 
lead to the application of ‘principal place of residence’, the PITA defines the 
principal place of residence as “the place where the individual usually 
resides.”48 Arguably, the usual place of residence could be a hotel or guest 
house that has been excluded in defining ‘place of residence’. Similarly, in 
respect of an individual who works at a branch office or operational site of a 
                                                 
45 Applegate v. FCT (1979) 79 ATC 4307 at 4317 See also FCT v. Jenkins (1982) 82 ATC 4098 the 
same line of reasoning was followed in the case of Mayhew v. FCT (2013) AATA 130.  However, 
in Iyengar v, Commissioner of taxation (2011) AATA 856  
46 Levene v. IRC (1928) AC 217  
47 As it did while defining ‘place of residence’ 
48 Paragraph 1 (a) and (b) of the first schedule to the PITA 
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company, the principal place of residence is the location of the branch office or 
site.49 The conflict may arise where the corporation operates its branch activities 
from a hotel or guest house and individual works in that branch. Going by the 
definition of ‘place of residence’ the hotel and guest house cannot be the 
individual’s place of residence whereas the ‘principal place of residence’ is 
defined to be the location of the branch office. The conflict mentioned above 
creates a complex situation for individuals, tax experts as well as the tax 
administrators in ascertaining the ‘place of residence.' Moreover, if he has more 
than one place of residence the difficulty lies in determining his ‘principal place 
of residence.' 
 
Ideally, the ‘place of residence’ and ‘principal place of residence’ are supposed 
to be objective tests. The international trend in designing the objective test for 
the determination of an individual is the number of days spent in the state at 
issue.  However, the Nigerian regime, under this heading, does not specify the 
period of presence in the ‘place of residence’ or ‘principal place of residence’ 
that qualifies an individual to be a resident. It only determines the 
commencement period of the residence status that is “on the 1st day of January 
in a year of assessment.” The key word in the commencement date is “on” 
meaning that once an individual happens to be in a state on the 1st January, he 
automatically becomes a resident of that state. Thus, an individual can become 
a resident of a state, even if he spent only one day. For instance, if he arrives at 
the state on 31st December, then become resident on the following day (1st 
January). Given the permanent nature of ‘place of residence’ and ‘principal 
place of residence’ mentioned above, an individual can acquire permanent 
residence status in just one day. Conversely, an individual can spend over 365 
days in a state without establishing permanent residence status.  
 
                                                 
49 paragraph 1 (d) of the PITA (as amended) 
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6.1.2 Residence of Entities other than corporations 
 
 
The Nigerian regime classifies entities such as trusts, estates, communities and 
families as taxable persons under the PITA. The income of these entities is 
assessed through direct assessment.50 Like the individual, PITA provides that 
these entities are liable to pay tax to the state where they are located. It provides 
for the determination of the tax residence of each of the entities. However, as 
discussed below, the PITA does not provide for a situation where any one of 
these entities happens to be located in more than one state in Nigeria. That is 
the type of tiebreaker rule provided in the case of an individual. 
 
6.1.2.1  Partnership 
 
Although the PITA recognises the notion of partnership income, it treats the 
partners individually. It provides that: 
“The gains or profits from a partnership of a partner therein shall be the 
sum of— (a) any remuneration, interest on capital, or the cost of passages 
to or from Nigeria wholly or mainly undertaken for the purpose of leave 
or recreation, which is charged in the partnership accounts in respect of 
that partner; and (b) his share of the income of the partnership, computed 
in accordance with the provisions of this Act…”51 
 
The Act requires a partnership to be registered with the relevant tax authority of 
the state where the partnership is situated.52 Thus, the tax residence of each of 




                                                 
50 Section 41 (1) PITA 
51 Section 8 (1) of the PITA 
52 Section 8 (8) of the PITA 
53 Ibid section 8 (7) 
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6.1.2.2   Corporation sole or body of individuals  
 
The residence of a corporation sole54or body of individuals55 is the state56 where 
its principal office is located as at the 1st January of the year of assessment. If it 
has no any office in any territory in Nigeria, then the residence is the state where 
the income is wholly or partly derived for that year.57   
6.1.2.3  Trustees and Executors of Estate 
 
 
The usual mode of creating a trust is where a settlor transfers his property to a 
trustee for the benefit of the beneficiary. On the other hand, an estate refers to 
the assets and liabilities left behind by a deceased person at his death. The 
Nigerian law recognises both the trust and the estate as entities capable of 
engaging in income-earning activities. It follows, therefore, that the income 
generated by these entities is taxable. However, in respect of a trust, the income 
tax liability depends on who earns the income as between the trustee and the 
beneficiary. Thus, whoever earns the income is liable to pay the tax.  In the same 
vein, the tax liability on the income earned by an estate depends on whether the 
income is earned by the heirs or by the estate before devolution. When the estate 
earns an income before devolution, the estate pays the tax on the income earned. 
                                                 
54 Historically corporation sole is a legal entity created to allow holders of religious offices to pass title 
and lands from one office holder to another in perpetuity without having to pay taxes. It is managed 
by a single director who is the sole incorporator or the successor of the incorporator of the 
corporation. But in the context of the PITA, the sole corporation is considered as a ‘sole 
proprietorship”. That is where an individual solely establishes an unincorporated business 
enterprise.  
55 One may argue that and other legal entities are associations of persons which may also be considered 
as body of individuals. Hence, the body of individuals is akin to a company. However, the term body 
of individuals should not be confused with the term association of person.  Only individuals could 
be members of the former and it is usually established not necessarily for income-earning activities. 
In the case of the latter, both individuals and other legal personalities could form the association of 
person and it is usually established for income-earning purposes.  For income tax purposes it is the 
income of the association of person that is taxable not that of the members. In the case of body of 
individuals, the taxable income is that of each of the members. see Lee, S ‘A Body of Individuals: 
The Paradox of Community in Contemporary Fiction’ (2009) Columbus: The Ohio State University 
Press, Ohio 
56 The state in this context includes the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. 
57 Paragraph 9 of the 1st schedule of PITA  
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However, after distribution, each of the heirs pays the tax from his share and the 
rule of determining individual’s residence apply.58 The PITA makes the 
following provision for the determination of the tax residence of a trust or estate:  
 
“In the case of income arising to a trustee of any settlements or trusts, or 
estates or to an executor of any estate of a deceased person, tax may only 
be imposed by the territory of which the tax authority is the relevant tax 
authority in relation to such settlement, trust or estate and to the extent 
provided in the Second Schedule to this Act.”59 
 
Nigeria has a different regime for the taxation of trust because it classifies trusts 
within the realm of personal income tax. The regime avoided the complexities 
involved in determining the residence of a trust under the South African60 and 
other regimes. Until recently when the Canadian Supreme Court in Fundy 
Settlement v. Canada61 gave guidance on the issue of trust residence, the 
Canadian regime was surrounded by uncertainty about the residence of a  trust 




Under the Nigerian customary laws, there is no notion of individual ownership 
of landed property. Thus, the land is considered as the property of the whole 
                                                 
58 See section 27 of the PITA “Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Part of this Act, the 
assess-able income of a trustee, or of an executor of the estate of a deceased individual, or of a 
beneficiary of a trust or estate for any year of assessment shall be the income of that person as 
determined under the provisions of the Second Schedule to this Act of the year preceding that year.” 
See also section 16 PITA 
59 Section 3 (6) PITA 
60 Under the South African regime, Trust is equated with corporations. Thus, the rule for the 
determination of corporate residence also applies to Trust. See DU Plessis, I ‘The Residence of a 
Trust for South African Income Tax Purposes’ (2009) 21 SA Merc L.J. 322–343. However, the 
Nigerian regime does not concern itself with the Trust. Instead it only makes the Trustee(s) liable to 
tax on the income accruable to them.   
61 (2012) SCC 14 the Canadian Supreme Court has extended the De Beers principle to the determination 
of residence of trusts as well. The court held that the trust was residents of Canada for tax purposes 
because it is the beneficiaries who exercised the CMC of the trusts. And they exercised it while 
residing in Canada. The court did not say that the residence of a trust can never be the residence of 
the trustees if the trustees (not the beneficiaries) exercised the CMC. The Trustees in this relied on 
the earlier decision in Thibodean Family v. The Queen, 78 DTC 6376 where the court  held that the 
residence of a trust for tax purposes was where the majority of the trustees reside. 
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family that comprises both the dead, living and unborn members of the family.   
The family property or any form of interest is managed and control by the head 
of the family who serves as the representative of the family in any transaction 
that affects the interest of the whole family.  Most of the Nigerian customary 
laws recognise the power of the head of the family to engage in income-earning 
activities with the family property and income so derived is devolved to the 
whole members of the family. As a result of this, the PITA classified the family 
income so generated as taxable under its provisions. Therefore, in determining 
the residence of the family for the purposes income tax, the Act provides that: 
“In the case of income of a family recognised under any law or custom 
in Nigeria as families income, in which the several interests of individual 
members of the family are indeterminate or uncertain, tax may be 
imposed only by the territory in which the member of that family who 
customarily receives that income in the first instance in Nigeria usually 
resides.”62 
 
The above provision makes the place where the original ancestor of the family 
resided. How can we determine the member who was first entitled to the family 
income? What about the ancestors who died even before the creation of Nigeria 
let alone its division into states?  The complexity of this provision could be 
cured if law concentrated on the individual members only and tax them by the 
aggregate of their income whether or not it was derived from family income. 
  
6.1.2.5  Communities 
 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria consists of more than two hundred and fifty-
six different tribes.63 Among these groups, there are nomadic pastoral 
communities64 that move around the territory of Nigeria without any settled 
                                                 
62 Section 3 (5) PITA 
63 Oni, BA ‘Discriminatory property inheritance rights under the Yoruba and Igbo Customary Law in 
Nigeria: The need for reforms’ (2014) 19 (2) IOSR-JHSS 30 at 30 
64There are about 6.5 million nomadic pastoralists in Nigeria. See SITUATION REPORT ON 
NOMADIC EDUCATION – The Department of Programme Development and Extension, National 
Commission for Nomadic Education, Kaduna, Nigeria found at 
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location. The PITA imposes tax on the collective income of this type of 
communities in the following terms: 
“In the case of a village or other indigenous communities, tax may be 
imposed for any year only by the law of the territory in which that 
community is to be found, and the tax may be charged on— (a) the 
estimated total income of all its members; (b) the estimated total income 
of those of its members whose income it is impracticable in the opinion 
of the relevant tax authority to assess individually; or (c) the amount of 
any communal income which, in the opinion of the relevant tax authority 
in relation to such community, it is impracticable to apportion with 
certainty between its members.”65 
 
In the light of the above provision, the tax residence of the nomadic pastoral 
communities is any state in Nigeria where they are found in the year of 
assessment. The problem with this provision is that by the nature of the nomadic 
communities, there is no specific time of the year where these communities 
could be found in a particular place. Therefore, they do not fall within any year 
of assessment unless a separate year of assessment will be provided for them. 
 
 
6.1.3 Residence of an Individual in Nigeria 
 
Due to the global economic integration, individuals residing in one state may 
engage in cross-border labour, business, and trade that inevitably bring him into 
contact with other states. Similarly, most of the Foreign Direct Investment 
regime allows foreign investors to incorporate companies.66 It follows, therefore 
                                                 
http://www1.chr.up.ac.za/chr_old/indigenous/documents/Nigeria/Report/Situation%20Report%20
on%20Nomadic%20Education  For discussion on the nature and activities of these communities see 
VerEecke, C ‘Nigeria’s experiment with a national programme for nomadic education’ Paper 
presented at the Association for African Studies meetings, Chicago, October 1988 Dyson-Hudson, 
R and  Dyson-Hudson, N ‘Nomadic Pastoralism’ (1980) 9 Annual Review of Anthropology 15 at 
16 
65 Section 3 (4) PITA 
66 For instance, in Nigeria, by section 17 of the Nigerian Investment and Promotion Council Act 2004 
“foreign companies are allowed to invest and participate in the operation of any enterprise in 
Nigeria, except those in the negative list.” and sections 20 and 54 of the Companies and Allied 
Matters Act Cap C20 LFN 2004 “for any foreign company that intends to carry on business in 
Nigeria to first be incorporated under the Nigerian law before it commences the business” The 
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that the income earned by the expatriate is liable to tax in the state where the 
income earner resides. The determination of the tax residence of this class of 
individuals varies from one state to another. While some states determine the 
individual residence based on physical presence, others use a combination of 
the physical presence and other connecting factors such as ordinary residence. 
The Nigerian Constitution empowers the federal government of Nigeria to 
exercise both substantive and enforcement tax jurisdiction over all individuals 
residing in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja and over all members of the 
armed forces, the police, officers of the Nigerian embassies/high commissions 
and the expatriates.67 The regime adopts a different formula for the 
determination of these classes of taxpayers.  
6.1.3.1 Physical Presence Test 
 
The Nigerian regime focuses more on expatriates working in Nigeria than on 
those who engage in business or trade. That is why both the physical presence 
and ordinary residence tests applicable in Nigeria hinge on the issue of 
employment rather than business or trade. Therefore, the tax residence of 
expatriate or foreigners is determined by the making reference to their 
employment. That is to say, an individual is deemed resident in Nigeria if he 
exercises duties of employment in Nigeria. Thus, an expatriate under foreign 
employment become a Nigerian resident if he carries out the duties of his job in 
Nigeria for 183 days or more68 in a 12-month calendar year. The PITA provides: 
“ The gain or profit from an employment shall be deemed to be derived 
from Nigeria if— (a) the duties of the employment are wholly or partly 
performed in Nigeria, unless— (i) the duties are performed on behalf of 
an employer who is in a country other than Nigeria and the remuneration 
of the employee is not borne by a fixed base of the employer in Nigeria; 
and (ii) the employee is not in Nigeria for a period or periods amounting 
                                                 
companies incorporated by the foreign investors engage the services of expatriate to carry out 
essential services to the companies.  
67 Section 2 (1) (b) of the PITA 2004 (as amended) 
68 including temporary periods of absence 
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to an aggregate of 183 days (inclusive annual leave or temporary period 
of absence) or more in any twelve month period commencing in a 
calendar year and ending either within that same year or the following 
year; (iii) the remuneration of the employee is liable to tax in that other 
country under the provisions of the avoidance of double taxation treaty 
with that other country ”69 
 
The application of the 183-day rule is very confusing and complicated. The 
above section has a deeming provision in respect of income from employment 
that took place in Nigeria where the employee did not stay in Nigeria for 183 
days or more in any twelve month period. It does not make the 183 – day rule a 
connecting factor for establishing tax residence; rather it only determines the 
source of income of an expatriate. Most Nigerian commentators70 and the Tax 
Authorities lean toward the notion that once an individual spends 183-days in 
Nigeria, he becomes a Nigerian resident. The commentators may arguably be 
persuaded by the phrase “(inclusive annual leave or temporary period of 
absence)” in section 10 (1) quoted above. Superficially, the section suggests that 
once an expatriate spends 183 – days in Nigeria, he becomes a Nigerian 
resident. Hence, it constitutes a connecting factor by the length of physical 
presence. However, the operative phrase in that section  “The gain or profit from 
employment shall be deemed to be derived from Nigeria if …” suggests the 
contrary. It specifically deals with the issue of deemed sourced not residence.71   
                                                 
69 Section 10 (1) of the PITA 
70Fowler, T ‘Highlighting the Issues, problems and challenges relating to the taxation of foreign 
individuals’ Paper presented at the 5th Business Law Conference of the Nigerian Bar Association 
Section On Business Law 7th April, 2010 in Lagos Nigeria at 3 Arogundale, JA ‘Nigerian income tax 
and its international dimension’ (2005)  (1st ed) Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan  at 23  Elegido, JM 
‘Liability of Non-Residents to Nigerian Tax’ (1987) 15 Int'l Bus. Law at 411; Abdulrazaq, MT 
‘Nigerian Revenue Law’ (2005) Malthouse Press Limited, Lagos at 21 
71 Section 3 of PITA defined taxable income as “(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, tax shall be 
payable for each year of assessment on the aggregate amounts each of which is the income of every 
taxable person, for the year, from a source inside or outside Nigeria, including, without restricting the 
generality of the foregoing— (a) gain or profit from any trade, business, profession or vocation, for 
whatever period of time such trade, business, profession or vocation may have been carried on or 
exercised; (b) any salary, wage, fee, allowance or other gain or profit from employment including 
compensations, bonuses, premiums, benefits or other perquisites allowed, given or granted by any 
person to an employee …” This definition makes a clear distinction between income derived from 




Be that as it may, the so-called 183 – day rule under the Nigerian regime is 
totally lopsided. It is only restricted to an individual who derives his income 
from employment. Therefore, it is entirely at variance with international trends 
on the physical presence test as discussed in chapter four, above. Even the US 
regime that is the closest to that of Nigeria provides for a ‘substantial presence 
test’.72 Under this test, an individual could become a US resident by spending a 
specific number of days irrespective of the source of his income. Another 
dimension of the weakness of the Nigerian regime is that it sought to treat 
expatriate differently, but it does not make any separate provision for the 
administration of tax of the expatriate. Thus, the regime makes them subject to 
the relevant tax authority of the state they reside in the year of assessment. 
Moreover, the local tiebreaker provision is not elaborate enough to deal with 
the case of expatriates. Therefore, the Nigeria operates a flawed regime on the 
physical presence test, and the complexities and inconsistencies of the regime 
could create a double residence situation that cannot be resolved by any DTA. 
 
6.1.3.2 Ordinary Resident 
 
 
Under the Nigerian regime, the expression ‘ordinary resident’ appears in the 
provisions dealing with the issues of exempted incomes and that of allowable 
deductions. Thus, the PITA exempts certain income of some particular 
individuals who are not ordinary residents of Nigeria.73 It also allows an 
                                                 
in Nigeria hinged on the individual who earns his income from employment. What about the 
individual who happens to be in Nigeria and earn his income through trade or business other than 
employment? 
72 For discussion on substantial presence test see chapter four of this thesis 
73 Section 19 (1) of the PITA provides that “There shall be exempt from the tax all that income specified 
in the Third Schedule to this Act” Paragraph 1 of the third schedule to the PITA provides that “The 
incomes set out in this Schedule are exempted from taxation.” The exempted income includes; “The 
emoluments payable from United Kingdom funds to members of visiting or other forces and to 
persons in the permanent service of the United Kingdom Government in Nigeria in respect of their 
offices under the United Kingdom Government and the emoluments payable to members of any 
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individual who ordinarily resides in Nigeria or who at any time during the year 
of assessment becomes ordinarily resident in Nigeria to deduct certain 
expenditure74 that is not available to a non-ordinary resident.75 Therefore, the 
ordinary resident status of an individual is crucial in determining the level of his 
tax liability. However, what could be distilled from the notion of ‘ordinary 
residence’ provided in the PITA is that the concept of ordinary residence is not 
considered as a connecting factor for establishing tax liability. Rather, it is used 
as a factor for totally exempting a taxable income or reducing its quantum. Thus, 
the Nigerian notion of ordinary residence hinges on the income instead of the 
income earner. In other words, the question as to whether or not an individual 
is an ordinary resident is premised on the issues of income exemption and 
allowable deduction. This makes Nigeria regime more complex and 
contradictory. 
 
Be that as it may, the PITA or any subsidiary legislation does not define the 
concept of ‘ordinary residence’. Also, there is no guidance from the Nigerian 
courts on the correct interpretation of the concept.76  In a search for the 
                                                 
civilian component, and the income of any authorised service organisations, accompanying the 
visiting forces: Provided that this exemption shall not apply to any individual who is a citizen of 
Nigeria or who ordinarily resides in Nigeria.”  Also  “All consular fees received on behalf of a 
foreign State, or by a consular officer or employee of the State of his own account, and all income 
of such officer or employee, other than income in respect of any trade, business, profession or 
vocation carried on by an officer or employee or in respect of any other employment exercised by 
him with Nigeria: Provided that this exemption shall not apply where the employee is engaged on 
domestic duties or where the officer or employee ordinarily resides in Nigeria and is not also a 
national of the foreign State.” See paragraphs 4 and 5 of the third schedule to the PITA. 
74 Such as insurance, Alimony paid, maintenance of an unmarried child, maintenance of a close 
incapacitated relative, payment made for assistance in respect a disabled individual. 
75 Section 33 (3) of the PITA (as amended) provides that   “In the case of an individual who ordinarily 
resides in Nigeria, or who at any time during the year of assessment— (a) becomes ordinarily 
resident in Nigeria in connection with any trade, business, profession or vocation carried on by him; 
or (b) exercises any employment, the whole gains or profits of which are deemed under the 
provisions of section 12 of this Act to be derived from Nigeria, there shall also be allowed the 
deduction specified in subsection (4) of this section. 
76 The Federal Inland Revenue Service, Information Circular No: 9302 of 22 March, 1993 attempted to 
provide explanation on the concept. Paragraph 2.1 of the Circular provides that: An individual is 
regarded as resident in Nigeria throughout an assessment year if he: 
(i) is domiciled in Nigeria; 
(ii)  sojourns in Nigeria for a period or periods in all amounting to 183 days or 
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definition of the expression ‘ordinary resident’, the Nigerian courts are required 
to rely on decisions of the UK courts77 and by extension, those of other common 
law jurisdictions.78 With the introduction of the Statutory Residence Test as the 
sole test for the determination of individual residence in the UK decisions on 
‘ordinary residence’ are now abandoned. The UK Finance Act 2013 expressly 
abolished the concept of ‘ordinary residence’ as a connecting factor. Now, what 
would be the stand of the Nigerian Courts when confronted with the issue of 
ordinary residence? 
 
Given the different notion of ‘ordinary residence’ discussed in chapter four, the 
question is – is there any distinction between the ordinary resident of Nigeria 
and the resident of one of the states in Nigeria? To sum it up, the complexities 
and inconsistencies that characterise the Nigerian regime on the physical 
presence test extend to the issue of ‘ordinary residence’. The only difference 
between the physical presence and ordinary residence tests is that the former 
test deals with individuals who earned their income from employment whereas 
the latter covers all types of incomes. 
 
 
                                                 
more in a 12-month period; or 
(iii)  serves as a diplomat or diplomatic agent of Nigeria in a country other than Nigeria 
Paragraph 2.3.1 of the Circular provides that “A non-resident individual is a person who is not 
domiciled in Nigeria or who stays in Nigeria for less than 183 days but derives income or profits 
from Nigeria. A non- resident individual becomes liable to tax from the day he commences to carry 
on a trade, business, vocation, or profession in Nigeria” However, one of the cardinal feature of tax 
is that only a legislation can define the persons who liable to tax not a mere Circular. Moreover, the 
Circular introduced the issue of ‘domicile’ which the PITA did not provide. 
77. Under the Nigerian legal system, all courts are enjoined to follow the line of reasoning of the UK’s 
court and the UK decisions are recognized as part of the persuasive judicial precedence. See Section 
10 of the High Court Law of Lagos State which is pari material with all other states High Court laws 
provides: “The High Court shall in addition to any other jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution 
of the Federation or by thus or other enactment possess and exercise, within the limits mentioned 
in, and subject to the provisions of, the Constitution of the Federation and this enactment, all the 
jurisdiction, powers and authority which are vested in or capable of being exercised by the High 
Court of Justice of England.” 
78 Like Canada and Australia 
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 6.1.4 Critique of the Nigerian Regime on Individual Residence 
 
 
The Nigerian residence-based regime violates horizontal equity principles 
because it treats similarly situated residents unequally. It also violates vertical 
equity by giving more emphasis to the lower income-earners and leaves the 
higher income earner. In the former case, the regime concentrates on the Pay-
As-You-Earn (PAYE) system79that is designed to deal with the income earn 
from the formal employment. Thus, the regime has limited application to the 
informal jobs, trade or business that constitute the largest part of the Nigerian 
economy.80 Take for instance, the case of two Nigerian residents. The first 
resident earns his income through a formal employment with a registered and 
known employer while the other resident is self-employed or engaged in an 
independent trade or business. The employer of the first resident is under 
obligation to deduct the taxable income from the salary or wages payable to the 
resident.81 Thus, there is no room for him to either evade or avoid the income 
tax. The second resident, on the other hand, is must pay the tax through the 
method of direct assessment. As a result of inadequate information and records 
on the activities of the self-employed resident, it would be easy for the second 
resident to avoid or even evade the tax. 
  
Furthermore, the Nigerian regime is not economically efficient because it 
segregates residents who derive their income from employment through the 
                                                 
79 Made pursuant to section 81 of the PITA and the Operation of PAY-AS-YOU-EARN (PAYE) 
regulations (S.L. 18 of 2002) 
80 Akhidime, EA and Rachel, AE ‘Nigerian Personal Income Tax (amendment) Act 2011: Implication 
for tax administration and enforcement’ (2013) 2 (4) AFRREV IJAH 217 at 222; Adebisi, JF and 
Gbegi, DO ‘Effect of Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion on Personal Income Tax Administration in 
Nigeria’ (2013) 1 (3) American Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 125 at 134 “The major 
problem lies in the collection of the taxes especially from the self-employed such as the 
businessmen, contractors, professional practitioners like lawyers, doctors, accountants, architects 
and traders in shops among others.” According to Ayua “This class of individual blatantly refuses 
to pay tax by reporting losses every year.” See Ayua, LA. ‘The Nigerian Tax Law’ (1999) Spectrum 
Law, Publishing, Ibadan. “This class of individual blatantly refuses to pay tax by reporting losses 
every year.” 
81 Section 82 and 84 of PITA 
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PAYE system. The only enforcement mechanism that could be argued to be 
similar to PAYE is the withholding tax regime but the provisions only deal with 
the formal form of businesses or trades.82 Other residents who earn their income 
from informal self-employed businesses enjoy the deficiency of the tax 
enforcement mechanism. This lopsided regime could distort the decisions of 
residents on whether to be in the formal or informal sector of the Nigerian 
economy. Thus, residents will be more inclined to be in the informal self-
employed which some commentators83 argue to be the largest sector of the 
Nigerian economy. Statistics show that as at 2014 the revenue generated from 
PAYE is far higher than that collected through direct assessment for the 
informal sector of the economy.84 For instance, in 2014 Lagos State generated 
the sum of N163, 001,789,450.77 from the personal income tax. Out of this 
amount only N9, 392, 939,866.44 was generated from the direct assessment of 
the informal sector, whereas the remaining N153, 608, 849,584.33 was 
generated from the PAYE system.85 
 
On administrative efficiency, the Nigerian residence-based regime for 
individuals is characterized by both administrative and enforcement concerns. 
The Nigerian Constitution shared the enforcement tax jurisdiction of the 
individual income tax between the federal and states governments.86 Under the 
                                                 
82 By sections 73 (1) “Income tax assessable on a person whether or not an assessment has been made, 
shall, if the relevant tax authority so directs, be recoverable from any payment made by any person 
to that person.” The other sections deal with specific aspect of the income; sections 69 (rent), 70 
(interest), 71 (dividend), 72 (directors fees) 
83 Akhidime, EA and Rachel, AE ‘Nigerian Personal Income Tax (amendment) Act 2011: Implication 
for tax administration and enforcement’ (2013) 2 (4) AFRREV IJAH 217 at 222; Ayua, LA. ‘The 
Nigerian Tax Law’ (1999) Spectrum Law, Publishing, Ibadan. 
84 See Internally Generated Revenue at State Level (2014), published by Nigerian National Bureau of 
Statistic found at www.nigerianstat.gov.ng  last visited on 27/07/2015 
85 Source: Lagos State of Nigeria, Board of Internal Revenue Service found at www.lirs.gov.ng last 
visited on 27/07/2015 
86 Section 4 (2) of the 1999 Constitution provides that “The National Assembly shall have power to 
make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part thereof with respect 
to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List set out in Part I of the Second Schedule to this 
Constitution” Item 59 of part of the second schedule provides that. “Taxation of incomes, profits and 
capital gains, except as otherwise prescribed by this Constitution.” That means the exclusive 
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provision of the Constitution, the PITA provides that an individual is liable to 
pay tax to the state he resides in as at the 1st January.87 For the purpose of 
enforcing this residence-based provision, PITA adopts Pay-As-You-Earn 
(PAYE) system.88 The system imposes an obligation on all employers of labour 
to deduct taxable income from the emoluments of their employees, and they 
must remit the deducted income to the relevant tax authority.89 By the provisions 
of section 2 (2) PITA, the relevant tax authority is supposed to be the tax 
authority of the state where the employee resides.90 
 
However, an individual may live in state A and work in state B and the income 
deducted from his salary goes to the state where his employer is situated not the 
state where he resides. The problem is created by the provision of the PITA 
where it states that:  
“Income tax chargeable on an employee by an assessment whether or not 
the assessment has been made, shall, if the relevant tax authority so 
directs, be recoverable from any emolument paid, or from any payment 
made on account of the emolument, by the employer to the employee. 
(2) A direction under subsection (1) of this section shall be in writing 
addressed to an employer or be published in the State Gazette, and shall 
specify the emolument of an employee or class of employees to which it 
                                                 
substantive tax jurisdiction to impose income tax on both individuals and corporations lie with 
National Assembly (The second arm of the federal government). In addition to the above exclusive 
jurisdiction, the National Assembly is also empowered to share the enforcement jurisdiction on 
individual income tax with the states. Section 4 (4) of the 1999 Constitution provides: “ In addition 
and without prejudice to the powers conferred by subsection (2) of this section, the National Assembly 
shall have power to make laws with respect to the following matters, that is to say:- (a) any matter in 
the Concurrent Legislative List set out in the first column of Part II of the Second Schedule to this 
Constitution to the extent prescribed in the second column opposite thereto;”  Item 7 of part two of 
the second schedule to the Constitution provides; “In the exercise of its powers to impose any tax or 
duty on - (a) capital gains, incomes or profits or persons other than companies … the National 
Assembly may, subject to such conditions as it may prescribe, provide that the collection of any such 
tax or duty or the administration of the law imposing it shall be carried out by the Government of a 
State or other authority of a State.” See also Emiko, G.I. ‘An Analysis of Federal/State Taxing Powers’ 
in Ajemo, M.A. (ed) Tax Law and Tax Administration in Nigeria (1991) NIALS Publication, Lagos, 
12 at 4. 
87 Section 2 (2) PITA 
88 See Section 81 of the PITA and the Operation of PAY AS YOU EARN (PAYE) regulations (S.L. 18 
of 2002.) see also Akhaah JCA in Lagos State Internal Revenue Board v. Motorola Nigeria Ltd and 
another (2012) LPELR-14712 (CA). 
89 Section 82 PITA 
90 See also section 108 of the PITA for the definition of ‘relevant tax authority’. 
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refers and the amount or amounts of income tax to be deducted, whether 
by reference to tax tables issued by the relevant tax authority or 
otherwise.”91 
 
Therefore, the above provision creates a relationship between an employer and 
the tax authority of the state where it is located not the state where the employee 
resides. The PITA clearly establishes the territorial limit of the relevant tax 
authority that: 
“The State Board shall be responsible for—  (a) ensuring the 
effectiveness and optimum collection of all taxes and penalties due to the 
Government under the relevant laws; (b) doing all such things as may be 
deemed necessary and expedient for the assessment and collection of the 
tax and shall account for all amounts so collected in a manner to be 
prescribed by the Commissioner; (d) generally controlling the 
management of the State Service on matters of policy, subject to the 
provisions of the law setting up the State Service;”92  
 
Thus, the relevant tax authority of the state where the employee resides is not 
empowered to direct the employer, who is located in another state, to remit the 
deducted tax. Furthermore, for individuals in the informal sector of the Nigerian 
economy, the PITA directs such class of taxpayers to file their annual return to 
the relevant tax authority in the state where they reside: 
“For each year of assessment, a taxable person shall, without notice or 
demand therefor, file a return of income in the prescribed form and 
containing the prescribed information with the tax authority of the State 
in which the taxable person is deemed to be a resident…”93 
  
In the light of the above provisions, there is a serious competition between states 
and federal and states, inter se on who is their resident for the purposes of 
individual income tax. It is a general trend in all the federal states that the 
geographical maps of the sub-national states share a gaunt boundary 
delineation. Due to the proximity of the sub-national states, the individuals 
                                                 
91 Section 81 (1) and (2) PITA 
92 Section 88 (1) PITA 
93 Section 41 (1) PITA 
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residing in one state may be working in another. They usually work in the 
daytime and return to their respective state of a residence after closing hours in 
another state.94 The issue of inter-state conflicts on individual residence has 
drawn the attention of many commentators.95  
 
The Nigerian inter-state conflict on individual tax residence brings another 
dimension to the discourse. The Nigerian Constitution granted only 
enforcement tax jurisdiction96 in respect of individual income tax to the states. 
Thus, the State Governments only enforce the individual income tax imposed 
by the Federal Government.97 The Federal Republic of Nigeria consists of 
thirty-six states and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. There are conflicts of 
enforcement jurisdiction between some of the economic centre states98 that 
share gaunt borderline with the states99 with less economic activities.  
                                                 
94 For instance, the USA individual residence regime recognized this fact, because by section 7701 (b) 
(7) (B) of the US Internal Revenue Code 1986, an individual regularly commuting to the US for 
employment and return to his place of residence either in Canada or Mexico is exempted. 
95 Swain, JA95  examined the US approach in addressing cross-border transaction both international and 
state levels, focusing on issues of residency, enforcement, and jurisdiction and sourcing in the light 
of US citizen-based income tax system; Lemos, MH ‘State enforcement of federal law’ (2011) 86 
(3) NYU L. Rev. on the other hand analysed the interface of law enforcement between state and 
federal government. That is the situation where a state seeks to enforce a federal law. Zelinsky, EA 
‘Apportioning the state personal income taxes to eliminate the double taxation of dual residents: 
Thought provoked by the proposed Minnesota Snowbird tax’ (2014) 15 (7) Fla. Tax rev. 533 (He 
challenged the traditional inter-state jurisdictional conflicts whereby if an individual is deemed 
resident in to two states, the states are entitled to tax the whole income of the individual. He argued 
that the emphasis should be placed on the physical presence of the individual in each of the states. 
Therefore, the taxing right on an individual income should be share between the states in pro rata of 
the days spent by the individual in each of the state. The problem with this view is that if the 
individual spent a half day in the two states and each of the state considers half day as full day, then 
the individual may end up paying the double of what he ought to have paid under the traditional 
rule. See also zelinsky EA ‘Rethinking tax nexus and apportionment: voice, exit and the dormant 
clause (2008) 28 Va. Tax Rev. 1; Hashmi A ‘Is Home Really Where the Heart Is?: State Taxation 
of Domiciliaries, Statutory Residents, and Non-residents in the District of Columbia’ (2012) 65 Tax 
Lawyer 797; Feld, LP and Kirchgassener, G ‘Income tax competition at the State and Local 
Government level in Switzerland’ (2000) CESiFo working Paper series. 238 
96 Whereas substantive tax jurisdiction on individual as well as both the substantive and enforcement 
tax jurisdiction are given to the Federal Government. 
97 Achara, RA ‘Can Nigerian local government council autonomously impose rates? (2003) 47 J. Afr. 
L.  221 Okorodudu, MT ‘Nigeria: Analysis of federal and state taxing powers’ (1985) 11 Int’l Tax 
J. 
98 Such as Lagos, Kano, Rivers, Abia, Oyo, Ananbra States and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. 




In consideration of the high living expenses in the former states, individuals 
may decide to reside in the latter states but work in the former states. Therefore, 
they earn their income in one state and reside in another. Moreover, the 
enforcement mechanism for collecting the taxable income of the individual is 
the PAYE system. As discussed above, the obligation to deduct the individual’s 
income tax from the salary is imposed by the states where the employer is 
located not where the employee resides.  This arrangement is a challenge for the 
Nigerian individual residence regime as to whether it is truly residence-based. 
As a result of the complex situation highlighted above, it is the source-states 
that collect the income tax, not the residence state.  
 
 
As a corollary, there is the issue of remittance of the income tax deducted to the 
beneficial state. Notwithstanding the fact that the PITA imposes a remittance 
obligation on the employer who deducts the taxable income of its employee to 
the state that imposes the deducting obligation, the employers often fail to 
discharge the obligation.100 The failure to comply may be a result of the 
employees’ discretion to indicate his state of residence in the record of his 
employment that may mislead the employer. It may be due to the employer’s 
deliberate failure to remit the deducted taxable income, and this is very common 
for government departments and agencies.101 To sum up, some vital unresolved 
questions expose the complexity and inconsistency of the Nigerian regime:  
                                                 
100 The Nigerian Court of Appeal in the case of Seven-Up Bottling Co.  Plc V.  Lagos State Board of 
Internal  Revenue (2000) 3 NWLR (pt. 650) 565 held that failure to  remit the tax deducted from 
salaries or emoluments of  employees was a debt to the State Board of  Internal  Revenue  that 
imposes the deduction and remittance obligation on the employer and it   is  enforceable  and  
recoverable  in  the  Court  of  law. However, under the PAYE system the revenue authority has no 
right to issue Notice to the employer, because it is the employee that is the taxpayer. See Elf Oil 
Nigeria Ltd v. Oyo State Board of Internal Revenue (2002) LPELR-12260 (CA). 
101 According to a report in 2009, the Nigerian Government departments and agencies as well as the 
National Assembly failed to remit the total of N72 Billion of the individu al income tax deducted 
from their employee. See Yusuf, I A ‘Why Nigerian tax system is weak’ The Nation Newspaper 
dated 5th June, 2011. In some situations, the employers use to resist the deduction and remittance 
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  If an individual resides in state A and has been paying his income tax to 
state B, can he unilaterally switch the payment of tax to the proper state 
(state A) under the PAYE system?  
 Does the PAYE system require each state to have a database of its 
residents and their respective employers in the other states?   
 How could a company remit the deducted taxable income in a situation 
where it is located in state A, but some of its employees reside in state 
A, and some other staff reside in state B?  
 
PITA established the Joint Tax Board with the function of resolving most of the 
questions raised above.102 The JTB was created by Section 85 of PITA It 
consists of the Chairman Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) who acts as 
its Chairman and one member from each State experienced in income tax 
matters nominated by Commissioner for Finance in that State.  The Public 
Service Commission is empowered to appoint an officer experienced in income 
tax matters as the Secretary of JTB.  The duties of JTB are to arbitrate disputes 
between FIRS and State Board of Internal Revenue (SBIR) and between SBIR 
of each State and another state, and to promote uniformity in the application of 
the law. However, the board lacks any form of enforcement mechanism. It only 
plays the role of an advisory body.  Therefore, it is incapable of resolving the 






                                                 
obligation impose on them, which was one of the issue raised in Ukpong & anor. v. Commissioner 
for finance and economic development & anor (2006) 19 NWLR (pt. 1013) 187. 
102 See section 86 (1), (2) and (9) of the PITA. 
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6.2 Residence-Based Taxation of Individuals in South African  
 
South Africa adopted a source-based regime103 as at the inception of its income 
tax system in 1914.104 The regime was in operation up to the end of the year of 
assessment 2001 when the Republic of South Africa switched from a source-
based system to a residence-based system. The switch was gradual, starting with 
the expansion of the deemed source rule to cover the investment income of all 
South African residents.105 Thus, this transitional regime introduced a partial 
residence-based system and for its application, resident has been defined as: 
For the purposes of this section … ‘resident’ means any natural person 
who is ordinarily resident in the Republic and any person other than a 
                                                 
103 Under the source-based income tax system the state imposes tax on the basis of the nexus between 
the state and the taxable income. See Olivier, L ‘Residence based taxation’ (2001) J. S. Afr. L. 20 
at 21. See also Boltar, J ‘Law of taxation’ (2000) Ann. Surv. S. African L. 813 at 813 - 814That is 
to say, once a person (resident or non-resident) derived income from a state, such income becomes 
taxable by the state at the same rate and the same rate of deduction is allowed to the income earners. 
Thus, residence status of the income earner is immaterial. See Williams, RC ‘Income Tax in South 
Africa: Law and Practice’ (2006) LexisNexis, Durban at 31. It is worth noting that the determination 
of the residence status of a taxpayer was relevant under the South African source-based regime by 
virtue of the deemed-source provisions in the Income Tax Act. For instance, sections 9 (2) and 9 (3) 
of the Income Tax Act deemed certain class of income accrued to an individual who is a South 
African ordinary resident or a corporation that is a domestic company. Similarly, section 10 of the 
Income Tax Act exempted certain income but the exemption is not applicable to the income accrued 
to an individual who is ordinary resident in South Africa or a domestic company. However, the word 
‘resident’ was defined under the regime. 
104 Williams argued that except for secondary tax on companies, the South African source-based 
regime was non-residents-friendly. See Williams (2006) at 32  
105 Section 9C (2) of the Income Tax Act No. 28 of 1997provides that “Subject to the provisions of 
section 9D(4), any investment income received by or accrued to any— (a) resident; and (b) person 
(other than a resident) arising from the activities carried on by him through a permanent 
establishment situated in the Republic, from any country other than the Republic during any year of 
assessment, shall, for the purposes of the definition of ‘gross income’ in section 1, be deemed to 
have been received by or accrued to such resident or person from a source within the Republic during 
such year of assessment.” Section 9C (4) provides that “Where any investment income is received 
or accrued in accordance with this section in the course of the carrying on of any trade outside the 
Republic, such trade shall for the purposes of sections 11, 20 and 28 be deemed to have been carried 
on in the Republic.” Section 9 D deals with the taxation of the investment income of ‘Controlled 
Foreign Companies’ while section 9E deals with foreign earned dividend. This regime was 
introduced based on the recommendation of the Commission of Enquiry into Certain Aspects of the 
Tax Structure of South Africa, GG 15924, Regulation Gazette 5378 of 1994 (Known as Katz 
Commission). In its Fifth Interim Report of the Katz Commission captioned ‘Basing the South 
African Income Tax System on the Source or Residence Principles – Options and 
Recommendations, the Commission recommended for the retention of the source-based for the 
active income and the extension of the deemed-source rule which implies the adoption of the 
residence-based for the passive income. See Katz Commission 5th Interim Report at paras. 9.1, 9.2. 
and 9.4  
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natural person who has its place of effective management in the 
Republic;” 106 
 
In switching to a fully-fledged residence-based regime, two major amendments 
were made to the interpretation section of the South African Income Tax Act. 
That is the provision that imposes the tax liability and the one defining the class 
of person on whom the tax liability is imposed. The former refers to the 
redefinition of the term ‘gross income’ which the amended legislation defines 
as: 
“'gross income', in relation to any year or period of assessment, means- 
(i) in the case of any resident, the total amount, in cash or otherwise, 
received by or accrued to or in favour of such resident; or (ii) in the case 
of any person other than a resident, the total amount, in cash or otherwise, 
received by or accrued to or in favour of such person from a source 
within or deemed to be within the Republic, during such year or period 
of assessment ...”107 
 
Before the amendment, the word ‘person’ was mentioned in the definition of 
‘gross income’ that envisaged that the residence status of the taxpayer was not 
relevant to the determination of tax liability. That is to say, a person whether or 
not a resident of South Africa, was liable to tax on the income he earned within 
the Republic of South Africa. At its infancy stage, the South African residence-
based regime exempted certain foreign income earned by the residents.108 This 
notion of residence-based system “has been described as a ‘residence-minus’ 
system.”109 However, in 2003, the residence-minus regime was modified,110 
                                                 
106 Section 9C (1) of the Income Tax Act No. 28 of 1997 
107 Section 1 of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 (as amended by section 2 of the Revenue Laws 
Amendment Act 59 of 2000). Before the amendment, the word ‘person’ was mentioned in the 
definition of gross income which envisaged that the residence status of the taxpayer was not relevant 
in the determination of tax liability. That is to say a person whether or not a resident of South Africa 
is liable to tax from the income he earned within the Republic of South Africa. 
108 Section 12 of the Revenue Law Amendment Act No 59 of 2000 as amended by section 24 of the 
Second Revenue Law Amendment Act No. 60 of 2001 and further amended by section 16 of the 
Revenue Law Amendment Act No. 74 of 2002. The essence of this provisions was to except the 
certain class of income if the income earner was a South African resident. 
109 Williams, RC (2006) at 32 
110 By way of reducing list of exempted foreign income to those mentioned in section 10 (1) (o) of the 
Income Tax Act (dealing with the issue of remuneration for foreign employment). More particularly, 
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which brought the South African regime more into line with the international 
trends.  Unlike the former tax regime where the term ‘resident’ had not been 
defined, the definition of a ‘resident’ is crucial under the residence-based 
system. Thus, the new regime clearly defines the term in the following words: 
 
“'resident' means any- (a) natural person who is - (i) ordinarily resident 
in the Republic; or (ii) not at any time during the relevant year of 
assessment ordinarily resident in the Republic, if that person was 
physically present in the Republic- (aa) for a period or periods exceeding 
91 days in aggregate during the relevant year of assessment, as well as 
for a period or periods exceeding 91 days in aggregate during each of the 
five years of assessment preceding such year of assessment; and (bb) for 
a period or periods exceeding 915 days in aggregate during those five 
preceding years of assessment, in which case that person will be a 
resident with effect from the first day of that relevant year of assessment: 
Provided that- (A) a day shall include a part of a day, but shall not include 
any day that a person is in transit through the Republic between two 
places outside the Republic and that person does not formally enter the 
Republic through a 'port of entry' as contemplated in section 9 (1) of the 
Immigration Act, 2002 (Act 13 of 2002), or at any other place as may be 
permitted by the Director-General of the Department of Home Affairs or 
by the Minister of Home Affairs in terms of that Act; and (B) where a 
person who is a resident in terms of this subparagraph is physically 
outside the Republic for a continuous period of at least 330 full days 
immediately after the day on which such person ceases to be physically 
present in the Republic, such person shall be deemed not to have been a 
resident from the day on which such person so ceased to be physically 
present in the Republic; … but does not include— (A) any person who 
is deemed to be exclusively a resident of another country for purposes of 
the application of any agreement entered into between the Governments 
of the Republic and that other country for the avoidance of double 
taxation; …Provided that where any person that is a resident ceases to be 
                                                 
section 24 (1) of the Revenue Law Amendment Act No. 45 of 2003 which states that from 1st June 
2004 the whole provisions of section 9F has been abrogated. “The amendments contained in the Act 
widened South Africa’s tax base by shifting the tax system from a “source plus” system to a “residence-
minus” tax system. Under the former “source plus” system, South Africa taxed items arising only from 
South African sources plus a limited category of foreign source items. Under the current “residence-
minus” system, South Africa imposes taxes on a worldwide basis less a limited category of foreign 
source items.”  See National Treasury’s detailed explanation to Section 9D of the Income Tax Act 






a resident during a year of assessment, that person must be regarded as 
not being a resident from the day on which that person ceases to be a 
resident…”111 
 
It will be recalled that both individuals and entities (other than companies) are 
being treated under the one regime in Nigeria. The South African system, on 
the other hand, terms the individual a ‘natural person’. It separates the 
determination of the tax residence of individuals from that applicable to non-
natural persons such as companies and other entities. Thus, an analysis of the 
South Africa residence-based regime in this chapter centres on natural persons. 
The above provisions encompass two basic tests for the determination of the tax 
residence of individuals; ‘ordinary residence’ and ‘physical presence’. 
 
 
6.2.1 Ordinary Residence 
 
 
The two tests were designed in hierarchical order. The starting point for the 
determination of the residence status of an individual under the South African 
tax regime is to inquire whether or not the individual involved is an ordinary 
resident of South Africa. Once the ordinary resident status is established, there 
is the need to apply the ‘physical presence’ tests. 112 The vital question is how 
to establish the ‘ordinary resident’ of an individual under the South African 
regime. The concept of ordinary residence has not been statutorily defined. 
Thus, reliance must be placed on the judicial connotations of the term. The cases 
                                                 
111 Section 1 of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 (as variously amended by Section 2 (h) of Act 59 
of 2000 Revenue Laws Amendment Act 59 of 2000; Section 6 (1) (p) of the Revenue Laws 
Amendment Act No.74 of 2002; Section 33 (1) of the Exchange Control Amnesty and Amendment 
of Taxation Laws Act No. 12 of 2003 and Section 12 (1) (i), (j), (k) of the Revenue Laws Amendment 
Act No. 45 of 2003; section 3 (1) (j) of the Revenue Laws Second Amendment Act No. 32 of 2005 
up to section 2 (1) (w) and (x) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act No. 22 of 2012) see also 
Koker, A and Williams, RC ‘Silke on South African Income Tax’ (2010) LexisNexis;  Koker, A et 
al ‘Silke Tax Yearbook 2012 – 2013’ (2013) LexisNexis, Durban at D37 – D39 
112 Williams, RC (2006) at 33 
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of Cohen v. CIR113 and CIR v. Kuttel114 are the two leading decisions in South 
African analysed the concept.  
 
In Cohen’s case, the appellant lived in South Africa but left for the US together 
with his family in 1940. Although his visa indicated that he was to stay in the 
US for less than one year, he remained there up to June 1942. In the interval, 
neither the appellant nor any member of his family had returned to South Africa. 
While he was away, the appellant earned income that supposed to be exempted 
if the income earner was not a South African ‘ordinary resident.' The appellant 
sought to benefit from the exemption on the ground that he was neither an 
‘ordinary resident’ nor carried out any business in South Africa at the time he 
earned the income. The Revenue Commissioner rejected the appellant’s claim 
and assessed him accordingly. He appealed against the decision and the court 
addressed the question whether or not the appellant was an ordinary resident of 
South Africa. From the beginning, the court explicitly stated its intention to rely 
on English decisions where is it stated that  
“…no case in our Courts has dealt with the argument now before us. 
Reference was, however, made to certain cases decided in Great Britain; 
but in none of them has it been decided that residence, or ordinary 
residence, in a country requires the physical presence of the taxpayer in 
that country during the year of assessment.” 
Thus, the court adopted the notion of ordinary residence formulated by the 
English courts.115 However, in delivering the judgment, Schreiner JA stated 
that: 
" If, though a man may be "resident" in more than one country at a time, 
he can only be "ordinarily resident" in one, it would be natural to 
                                                 
113  13 SATC 362  
114 54 SATC 298 
115  Levene v Inland Revenue Commissioners (1928) All ER 746 (HL); Inland Revenue Commissioners 
v Lysaght (1928) AC 234; Reid v Inland Revenue (1926) SLT 365; Turnbull v Solicitor of Inland 
Revenue (1904) 42 S.L.R. 15 
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interpret "ordinarily" by reference to the country of his most fixed or 
settled residence. This might not be his country of domicile, for it might 
not be his domicile of origin and he might not have formed the fixed and 
settled intention, which “excludes all contemplation of any event on the 
occurrence of which the residence would cease”, which is necessary to 
bring into existence a domicile of choice Johnson v Johnson, (1931, A.D. 
391). But his ordinarily residence would be the country to which he 
would naturally and as a matter of course return from his wanderings; 
as contrasted with other lands it might be called his usual or principal 
residence and would be described more aptly than other countries as his 
real home. If this suggested meaning were given to "ordinarily" it would 
not, I think, be logically permissible to hold that a person could be 
"ordinarily resident" in more than one country at the same time”116 
(emphasis added) 
One of the concern in the above formulation is how to reconcile the distinction 
between ‘domicile’ and ‘ordinary residence’ formulated by the Court in 
Cohen’s case. The court defined ordinary residence as the place where an 
individual would return from his wandering as a matter of course. This suggests 
that there must be an intention on the part of the individual to go back to that 
particular place from his wandering as a matter of course. To return to a place, 
of course, suggests a degree of permanence.117 Thus, both the two basic 
elements of domicile (intention and permanence) have featured in Schreiner 
JA’s definition of ordinary residence. This is contrary to the UK notion of 
ordinary resident as enunciated in the UK cases of Levene and Lysaght where 
ordinary residence was defined as: 
“residence in a place with some degree of continuity and apart from 
accidental or temporary absences.”  
Justice Schreiner stated that in the South African context an individual could 
not be an ordinary resident of more than one place. Domicile means an 
                                                 
116 13 SATC 362 at 364;  
117 Compare this with the view of Bristowe J, in the earlier South African decision Robinson v. 
Commissioner of Taxes (1917) 32 SATC 41 that “Residence means a man’s home or one of his 




individual’s fixed and permanent place of abode in which he intends to remain 
indefinitely, or if he leaves, he maintains an intention to return. As a rule, no 
individual can live without a domicile, and he cannot have two domiciles at the 
same time.118 However, the notion of ordinary residence connotes residence in 
a place with some degree of continuity and apart from accidental or temporary 
absences. It is not so with usual or occasional or temporary residence.119  
 
Therefore, the key elements of domicile are the intention of the individual to 
live in a particular place indefinitely coupled with the permanent intention to 
return to that place even if he left it. This element of domicile has featured in 
the South African notion of ordinary residence contained in the statement of 
Schreiner JA in 13 SATC 362 at 364 that “…However, his ordinary residence 
would be the country to which he would naturally and as a matter of course 
return from his wanderings ..” It is submitted, therefore, that the South African 
notion of ordinary residence is akin to the concept of domicile. 
 
In Kuttel’s case, the respondent had left South Africa for the US in 1983. As at 
the time of his departure the respondent retained his house and director’s 
position in a South African company. While staying in the US, the respondent 
had visited South Africa and stayed at his house for almost ten times. He even 
attended board of directors’ meeting on two occasions. The Commissioner 
assessed him for tax on the income he earned while he was away. The 
respondent claimed that his income falls within the definition of section 10 (1) 
(h) of the Income Tax Act. Thus, the income was exempted under the Act. The 
Commissioner rejected this assertion. The court of first instance held that the 
respondent was an ordinary resident of the US not of South Africa as holding a 
                                                 
118 Mark v. Mark (2006) 1 AC 98; IRC v. Bullock (1976) 1 WLR 1178 at 1184. For discussion on the 
significance of the parent domicile to the determination of an individual domicile see Lollman, J 
‘The significance of parental domicile under the citizenship clause’ (2015) 101 Va. L. Rev. 455 
119 Levene v. IRC at 225 
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director’s position could not make an individual to be an ordinary resident. 
Therefore, his income was exempted. The Commissioner appealed against this 
decision. The Court held that: 
“Words ‘ordinarily resident’ narrower than just ‘resident’ – Unnecessary 
in this case to decide whether a person may not be held to be ordinarily 
resident in more than one country at the same time – Natural and ordinary 
meaning of the words ‘ordinarily resident’ to be applied to provisions 
under consideration – applying this meaning to the words in question, 
there could be no doubt that at the relevant times the taxpayer was not 
ordinarily resident in the Republic the fact that the taxpayer had kept his 
home in Cape Town was in no way inconsistent with his usual or 
principal residence or home having been in the United States – Held 
accordingly that Commissioner for Inland Revenue had incorrectly 
assessed the taxpayer to tax in the Republic in respect of interest and 
dividend income in the relevant years of assessment.”120 
 
From the above quotation, it is clear that the court followed the line of reasoning 
of the court in Cohen’s case which by extension fell in line with the decisions 
of the UK Courts.121 In essence, the central theme of the above cases is that an 
individual has his ordinary residence in the place where he has his ‘usual’ or 
‘principal residence’. Thus, the physical presence of the individual in South 
Africa is not a determinant of whether or not he is an ordinary resident.  
 
In the light of the above, it could be argued that the concept of ‘ordinary resident' 
is not new to the South African tax system because it featured in the former 
source-based regime. Thus, the concept is not unique to the residence-based 
regime.122 The question is, whether or not the above South African cases dealt 
with the concept of ordinary residence as a connecting factor or as a relief or 
exemption mechanism? It should be noted that the notion of ordinary residence 
under the source-based system should not be construed to have the same effect 
                                                 
120 54 SATC 298  at 299  
121 More particularly the case of Shah v Barnet London Borough Council (1983) 1 All ER 226(HL) 
122 Danziger, E ‘International income tax: The South African perspective’ (1991) Butterworts, Durban  
at 33 - 46 
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on the residence-based system. In the former source-based regime, the concept 
of ordinary residence was a mere determinant for deciding the eligibility of an 
individual to certain reliefs or exemption. Whereas, under the residence-based 
system, it is used as a connecting factor. Therefore, there is a need to distinguish 
the concept of ‘ordinary residence’ as a jurisdictional nexus and as a ground for 
relief or exemption to appreciate the South African notion of ordinary residence. 
 
In the former perspective, the concept serves as a link between the potential 
taxpayer and the state. It must be established first, before the issue as to whether 
or not the taxpayer is entitled to any relief or exemption. Thus, in the absence 
of any jurisdictional link, the person is not liable to pay tax in the first place let 
alone seeking for any relief or exemption. Furthermore, the jurisdictional nexus 
is applied to determine the extent of the state tax jurisdiction that could be both 
substantive and enforcement jurisdiction.123 In the latter perspective, the 
concept deals with the issue of entitlement to relief and exemption available to 
an individual upon whom the state has already asserted its tax jurisdiction. All 
the earlier South African cases on ordinary residence were premised on the latter 
perspective, and they all predate the adoption of the residence-based system. 
Therefore, it is doubtful whether such decisions analysed the concept of 
ordinary residence in the context of establishing a jurisdictional link.  
 
Most commentators124 on the South African notion of ordinary residence rightly 
made reference to the leading Canadian authority of Thompson v. MNR125. It is 
                                                 
123 Hellerstein, W ‘Jurisdiction to Tax Income and Consumption in the New Economy: A Theoretical 
and Comparative Perspective’ (2003) Geo. L. Rev. 1 at 3 see also Swain, JA ‘Misalignment of 
Substantive and Enforcement Tax Jurisdiction in a Mobile Economy: Causes and Strategies for 
Realignment’ (2010) 63 (x) National Tax Journal, Fox Special Issue at 112 “When a state asserts 
substantive jurisdiction over the subject matter of a tax, the state generally should also have 
enforcement jurisdiction over a person who can remit the tax.” 
124 Notably, Williams, RC (2006) at 35; Olivier, L ‘Residence based taxation’ (2001) J. S. Afr. L. 20 at 
25; Olivier, L and Honiball, M ‘International tax: A South African perspective’ (2008) (4th ed), Siber 
Ink, Cape Town at 61 
125 (1946) SCC  
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a good approach because Thomson’s case directly dealt with the concept of an 
ordinary resident as a jurisdictional link. Thompson’s case is the leading case 
where the ordinary residence as a jurisdictional link was directly at issue.126 
Stressing the assertion that the South African cases did not deal with the concept 
of ordinary residence as a jurisdiction link, there is the need to distinguish 
Thomson’s case and Cohen and Kuttel. In Thomson’s case, the central issue is 
whether or not the appellant was a Canadian ordinary resident and liable to 
Canadian income tax.  
 
The determination of the individual’s residence goes to the root of exercising 
tax jurisdiction by the Canadian authority. Because failure to establish the 
ordinary residence status, Thompson would not be liable to tax on any part of 
his income. In both Cohen and Kuttel, on the other hand, the central issue was 
whether a certain class of income that supposed to be taxable was exempted. 
Thus, the vital question was not premised on the assertion of tax jurisdiction 
over both Mr Cohen and Mr Kuttel. Rather it was the taxability of a certain class 
of their income that was linked to their ordinary residence status. This suggests 
that other part of their income remained taxable, and that was the position in the 
Thompson’s case. 
It is submitted that as at August 2015 there is not any South African that clearly 
dealt with the question of ordinary residence as a jurisdictional link, not as a 
ground for enjoying relief or exemption of certain income from tax. Therefore, 
if the definition of legal concept should always be contextual, the South African 
court defined the concept of ordinary residence out of context. The only 
available guidance is the Interpretation Notes issued by the South African 
Revenue Service on how to determine the ordinary residence. Given the non-
                                                 
126 Even the UK case of Shah v. Barnet London Borough Council and others (1983) 1 All ER 226 (HL) 
234 did not considered the ‘ordinary residence’ as jurisdictional link but rather as a ground of 
enjoying certain educational benefit.   
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binding nature, the Interpretation Notes will not be discussed in this thesis. It 
should be noted that, even the UK that set the pace of the analysis of ordinary 
residence has abandoned the concept of ordinary residence as a connecting 
factor for individual residence. Furthermore, the Canadian Courts are wary of 
applying the UK decisions on the meaning of ordinary residence. Because the 
UK decisions focused on the cessation rather than the establishment of  ordinary 
residence. While stating the difference between the Canadian and the UK 
approach to questions of ‘resident’ and ‘ordinary resident’ Bowman, J. in 
Kadrie v. Canada,127 stated that: 
“It is, I believe, apparent from the decision of Schujahn v. M.N.R. 62 
DTC 1225 and the Thomson case that one should treat with some caution 
the decisions under the United Kingdom taxing statutes.”  
Therefore, the most relevant leading authority for ordinary residence is 
Thompson’s case.  
 
Despite the above concerns raised about the notion of ordinary residence under 
the South Africa regime, it is far better than the confused and incoherent notion 
under the Nigerian regime. Under the Nigerian regime, both tax practitioners 
and academics have deliberately avoided discussion of the concept of ordinary 
residence. To date no Nigerian case has even made reference to the concept 
from both perspectives.  Finally, it is submitted that inconsistency characterises 
the definition of ordinary residence. The question as to whether an individual 
could be an ordinary resident in more than one state depends on the notion of 
ordinary residence adopted by the two states at issue.  Thus, it is possible for an 




                                                 
127 (2001) T.C.J. No 601 (Q.L.) 
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6.2.2 Physical presence 
 
 
Given the fact-intensive nature of ordinary residence, it is possible for an 
individual to reside in South Africa for a very long period without assuming an 
ordinary resident status. Perhaps he maintained an intention to return to the 
country whence he comes. An objective test was introduced to bring this class 
of individual into the tax net. The test ascertains the residence status of an 
individual based on the number of days he spends in the Republic. It dictates 
that an individual is resident or non-resident in particular circumstances for the 
purposes of specific tax provisions, irrespective of the actual residence status of 
that individual.128 It does not decide the question of the factual situation 
surrounding the residence. The test is designed to provide the absolute certainty 
that may not be found under the ordinary residence test. An individual falls 
within the ambit of this test if the aggregate number of days he physically spent 
in the Republic exceeds: 
a) 91 days in the present year of assessment;129 and 
b) 91 days in the previous five years of assessment before the current year; 
and 
c) 915 days in those previous five years of assessment 
 
Thus, an individual becomes a South African resident immediately he satisfies 
all the above conditions. That is to say, for an individual to fall within the ambit 
of this test, he must be present in South Africa for a certain number of days for 
at least six consecutive years. Thus, an individual is deemed to be a resident 
                                                 
128 Kamal, S ‘Individual tax residence’ (2011) Sweet & Maxwell, London at 125 - 126 
129 Section 7 (1) (G) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act No. 17 of 2009 provided that ‘‘year of 
assessment’ means any year or other period in respect of which any tax or duty leviable under this 
Act is chargeable, and any reference in this Act to any year of assessment ending the last or the 
twenty-eighth or the twenty-ninth day of February shall, unless the context otherwise indicates, in 
the case of a company or a portfolio of a collective investment scheme in securities be construed as 




from the first day of the sixth year of in which he has had a physical presence 
in South Africa for the required number of days. Superficially, it could be 
argued that the test is straight forward and easy to analyse since the physical 
presence of the individual is measured by the number of days he spends in South 
Africa.130 However, in the light of the quoted provisions of section 1 of the 
Income Tax Act 1962 (as severally amended) there are many issues surrounding 
the physical presence test that needs to be addressed.  
 
Under this test, a ‘day’ includes a part of a day it does not mean a full period of 
24 hours spent in South Africa. Thus, since part of day counts, it follows that 
the dates of arrival in or departure from South Africa are included. Because, an 
individual may arrive or depart South Africa in the noon or immediately before 
midnight. However, the day spent in transit without formal entry into South 
Africa is not considered in computing the number of days spent. The inclusion 
of the part of a day makes the South African regime better than that of the UK.131 
Also, in terms of making reference to the previous periods of physical presence 
in computing the number of days, the conditions lay down by the South African 
regime is more generous than that of the US.132 Furthermore, South Africa and 
New Zealand are the only jurisdictions that provide for the cessation of  physical 
residence status based on the number of days of absence amongst all the 
jurisdictions that adopted the physical presence test.133  
                                                 
130 Unlike the South African Provision, the Nigerian physical presence test is only applicable to the 
individual who earns his income from employment. Notwithstanding the fact that section 3 of the 
PITA distinguished income from employment with that of trade or business. Thus, those who earn 
income from trade or business are not subject to the 183 – day rule. 
131 For instance, in Wilkie v IRC (1952) 1 All ER 92.The court held that the 183-day rule is not satisfied 
even if the individual spent 182 days and 20 hours in an income year of 366 days in the UK. 
Therefore, he is not a UK resident 
132 Under the  US substantial presence test, an individual is deemed to be a resident of the US if he 
spends 31 days during the calendar year. And the total of the days he spent in the US during the 
current calendar year and the two preceding years must be at least 183 days. 
133 Section YD 1 (3) – (6) of New Zealand Income Tax Act 2007 provide that (3) “A person is a New 
Zealand resident if they are personally present in New Zealand for more than 183 days in total in a 
12-month period. (4) If subsection (3) applies, the person is treated as resident from the first of the 
183 days until the person is treated under subsection (5) as ceasing to be a New Zealand resident. 




However, the main problem with the South African physical presence test is 
that it is dependent on the ordinary residence test. Thus, it is not an independent 
test. Despite the fact that the provision of section 1 envisages the issue of 
cessation of the resident status acquired under the physical presence test, where 
it stated that:  
“…Provided that where any person that is a resident ceases to be a 
resident during a year of assessment, that person must be regarded as not 
being a resident from the day on which that person ceases to be a 
resident…” 
 
However, as at October 2015, no South African decision provides guidance as 
to what constitutes the cessation of ordinary residence. 134  The determination of 
when ordinary residence status begins and terminates has serious implications 
in the application of the physical presence test that is only applicable to the non-
ordinary resident.135 Failure to provide clear guidance on the establishment and 
termination of the ordinary residence status could hinder the application of this 
test or create a double non-taxation scenario.  
 
For instance, the case of an individual who left South Africa during the 2013 
year of assessment and severed all his connection with the Republic. On the 
                                                 
resident if they are personally absent from New Zealand for more than 325 days in total in a 12-
month period. (6) The person is treated as not resident from the first of the 325 days until they are 
treated again as resident under this section.” 
134 Some commentators make case for making reference to the cases of Davies and another v HMRC 
and Gaines-Cooper v HMRC (2011) UKSC 47 where the UK Supreme Court held that for an 
individual to lose his UK ordinary resident status he must established a distinct break from his UK 
mode of life. The same decision was followed in the subsequent case of Lynette Dawn Yates v 
HMRC (2012) UKFTT 568 (TTC) where the court expanciate on what amount to distinct break. See 
Walt, J ‘Ordinary resident – a taxing question’ (2012) found at 
http://www.thesait.org.za/news/109452/Ordinarily-resident---a-taxing-question.htm last assessed 
on 17/08/2015. Moreover, the leading South African cases of Cohen and Kuttel clearly stated that 
physical presence is not a decisive factor for establishing ordinary residence. Hence the need for 
separate test that specifically deals with the issue of physical presence. 
135 Section 1 provides that “…not at any time during the relevant year of assessment ordinarily 
resident in the Republic…” 
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basis of the above decisions136 on ordinary residence that person ceased to be 
an ordinary resident of South Africa. However, he return to South Africa during 
the 2014 tax year and spent over 91 days in the country. By section 1 of the 
Income Tax Act 1962 (as amended), the determination of his ordinary resident 
status is the first criterion for applying the physical presence test.  
 
The question is – did he regain the ordinary resident status by his return? 
Whereby the computation of the number of days could commence from the date 
he returns. There is no answer to this question in the South African context. 
Because there is no decision dealing with the issue of the cessation of ordinary 
resident status let alone a decision that deals with the question of regaining a 
lost ordinary residence status. Therefore, there is no certainty of his ordinary 
residence status and the same section 1 provides that the physical presence test 
is only applicable where the individual is not ordinary resident in the current 
year of assessment. Thus, the condition for the application of the physical 
presence test is not satisfied. Given this quagmire, how can this individual be 
taxed after his return in the 2014 year of assessment? 
 
It could be argued that the individual may fall into the net of the physical 
presence test since he spent more than 91 days in the 2014 year of assessment. 
Also, since he was an ordinary resident of South Africa up to 2013, there is the 
possibility of satisfying the second and third legs of the test.137 However, the 
condition precedent for the application of the test is that the individual must not 
be an ordinary resident during the year of assessment. Thus, the issue of the 
                                                 
136 Lysaght v. IRC (1928) at 535; Reed v Clark (1985) 58 TC 528, 556Tuczka v. HMRC (2011) 113 
UKUT 1 at 9 (TCC); Darrell Healey v HMRC (2014) UKFTT 889  (UK) Beament v. MNR,136 The 
Queen v, Reader 75 DTC 5160 at 5163, Kadrie v. The Queen ( 2001) T.C.J. No 601 (Q.L.) (Canada) 
Applegate v. FCT (1979) 79 ATC 4307 at 4317 (Australia) 




ordinary residence status of the individual must be settle before moving to the 
remaining part of the test. 
 
Therefore, for the smooth application of the physical presence test, there is a 
need for the South African courts to explore clear rules for the acquisition and 
termination of ordinary residence status. The reliance on the UK decisions is 
not a viable option because the concept of ordinary residence is no longer 
relevant to the UK regime that implicitly abrogated the principles established in 
those cases relied upon in South Africa. It appears that the commentators on the 
South African regime have rightly considered Thompson’ case as the leading 
guide for the determination of ordinary residence. Therefore, there is a need to 
consider another Canadian case of Kadrie v. Canada, where Bowman, J. 
categorised the Canadian cases involving the questions of resident or ordinary 
resident into three; 
“(a) Cases where a person who has theretofore been ordinarily resident 
in Canada leaves, takes up residence elsewhere and alleges that he or she 
has so severed the relationship with Canada that he or she is no longer 
resident here;  
(b) Cases where a person, ordinarily resident in another country, acquires 
a residence and other ties in Canada. There the question is whether that 
person has become “ordinary resident” in Canada;  
(c) Cases where a Canadian resident leaves Canada and severs his or her 
connection with this country so that he or she is not a Canadian resident, 
and then require ties here. The question here is whether that person has 
resumed residence here.” 138 
 
By following the above categorization, the obstacles being faced by the South 
Africa physical presence test could be removed. However, the problem of the 
Nigerian physical test is very complex and totally at variance with the 
international norm, and it needs a total overhaul.  
 
                                                 
138 (2001) T.C.J. No 601 (Q.L.) 
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A DTA is a means of achieving cooperation between states to prevent double 
taxation. The states who are parties to a DTA use it as a mechanism for the 
exchange of information regarding the activities of the potential taxpayer.139 
They also utilise the DTA to achieve coherence in defining their respective 
taxable subjects. The latter purpose is a focal point while referring to the DTA 
or Multilateral Tax Treaties in this thesis. Under the DTA regime, for a person 
to benefit from the provision in a DTA, he must a be a resident of one or both 
the contracting parties. 140  That is the main reason for making reference to the 
definitional rules contained in the DTAs. Thus, it is necessary for a state that is 
a party to the DTA to determine the residence status of the potential taxpayer 
under the domestic laws. The need to satisfy this core requirement of the DTA 
means that the states must understand the intricacies in the definitional rule of 
residence under their respective domestic laws. 
 
As indicated above, although both Nigeria and South Africa adopted a 
residence-based system, the residency regime of the two states face in different 
directions. The two states are Africa’s largest economies. Therefore, it is 
inevitable for individuals of these states to cross the border of either state for 
the purposes of trade, business or employment. Hence, it is possible for the 
individuals to fall within the definition of residents of the two states. The states 
have entered into Double Taxation Agreements to tackle double taxation. The 
                                                 
139 See  Bagaria, S ‘The nature and purposes of double taxation agreements and the issues which the 
interpretation of such agreements may give rise’ (2012) found at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2018859  
at 6 last visited on 11/08/2015 
140 Arnold, BJ ‘An overview of the issues involved in the application of double tax treaties’ in 
Trepelkov, A et al (ed)  ‘United Nations Handbook on Selected Issues in Administration of Double 
Tax Treaties for Developing Countries’ (2013) UN Publication, New York 1 at 22 -23 
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Nigeria – South Africa DTA141 covers both the individual and corporate 
taxpayers of the two States.142 Thus, it deals with the issue of dual residency of 
both individual and corporation. It provides that: 
“For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "resident of a Contracting 
State" means: (a) in Nigeria, any person who, under the laws of Nigeria, 
is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of 
management, place of incorporation or any other criterion of a similar 
nature … (b) in South Africa, any individual who is ordinarily resident 
in South Africa and any person other than an individual who has its place 
of effective management in South Africa.”143 
 
In resolving the possible conflict in determining the individual residence, the 
agreement provides for a hierarchy tie-breaker rule of resolving individual dual 
residence conflict.  
“Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph 1 an individual is a 
resident of both Contracting States, then his status shall be determined 
as follows: (a) he shall be deemed to be a resident only of the State in 
which he has a permanent home available to him; if he has a permanent 
home available to him in both States, he shall be deemed to be a resident 
only of the State with which his personal and economic relations are 
closer centre of vital interests; (b) if the State in which he has his centre 
of vital interests cannot be determined, or if he has not a permanent home 
available to him in either State, he shall be deemed to be a resident only 
of the State in which he has an habitual abode; (c) if he has an habitual 
abode in both States or in neither of them, he shall be deemed to be a 
resident only of the-State of which he is a national; (d) if he is a national 
of both States or of neither of them, the competent authorities of the 
Contracting States shall settle the question by mutual agreement.”144 
(Emphasis added) 
 
The permanent home; the closeness of personal and economic relations; 
habitual abode; and nationality are the key tiebreaker rules provided for in the 
above clause of the DTA. The determination of these terms requires a fact-
                                                 
141 Nigeria – South Africa, Comprehensive Agreement for the avoidance of Double Taxation and 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, dated 29th April, 2000, taking effective on 1st January, 2009. 
142 Article 3 (1) (i) “the term "person" includes an individual, a company and any other body of persons 
which is treated as an entity under the taxation laws in force in each Contracting State.” 
143 Article 4 (1) of the Nigeria – South Africa DTA 2009 
144 Article 4 (2) of the Nigeria – South Africa DTA 2009 
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intensive inquiry and the agreement fails to define the terms or give guidance 
on how to ascertain them. For instance, what constitutes a ‘permanent home’ or 
‘habitual abode’ in Nigeria may be different in South Africa. Nigeria is a federal 
state comprising the central government and sub-national states, and there are 
local dual residence conflicts between the sub-national states.145 The agreement 
recognises this fact where states that  
“For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "resident of a Contracting 
State" means: (c) that State itself and any political subdivision or local 
authority thereof”.  
 
Therefore, is it a ‘permanent home’ or ‘habitual abode’ in Nigeria or a sub-
national state of Nigeria? This makes it difficult to ascertain the ‘permanent 
home’ or ‘habitual abode’ of an individual in Nigeria with the context of the 
agreement. However, it may be easily ascertained in South Africa, because 
South Africa in not a federal state. It may be assumed that the permanent home 
refers to ‘ordinary residence’ and ‘habitual abode’ refers to ‘domicile.' The 
analysis in chapter four revealed the different notion of these two expressions, 
but the DTA does not adopt a particular connotation. 
 
In both Nigeria and South Africa, the closeness of personal and economic 
relations of an individual vis-à-vis the state is a subjective question that is 
determinable only by the fact and circumstances of the particular individual 
involved. Thus, the word ‘close’ envisages an issue of degree. The agreement 
does not provide for the degree of the closeness required for the tiebreaker rule 
to apply. Therefore, the application of this tiebreaker requires a judicial 
determination of the closeness, which is not contemplated by the agreement. Is 
the ‘personal’ and ‘economic’ relation to be read conjunctively or disjunctively? 
It may be possible for an individual to have a close personal relationship with a 
state that is  party to the agreement but at the same time have closer economic 
                                                 
145 See paragraph 1 of the 1st Schedule of the PITA 2004 (as amended) 
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relation with both parties as well as other non-party states. Economic nexus has 
been and is still an unsettled issue in a jurisdiction like the USA where it is used 
as a connecting factor for the states’ tax jurisdiction.146 
 
The last tie-breaker is the nationality of the individual involved. The notion of 
nationality is not consonant with the rationale of the residence-based taxation. 
The policy issue behind the residence-based system is that since an individual 
benefits from the infrastructure provided by the state where he resides, he is 
liable to pay tax to that state in consideration of the benefit enjoyed.  Thus, a 
national of one state may live in another state and enjoy the facilities put in place 
by the state. Therefore, the state of residence is more entitled to tax the 
individual than his state of nationality. Since nationality cannot be justified as a 
domestic connecting factor, it cannot be suitable as a tie-breaker rule. For 
instance, in the context of the Nigeria – South Africa DTA, a British national 
may reside in Nigeria or South Africa without being a national of either state 
leading to a triangular situation. This is a situation where a potential taxpayer 
who falls within definitional rules of a resident of the two states party to the 
DTA, but he receives the income from sources in a third state. 
   
In the light of the above, it is arguable that the only viable tiebreaker is for the 
states to agree on the possible solution to the jurisdictional conflict. The 
question is how long will it take to reach the agreement? What will be the 
position of the potential taxpayer in the interim? According to Miller,147 the 
states take eight to ten years before they reach agreement. Assuming the 
                                                 
146 Thimmesch, AB ‘The Illusory promise of economic nexus’ (2012) 13 (4) Fla. Tax Rev. 158;  Faber, 
PL ‘Economic Nexus: Right or Wrong’ (2009) 87 Tax Mag. 99; Edson, CR ‘Quill's constitutional 
jurisprudence and tax nexus standards in an age of electronic commerce’ (1995) 49 Tax Law 893; 
Fatale, MT ‘State Tax Jurisdiction and the Mythical "Physical Presence" Constitutional Standard’  
(2000) 54 Tax Law 105;  Lemmon, ES ‘Economic nexus: legislative presumption or legitimate 
Proposition?’ (1999) 14 Akron Tax J. 1; Swain, JA ‘State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential 
and Policy Perspective’ (2003)  45 WM. & Mary L. Rev. 319  
147 Miller, A and Oats, L ‘Principles of taxation’ (2014), (4th ed) Bloomsbury 143 
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agreement is reached within two or three years, in the interim, the individual 
will remain in an uncertain situation about his residence status. The individual’s 
situation would worsen if the states fail to reach agreement. Thus, the individual 
becomes liable to pay tax to both states on the same income – the double 
taxation sought to be avoided by the DTA. 
 
 
Furthermore, the Nigeria-South Africa DTA only captures the substantive tax 
jurisdiction of the two states. The DTA does not touch the issue of enforcement 
tax jurisdiction. The enforcement tax jurisdiction of the individual’s income tax 
is a very complicated area under the Nigerian regime. In Nigeria, the states of 
the federation have no substantive tax jurisdiction over income, but the 
Constitution clothes them with enforcement jurisdiction.148 The assertion of 
enforcement jurisdiction of the states has led to the local dual residence 
conflict,149 which has not been addressed by the DTA. Under the Nigerian 
regime, there is the possibility of having both local and international dual 
residence conflict. The PITA makes the ‘principal place of residence’ a 
tiebreaker for resolving the local dual residence conflict. However, the 
tiebreaker is very complex because the determination of a ‘principal place of 
residence’ is a fact-intensive exercise. Therefore, if a South African citizen falls 
within of two Nigerian states and the local tiebreaker cannot resolve the conflict, 
what would be the position of the Nigeria-South Africa DTA?150 
 
                                                 
148 See section 4 (3) of the Nigerian Constitution 1999 
149 The mechanism for resolving local dual residence conflict is provided in section 86 of the PITA. 
Section 86 (1) established body called the Joint Tax Board and section 86 (9) spelt out the function 
of the board to include “use its best endeavours to promote uniformity both in the application of this 
Act and in the incidence of tax on individuals throughout Nigeria” Paragraph 10 of the first schedule 
of the PITA provides for the framework for resolving the local dual residence conflict.  
150 Paragraph 1 of first schedule to the Nigerian Personal Income Tax Act Cap 2004 provided for the 
tie-breaker rule. But, like any other tie-breaker rule, there is always a confusion where the rule does 
not work. Section 86 of the same Act established a Joint Tax Board with a view to settle any potential 
jurisdictional conflicts. However, the Board only serves as advisory body.  
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The question is whether the DTA resolves all the possible jurisdictional 
conflicts between the two states? The answer is "no". Given the weakness of the 
DTA discussed above, especially the non-binding nature of the DTA for a third 
party, some commentators151 have advocated a multilateral treaty to address the 
jurisdictional conflicts. However, the diverse nature of the economic, political 
and cultural policies has led to the insistence by the state to preserve and retain 
their tax sovereignty152 and that result has divergent tax principles and policies. 
Thus, to achieve cooperation through the DTA, the states must first address the 
issue of sovereignty.153 “The state tax sovereignty is not absolute, and complete 
sovereignty is impossible.”154 Therefore, a comparative analysis is the most 
viable of achieving co-operation. 
 
6.3.1 Application of DTA under Nigerian and South African Laws 
 
 
The overlap between a DTA and domestic law makes an analysis of the 
application DTA crucial. The application of a DTA relates to the enforcement 
of the DTA provisions.155 The issue of the  domestic application of a DTA is 
                                                 
151 Latulippe, L ‘The expansion of the bilateral tax treaty network in the 1990s: the OECD's role in 
international tax Coordination’ (2012) 27 Austl. Tax F. 851; Reinhold, RL ‘Some things that 
multilateral tax treaties might usefully do’ (2004) 57 (3) The Tax Lawyer 661 at 708 (He argued for 
multilateral tax treaty to address the issue of multinational service partnership and electronic 
commerce); Brooks, K ‘The Potential of Multilateral Tax Treaties’ (2010) In Lang, M et al (Ed)Tax 
Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics’ IBFD Publication  (He explores the 
potential of using multilateral tax treaties in achieving coordination of international tax regimes); 
Thuronyi, V ‘International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty’ (2001) 26 Brook J. Intl L. 
1641 Diane M. Ring, DM ‘Prospects for A Multilateral Tax Treaty’ (2001) 26 (4) Brook J. Intl L. 
26 1699 at 1710 (The discussed the method of designing an optimal multilateral tax treaty); 
Jogarajan, S ‘A Multilateral Tax Treaty for ASEAN ― Lessons from the Andean, Caribbean, Nordic 
and South Asian Nations’ (2011) 6 Asian Journal of Comparative Law 1 – 23 (making case for the 
ASEAN countries to enter into a regional multilateral tax treaty)   
152 Rosenbloom, HD ‘Sovereignty and the Regulation of International Business in the Tax Area’ (1994) 
20 Canada-US L. J. 267 at 267; Steines, JP ‘Income Tax Implications of Free Trade’ (1994) 49 (4) 
Tax Law Review 675 at 689 
153 Li, J ‘Tax Sovereignty and international tax reform: The Author’s response’ (2004) 52 (1) 141 
154 Charles E. McLure CE ‘Globalization, tax rules and national tax sovereignty’ (2001) 55 (8) Bull Int’l 
Fiscal Doc. 328 at 329 
155Ajomo, MO  ‘Development in International Relations’ in T A Aguda, TA (ed) in ‘The Challenge of 
the Nigerian Nation’ (1985) Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Lagos,  
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centred on the distinction between monist and dualist legal systems.156 The 
terms monism and dualism describe different types of domestic legal 
systems.157 In dualist states the constitution “accords no special status to 
treaties; the rights and obligations created by them have no effect in domestic 
law unless legislation is in force to give effect to them.”158 In contrast, “the 
essence of the monist approach is that a treaty may, without legislation, become 
part of domestic law once it has been concluded in accordance with the 
constitution and has entered into force for the state.”159  
 
In dualist states, a DTA has legal status in the domestic legal system.160Thus, 
the DTAs require implementing legislation to have the force of law in the 
domestic legal system. In monist states, DTAs do not require domestic 
implementation legislation to acquire the status of law in the domestic legal 
system.161 However, in some monist states, certain treaties do not require 
domestic law to operate. In all monist states, some treaties have the force of law 
within the domestic legal system. 
 
Under the Nigerian regime, a DTA must be passed into law by the National 
Assembly before it has the force of Law in Nigeria; this rule is codified in 
Section 12(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as follows:  
“No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the 
force of law except to the extent to which any such treaty has been 
enacted into law by the National Assembly.” 
 
                                                 
156 Sloss, D ‘Domestic Application of Treaties (2011), Available at: 
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/635  
157 Aust, A ‘Modern Treaty Law and Practice’ (2007) CUP, Cambridge at 181–95 
158 Ibid 
159 Ibid 
160 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn OUP, Oxford 2008) 31–33. 
161 Ibid  
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This section makes Nigeria a dualist state.162 It provides that all treaties must be 
enacted into law before they can apply in Nigeira. Hence, after such enactment, 
treaties should occupy the same position with other Nigerian legislation, but 
subject to the provision of Nigerian Constitution. Thus, the source of law is the 
law enacted for the implementation of the treaty not the provision of the 
treaty.163 The Nigerian Supreme Court reinstated this principle in the case of 
General Sani Abacha v. Chief Gani Fawehinmi164 that:  
“Before its enactment into law by the National Assembly, an 
International treaty has no such force of law as to make its provisions 
justiciable in our courts…. Where, however, the treaty is enacted into 
law by the National Assembly, as was the case with the Charter which is 
incorporated into our municipal law by the 1983 Act, it becomes binding 
and our courts must give effect to it like all other laws falling within the 
Judicial powers of the Courts.” 
 
This section makes Nigeria a dualist state. It provides that all treaties must be 
enacted into law before they can apply in Nigeira. Hence, after such enactment, 
treaties should occupy the same position with other Nigerian legislation, but 
subject to the provision of the Nigerian Constitution. Thus, the source of law is 
the law enacted for the implementation of the treaty not the provision of the 
treaty.165 For instance, personal income tax is one of the taxes covered by Article 
2 (3) of the Nigerian -South Africa DTA. Under the Nigerian tax system, the 
                                                 
162 Hollis, DB ‘A Comparative approach to treaty law and practice‘ in Hollis, DB et al  (eds), National 
Treaty Law and Practice (2005) Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 32– 45; Ajomo, MO  ‘Development in 
International Relations’ in T A Aguda, TA (ed) in ‘The Challenge of the Nigerian Nation’ (1985) 
Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Lagos, 
163 Oppng, RF ‘Re-imagining international law: an examination of recent trends in the reception of 
international law into National legal systems in Africa’ (2007) Fordham Inter’l L.J at 173. See also 
Murmansk State Steamship Line v. Kano Oil Millers Ltd. (1974)252 S.C at 256; Capital Bancorp  v. 
Shelter Savings and Loans Ltd (2007) All FWLR  pt440 p. 684; Ajomo, MO  ‘Development in 
International Relations’ in T A Aguda, TA (ed) in ‘The Challenge of the Nigerian Nation’ (1985) 
Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Lagos, 
164 (2000) 6 NWLR part 660 p/ 228, see also C.S.S.T v. C.O.E., Kogi State (2006) All FWLR Pt 299 at 
1549. 
165 Oppng, RF ‘Re-imagining international law: an examination of recent trends in the reception of 
international law into National legal systems in Africa’ (2007) Fordham Inter’l L.J at 173. See also 
Murmansk State Steamship Line v. Kano Oil Millers Ltd. (1974)252 S.C at 256; Capital Bancorp  v. 
Shelter Savings and Loans Ltd (2007) All FWLR  pt440 p. 684  
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states of the federation are empowered to assess, collect and administer personal 
income.166 The Nigerian constitution brought the constituent states of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria into the process of making a treaty. Section 12 (3) 
provides  that: 
“A bill for an Act of the National Assembly passed pursuant to the 
provisions of Subsection (2) of this section shall not be presented to the 
President for assent, and shall not be enacted unless it is ratified by a 
majority of all the Houses of Assembly in the Federation.” 
 
Therefore, the application of a DTA that covers personal income tax requires 
the involvement of the constituent states of the federation. The rule provided by 
the Nigerian Personal Income Tax Act for the determination of individual 
residence within the constituent states of Nigeria must be taken into 
consideration in applying the DTA provision. It is the responsibility of the states 
of the federation to determine the residence of individual residing within their 
territory, not the federal government.167 
 
However, the Republic of South Africa is a monist state.168 Section 231 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 provides that:  
“(1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the 
responsibility of the national executive.  
  (2) An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been 
approved by resolution in both the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces unless it is an agreement referred to 
in subsection (3).  
 (3) An international agreement of a technical, administrative or 
executive nature, or an agreement which does not require either 
ratification or accession, entered into by the national executive, binds 
the Republic without approval by the National Assembly and the 
                                                 
166 Section 2 (1) and (2) of the Personal Income Tax Act 2004. See also Part II of the schedule to the 
Taxes and Levies (Approved Collection List) Act 2004 
167 Section 2 (1) and (2) of the Personal Income Tax Act 2004. See also Part II of the schedule to the 
Taxes and Levies (Approved Collection List) Act 2004 
168 Botha, NJ ‘National Treaty Law and Practice: South Africa ‘in Hollis, DB et al  (eds), National 
Treaty Law and Practice (2005) Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 600–02 
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National Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in the Assembly 
and the Council within a reasonable time.  
 (4) Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is 
enacted into law by national legislation, but a self-executing 
provision of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is 
law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or 
an Act of Parliament.  
(5) The Republic is bound by international agreements which were 
binding on the Republic when this Constitution took effect.”  
 
By section 231 (3) above not all treaties require domestication and the treaties 
are lower than domestic legislation169 whereas in Nigeria the Constitution 
makes no exemptions as regards the domestication of treaties. Thus, DTAs also 
require domestic legislation to operate. However, there are divergent views in 
South Africa as to whether DTAs fall within the self-executing treaties 
mentioned in section 231 (3) above. Section 108 of the South African Income 
Tax Act 1962 (as amended) provides that: 
“(1) The National Executive may enter into an agreement with the 
government of any other country, whereby arrangements are made 
with such government with a view to the prevention, mitigation or 
discontinuance of the levying, under the laws of the Republic and of 
such other country, of tax in respect of the same income, profits or 
gains, or tax imposed in respect of the same donation, or to the 
rendering of reciprocal assistance in the administration of and the 
collection of taxes under the said laws of the Republic and of such 
other country.  
(2) As soon as may be after the approval by Parliament of any such 
agreement, as contemplated in section 231 of the Constitution, the 
arrangements thereby made shall be notified by publication in the 
Gazette and the arrangements so notified shall thereupon have effect 
as if enacted in this Act.” 
 
The above provision makes clear that a DTA requires parliamentary approval 
before it binds the Republic. Thus, the DTA is not a self-executing treaty. Du 
Plessis opines that “(a) South Africa's DTAs do not attain a status on the same 
level as the Constitution; (b) treaty override is possible in terms of the 
                                                 
169  Section 231 (4) of the South African Constitution 1996 
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provisions of the Constitution.”170 On the other hand, Hattingh argues that 
DTAs are self-executing and become law upon the approval of the 
parliament.171  Therefore, the legal position of the DTA is South Africa is not 
settled. The question is how to apply the DTA between Nigeria, a federal and 
dualist state and South Africa a non-federal and monist state?  
 
6.4 Lessons for the Two Regimes 
 
 
The crux of the comparison between the Nigerian and South African regimes of 
individual residence-based taxation centres on the misalignment of the 
substantive and enforcement income tax jurisdiction under the two regimes. 
Nigeria is a federal state, but South Africa operates a sui generis system of 
government that reflects the features of a federal state172 but in practical terms, 
it is not a federal republic. Thus, the provinces do not enjoy the autonomy of 
the sub-national states under a typical federal system. Therefore, South Africa 
has a single income tax system for both individuals and corporates. That is to 
say, both the substantive and enforcement income tax jurisdiction lies with the 
national government. On the other hand, the Nigeria individual income tax 
regime exclusively allocates the substantive jurisdiction of the federal 
government and shares the enforcement jurisdiction between the federal and 
states governments.173 Given the divergence of the two regimes discussed 
above, it is possible to view the regimes through the lens of three federal states 
                                                 
170 Du Plessis, I ‘The incorporation of double taxation agreements into South African domestic law’ 
(2015) (18)4 PELJ  at 1200 
171 Hattingh, PJ ‘Elimination of International Double Taxation’ in De Koker, A and Brincker, E (eds) 
‘Silke on International Tax’ (2010) LexisNexis, Durban  
172 See sections 101 (1) of the Republic of South Africa 1996   “The constitution provides for a 
constitutionally-entrenched distribution of powers between the national and provincial governments, 
and appoints the constitutional court to enforce the arrangement. The relationship between the 
spheres of government is determined by the principle of co-operative government” See Leonardy, 
U  and Brand, D ‘The defect of the constitution: concurrent powers are not co-operative or 
competitive powers’ (2010) J. S. Afr. L. at  657  
173 See sections 2 and 3 of the PITA 2004 
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that have adopted the residence-based system, namely, the USA, Canada, and 
Australia. 
 
Under the US federal constitution, both the federal and the state governments 
are clothed with substantive and enforcement income tax jurisdiction.174 Thus, 
the federal and states governments exercise income tax jurisdiction 
concurrently. In other words, a state may impose and enforce both individual 
and corporate income taxes within its territorial jurisdiction even if there is 
overlap with the tax imposed by the federal government. For instance, a resident 
of New York is concurrently subject to the federal income and that of the New 
York State. The arrangement has been sanctioned by the US Supreme Court 
which stated that: 
“The Concurrent federal and state taxation of income, of course, is a 
well-established norm and, in the absence some explicit directive from 
Congress, we cannot infer that treatment of income at the federal level 
mandates identical treatment by the States.”175 
 
However, the federal government retains the power to control and coordinate 
the states taxing jurisdiction. It also regulates the international tax regime.176 In 
the exercise of their income tax jurisdiction, the states adopt two primary 
connecting factors, the ‘domicile’ and the ‘physical presence’ tests.177 Thus, the 
determination of individual tax residence is carried out in vertical form. At the 
federal level, there are three connecting factors for individual residence; 
citizenship, Green Card and substantial presence tests, whereas, at the state 
                                                 
174 Hellerstein, W ‘The Original Model: The United States’ in G. Bizioli, G and Sacchetto, C  (ed) ‘Tax 
Aspects of Fiscal Federalism A Comparative Analysis’ (2011) IBFD Publication, Amsterdam 23 at 
36 Hellerstein, W ‘The U.S. Supreme Court’s state tax jurisprudence’ in R. S. Avi-Yonah, J. R. 
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175 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, (1980).445 U.S. 425, 448  
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177 For detail discussion on the US states income tax jurisdiction see Hashmi, A ‘Is Home Really Where 
the Heart Is? State Taxation of Domiciliaries, Statutory Residents, and Nonresidents in the District 
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level, there are two basic tests, namely, ‘domicile’ and ‘physical presence’. 
Superficially, Nigeria seems to be closer to the US regime, but they differ 
because in Nigeria the federal government exclusively retains the substantive 
jurisdiction while in the US both the federal and states governments 
concurrently exercise the substantive jurisdiction. However, the South African 
regime is totally at variance with that of the US.  
 
The Canadian Constitution allocates taxing jurisdiction over income to both the 
federal and the provincial government.178 However, in 1940 the Canadian 
Provincial and the Federal Governments signed the Wartime Tax Agreement 
under which the provinces temporarily ceded their income tax jurisdiction to 
the Federal Government in consideration of the annual grant to the state.179 After 
the expiration of the agreement in 1946, seven out of the nine provinces signed 
another agreement extending the previous one.180 Under the current 
arrangement, the tenet of the agreements mentioned above is maintained. Thus, 
with the except of Quebec, the Federal Government exercises substantive 
income tax jurisdiction and the Canada Revenue Agency centrally administers 
and enforces income tax. Under the Canadian regime the income tax jurisdiction 
allocated to both the Federal and Provincial Governments remains in force. 
However, the Federal Government now exclusively exercises both substantive 
and enforcement tax jurisdiction pursuant to the agreements. Because of the 
Quebec deviation from the rest of the provinces, the Canadian regime is similar 
to that of  South Africa because they both have central individual income tax 
systems, but the Canadian system totally differs from that of Nigeria. 
 
                                                 
178 Sections 91 and 92 of  the Canadian Constitution Act  of 1867 
179 Alarie, B and Bird, RM ‘Tax Aspects of Canadian Fiscal Federalism’ available at 
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Foundation, at p. 42. 
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In Australia, the federal and states governments’ tax jurisdiction is unique 
because the Australian Constitution grants both substantive and enforcement 
income tax jurisdiction to the provinces.181 However, as a result of WW II, the 
federal government enacted the Uniform Income Tax Act of 1936 to finance the 
war and to streamline the income tax administration during the war period.182 
In 1942, the federal government enacted four Acts whose provisions explicitly 
removed the provincial taxing jurisdiction over income, and the Australian Tax 
Office was saddled with the responsibility of enforcing the income tax 
jurisdiction.183 On two occasions, the Australian provinces challenged the 
federal government taking over of the income tax, but the court184 dismissed 
their claims and upheld the validity of the Act passed by the Federal 
government. Therefore, the current position of the law is that both substantive 
and enforcement income tax jurisdiction lies with the Australian Federal 
Government. The South African individual income tax regime shares the same 
feature with the Australian regime.  
 
The South African regime has addressed the complexity inherent in the 
operation of the residence-based system in a federal or quasi-federal state. The 
South Africa regime centralizes both the substantive and enforcement tax 
jurisdiction in respect of individuals that prevents any potential intra-provincial 
jurisdictional conflict. It is arguable that in the US, which is a federal state, the 
federal and state governments share both substantive and enforcement income 
tax jurisdictions for the individual and corporation.  However, the US is a 
federal state with a well-developed political and economic structure compared 
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to Nigeria and South Africa.  Nigeria should learn many lessons from South 
Africa especially the issue of the definitional rules for determining individual 
tax residence. Furthermore, there is a network of DTAs entered into by both 
Nigeria and South Africa.185 However, the above analysis of Nigeria-South 
Africa DTA reveals that complexity and uncertainty characterise the DTA 
regime. 
 
On the definitional rule, the South African regime adopts a facts and 
circumstances test alongside with an objective test. That is the ordinary 
residence test and where it is not applicable, the physical presence test applies. 
Conversely, the Nigerian regime is primarily statutory, and there is virtually no 
judicial guidance on the connotation of the key terms. The difference between 
the two regimes centres on balancing the inconsistencies inherent in the fact and 
circumstances test and the complexities associated with the objective criterion. 
The mixture of the two tests by the South African regime exposes the system to 
the issue of the inconsistency and complexity186 whereas, the objective test 
adopted by Nigeria renders the regime a complex one.187 It is submitted that 
notwithstanding the challenges of being inconsistent and complex, the South 
African regime is more comprehensive and better than the Nigerian regime 
because the Nigerian regime applies a different objective test that is not clearly 
                                                 
185 As shown in Appendix A and B. 
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based on the days spent by the individual in the state.188 However, it is based on 
a ‘place of residence’ or a ‘principal place of residence’ defined in a more 






In the light of the above, the Nigerian individual tax residence regime differs 
from all the three federal jurisdictions highlighted above. In Nigeria, the federal 
government has the exclusive substantive income tax jurisdiction and shares 
enforcement jurisdiction with the state governments. Thus, Nigeria operates a 
regime that is entirely different from the rest of the world. This is evident from 
the connecting factors use in determining individual residence at the states level; 
the ‘place of residence’ and the ‘principal place of residence.' Therefore, the 
Nigerian regime is very complex and inconsistent. It fails the basic criteria of a 
good tax system; equity, efficiency and simplicity. The South African regime, 
on the other hand, is more in tune with international best practice as it reflects 
the norm for determining individual residence. Therefore, Nigeria should learn 
many lessons from South Africa about the design and administration of the 
individual residence-based tax system. 
  
The above critique on the bilateral treaty regime existing between Nigeria and 
South Africa shows that the complexities and inconsistencies inherent in the 
Nigeria regime cannot resolve any potential dual tax residence conflict between 
Nigeria and South Africa. Thus, a comparative analysis is the panacea for the 
double taxation situations. A comparative analysis as a means of achieving 
cooperation among the states could allow the states to amend their definitional 
                                                 
188 Which is the global norm for any objective test. 
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7.0  Introduction 
 
The allocation of the taxing power is premised on the relevant connecting factor 
between the taxing state and the potential taxpayer. The concept of residence is 
one of the key factors that link a state with the taxpayer. This chapter focuses 
on the establishment of corporate residence in Nigeria and South Africa. The 
determination of corporate residence is pivotal in asserting taxing rights over a 
corporation by the state under both their domestic law and tax treaty. Thus, the 
states primarily formulate the definitional rule of tax residence through their 
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respective national legislation. And where there are jurisdictional conflicts, the 
states derive their respective taxing right through a bilateral tax agreement 
entered into with one another.  
 
The interface of state tax sovereignty and economic globalisation questions the 
effectiveness of the bilateral treaty regime in resolving the tax jurisdictional 
conflict, particularly on the definition of tax residence. Globalisation brings the 
States closer to each other to the extent that the tenet of bilateral treaties could 
solve the potential jurisdictional conflicts. The concept of tax sovereignty, on 
the other hand, hinders any move for switching to multilateral treaty regime. 
Despite these obstacles, the states need to co-operate with each other. This 
chapter makes a case for a comparative analysis of the rules adopted by the 
states in defining the concept of residence as a jurisdictional link. It provides an 
in-depth analysis of the definitional rule of corporate fiscal residence in Nigeria 
and South Africa. By this method, the states preserve their tax sovereignty and 















7.1 Residence-Based Taxation of Corporations in Nigeria 
 
 
Corporate tax in Nigeria applies to all duly registered corporations.1 There is 
various legislation that imposes different types of tax on the corporate income.2 
However, the determination of corporate residence in Nigeria is governed by 
two separate items of legislation. That is the Companies Income Tax Act3 
(CITA) and the Petroleum Profit Tax Act4 (PPTA). All registered companies 
that engage in all kind of businesses apart from upstream petroleum operations 
are taxable under the CITA.  While the PPTA imposed a tax on all companies 
that engage in the upstream petroleum business.  Thus, under the Nigerian 
regime, the nature of the corporate business activities determines the law 
applicable for purposes of the corporate taxation. The duality of the legal regime 
is premised on the distinction between the downstream and upstream sector of 
the petroleum industry.5  
                                                 
1 The duly registered companies here referred to those companies incorporated under part A of the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act Chapter C20 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004 
(CAMA). Because the operating words in section 9 (1) of Companies Income Tax Act 2007 (as 
amended) are “trade or business” which suggest that the tax is imposed from the corporate income 
derived from trade or business. The Supreme Court in Arbisco v. FBIR (1966) NCLR 401 at 410 held 
that the determination of ‘trade or business’ is a question of fact not law. Furthermore, by section 23 
(1) (a –d) of the Companies Income Tax Act all other corporate bodies, such as ‘Registered Trustees’ 
of certain organisations whose object is to engage in non-profit venture are being established under 
part C of the CAMA are exempted from tax. Also section 23 (2) and (3) exempted corporation that 
promotes sport activities and a company limited by guarantee respectively. Therefore, the Nigerian 
corporate tax regime is only applicable to companies. All other entities and body of persons are 
subsumed under the individual tax regime. 
2 The Companies Income Tax Act Chapter C21 LFN 2004, Petroleum Profit Tax Act Cap P8 LFN 2004 
and Tertiary Education Trust Fund Act 2011 (By section 60 of the Petroleum Profit Tax, whenever a 
company paid tax under the Act, the profit of that company is not liable to again under PITA or CITA. 
But this provision is not applicable to the tax impose by the Tertiary Education Trust Fund Act see 
section 1 (4) of the Tertiary Education Trust Fund Act) 
3 Chapter C21 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 
4 Chapter P8 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 
5 The CITA imposes tax on the income of all corporations except those carrying on upstream petroleum 
business. This includes businesses in the downstream sector of the petroleum industry. The PPTA, on 
the other hand, taxes the income of the corporations operate in the upstream sector of the petroleum 
industry. Section 2 of the PPTA defines upstream petroleum operation to include survey, exploration, 
drilling, production and transportation of the crude oil to the loading platforms as well as other 
operations connected with the upstream operation. See the case of Shell Petroleum Development 
Company (Nig.) Ltd v. FBIR (1996) 8 N.W.L.R (Pt. 466) 256 and the case of Gulf Oil Company 




The two regimes impose tax on companies that fall within their respective 
coverage. It follows, therefore, that notion of corporate residence under these 
regimes may vary. The separate legal regime may not be unconnected with the 
fact that the upstream petroleum sector is the hub of the Nigerian economy.6  
That could be the reason for a tax regime different from the one applicable to 
other areas of the economy. Therefore, analysis of the corporate residence under 
the Nigerian regime needs to be carried out through the lens of the dichotomy 
mentioned above. 
 
7.1.1 Corporations Carrying on Business other than upstream Petroleum 
 
 
As stated above, the taxation of all companies under this category is primarily 
governed by the Companies Income Tax Act.7 The Act provides that: 
“Subject to the provisions of this Act, the tax shall, for each year of 
assessment, be payable at the rate specified in subsection (1) of section 
40 of this Act upon the profits of company accruing in, derived from, 
brought into, or received in Nigeria in respect of - (a) any trade or 
business for whatever period of time such trade or business may have 
been carried on;…”8 (emphasis added) 
And  
“(1) The profits of a Nigerian company shall be deemed to accrue in 
Nigeria wherever they have arisen and whether or not they have been 
brought into or received in Nigeria (2) The profits of a company other 
than Nigeria company from any trade or business shall be deemed to be 
derived from Nigeria (a) if that company has a fixed base in Nigeria to 
                                                 
1) transportation of the crude from the loading platforms to other countries or to the oil refinery; 2) 
refining of the crude oil; 3) refined oil distribution and marketing; 4) servicing the upstream 
operations; and 5) gas utilization. See David-West, JO ‘Oil, gas and Minerals taxation’ a paper 
presented at the Special Training Programme of the Chartered Institute of Taxation of Nigeria on 
22/5/2013  
6 Lawal, KT ‘Taxation of Petroleum Profit under the Nigeria’s Petroleum Profit Tax Act (2013) 4 (2) 
Int’l Journal of Advanced Legal Studies and Governance 1 at 2; Nlerum, FE ‘Reflections on the 
attitude of the courts to tax incentive mechanism in Nigeria’ (2012) NIALS Journal of Business Law 
111 
7 Cap C21 LFN 2004 
8 Section 9 (1) of Companies Income Tax Act 2007 (as amended) 
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the extent that the profit is attributable to the fixed base …”9 (emphasis 
added) 
 
The combined effect of the above provisions establishes the Nigerian residence-
based tax regime for corporations applicable to the companies that engage in 
businesses other than upstream petroleum operation. The provisions of section 
9 (1) envisage that all a company’s profits accrued in, derived from, brought 
into, or received in Nigeria are taxable. That is to say; it imposes a corporate tax 
on both active and passive incomes of all companies that in one way or the other 
connected to Nigeria. Having imposed corporate tax, section 13 (1) delimits the 
scope and extent of the tax imposed. In defining the scope of the tax jurisdiction, 
the section uses the terms ‘a company,' ‘a Nigerian Company’ and ‘a company 
other than Nigerian Company.' Thus, the section makes a Nigerian company 
taxable on its Nigerian-sourced income, and foreign-sourced income brought 
into Nigeria.10 The non-Nigerian company is liable to tax on the profit 
attributable to the business or trade carried on in Nigeria. 
  
The above provisions set out the Nigerian notion of the residence-based taxation 
of corporate income whereby all Nigerian companies are taxable on their global 
income whether or not accrued, derived or brought to Nigeria. Therefore, in 
ascribing tax liability, it is crucial to determine the residence of a company for 
income tax purposes. The Nigerian regime uses the terms ‘Nigerian company’ 
and ‘foreign company’ to describe the subjects of the corporate taxation. Thus, 
it does not use the usual terms; ‘resident’ and ‘non-resident’ companies. 
However, for the purpose of this analysis, it is assumed that ‘Nigerian company’ 
means resident company and ‘foreign company’ means non-resident company. 
A Nigerian company is subject to worldwide taxation while a foreign company 
                                                 
9 Section 13 (1) CITA 
10 Arogundade JA ‘Nigerian Income Tax & Its International Dimension’ (2005) Spectrum Books, 
Ibadan at 31 
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is taxable on income derived from Nigeria. The main question is what 
constitutes the residence of a Nigerian company for tax purposes? Therefore, in 
answering that question the CITA provides that: 
“The incorporation number of a company to which the provisions of 
section 8 apply, shall serve as the identification number of the company 
and shall be displayed by the company on all business transactions with 
other companies and individuals and on every document, statement, 
returns, audited account and correspondence with Revenue Authorities, 
including the Board of Customs and Excise, Ministries and all 
Government agencies.”11 
 
The adoption of the incorporation number as the income tax identification 
number suggests that the Nigerian regime has adopted ‘the place of 
incorporation test’ as the sole determinant. Therefore, any company that fails 
the test is a foreign company. 
 
7.1.1.1 Place of Incorporation 
 
 
The Nigerian corporate tax regime adopts ‘incorporation test’ as the sole test 
for the determination of the tax residence of companies that engage in 
businesses other than the upstream sector of the petroleum industry. The 
application of the incorporation test is premised on the framework set up by the 
corporate law of the state. Therefore, in analysing the incorporation test for 
determining the corporate residence, there is a need to highlight the import of 
the Nigeria corporate law. The principal corporate law in Nigeria is the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA).12 The CAMA set the framework 
for the participation of foreign companies in Nigerian economy by stating that: 
                                                 
11 Section 10 CITA 
12 Cap C20 LFN 2004, 
253 
 
“Subject to provisions of any enactment regulating the right and capacity 
of alien to undertake or participate in trade or business, an alien or a 
foreign company may join in forming a company.”13 
 
However, section 54 of the CAMA provides: 
“Subject to Sections 56 - 59 of this Act, every foreign company which, 
before or after the commencement of this Act, was incorporated outside 
Nigeria, and having the intention of carrying on business in Nigeria shall 
take all steps necessary to obtain incorporation as a separate entity in 
Nigeria for that purpose, but until so incorporated the foreign company 
shall not carry on business in Nigeria or exercise any of the powers of a 
registered company and shall not have a place of business or an address 
for service of documents or processes in Nigeria for any purpose other 
than the receipt of notices and other documents as matters preliminary to 
incorporation under this Act.”14 
 
The above section makes it mandatory for any foreign company that intends to 
carry on business15 in Nigeria to first be incorporated under Nigerian law before 
it commences business.16 Moreover, whenever a foreign company starts a 
business without being incorporated in Nigeria, all transactions entered into are 
void.17 A foreign company that has not been incorporated can only sue and be 
sued in its name for any business conducted outside Nigeria, but it cannot carry 
on any business.18 In addition to that provision, the incorporation requirement 
for a foreign company seeking to run business in Nigeria has been echoed by 
the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act which provides: 
                                                 
13 Section 20 (4) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act Cap C20 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
2004 
14 Section 54 of the CAMA 
15 ‘To carry on business’ has been held In E.I.I.A v. C.I.E Ltd (2006) 4 NWLR (PT 969)114 at 125-
126 to mean to conduct, prosecute or continue a particular business continuously. It also means to 
hold oneself out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services. 
16 Section 54 (1) of the CAMA see also Unipetrol Nigeria Plc v. Agip Nigeria Plc (2002) 14 NWLR 
(PT. 787) 312 at 330-331. 
17 Shall be liable to fine under section 55 of CAMA. See Section 54 (2) CAMA. See also E.I.I.A v. 
CIE (2006) 4 NWLR (PT 969) 114 at 125-127 
18 Section 60 (b) of the CAMA see the case of Ritz & Co. KG v. Techno Ltd (1999) 4 NWLR (Pt 598) 
298 at 300; Watanmal (Singapore) v. Liz Olofin & Co (1998)1 NWLR (PT 533) 311 AT 319, (To 
deny a foreign company the right to sue to recover, its money simply because it is not incorporated 
in Nigeria could turn Nigerian companies and individual doing business with foreign companies 
abroad into potential fraud syndicate.) 
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“Except as provided in Section 18 of this Act any Nigerian or any non-
Nigerian may invest and participate in the operation of any enterprise in 
Nigeria. The provisions of this Act shall not apply to enterprises on the 
“negative list” as defined in Section 33 of this Act. Subject to this Act, a 
person who intends to establish an enterprise to which this Act applies 
shall do so by the Provisions of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 
1990.”19 
 
Given the above provisions, the Nigerian corporate and investment laws do not 
allow a foreign company to conduct business freely in Nigeria.  
 
Moreover, a foreign company not registered in Nigeria may legally do business 
in Nigeria through a company registered in Nigeria. In the case of FBIR v. 
Halliburton (WA) Ltd,20  the respondent was a foreign company that did not 
satisfy the requirement of section 54 CAMA but derived income from Nigeria 
through its Nigerian affiliate company. The court addressed the meaning of 
“carry on business" within the context of section 54 CAMA. Thus, the crucial 
issue was whether the provision of equipment and technical staff to handle the 
equipment from overseas by the respondent to its Nigerian affiliate, amounts 
carrying on business in Nigeria as defined by section 54 of CAMA? The court 
held that the respondent was a contractor who was not registered in Nigeria. 
Also, the respondent’s activities were a mere sourcing of contract in Nigeria, 
but it did not carry on business in Nigeria in the context of section 54 CAMA.21 
In the light of this decision, a company that is not registered in Nigeria can still 
be liable to tax once it derived its income through an affiliate registered in 
Nigeria. 
                                                 
19 Sections 17 – 19 of the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act Cap N117 Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria 2004 
20 (2014) LPELR-24230(CA) 1 at 16 - 18 
21 The court cited the cases of Edicomsa International Inc. and Associates v. Citec International Estates 
Ltd. (2006) 4 NWLR (pt. 969) 114 at 125 136; Olorunfemi v. Asho (1999) 1 NWLR (pt.585) 1 at 9 and 
the case of Chukwueke v. Okoronkwo (1999) 1 NWLR (pt.587) 410 at 418. As corollary to this Where, 
however, a non-Nigerian company is not resident in Nigeria, the fact that a non-resident foreign 
company is a beneficial owner of share capital of a Nigerian company does not make such non-
Nigerian company subject to Nigerian tax. See the Supreme Court decision in Aluminum Industries v. 




The Companies Income Tax Act, on the other hand, makes the following 
provisions: 
“"company" means any company or corporation (other than a 
corporation sole) established by or under any law in force in Nigeria or 
elsewhere; "foreign company" means any company or corporation (other 
than a corporation sole) established by or under any law in force in any 
territory or country outside Nigeria; "Nigeria company" means any 
company incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act or 
any enactment replaced by that Act;”22  
 
The above provision envisages the existence of foreign companies alongside 
Nigerian companies.23 To show its recognition of the foreign companies, the 
Act imposes a residence-based tax on the Nigerian companies and sourced from 
the foreign companies.24 Therefore, there is a serious conflict between the 
provisions of CAMA and that of CITA. Under the Nigerian legal system, the 
two items of legislation are concurrent in status, because they are both Acts of 
the National Assembly. The CITA imposes a tax on the company while the 
CAMA regulates the formation and management of the company. It follows that 
the provisions of CITA apply to the companies registered under the provisions 
of the CAMA. Therefore, the crux of the conflict between the two laws is that 
the CAMA forbids unregistered foreign companies from carrying on any 
business in Nigeria. The CITA, on the other hand, allows such type of 
                                                 
22 Section 105 of the CITA 2007 (as amended). Equally, the recognition of the foreign companies has 
been re-echoed by section 30 (1) (b) of the CITA (while empowering the Federal Inland Revenue 
Service to assess the turnover of a company instead of profit in certain situations.): “ Notwithstanding 
section 40 of this Act, where in respect of any trade or business carried on in Nigeria by any company 
(whether or not part of the operations of the business are carried on outside Nigeria) … (b) if that 
company is a company other than a Nigerian company …”  
23 Section 105 and 13 (2) of the CITA see also section 2 and 18  of the Petroleum Profit Tax Act 
24 John, D C ‘Corporate taxation laws in Nigeria: a review’ (2011) 2 (1) Int’l Journal of Advanced Legal 
Studies and Governance, 236 at 238; Gwangdi, MI and Garba, A ‘Administration of Companies 
Income Tax in Nigeria: Issues of compliance and enforcement’ (2015) 7 (8) European Journal of 
Business and Management 18 at 21. 
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companies to operate and generate taxable income. The question is which of 
these legislation takes precedence over another? 
 
Furthermore, it could be argued that the provisions of section 54 are only 
applicable where the foreign company seeks to earn an active income. By the 
combined effects of sections 20 and 80 of the CITA, all passive income (such 
as dividends, interest, royalty and rent) earned by a non-resident company are 
taxable by way of withholding tax.25 That is to say, a foreign company can earn 
this type of income without the need of complying with the provision of section 
54 of the CAMA. However, the provision of Section 54 is very clear and 
unambiguous in prohibiting all kind of business by a foreign company before 
its registration.  
 
The test operates on the framework set up by the corporate law. The Nigerian 
corporate law regime does not recognise a foreign company thereby rendering 
the tenor of the test nugatory. Therefore, the ‘incorporation test’ adopted for the 
determination of the corporate residence in Nigeria is a flaw. 
 
7.1.2. Corporations carrying on upstream Petroleum Business  
 
 
One of the unique features of the Nigerian corporate tax system is the duality of 
the legal regime. All companies that engage in upstream petroleum operations 
are treated differently from all other companies. Thus, they are subject to 
different tax at a different rate. The rationale behind this separation is still 
questionable. Both the companies running upstream oil business and other 
companies followed the same process to acquire their respective legal status. 
Therefore, they are all companies within the context of the CAMA. It is the type 
of the business carried out by the companies that makes them differ from each 
                                                 
25 See the case of Oando Plc vs FIRS (2014) 16 TLRN 99. 
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other.26 The CAMA allows companies to have more than one object in their 
Memorandum of Association that is closely related. So it is possible for a 
company to have two objects; one for dealing in upstream and the other for 
downstream. In this situation, under which of the Acts (CITA or PPTA) the 
company pays its tax? Alternatively, is it liable to tax under both Acts? If yes, 
then the company is exposed to double tax on its income. 
 
Be that as it may, under the current regime the Petroleum Profits Tax Act 
(PPTA) imposes and regulates the taxation of the profits of the companies that 
operates in the upstream sector of the petroleum industry. The Act provides: 
 “There shall be levied upon the profit of each accounting period of any 
company engage in petroleum operation during that period, a tax to be 
charged, assessed and payable in accordance with the provision of this 
Act.”27 
 
The above provision imposes a tax on the profit of the companies in petroleum 
operation. The section does not make reference to the source of the profit. That 
is whether the profit derived from Nigerian-source only or from both Nigerian 
and foreign-source. Failure to make that reference questions the true nature of 
this regime. However, from the content of the section the principal subject of 
the tax is a company and that brings the question as to what constitute a 
company for the purposes of the Act? The Act has two different definitions of 
company as follows: 
 “Company” means any body corporate incorporated under any law in 
force in Nigeria or elsewhere.”28 
 
                                                 
26 Section 27 (1) (c) of the CAMA Cap C20 LFN 2004 
27 Section 8 of the Petroleum Profit Tax Act Cap P8 LFN 2004. 
28 Ibid at Section 2. See also section 18 (3) of the same Act “In this section “foreign company” means 
a company incorporated outside Nigeria before 18 November 1968; and having on that date an 
established business in Nigeria.” 
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“resident in Nigeria” about a company means a company the 
management and control of the business of which are exercised in 
Nigeria.”29 
 
Superficially, the provisions have adopted two basic tests for the determination 
of the corporate residence that is the ‘incorporation test’ and the ‘CMC test’. 
Now let us examine the nature and extent of these tests. 
 
7.1.2.1 Place of Incorporation 
 
As discussed above, the application of the incorporation test is premised on the 
enabling environment provided by the corporate law. The companies covered 
by the PPTA are not in any way different from the other types of companies. 
Thus, they are all regulated by the CAMA. Any attempt to analyse the 
incorporation test under this heading will amount to a repetition. 
 
7.1.2.2 Centre of Management and Control  
 
By their combined effect the above-cited sections 2 and 17 (3) make any 
company operating in the upstream sector whose central management and 
control takes place in Nigeria liable to tax under the PPTA. The provision 
suggests that the CMC test could be used to determine the residence status of 
the companies that falls under the Act. However, the Act did not elaborate on 
the relationship between the CMC test and the incorporation test. That is to say 
at what stage does the CMC test become applicable? Does it serve as an 
alternative test to the incorporation test? In the absence of that clarification, 
mentioning the CMC as a test for companies’ residence is misleading. 
 
                                                 
29 Section 2 PPTA See also section 17 (3) of the same Act “In this section - Nigerian company means 
any company the control and management of whose activities are exercised in Nigeria…” 
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As a corollary, the Act neither defines the concept of CMC nor gives guidance 
on how to determine it.30 It follows therefore that even if the Revenue Authority 
or the companies seeks to invoke the concept of CMC, reliance must be placed 
on the English courts’ decisions on the concept.31 Therefore, the rule in De 
Beers and other subsequent decisions that followed and expatiated its 
principles32 will apply in Nigeria as guidance on the determination of the CMC 
of a company for purposes of tax under the PPTA. 
 
The Act did not define the concept of CMC. However, even if it did, the idea of 
adopting the CMC test in determining the corporate residence of the companies 
has been rendered nugatory by other provisions of the Petroleum Profits Tax 
Act.  The Act provides that:  
“(1) A company not resident in Nigeria which is or has been in petroleum 
operations (hereinafter in this section referred to as a “non-resident 
company”) shall be assessable and chargeable to tax either directly or in 
the name of its manager, or in the name of any other person who is 
resident in Nigeria, employed in the management of the petroleum 
operation carried on by such non-resident company, as such non-resident 
company would be assessed and charged if it were resident in Nigeria; 
(2) The person in whose name a non-resident company is assessable and 
chargeable to tax shall be answerable – (a) for all matters required to be 
done by virtue of this Act for the assessment of the tax as might be 
required to be done by such non-resident company if it were in Nigeria; 
(b) for paying any tax assessed and charged in the name of such person 
by virtue of subsection (1) of this section. The manager or any principal 
officer in Nigeria of every company which is or has been engaged in 
petroleum operations shall be answerable for doing all such acts as are 
                                                 
30 As at 20th August, 2015 there is no any judicial decision that dealt with the concept of CMC in relation 
to the companies within the ambit of the PPTA. 
31 Under the Nigerian legal system, all courts are enjoined to follow the line of reasoning of the UK’s 
court and the UK decisions are recognized as part of the persuasive judicial precedence. See Section 10 
of the High Court Law of Lagos State which is pari material with all other states High Court laws 
provides: “The High Court shall in addition to any other jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution of 
the Federation or by thus or other enactment possess and exercise, within the limits mentioned in, and 
subject to the provisions of, the Constitution of the Federation and this enactment, all the jurisdiction, 
powers and authority which are vested in or capable of being exercised by the High Court of Justice of 
England.” 
32 Which were discussed in detail in chapter four of this thesis  
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required to be done by virtue of this Act for the assessment and charge 
to tax of such company and for payment of such tax”33 
 
The above provision suggests that the corporate tax liability of the companies 
that fall under the PPTA has been indirectly shifted to the employees of the 
companies. In other words, it is the residence of the employee of the companies 
that is crucial in determining the companies’ tax liability. That is to say, both 
the resident and non-resident oil company could become liable to tax either 
directly or through their managers and other principal officers. The above 
provision did not only compound the problem of corporate residence but has 
also altered the notion of corporate tax as a whole. It raised a question as to 
whether the Nigerian regime imposes a corporate tax on the companies engages 
in the upstream sector of the petroleum industry. It should be noted that the 
CITA contained a similar provision about companies other those operating in 
the upstream sector. Even though the section is not as detailed as the above 
sections: 
“The principal officer or manager in Nigeria of every company shall be 
answerable for doing all such acts, matters and things as are required to 
be done by virtue of this Act for the assessment of the company and 
payment of the tax.”34 
  
In the light of the above, it is clear that Nigerian corporate tax regime is very 
complex and inconsistent.35 It follows, therefore, that the issue of corporate tax 
residence must be flawed as well. Hence the need for serious reform of the 
system, to bring it in tandem with the international best practice. 
 
                                                 
33 Section 25 and 26 of the Petroleum Profit Tax Act  
34 Section 48 of the CITA Cap C21 LFN 2004 
35 Notwithstanding the recent tax reform efforts embark upon by Nigerian government. For discussion 
on the current tax reform in Nigeria see Sanni, A ‘Nigeria Recent Developments in Company Income 
Taxation in Nigeria’ (2010) 65 (1) Bulletin for International Taxation 1; Sanni, A ‘Problems of 
Determining the Applicable Tax Laws in Nigeria: Resolving the Dilemma for FIRS and Taxpayers’ 
(2012) 56 (1) Journal of African Law  55-67. 
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7.3 Residence-Based Taxation of Corporations under South African 
Regime 
 
The South African regime discussed in chapter five dealt with the taxation of 
natural persons. All entities other than natural persons are subsumed into the 
corporate taxation regime.36  As mentioned earlier, at the introduction of the 
income tax system, the South African regime imposes a corporate income tax 
on the basis of the source of the taxable income. Thus, corporations were liable 
to pay tax on all the income they derived or deemed to have been derived from 
South Africa. While describing the nature of the former South African regime, 
Williams stated that: 
“…the tax liability of a company did not hinge on whether it was resident 
in the Republic, but on whether or not it was a ‘domestic company’ as 
opposed to an ‘external company.' The Act defined a ‘domestic 
company’ as a South African company or a company that is managed 
and controlled in the Republic…”37 
 
In the year 2000, South Africa switched from the source-based to the residence-
based system by removing the word ‘person’ and replacing it with ‘resident’ in 
the definition of gross income. The word ‘person’ suggested that the focus was 
on the source of the income rather than the income earner because a person 
could be a South African resident or non-resident. By this amendment, the 
determination of who is a South African resident for tax purposes is crucial in 
determining the tax liability. As to corporations, the Act defined resident as:   
 
“'resident' means any- …(b) person (other than a natural person) 
which is incorporated, established or formed in the Republic or 
which has its place of effective management in the Republic, but 
does not include— (A) any person who is deemed to be 
exclusively a resident of another country for purposes of the 
application of any agreement entered into between the 
Governments of the Republic and that other country for the 
                                                 
36 For the purposes of this chapter reference to corporation or corporate include trust and other entities 
other than natural persons. 
37 Williams, RC (2006) at 38-39. See sections 4 (1) (f) of Income Tax Act No. 85 of 1974  
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avoidance of double taxation; or (B) any company if— (AA) that 
company is incorporated, established or formed in a country other 
than the Republic; (BB) that company has its place of effective 
management in the Republic; (CC) that company would, but for 
the company having its place of effective management in the 
Republic, be a controlled foreign company with a foreign business 
establishment as defined in section 9D(1); and (DD) the aggregate 
amount of tax payable to all spheres of government of any country 
other than the Republic by that company in respect of any foreign 
tax year of that company is at least 75 percent of the amount of 
normal tax that would have been payable in respect of any taxable 
income of that company had that company, but for this subitem 
(B), been a resident for that foreign tax year: Provided that the 
aggregate amount of tax so payable must be determined— (i) after 
taking into account any applicable agreement for the prevention 
of double taxation and any credit, rebate or other right of recovery 
of tax from any sphere of government of any country other than 
the Republic; and (ii) after disregarding any loss in respect of a 
year other than that foreign tax year or from a company other than 
that company: … Provided further that in determining whether a 
person that is a foreign investment entity has its place of effective 
management in the Republic, no regard must be had to any 
activity that— (a) constitutes— (i) a financial service as defined 
in section 1 of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services 
Act, 2002 (Act No. 37 of 2002); or (ii) any service that is 
incidental to a financial service contemplated in subparagraph (i) 
where the incidental service is in respect of a financial product 
that is exempted from the provisions of that Act, as contemplated 
by section 1(2) of that Act; and (b) is carried on by a financial 
service provider as defined in section 1 of the Financial Advisory 
and Intermediary Services Act, 2002 (Act No. 37 of 2002), in 
terms of a licence issued to that financial service provider under 
section 8 of that Act’’38 
 
                                                 
38 Section 1 of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 (as variously amended by Section 2 (h) of the 
Revenue Laws Amendment Act 59 of 2000; Section 6 (1) (p) of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 
No.74 of 2002; Section 33 (1) of the Exchange Control Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws 
Act No. 12 of 2003 and Section 12 (1) (i), (j), (k) of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act No. 45 of 
2003 up to section 2 (1) (w), (x) and (y) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act No. 22 of 2012) see 
also Koker, A and Williams, RC ‘Silke on South African Income Tax’ (2010) LexisNexis;  Koker, 
A et al ‘Silke Tax Yearbook 2012 – 2013’ (2013) LexisNexis, Durban at D37 – D39 
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Apart from the exceptions, the above provision contained two basic tests for the 
determination of corporate residence. That is the ‘place of incorporation’ and 
‘place of effective management’ tests. The former is the primary test, because 
once it is satisfied by a corporation, the latter test will not be considered at all. 
In other words, the latter test is only applicable where the former failed to bring 
the corporation into the tax net. Therefore, even if a company or any recognised 
entity is not incorporated, established or formed in South Africa, it could be a 
resident if it is managed effectively in South Africa. 
 
7.3.1 Place of Incorporation 
 
The above-quoted provision mentioned three key terms that are relevant to this 
test: ‘incorporated’, ‘established’ or ‘formed’. These terms represent the various 
modes of giving legal recognition to some entities under the corporate law. The 
application of this test is premised on the framework provided by corporate law 
for the incorporation, establishment, and formation of all persons other than a 
natural person. The term ‘incorporated’ refers to duly registered companies and 
close corporations39 while the terms ‘established’ and ‘formed’ apply to trusts 
and other entities that are not legal persons.40 Therefore, once it is proved that a 
particular entity was incorporated, established or formed in South Africa, then 
such entity is a resident for tax purposes41 and it will “permanently remain a 
resident even if it severs all links with the Republic”.42  
 
The fact that the South African ‘incorporation test’ is being operated alongside 
with the POEM test suggests that foreign entities are allowed to carry out 
business without being incorporated in the Republic. Thus, the regime allows 
                                                 
39 Williams, RC (2006) at 37 
40 DU Plessis, I ‘The residence of a trust for South African income tax purposes’ (2009) 21 SA Merc. 
L. J 322 at 329. 
41 Subject to the exceptions mentioned in section 1 of the Income Tax Act. 




the test to operate smoothly without running into conflict with the corporate law 
as in Nigerian case.  
 
7.3.2 Place of Effective Management 
 
 
Where a company or other entity is not incorporated, established or formed in 
South Africa, it could still be a resident, as defined, if it is effectively managed 
in the Republic. As discussed in chapter 5.3.2.2.2 of this thesis, the concept of 
POEM was originally designed to serve as a tie-breaker provision in the DTA 
for resolving dual residence conflicts.43 However, some jurisdictions adopted a 
similar concept44 as a connecting factor in determining the tax residence of 
corporations. Thus, the concept currently played two significant roles in the 
determination of tax liability of corporations; as a jurisdictional link and as a 
tiebreaker rule.45 By the above-quoted provision, the Republic of South Africa 
joins the league of the jurisdictions that adopt POEM as a connecting factor.46  
 
Despite the adoption of the concept of POEM as a jurisdictional link, the South 
African Income Tax Act did not define the concept. Thus, it has no meaning 
under the domestic law. However, immediately after the adoption of the 
residence-based system, the South African Revenue Service issued 
Interpretation Note No. 6 of 2002.47 The Note defined the POEM as the place 
                                                 
43 Cockfield, AJ ‘International Tax Competition: The Last Battleground of Globalization’(2011) 63 (12) 
Tax Notes International 867 at 868. 
44 Even though only India and South Africa adopted the OECD notion of POEM. However, most of the 
civil law Jurisdictions adopted the concept of ‘place of management’ as jurisdictional link between 
the state and the corporate taxpayer. See Broe, LD ‘Corporate Tax Residence in Civil Law 
Jurisdiction’ in Maisto, G  (ed) ‘Residence of companies under tax treaties and EC law’ (2009) IBFD 
Publication 95 at 96. 
45 For discussion on the two roles see Merwe, BA 'Residence of a company - the meaning of "effective 
management" (2002) 14 SA Mercantile Law Journal at 91 Oguttu, AW ‘Resolving double taxation: 
the concept 'place of effective management' analysed from a South African perspective’ (2008) 41 
Comp. & Int'l L.J. S. Afr. 80 at 84-86. 
46 Other jurisdictions adopted the concept of ‘place of management’, but South Africa adopted the 
POEM as it is in the OECD Model convention. Almost all other jurisdictions use the term POEM as 
a tiebreaker rule not as a connecting factor. See chapter 5.3.2.2.2 of this thesis 
47 As updated by Interpretation Note 6 (issue 2) of 3/11/2016 
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where the regular day-to-day management by the senior managers of the 
corporation takes place. Thus, if the day-to-day management occurs in one 
particular place, then that particular is the POEM. Conversely, if the day-to-day 
management is exercised at different locations or via video-conferencing, the 
POEM would be the location where the senior managers carried out the day-to-
day operational management and business decisions. However, if the daily 
business operations take place in different locations, then the POEM would be 
the place where the corporation has the strongest economic connection.  
 
The Note entirely disregarded the place where the main control of the company 
or trust is carried out or where the board of directors meets. Thus, based on the 
provision of Note No. 6, the South African notion of POEM focuses on the 
location where the lower level management team discharges its duties. That is 
where the day-to-day policies of the corporation are implemented actually. 
However, the analysis of the various notions of the CMC and POEM in chapter 
four revealed that the international trend leans towards the place where the 
board of directors or top management team meet. 
 
Given the above position of the SARS and the non-binding nature of the 
Interpretation Notes, there was a need to have a judicial pronouncement on the 
issue. As at August 2015, there is only one South African court decision that 
gave guidance on the connotation of the concept of POEM. That is the case of 
Oceanic Trust Co Ltd v Commissioner of South African Revenue Service.48 The 
case involved, among other things, a question of residency of a trust. On this 
issue Louw J stated that: 
“In my view, for this court to declare that SISM was not a resident of the 
Republic, will require this court to inquire into the facts and to make 
factual findings, inter alia on the question where, in South Africa or 
Mauritius, SISM’s key management and commercial decisions that are 
                                                 
48 (2012)JOL 28880 (WCC) 
266 
 
necessary for the conduct of SISM’s business were in substance made 
during the years in question… even if the facts are sufficiently clear to 
make a decision the place where key management and commercial 
decisions that were necessary for the conduct of SISM’s business, were 
in substance made, has, in my view not been established to be outside 
South Africa. It would appear to me that at least some key management 
decisions and at the very least, key commercial decisions necessary for 
the conduct of SISM’s business were in substance made in South Africa. 
Therefore, applying the Smallwood test, the facts to the extent that they 
have been established, do not, in my view, establish that the POEM of 
SISM was in Mauritius, and not in South Africa.”49 
 
It is submitted that going by the facts and the claim of the parties before the 
court; the above passage was not the ratio of the judgment. The Court in Oceanic 
Trust explicitly stated that the determination of the POEM is a question of fact, 
and the law precludes it to decide. That shows that the court did not digest the 
required facts to arrive at any decision. Assuming it was the ratio, the decision 
was purely based on the English case of HMRC v Smallwood and another50 that 
dealt with the issue of the POEM of a trust in terms of the UK – Mauritius 
DTA.51 Therefore, the decision viewed the POEM as a tiebreaker, not as a 
jurisdictional link. There is the need to rethink the value of the Oceanic case in 
determining the corporate residence in South Africa. However, the court 
propounded that in determining the residence of a trust (and by extension a 
company) the focal point should be on where the key management and 
commercial decisions of the trust are taken. 
 
                                                 
49 In arriving at its decision, the court relied on the English case of HMRC v Smallwood and Anor 
(2010) EWCA Civ. 778 that dealt with the issue of POEM of a trust in terms of the UK – Mauritius  
DTA. See also the case of CSARS v Tradehold Limited (2012) (132/11) ZASCA 61. The Tradehold’s 
case dealt with the issue of conflict between the DTA and the Income Tax Act. The Court rely on the 
content of the DTA and held that Tradehold was resident of South Africa, and refused to apply the 
POEM test on Tradehold. 
 
50 (2010) EWCA Civ. 778 
51 It should be noted that this case viewed POEM as where the top management of the corporation is 
located. The question is why the Oceanic case takes different position? 
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By way of analogy, in Fundy Settlement v. Canada,52 the Canadian Supreme 
Court has extended the De Beers principle to the determination of residence of 
trusts as well. The court held that the trusts were residents of Canada for tax 
purposes because it is the beneficiaries who exercised the CMC of the trusts, 
and they exercised it while residing in Canada.53 The court did not say that the 
residence of a trust can never be the residence of the trustees if the trustees (not 
the beneficiaries) exercised the CMC. The trustees, in this case, relied on the 
earlier decision54 where it was held that the tax residence of a trust was where 
the majority of the trustees reside. The rule, in this case, suggests that the focal 
point in determining the tax residence of a trust is who, in fact, exercised the 
CMC of the Trust. Thus, it is a question of fact. That is to say, the place of the 
Trustees meeting or by extension the board of directors meeting is no longer 
decisive in determining trust or corporate residence. 
 
The absence of clear statutory or judicial decisions on the POEM led 
commentators to share their views. However, most of the South African tax 
expert commented on the concept of POEM as a tiebreaker rule as provided by 
the OECD Model Convention. This thesis will analyse the concept as a 
jurisdictional link as adopted by South Africa. Therefore, only the view of the 
commentators that looked at the POEM as a jurisdictional link will be 
highlighted. Williams55 described the CMC as the place where the top level 
strategic policy decisions of the company are taken and contrasts it with the 
POEM where the company runs its day-to-day activities. De Koker and 
Williams argued that: 
“the place from where factually and effectively the day-to-day affairs of 
the company are managed by its executive directors and management – 
that is, where strategic decisions for the conduct of the company’s 
                                                 
52 (2012) SCC 14 
53 Kroft, ED et al ‘SCC upholds new test for residency of trusts’ (2013) 23 Int'l Tax Rev. 76 
54 Thibodean Family v. The Queen, 78 DTC 6376 
55 Williams, RC (2006) at 38 
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business are in substance formulated and implemented with a degree of 
regularity – will be the place of effective management. These decisions 
must pertain to the company’s day-to-day activities in terms of managing 
the ordinary operations of the business.”56 
 
The above view is closer to paragraph 24 of the commentary on Article 4 (3) of 
OECD Model Convention. Thus, the view considered the POEM more as a 
tiebreaker than a connecting factor. Meyerowitz57 opines that the POEM is the 
place where directors meet and take a decision on the company’s business. He 
distinguishes it from the place where the directors or staff managed the company 
or where it carries on its business. He further argues that where the company 
has executive directors, the POEM is where the executive directors run the 
affairs of the company. Van der Merwe58 tries to differentiate  the concept of 
CMC. He argues that the line of distinction between two lies on the role being 
played by the POEM as a tiebreaker rule which the CMC does not play. 
 
Therefore, the CMC suggests the place where top level management decisions 
are taken as opposed to day-to-day management role of the POEM. Davis,59 on 
the other hand, opines that the POEM is the place the business is entirely or 
sufficiently managed, “the place where the shots are called.” Olivier60  makes 
an interesting analysis of the POEM; she argues that where the directors meet 
is only a factor but not a determinant for the POEM. She further argues that the 
determination of the POEM always raised the question as to whether or not the 
directors take decisions for the corporation, or are mere rubber-stamps of the 
                                                 
56 De Koker, AP and Williams, RC ‘Silke on South African Income Tax’ (2010) LexisNexis Butterworth 
in par 14.45. 
57 Meyerowitz, D ‘Meyerowitz on income tax 2002 – 2003 edition’ The Taxpayer at 5.19 
58 Merwe Van der, BA ‘Residence of a company – the meaning of ‘effective management’’ (2002) SA 
Merc. L.J. 79 at 92. This is line with the view of Olivier. See Olivier, L ‘Residence based taxation 
(2001) J. S. Afr. L. 20 at 25 
59 Davis et al ‘Juta’s income tax’ loose-leaf, at 1 resident – 2A (commentary on the meaning of resident 
in section 1 of the Income Tax Act, 1962  
60 Olivier, L and Honiball, M ‘International tax: A South African perspective’ (2008) (4th ed), Siber 
Ink, Cape Town at 66  
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shareholders. However, she questioned the efficacy of the POEM in a situation 
where the directors meet via video conferencing.61  
 
It is arguable that the notion of the CMC62 is not new to South Africa, as it has 
been in use under the source-based regime. For instance in Rhodesia Railways 
and Others v. COT63 corporate residence was one of the issues for 
determination. The Court relied on the English court decision in De Beer64 that 
enunciated the CMC test and adopted the test in determining the question of 
residence. Therefore, the South African regime had at one time given priority 
to the place where top management decisions took place as opposed to day-to-
day activities. However, the CMC test was not a test for establishing a 
jurisdictional link between South Africa and the companies involved, but rather 
as a means to determine the companies’ eligibility for certain relief or 
exemption. 
  
Given the above analysis, it is submitted that due to the lack of clear-cut judicial 
pronouncement on the connotation of the POEM, the South African POEM test 
is characterised by inconsistencies and uncertainties. Also, the tax experts need 
to appreciate the distinction between the POEM as a tiebreaker and as a 
jurisdictional link. Therefore, it is further submitted that as a connecting factor, 
the concept of POEM is almost the same as the CMC. The thin line of distinction 
lies in who takes the decision and where the decision was taken.65 In many 
situations, it could be difficult to differentiate the personality and the place.  
 
                                                 
61 Ibid at 67 
62 As Williams described the concept of the CMC as the place where the top strategic management 
decisions are taken. Williams, RC (2006) at 38 
63 (1925) AD 439. The CMC test was also applied in Boyd v. CIR (1951) 3 SA 525 
64 (1906) AC 455 
65The Indian notion of POEM provides that once a company’s POEM is located in India at any time 
during the year, then the company become an Indian resident. See Rohit Gupta, CA ‘Place of Effective 
Management (POEM) in India & Corporate Taxation’ available at http://taxguru.in/income-tax/place-
effective-management-india-corporate-taxation-analysis safeguards.html  last access 20/6/2015. This 
makes easier to understand the distinction between POEM and CMC 
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7.4 Corporate Residence under Nigeria – South Africa Double Taxation 
Treaty 2000 
 
As discussed in chapter five above, the tenet of the Nigeria – South Africa DTA 
covers the tax residence of both the individuals and corporations of the two 
states. Thus, this heading is not repeating the analysis made in Item 5.4 of 
chapter five, but rather analysing the portion of the DTA that touches the issue 
of corporate residence. To resolve dual corporate residence conflict between the 
state parties, the DTA defined resident as: 
“For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "resident of a Contracting 
State" means: (a) in Nigeria, any person who, under the laws of Nigeria, 
is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of 
management, place of incorporation or any other criterion of a similar 
nature … (b) in South Africa, any individual who is ordinarily resident 
in South Africa and any person other than an individual who has its place 
of effective management in South Africa.”66 
 
The above provision has adopted the tests being used for the determination of 
corporate resident in the two states. In the case of Nigeria, the above provision 
mentioned the terms ‘place of management’ and ‘place of incorporation.' This 
suggests that a corporation could be a Nigerian resident on the grounds of being 
incorporated in Nigeria or its place of management is located in Nigeria. 
Whereas, in the case of South Africa, only the ‘place of effective management’ 
was mentioned.67 No provision in the DTA covers any potential conflict when 
a corporation falls within the definition of the two states. Therefore, the DTA 
does not cover the possible jurisdictional conflict on the corporate residence 
between Nigeria and South Africa. For instance, the provisions of section 48 of 
the CITA and 25 and 26 of the PPTA made the managers and other principal of 
sections employees of both Resident and non-resident companies liable to do 
all that the companies are required to do including the payment of tax. Thus, the 
                                                 
66 Article 4 (1) of  the Nigeria – South Africa DTA 2009 




residence of the employees of the companies is more relevant than that of the 
employers.  Therefore, the only solution to any potential conflict between the 
two trading partners (Nigeria and South Africa) is for them to understand the 
regime of each other through comparative analysis. 
  
 
7.5  Lesson for the two Regimes 
 
There are two different items of legislation that govern the Nigerian regime on 
corporate taxation. Superficially, apart from imposing the tax at different rates, 
the regimes also envisage a different set of rules for the determination of 
corporate residence. The CITA explicitly adopts the incorporation test as the 
sole test for the determination of all companies within its coverage. The PPTA 
defines Nigerian resident to include corporations that have their CMC in 
Nigeria. However, analysis of the two regimes reveals that the CMC test 
mentioned in section 2 of the PPTA has been rendered nugatory by section 25 
and 26 of the same Act. Therefore, the ‘incorporation test’ remains the sole test 
for corporate residence in Nigeria. Some of the legislation that imposes other 
type of corporate taxes has also adopted the incorporation as the test 
determining corporate residence.68  
                                                 
68See section 1(2) of the Tertiary Education Trust Fund (Establishment, Etc) Act 2011 “The Tax at the 
rate of 2 percent shall be charged on the assessable profit of a company registered in Nigeria…” 
superficially, it could be argued that Nigeria shared similar regime with the US. However, the US 
corporate law recognised and allowed foreign companies to operate in the US without necessarily 
being incorporated in the US. But in order to address the challenges of using ‘place of incorporation’ 
as a sole test, the US regime categorised the foreign companies into two; those whose income is 
effectively connected with the US and others whose income is not effectively connected with the US. 
In the former case the income are taxable regardless of the source, but in the latter case the companies 
are taxed at the rate of 30% only. For detail discussion on this see Brauner, Y ‘United States’ in 
Maisto, G (ed) Residence of Companies Under Tax Treaties and EC Law (2009) 855 at 865-66; 
Tillinghast, DR ‘A Matter of Definition: Foreign and Domestic Taxpayers’ (1984) 2 Int'l Tax & Bus. 
Law. 239 at 240 Available at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol2/iss2/1 last access 
10/4/2014 However, despite the adoption of the above mechanism, the US regime remains exposed 
to the dangers inherent in the adoption of ‘place of incorporation’ as a sole test. That is why some 
commentators are making case for the adoption of CMC alongside with ‘place of incorporation’ test. 
See Avi-Yonah, RS ‘Beyond territoriality and deferral: The promise of "Managed and Controlled"’ 
(2011) 63 (9) Tax Notes Int'l 667 at 668. See also New York State Bar Association Tax Section, 




The analysis also reveals that the incorporation test is facing a serious challenge 
from the Nigerian corporate law regime. The Nigerian corporate law regime 
does not allow foreign corporations to do business in Nigeria without first being 
incorporated under Nigerian law. The corporate tax system, on the other hand, 
envisages and recognizes the participation of unregistered foreign corporations 
in the Nigeria economy.  The conflict between the two regimes questions the 
utility of the incorporation test for the determination of the corporate residence 
in Nigeria. It also causes misalignment between the substantive and 
enforcement jurisdiction.69 Therefore, the Nigerian regime on corporate tax 
residence is very defective.  
 
South African corporate tax, on the other hand, is governed by a single regime.70 
The South African regime overcomes the challenges being encountered by the 
Nigerian ‘incorporation test’ because South African corporate law has 
accommodated the test. South African corporate law recognises and allows 
foreign incorporated companies to operate in the Republic if they are registered 
in South Africa as an external company. The income tax liability of the company 
arises when it locates its POEM in South Africa. Thus, there is no conflict 
between the corporate and tax regimes. Furthermore, notwithstanding the 
inconsistencies in defining the South African POEM test, it is better than not 
having the test. Therefore, the South African regime has followed the global 
trend by adopting a fact and circumstances test to augment the incorporation 
test.   
 
                                                 
2011,” dated 31st January, 2011 (discussing the issues surrounding changing the definition of 
corporate residence based on “management and control” and ultimately recommending that it be 
considered in connection with broad-based international tax reform in the future) 
69Swain, JA ‘Misalignment of Substantive and Enforcement Tax Jurisdiction in a Mobile Economy: 
Causes and Strategies for Realignment’ (2010) 63 (x) National Tax Journal, Fox Special Issue at 112 
70 In South Africa, the income and capital gain taxation of both the individuals as well as all non-natural 
persons are governed by the Income Tax Act 1962 (as amended). Therefore, all the complexities 
associated with having dual regimes for corporate tax have been prevented. 
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Moreover, sections 3 (1) of the PITA and section 13 (1) of the CITA define 
taxable income for both individual and corporation respectively. The definition 
provided by those sections explains one of the features of the Nigerian corporate 
tax regime. Whereas, the former section defined taxable income for individual 
as the aggregate amount of the income earned by the individual both within and 
outside Nigeria, the latter section, on the other hand, defines it as the total profits 
of the company accrued, received or brought into Nigeria. In the light of those 
provisions, the worldwide taxation imposed on individuals differs from that 
imposed on corporations. In the case of individuals, it is a complete global 
taxation, because the aggregate income from all sources is taxable whether or 
not brought into Nigeria. However, in the case corporations, the global taxation 
only operates if the Nigerian company brought the foreign-sourced profit into 
Nigeria. That is to say, the foreign earned profits not brought into Nigeria are 
not taxable at the corporate level.71 The provisions of the CITA consistently 
make reference to the word ‘profit’ instead of the word ‘income’, while the 
PITA uses ‘income. The questions arise – is there any difference between 
‘profit’ and ‘income’ in the Nigerian context? What is the rationale for the 
distinction?  
 
Furthermore, section 30 of the CITA adds to the confusion mentioned above 
and complexity that characterizes the Nigerian corporate tax regime. The 
section provides:  
“(1) Notwithstanding section 40 of this Act, where in respect of any trade 
or business carried on in Nigeria by any company (whether or not part of 
the operations of the business are carried on outside Nigeria) it appears 
to the Board that for any year or assessment, the trade or business 
produces either no assessable profits or assessable profits which in the 
opinion of the Board are less than might be expected to arise from that 
trade or business or, as the case may be, the true amount of the assessable 
profits of the company cannot be readily ascertained, the Board may, in 
                                                 
71 Arogundade JA ‘Nigerian Income Tax & Its International Dimension’ (2005) Spectrum Books, 
Ibadan at 31 
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respect of that trade or business, and notwithstanding any other 
provisions of this Act if the company is a- (a) Nigerian company, assess 
and charge that company for that year of assessment on such fair and 
reasonable percentage of the turnover of the trade or business as the 
Board may determine; (b) if that company is a company other than a 
Nigerian company and I) that company has a fixed base of business in 
Nigeria assess and charge that company for that year of assessment on 
such a fair and reasonable percentage of that part of the turnover 
attributable to that fixed base…”72 
 
The above provision has been reaffirmed by the Nigerian Supreme Court and 
the Court of Appeal.73 The implication of the provision is that a Nigerian 
resident company could be taxed on a reasonable percentage of its turnover from 
the business carried out both within and outside Nigeria. On the other hand, 
once a non-resident company has a fixed based74 in Nigeria, it becomes liable 
to tax not only on its profit but on its turnover.75 The assessment of the 
                                                 
72 Section 30 (1)  (a) and (b) of the  CITA 2007 (as amended) 
73 See the cases of Offshore International vs FBIR (2011) 4 TLRN 84 and Shell International v. FBIR 
(2004) 3 NWLR (Pt 859) 46 JGC Corporation v. FIRS (2014) 15 TLRN 105 and Saipem Contracting 
Nigeria Ltd v. FIRS (2014) 15 TLRN 76 
74 The concept of fixed based is central in the determination of tax liability of a non-resident company 
in Nigeria. Section 13 (2) of the CITA provides that “The profits of a company other than a Nigeria 
company from any trade or business shall be deemed to be derived from Nigeria (a) if that company 
has a fixed base in Nigeria to the extent that the profit is attributable to the fixed base…” The section 
did not define “fixed based” but it only stated what are not considered as fixed based. Thus, 13 (3) 
provides “for the purposes of subsection 2 of this section a fixed base shall not include facilities 
used solely for the (a) storage or display of goods or merchandise. (b) Facilities used solely for the 
collection of information. Therefore, the fixed based has be a place of business of but the business 
of the company need not be carried on through that fixed base. The concept of Permanent 
Establishment (PE), on the other hand, is used as a determinant for exercise of tax jurisdiction by 
the source-state over the income of a non-resident company. In other words, a source-state can only 
tax income of a non-resident company if the company has PE located within the state and the income 
is attributable to that PE. Nigeria adopted the concept of PE in all of the DTAs it entered into. 
However, under its domestic law, Nigeria adopted different notion of PE that is the fixed based. By 
the provision of section 13 (2) above, the fixed based must not belong to the company. What is 
important is that the fixed based is available to the company whether or not it earn the income 
through the fixed based. Thus, the existence of the fixed based is sufficient to make the company 
liable. Furthermore, section 6 of the PITA is more line with the concept of PE because it makes it a 
requirement that the business must be carried on through that fixed based in the case of individual 
taxpayer. 
75 Profit has been defined as the remaining earning of the company after deduction of all the expenses 
incurred in making the profit. Turnover, on the other hand, means the total earning of the company 
before any kind of deduction. Other legislation also use impose levy on the companies based on the 
companies’ turnover. For instance, Section 12 (2) of the National Information Technology 
Development Act 2007 imposes a levy of 1% of the Profit before tax of the following type of 
companies whose total turnover is N1 Billion and above. The companies include “(i) GSM Service 
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companies (especially non-resident companies) based on their turnover instead 
of earned income makes the Nigerian corporate tax regime different from the 
rest of the world. The taxation of the turnover of a foreign company implies that 
the Nigerian regime taxes non-resident companies on their global income. 
Therefore, the Nigerian regime is a confused and inconsistent system, and the 
same confusion is extended to the determination of corporate tax residence.76 
 
Section 1 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (as amended) states the features of South 
Africa residence-based system. The section defines the gross income as “the 
total amount earned by or accrued to a resident” and after making certain 
deductions pursuant to the Act, the remainder stands as the taxable income. The 
section further defines income earner that is the resident as discussed above. 
Therefore, the South African regime makes it clear that it taxes income, not 
profit or even turnover. It also provides that a non-resident is taxable on his 
South African-sourced income. This is in tandem with the international norm 




In designing the definitional rule for fiscal residence, states are always faced 
with two competing goals. That is to provide a definition that could prevent the 
erosion of their tax base, on one hand, and make the definition transparent and 
readily appreciated by the taxpayers. To balance these goals, states have 
formulated tests for the potential taxpayers. Once a person passes the test(s), he 
becomes liable to tax. However, in formulating the tests for corporate residence, 
                                                 
Providers and all Telecommunications companies; (ii) Cyber Companies and Internet Providers; (iii) 
Pensions Managers and pension related companies; (iv) Banks and other Financial Institutions; (v) 
Insurance Companies.” And section 16 of the same Act mandated the Federal Inland Revenue Service 
to assess and collect the levy as at the time it is collecting the income tax of the company covered by 
the Act. 
76 The PWC Tax in Africa survey of 2007 revealed that the Nigerian corporate tax system is 
aggressive and unreasonable. See Tax in Africa Survey 2007 at 7 
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the states are supposed to understand the role of the chosen tests. It is possible 
for a particular test to have two functions; as a connecting factor or as a 
tiebreaker.  
 
The above analysis reveals that the South African regime relies on the decisions 
that discuss the concept the ‘ordinary resident’ as a mechanism for determining 
the eligibility of an already taxable person to certain reliefs or exemption. The 
regime lacks a clear judicial guide on the role play by ‘ordinary residence’ test 
in determining a jurisdictional link. In the same vein, the regime confuses the 
function of the POEM as a connecting factor and as a tiebreaker rule. A 
corporation must be determined as a resident of a party to DTA before the 
question of applying tiebreaker rule come up. There is a need for a judicial 
decision in South Africa that can define the concept of POEM as a connecting 
factor. However, the South African regime is far better than that of Nigeria. The 
Nigerian regime is totally at variance with the international norm for the 
residence-based system. Therefore, the only solution to the Nigerian regime is 
to undergo a total overhaul, not a minor reform that could reshape the South 
African regime. 
 
As trading partners, Nigeria and South Africa need to co-operate with each other 
especially in designing the definitional rule of residence. They could achieve 
the co-operation through understanding details of their respective regimes more 
than they anticipate from the DTA. The above comparative analysis reveals the 
silent features of the two regimes that cannot be appreciated through any DTA. 
By this comparison, the two countries could understand the weakness and 
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The thesis has established that states’ tax jurisdiction is an aspect of the states’ 
sovereignty, and the determination of the residence status of the taxpayers is 
crucial to a residence-based tax system. The residence-based regime is 
concerned with the personality of income earner instead of the income itself. 
However, despite its significance in the tax system, there is no standard rule for 
determining the concept of fiscal residence. A comparative analysis of the rules 
for determining tax residence reveals that all the jurisdictions covered accord 
different connotations to the concept. The diversity and inconsistencies 
discovered in defining both the individual and corporate tax residence stem 
from the notion of the states’ tax sovereignty. States are protecting their taxing 
power. The reality of global economic integration vests the states with an 
exclusive tax jurisdiction; the states’ borders are fading. It allows the taxpayers 
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to move freely and exploit the ambiguities created by the divergence of the 
definition of tax residence between the states. Hence the need for achieving 
states’ cooperation in delimiting their tax jurisdiction without losing their 
sovereignty.  
 
The traditional method of achieving the cooperation is through both unilateral 
and bilateral mechanism, that is to say, the double taxation relief provisions in 
their domestic laws and a bilateral Double Taxation Agreement (DTA). Global 
economic integration hinders the smooth operation of the DTA, because the 
DTA binds only parties to it. Besides, the cross-border mobility of persons and 
trade creates a tripartite scenario, whereby a state that is a non-party to the DTA 
is involved in the jurisdictional conflict. Superficially, a multilateral treaty 
regime could be a viable solution to this problem. However, the exercise of the 
States’ tax sovereignty is an obstacle to the formation of any multilateral treaty.1 
The state tax jurisdiction comprises both substantive and enforcement 
jurisdiction over the taxpayer. Therefore, it is possible for the states to surrender 
enforcement jurisdiction as a result of any multilateral treaty. However, it could 
be difficult for the states to surrender their substantive tax jurisdiction because 
it goes to the root of their sovereignty. Thus, the multilateral treaty is not 
feasible. 
 
Given the interface between the states’ tax sovereignty that led to the diverse 
and inconsistent definition of tax residence and the need for the states’ co-
operation, this thesis has argued for a departure from the above traditional 
approach. That is the comparative analysis of the definitional rules in order to 
ascertain the level of convergence and divergence and how they could extend 
mutual respect for each other’s tax sovereignty and balance their interests 
                                                 
1 Due to the global economic integration, regional multilateral treaty regime harmonising the 
definitional rules of tax residence may not facilitate the desired cooperation, because there could be a 
situation where the resident of a non-party state is involved. 
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against that of the taxpayers in defining the tax residence outside the realm of a 
tax treaty. The in-depth comparative analysis of the different domestic legal 
regimes prevents states from losing their tax sovereignty to a multilateral treaty 
regime. Whereas, creating a level ground for the states to cooperate with each 
other in defining the scope of their tax jurisdiction as dictated by the global 
economic integration. 
 
Nigeria and South Africa have been selected to serve as two pilot states for the 
comparative analysis project. This thesis has established that despite some 
shortcomings; the South African regime is far better than that of Nigeria. As 
Nigeria will learn a lot from the more elaborate South African regime. It is also 
establishes that the Nigeria – South Africa DTA was designed without a proper 





The thesis found that the network of bilateral DTAs based on the OECD and 
UN Models is the current mechanism for international tax cooperation. The 
impact of the global economic integration has eroded the usefulness of the 
bilateral tax treaty regime. The OECD has recently joined the call for a shift 
from the bilateral to a global multilateral treaty regime, through its OECD-
BEPS initiative. The thesis also found that a multilateral tax treaty regime could 
be possible in respect of enforcement aspect of states tax jurisdiction.2 But in 
their desire to preserve their tax sovereignty, the states are reluctant to surrender 
the substantive aspect of their tax jurisdiction to a multilateral treaty regime. 
 
                                                 
2 For instance, as at 12th July 2016, there were over ninety states participating in the Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (MAATM). The MAATM is not a substitute for 
DTAs because its coverage is restricted to information exchange and assistance in the recovery of 
debts and servicing of documents, which is an aspect of enforcement tax jurisdiction. 
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It has been established that a comparative analysis is the most viable option for 
achieving the desired States’ cooperation in defining tax residence. The 
proposed comparative model hinges on the need for the states to understanding 
the intricacies surrounding their respective definitional rules through a 
comparative study It is usually assumed that tax co-operation envisages a 
complete harmonisation of the different definitional rules. However, the unique 
structure of international tax system requires that international cooperation 
initiative should not be all-or-nothing.3 This thesis has argued that the 
international co-operation must be in carried out in a gradual process. Therefore, 
this thesis has taken a middle ground between the proponents of harmonisation 
of all the definitional rules applicable in all states and those agitating for 
maintaining the status quo; that is the use of a unilateral solution that leads to 
tax competition. In pursuing this alternative, the states need to analyse 
comparatively and understand the interaction of their different definitional 
rules.  
 
The comparative model has the significant advantage of improving 
compatibility between the different definitional rules that the states adopted. It 
could reinforce the investors’ certainty and potential cooperation in tax 
enforcement among states. The comparative alternative aimed at a gradual 
cooperation of States. Starting with trading partners and gradually extend to the 
regional level, where members of a regional organisation may form a body of a 
tax expert to carry out the comparative analysis of the respective definitional 
rules. The success of this kind of cooperation at the one regional levels could 
transcend to other regions. The spread of the model to many regions may 
transform it to an international norm, in the same non-OECD members adopted 
the OECD model as a norm for designing DTA. 
                                                 




Therefore, the findings and recommendations made below are based on a 
comparative analysis of the Nigerian and South African legal regime on the 
determination of tax residence. The findings are both general and country-
specific. Nigeria and South Africa are trading partners who believe in the 
bilateral tax treaty regime. There is a subsisting DTA between them, and they 
each has a network of DTAs with some of their respective trading partners. It is 
also found that ascertaining the residence status determines the benefits 
available to the taxpayers under the DTA. 
 
Moreover, almost all the DTA contain a provision that wherever the tiebreaker 
rules fail to resolve the conflict, the parties should resort to a mutual agreement. 
Thus, the last item on the list of tiebreaker rules of a DTAs is the mutual 
agreement between the parties. The tax liability hangs on the potential taxpayer 
throughout the period of negotiating the agreement. Whenever the parties fail 
to reach mutual agreement; the taxpayers remain liable to the tax imposed by 
the two parties simultaneously.  Therefore, the co-operation can only be 
achieved if the parties understand the details of the domestic laws of each other. 
The parties can only understand the details through comparative analysis of 
their respective regimes. 
 
The specific findings are based on the tests apply to Nigeria and South Africa 
in determining the residence status of their taxpayers. The two states adopted 
different tests for defining the same categories of taxpayers. That is why the 
findings on those tests are country-specific, and separate findings are for the 






8.2.1 South African regime 
 
The South African regime has adopted two alternate tests: ordinary resident and 
physical presence tests for determining the residence status of a natural person. 
It also adopted the place of incorporation and place of effective management 
tests for all entities other than the natural persons. Below are the findings on 
each of those tests.  
 
8.2.1.1  Natural Person 
 
It is found that the South African rule for determining the residence of the 
natural persons is primarily based on the concept of ordinary residence. That is 
to say, once it is established that an individual is an ordinary resident of South 
Africa, he automatically becomes liable to income tax. However, the concept of 
ordinary residence is not statutorily defined. It is also found that all the judicial 
authorities4 frequently relied upon in defining the concept predated the South 
African residence-based regime.5 The reliance of those cases amounts to 
confusing the dual roles of the concept of ordinary residence. That is ordinary 
residence as a jurisdictional link and as a criterion for benefiting tax relief or 
exemptions. It is found that the cases currently relied upon in South Africa 
analysed the latter role of the concept. Whereas, under the residence-based 
regime, the ordinary residence is primarily a jurisdictional link.  Therefore, the 
South African notion of ordinary residence as a basis for exercising tax 
jurisdiction over individuals is neither statutorily defined nor judicially 
analysed. 
 
The second test applicable in South Africa in the case of a natural person is the 
physical presence test. It is found that the application of the South African 
                                                 
4 Such as Cohen, Kuttel, Soldier etc 
5 Which began in the year 2001 
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notion of physical presence test is dependent upon the ordinary resident status 
of the individual involved. Thus, the test is only applicable if the individual is 
not ordinary resident in the current year of assessment. The lack of an explicit 
provision or a South African judicial authority that provide the rules for the 
establishment and cessation of ordinary resident status, puts the application of 
the test is in jeopardy.  
 
8.2.1.2  Corporations 
 
The second alternative test for corporate residence in South Africa is the place 
of effective management (POEM). The POEM is not defined statutorily. The 
thesis found that the role of the POEM as a connecting factor is not appreciated 
or is being confused with its role as a tiebreaker rule. The OECD designed the 
POEM originally to serve as a tiebreaker rule in the DTAs. However, South 
Africa and recently India adopted it as a jurisdictional link. Thus, the POEM 
serves as both jurisdictional link, and a tiebreaker rule in South Africa. To date, 
no single South Africa case dealt with the POEM as a jurisdictional link, not a 
tiebreaker. Even the case of Oceanic Trust that attempted to determine the issue, 
the pronouncement made in the case was not a ratio. The thesis found that the 
POEM as a jurisdictional link is similar to the Central Management and Control 
(CMC) test. A similar version of POEM was adopted by the civil law 
jurisdictions notably Germany. Thus, in determining the POEM as a 
jurisdictional link, the relevant place is where the strategic management 
decision of the corporation was taken.  
 
8.2.2 Nigerian Regime 
 
It is found that despite the above shortcomings of the South African regime, it 
is far better than that of Nigeria. The Nigerian regime adopted the concepts of 
‘place of residence’, ‘place of principal residence’, physical presence and 
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ordinary resident tests for the determination of the individual residence. It also 
adopted a place of incorporation and CMC tests for the companies. 
 
8.2.2.1  Individuals and other entities 
 
The Nigerian Personal Income Tax Act (PITA) defines the both the ‘place of 
residence’ and ‘principal place of residence’ in a complex and inconsistent 
manner. It also defines the physical presence and ordinary resident test in the 
same way. It is found that no Nigerian judicial authority clarifies the ambiguities 
created by the PITA in the definitions.  It is hard to appreciate the intendment 
of the Legislature in providing the physical presence and ordinary residence 
tests. The thesis also found that even if the above tests are well defined by the 
PITA or they received judicial clarifications, the Nigerian federal system of 
government also hinders the smooth application of the tests. It is also found that 
the Nigerian notion of ordinary resident and the 183 – day rule apply only to the 
individuals in the formal employment. Thus, individuals in the informal sector 
of the economy are not affected by the two tests. Finally, it is found that the two 
tests being used by the South Africa regime on natural persons can be reform in 
line with the above findings. However, the Nigerian regime needs to undergo a 
total overhaul, not a minor reform that could reshape the South African regime. 
 
8.2.2.2  Companies 
 
The thesis revealed that the Nigerian regime provides separate tests for all 
companies that carry on business other than upstream oil activities and those 
dealing in the upstream sector of the petroleum industry. In the case of the 
former companies, the regime makes the place of incorporation as the sole test 
for ascertaining their tax residence status. For the latter companies both the 
place of incorporation and CMC tests have been adopted. However, it is found 
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that the place of incorporation test operates on the platform of the corporate law, 
but there is serious conflict between the Nigerian corporate tax regime and the 
Nigerian corporate law. This hinders the application of the test. For the CMC 
test, it is found that a provision of same Act that adopted the test renders it 
nugatory. The provision makes the manager and any principal officer of the 
company liable to do all that the company is required to so by the Act. In the 
whole, the thesis revealed that the Nigerian regime is a totally defective. Thus, 
Nigeria operates a regime that is entirely different from the rest of the world. 
The South African regime, on the other hand, is more in tune with the 




8.3  Recommendations 
 
1. As trading partners, Nigeria and South Africa need to co-operate with 
each other especially in designing the definitional rule of residence. 
Therefore, they could achieve the cooperation through understanding 
details of their respective regimes more than they anticipate from the 
DTA. The above comparative analysis reveals the silent features of 
the two regimes that cannot be appreciated through the DTA. By this 
comparison, the two states could understand the weakness and 
strength of their system and the possible areas of reform. 
 
2. There is a need for a South African statutory provision or a judicial 
pronouncement on the establishment and cessation of the ordinary 
resident status. Given the impact of such establishment and cessation 
on the application of the physical presence test. Without knowing 
when an individual ceased to be an ordinary resident, the present 
provision for physical presence test is useless. Alternatively, the 
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section 1 of the Income Tax Act 1962 (as amended) be further 
amended to remove the requirement of the cessation of the ordinary 
resident status before the application of the physical presence test. 
 
3. The current debate in South Africa is whether the relevant place in 
POEM is where the day-to-day or strategic management decisions are 
taken. The notion of POEM as a jurisdictional link should not be 
confused with its role as a tiebreaker rule. Both the South African tax 
experts and the South African Revenue Service need to appreciate this 
fact while taken a stand from the above debate. There is the need for 
a South Africa judicial authority that directly address the issue of 
POEM as a jurisdictional link since the South African regime adopted 
the POEM as such. 
 
4. There is a need for Nigeria to learn from the Australian regime by 
centralising both the substantive and enforcement jurisdiction on 
income tax to the federal government. Alternatively, in the alternative 
to exclusively assign the substantive tax jurisdiction on the individual 
income tax to the states and allow the federal government to retain the 
both the substantive and enforcement jurisdiction over corporate 
income tax.  
 
5. The provision of the Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004 
should be amended to recognise the foreign companies to participate 
in the Nigerian economy without being incorporated. Thus, 
accommodating the provisions of the Nigerian Companies Income 
Tax Act and the Petroleum Profits Tax Act, about the place of 
incorporation test. Also to repeal sections 25 and 26 of the Petroleum 





6. The provision of the Nigerian PITA should be amended to provide a 
clear test for the determination of the residence of individuals and 
other recognized entities. In line with the recommendation No.4, the 
current ‘place of residence’ and the ‘principal place of residence’ tests 
should be replaced with either residence or ordinary residence and 
complemented by a physical presence test.  Thus, the present vague 
and redundant physical presence and ordinary residence tests should 
be subsumed into the new ones mentioned above. Nigeria should 
make a shift from the current regime that based the determination on 
the employment status of the individuals. Thus, the tax net should be 
extended to the individuals in the informal sector of the economy.   
 
8.4  Further Research 
 
The two primary criteria for exercising income tax jurisdiction are the 
residence and source basis. The determination of the source of income 
is an important aspect of the discourse on income tax jurisdiction. 
Thus, most of the jurisdictions operate a residence-based systems with 
some element of the source-based system. Also, there is a network of 
tax treaties involving States that operate residence and source –based 
regimes. Given the significance of the source-based regime, there is 
need for further research on the source of income within the theme of 
this thesis. That is to say, to comparatively analyse the concept of the 
source of income through the lens of the tax sovereignty and the global 
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